Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Tony petitioned for formal probate of his mother Judith’s will and codicil, which left her entire estate to him and specifically disinherited her other children, Rick, Sandy, and Beth. The siblings objected, alleging that the will was the product of undue influence, among other claims. The dispute centered on family dynamics and prior business conflicts between Tony and Rick, including previous litigation over property and asset division. In the prior case, the court made adverse findings about Tony’s credibility and honesty regarding his dealings with Rick.The siblings, as respondents, successfully moved in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Todd County, for the admission of the prior court’s findings and conclusions under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, arguing these were relevant to the undue influence claim. The circuit court admitted almost all of the findings from the prior case as conclusively established, including negative credibility determinations about Tony. The jury in the undue influence trial was instructed to accept these findings as true, and ultimately found that Tony had unduly influenced Judith, invalidating the will.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court properly applied collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred by admitting the prior findings wholesale, as the issues in the prior litigation were not identical to those in the undue influence case and the credibility determinations were not essential to the prior judgment. The Supreme Court found this error was prejudicial, as it likely impacted the jury’s assessment of Tony’s credibility, a central issue in the undue influence claim. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Estate Of O'Neill" on Justia Law

After the death of Glenna Mae Wylie-Nelson, her Last Will and Testament devised her home and two lots to her son Leslie H. Wylie, but reserved a life estate for her husband, Larry T. Nelson. The Will also provided that if Larry and Leslie agreed to sell the property during Larry’s lifetime, Leslie would receive the first $40,000 from the sale and the remaining proceeds would be split equally. Larry claimed that community property funds were used for maintenance and improvements on the property during his 35-year marriage to Glenna Mae and sought compensation for the increase in property value attributable to these efforts.While Glenna Mae’s estate was being probated in the Magistrate Court of Bonner County, Larry filed a petition under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) in the District Court of the First Judicial District. He sought a judicial declaration of his rights in the property and compensation for his claimed community property interest. Respondents, including Leslie and the estate’s co-personal representatives, moved to dismiss the petition, arguing lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Larry attempted to amend his petition to clarify his claims and remove his request for partition by sale. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under TEDRA, denied leave to amend, and awarded attorney fees to the Respondents.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case de novo. It held that TEDRA provides district courts with broad subject matter jurisdiction over estate and trust matters, including Larry’s claims for declaratory relief regarding his interest in property passing at death. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed its orders denying leave to amend and awarding attorney fees, and remanded for further proceedings. Larry was awarded costs on appeal. View "Nelson v. Wylie" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute among siblings regarding the partition of farmland in Grant County, North Dakota, originally owned by their parents. After the parents conveyed the land to their children as tenants in common, reserving life estates, four siblings transferred their interests into a family trust in 2017, leaving Bryan Tischmak as the sole sibling outside the trust. In 2022, the trust entered into an agreement for rock, sand, and gravel extraction on portions of the property. Bryan initiated a partition action in 2023, seeking division of the land and an accounting of income.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, presided over a bench trial, during which the parties stipulated to the appointment of a referee to recommend partition options. Bryan advocated for an option that would award him sections including the family homeplace, but the court adopted a different recommendation (Recommendation 5), granting him the S1/2 of Section 33 and the NW1/4 of Section 34, and ordering the trust to pay him a sum based on the property’s value and his share of land income. The court later corrected a clerical mistake that had mistakenly awarded Bryan all of Section 33 instead of the S1/2, and denied Bryan's motions to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in adopting the referee’s recommendation, correcting clerical errors, and calculating Bryan’s share of income and expenses. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that its findings were not clearly erroneous. However, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to require the trust to reimburse Bryan $2,417.20 for certain trust-exclusive expenses. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "Tischmak v. Theurer" on Justia Law

Two siblings, Ryan and Nancy, disputed the administration of their father Hal’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS), an Idaho storage facility business. Hal, who suffered from progressive dementia before his death, was TPS’s sole voting member and manager, with Nancy assisting in legal and management matters. Several amendments to TPS’s operating agreement changed ownership and management, culminating—after Hal’s death—in Nancy executing further amendments that retroactively transferred Hal’s economic interest to herself and changed accounting records. Nancy, an attorney, served as both Hal’s lawyer and later as personal representative of his estate. Ryan questioned whether Hal’s interest in TPS remained an estate asset and sought access to business records, which Nancy resisted.The siblings litigated issues in two related cases in Bonneville County: a probate case in the Magistrate Court regarding Hal’s estate, and a separate TEDRA (Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act) civil action in District Court initiated by Ryan. Both courts and parties at times treated the cases as consolidated. Ryan’s TEDRA complaint sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and appointment of a receiver, naming Nancy in both her individual and representative capacities and TPS as defendants. The magistrate court dismissed Ryan’s claims and removed Nancy and TPS as parties, finding that estate matters should be decided exclusively in probate. The district court affirmed, denying Ryan’s motions and dismissing his amended complaint, reasoning that Ryan’s claims were matters for probate only.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated both lower courts’ judgments. It held that Ryan’s claims for judicial determination of estate assets and breach of fiduciary duty fall within TEDRA’s definition of “matters” and may be raised in a separate civil action, not only in probate. The Court reversed the orders dismissing claims and parties, remanded the case for further proceedings, and awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to Ryan against Nancy personally. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

A group of unhoused veterans with severe disabilities and mental illnesses sued the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), seeking to restore the West Los Angeles VA Grounds for its intended use: housing disabled veterans. The VA had leased portions of this land to third parties—including the Regents of the University of California, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources LLC—for uses that did not principally benefit veterans. Plaintiffs argued that the lack of supportive housing denied meaningful access to VA healthcare, violated the Rehabilitation Act, and placed them at serious risk of institutionalization. They also challenged VA policies that counted disability benefits as income, restricting access to supportive housing, and claimed that certain land-use agreements violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Additionally, they asserted that the original 1888 Deed created a charitable trust that the VA had breached.The United States District Court for the Central District of California held a four-week bench trial, finding that the VA’s land-use leases with UCLA, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources LLC were unlawful, voided these leases, and enjoined the VA from renegotiating them. The court certified a plaintiff class, ordered the VA to build supportive housing, found the VA and HUD violated the Rehabilitation Act in several respects, and determined that the VA had breached fiduciary duties under a charitable trust theory, invalidating certain leases on that basis as well.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Ninth Circuit held that federal courts retained jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claims, upheld class certification, and affirmed findings of meaningful access, Olmstead, and facial discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act against the VA. The court reversed judgment against HUD, and also reversed the charitable trust claim, finding no judicially enforceable fiduciary duties under the Leasing Act. The court vacated related injunctive relief and judgments based on the charitable trust theory, including those against UCLA, Brentwood, and Bridgeland. The injunctions were modified, allowing the VA to renegotiate leases if compliant with statutory requirements. View "Powers v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves a Nevada-domiciled trust, managed by a Nevada family trust company, whose trustee petitioned the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada to seal confidential information and close all court proceedings under NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256. The district court sealed nearly all documents and concealed the existence of the case, citing concerns over revealing personal, financial, and business information, and later provided limited case information after media inquiries. Several media organizations, having reported on the matter—especially due to its connection to Rupert Murdoch and control over major media holdings—sought intervention to access court records and proceedings, arguing that the First Amendment presumption of public access applied.The probate commissioner recommended allowing media intervention but denying access, and the district court entered an order adopting this recommendation. The court interpreted the statutes as granting automatic and comprehensive confidentiality, finding that privacy and security concerns—heightened by the parties’ public profiles—constituted a compelling interest for sealing and closure. The district court also concluded it lacked discretion to consider redaction as an alternative and held that the statutes’ confidentiality provisions justified the broad closure, even after the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court recognized a First Amendment presumption of access in civil and family court proceedings.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision, holding that NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 permit only provisional sealing and require judicial discretion. The statutes do not automatically justify blanket sealing or closure, nor do they displace the common law or constitutional presumption of openness. The court found that the district court failed to make specific, non-speculative factual findings to justify the sealing and closure and did not adequately consider less restrictive alternatives. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its sealing order and conduct the required analysis for each document and hearing transcript. View "New York Times Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

William C. Hansen and Verna Hansen, a married couple, established a revocable trust in 1997, with separate shares for each spouse and detailed distribution instructions for each share after their deaths. On the same day, William C. Hansen executed a durable power of attorney naming Verna Hansen as his agent, granting her broad authority over his property. After William C. Hansen’s death in 1999, Verna Hansen, acting as his agent under the power of attorney, amended the trust twice, altering the distribution provisions. Following the deaths of both William and Verna Hansen, a dispute arose between their descendants—on one side, Catherine Hansen Dietemann and her daughter Lauren, and on the other, William Anthony (“Tony”) Hansen—regarding the validity of these amendments and the proper distribution of the trust assets.After Bravera Wealth, the trustee, sought a judicial declaration of beneficiary rights, the District Court of Stark County granted summary judgment in favor of Tony Hansen. The district court concluded that the trust amendments made by Verna Hansen were valid, finding that the broad language in the power of attorney gave her the authority to amend the trust, and that the relevant statutory requirement for express authorization did not apply retroactively. Based on the amended trust terms, the court also applied North Dakota’s antilapse statute to determine the distribution shares among the beneficiaries.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the lower court’s interpretation of North Dakota Century Code § 59-14-02(5), which requires that any powers to amend a trust by an agent under a power of attorney must be expressly stated. The Supreme Court held that the statute applied to this proceeding because it was commenced after July 31, 2007, and that neither the trust nor the power of attorney provided the required express authorization for Verna Hansen to amend the trust. As a result, the court ruled the amendments invalid, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for distribution according to the original trust terms. View "Matter of Hansen Trust" on Justia Law

An estate dispute arose following the death of Marvin C. Lepp, whose heirs included seven children and four grandchildren. Initially, Murray Lepp and Michael Lepp were appointed co-personal representatives of the estate. Over time, disputes developed between the heirs regarding the management of the estate, including the removal of personal representatives, appointment of a successor, and the handling of a contract for deed concerning estate property. After both co-personal representatives were removed, the district court appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative. Additional litigation involved the cancellation of Murray Lepp’s contract for deed, disputes over rent payments related to estate property, and requests for attorney’s fees.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, considered and issued various orders: it removed the co-personal representatives, appointed Dacotah Bank, cancelled Murray Lepp’s contract for deed following summary judgment, denied Murray Lepp’s motions to dismiss and reconsider, resolved some rent disputes, and awarded attorney’s fees to Maureen Lepp. Murray Lepp filed notices of appeal from these orders.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It determined that the appeal from the order appointing Dacotah Bank was untimely under the procedural rules. The court further found that, because the estate’s administration was unsupervised and several claims and petitions remained unresolved in the district court, including issues of partial distribution and final accounting, the orders appealed from were not final and appealable absent certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Since no such certification was sought or granted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Estate of Lepp" on Justia Law

Alan Cartwright was the beneficiary of a family trust managed by his sister, Alice Garner, and her husband, Alan Garner. Over more than a decade, Cartwright, represented by attorneys Jerry Mitchell and later his son Justin Mitchell, brought six lawsuits against the Garners challenging their administration of the trust. All of these lawsuits were ultimately resolved in favor of the Garners. After the trust litigation concluded, Cartwright, dissatisfied with his legal representation, sued the Mitchells for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment. The Garners also sued the Mitchells and their law firms under the tort-of-another doctrine, seeking to recover attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred during the trust litigation.In the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the Mitchells moved to dismiss the Garners’ suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), arguing that the claims were filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the TPPA did not protect attorneys alleged to have acted inconsistently with their client’s interests. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Mitchells had met their initial burden under the TPPA by showing the Garners’ suit related to the underlying trust lawsuits.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that, under the TPPA, an attorney filing a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise the right to petition; rather, the attorney facilitates the client’s exercise of that right. Therefore, the Mitchells failed to demonstrate that the Garners’ suit was filed in response to the Mitchells’ own exercise of the right to petition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, denying the Mitchells’ petition for dismissal under the TPPA. View "Garner v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell" on Justia Law

Melissa Evans passed away in a car accident in 2020, leaving a will that named her former spouse, Scott Evans, as the primary beneficiary and three children—Joshua (her son and appellant), Ryan (her biological son), and Tamra (her former stepdaughter)—as contingent beneficiaries. After her death, Joshua initiated probate proceedings in Rogers County District Court, seeking appointment as personal representative and determination of heirs. The petition identified only Joshua and Ryan as heirs, omitting Scott and Tamra, who were named in the will. Notice of the probate hearing was not provided to Scott or Tamra.The Rogers County District Court admitted the will to probate and issued an order in November 2020 identifying Joshua and Ryan as the sole heirs, devisees, and legatees. Joshua was appointed personal representative but was later removed, with James Greer eventually appointed as successor personal representative. In January 2024, Greer moved to vacate the portion of the 2020 order identifying heirs and beneficiaries, arguing that proper notice had not been given. The court granted the motion in March 2024. In May 2024, after a hearing with all relevant parties, the court modified the order, identifying Tamra as a beneficiary under the will, though the written order recognized Joshua and Ryan as heirs-at-law and all three as beneficiaries.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that Joshua's challenge to the order vacating the prior determination of heirs was untimely, as it was not appealed within the required thirty-day period. Furthermore, the court found that the modified order determining heirs and beneficiaries was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, as it did not affect a substantial right. The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the determination of heirs and beneficiaries remains subject to revision until the final decree of distribution. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS v. GREER" on Justia Law