Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Lea and Ann Brent were married in 1953 and divorced in 1983. As part of their divorce, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 per month in permanent periodic alimony until her death or remarriage. Ann died in 2015, never having remarried. Lea began paying less than the required amount in 2002, but Ann never filed a contempt action for the unpaid alimony. Lea died in 2021, and Ann’s Estate filed a probate claim against Lea’s Estate for unpaid alimony totaling $358,700, covering the period from 2002 to 2015.The Washington County Chancery Court found that the claim for unpaid alimony was valid but limited it to the period from July 2014 to November 2015 due to the seven-year statute of limitations. The court awarded Ann’s Estate $139,104, which included the unpaid alimony for that period plus 8 percent interest per annum. However, the court denied Lea’s Estate credit for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 made between July 2014 and November 2015 and for a $75,143.28 life insurance proceeds payment made to Ann’s Estate in 2019.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the chancery court erred in denying Lea’s Estate credit for the partial alimony payments and the life insurance proceeds payment. The Supreme Court held that the total amount of credit exceeded the total amount owed for the relevant period, leaving no unpaid alimony to award Ann’s Estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate. View "In re The Estate of Brent v. The Estate of Brent" on Justia Law

Leslie J. Knoles (Decedent) and Ruth Catello co-owned a property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. In 2020, Decedent recorded a quitclaim deed to herself, which, if valid, severed the joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common. Decedent died shortly after recording the deed. Decedent's four surviving siblings initiated probate proceedings to distribute her estate, including the property. Catello filed a competing petition for letters of administration and later a petition to administer a will. Concurrently, Catello sued two siblings to cancel the quitclaim deed and quiet title to the property. The siblings filed a cross-claim to partition the property by sale.The Superior Court of San Diego County entered an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale, identifying the property owners as Catello and Decedent’s estate. The judgment ordered the sale proceeds to be distributed equally between Catello and Decedent’s estate after expenses. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing to sue for partition because the probate court had not yet determined ownership of the property.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring the partition claim because their ownership interest in the property was not confirmed and was contingent upon the outcome of the ongoing probate proceedings. The court emphasized that a party seeking partition must have clear title, which the siblings did not possess. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and directed the case to be dismissed. View "Amundson v. Catello" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two cotrustees of the William A. Rutherford Trust regarding the distribution of the trust estate following the deaths of the grantors, William and Joyce Rutherford. The plaintiff, Jeffrey A. Rutherford, and the defendant, Richard J. Slagle, could not agree on how the trust estate should be distributed. The defendant believed the trust required equal distribution among the decedent’s children, while the plaintiff disagreed.The defendant petitioned the Greenwich Probate Court to construe the trust and determine the proper distribution. The Probate Court granted the petition and ordered the trust estate to be distributed equally among the children. The plaintiff appealed this decree to the Superior Court, challenging the Probate Court’s decision and raising issues related to discovery in the Probate Court.The Superior Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff’s reasons for appeal were limited to discovery issues and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding these issues. The plaintiff then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that summary judgment is not appropriate in probate appeals and that the Superior Court failed to conduct a de novo review of the Probate Court’s decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that summary judgment is available in probate appeals under Practice Book § 17-44, as the term “any action” includes probate appeals. However, the court found that the Superior Court improperly granted summary judgment because it did not engage in a de novo review of the substantive issue resolved by the Probate Court—how the trust estate should be distributed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Rutherford v. Slagle" on Justia Law

Anna Dewdney, a children's book author, created a revocable trust in 2011, designating her daughters, Berol and Cordelia Dewdney, and her romantic partner, Ralph Duncan, IV, as beneficiaries. Initially, the trust allocated 40% of the income to each daughter and 20% to Duncan. Anna amended the trust several times, ultimately increasing Duncan's share to 50% and reducing each daughter's share to 25%. Anna passed away in 2016, and Duncan became the sole trustee. Plaintiffs allege Duncan pressured Anna to increase his share and entered into an oral agreement to make them his sole heirs in exchange for the increased distribution.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to Duncan on all claims brought by the plaintiffs, including intentional interference with expectation of inheritance (IIEI), breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and constructive fraud. The court ruled that plaintiffs needed to seek a remedy in probate court for their IIEI claim, failed to establish breach of contract due to anticipatory repudiation, could not show detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, were receiving benefits from the trust for unjust enrichment, and did not meet the legal requirements for constructive fraud.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It recognized the tort of IIEI but held that plaintiffs must first seek a remedy in probate court due to the exclusive jurisdiction over trust administration. The court found no anticipatory breach of contract as Duncan's statement did not constitute a positive and unequivocal refusal to perform. It ruled promissory estoppel inapplicable due to the existence of a contract and lack of detrimental reliance. The unjust enrichment claim was barred as it involved trust administration, and the constructive fraud claim failed for similar jurisdictional reasons. View "Dewdney v. Duncan" on Justia Law

William H. Tatum Jr. was convicted of bank fraud and had a $15,284,348 restitution judgment against him. He owned a 50% membership interest in Tatum Land and Cattle Company, LLC (TLCC). Upon his death in 2018, his estate, including his TLCC interest, was left to his wife, Betsy Gay Roberts-Tatum. Betsy died in 2020, and her son, Zachary I. Haynie, became the executor of her estate. Darrell Tatum, William’s grandson, was appointed executor of William’s estate. The United States, Peoples Bank, and John Deere Financial filed claims against William’s estate.The Tippah County Chancery Court admitted William’s will to probate and appointed Gay as executrix. After Gay’s death, Darrell was appointed as successor executor. Darrell petitioned for the public sale of William’s TLCC interest to satisfy estate debts. Zach opposed, seeking to enforce the TLCC operating agreement’s buyout provision. The chancellor ordered the public sale, which resulted in Joe Tatum purchasing the interest for $675,000. Zach objected, arguing the sale price was inadequate and sought relief, including assignment of the promissory note and deed of trust from Peoples Bank.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that any additional funds recovered from the estate would go to the United States due to the restitution judgment, rendering Zach’s claims moot. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that a decision would not benefit Zach practically since the United States would claim any additional funds. The court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions, including the public sale and denial of Zach’s motions. View "In The Matter of The Estate Tatum" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

Richard Spizzirri and his fourth wife, Holly Lueders, entered into a prenuptial agreement requiring Spizzirri’s estate to transfer $6 million to Lueders and $3 million to her children upon his death. After Spizzirri’s death, the estate paid the stepchildren and deducted the payments as “claims against the estate” for tax purposes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, denying these deductions, leading the estate to petition the tax court for review.The U.S. Tax Court ruled that the transfers to the stepchildren were not deductible as “claims against the estate” because they were neither “contracted bona fide” nor “for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” The estate failed to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, as it did not provide credible evidence to support the deductions. The court found that the payments were essentially donative in character, as they were made to keep Lueders happy and maintain the marriage, rather than as part of an arm’s length transaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the tax court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the payments to the stepchildren were not contracted bona fide, as they were related to Lueders’s expectation of inheritance and lacked the characteristics of a bona fide transaction. The court emphasized that the payments were made with donative intent and were not part of an ordinary business transaction. Therefore, the estate was not entitled to deduct the $3 million transfer to the stepchildren as “claims against the estate.” View "Estate of Spizzirri v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Erna Rousey transferred five real properties and nearly $225,000 in cash assets to her son, James “Jimmy” Rousey, Jr., in the last few years of her life. After her death, her estate sought recission of these transfers, alleging undue influence. The estate argued that Erna lacked the mental capacity to make the transfers and that they were the product of fraud, undue influence, or coercion. Jimmy contended that the transfers were valid gifts and that Erna had sufficient mental capacity.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that Jimmy maintained a confidential relationship with Erna and that the property transfers were the result of undue influence. The court concluded that the estate was entitled to recission of the property transfers and awarded attorney’s fees to the estate. Jimmy, representing himself, appealed the recission and attorney’s fee award, arguing that the transfers were valid gifts and that the court erred in its findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the recission of the property transfers. The court held that the estate provided clear and convincing evidence that Jimmy exerted undue influence over Erna, who was susceptible due to her diminished mental capacity, isolation, and reliance on Jimmy. The court found that Jimmy failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence and that the transfers were not gifts. However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the enhanced attorney’s fee award for reconsideration, noting that the superior court may have improperly relied on Jimmy’s actions before the litigation started and did not sufficiently explain why Jimmy’s opposition to the petition was in bad faith. The Supreme Court instructed the lower court to reconsider the attorney’s fee award based on appropriate factors. View "In re Estate of Rousey" on Justia Law

Joy Goodwin Adams sued Tiffany Rudd Atkinson, Katherine M. Rudd, Goodwin Capital Partners, Ltd., and KATISAM, Inc., seeking reimbursement for attorneys' fees she paid to a third party. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed her suit with prejudice, leading Joy to appeal. The central issue was whether the terms "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous when used independently in a contract. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that they are synonymous.The case involves three trusts and two agreements. Joy's parents created two trusts in 1986 and 1987 for Joy and her daughters, Tiffany and Kate. Joy created a third trust in 1989. Joy executed a 2011 release-and-indemnification agreement with BB&T, a co-trustee, and a 2013 settlement agreement with the defendants after Tiffany and Kate sued her for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The 2013 agreement included a "hold harmless" provision requiring the defendants to protect Joy against claims for attorneys' fees by corporate trustees successfully defending against suits initiated by Tiffany and Kate.In prior litigation, Tiffany and Kate sued BB&T for negligence, and BB&T filed a third-party claim against Joy for attorneys' fees. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of BB&T on the negligence claim and denied Joy's motion on the indemnification claim. Joy settled BB&T's claim for $614,791.62 and then demanded reimbursement from the defendants, who refused.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous, meaning the defendants agreed to reimburse Joy for the attorneys' fees she paid to BB&T. The court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

Thomas R. McDonald filed a petition contesting amendments to the Declaration of Trust of Judith E. Stratos 2000 Trust, which named William Goebner as successor trustee. McDonald alleged the amendments, which removed him and his sister as beneficiaries, were due to undue influence, fraud, and financial elder abuse. He sought various remedies under the Probate Code. Two days before a scheduled hearing, Goebner filed a demurrer to dismiss McDonald’s claims, which the trial court overruled as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, requiring demurrers to be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint.The trial court overruled Goebner’s demurrer as untimely, leading Goebner to petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order. He argued that the Probate Code, specifically section 1043, which allows an interested person to make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing, should govern the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, not the Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Goebner, holding that section 1043 of the Probate Code governs the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, allowing it to be filed at or before the hearing. The court concluded that Goebner’s demurrer, filed two days before the hearing, was timely. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer as untimely and to consider the demurrer on its merits. Goebner was entitled to recover his costs in the writ proceeding. View "Goebner v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law