Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

An elderly man, Jerome, experienced significant health decline and was moved into a nursing home, prompting his wife, Janet, to petition the Saginaw Probate Court for a protective order under Michigan law. She requested the transfer of all of Jerome’s assets and most of his income to her, citing her increased financial needs and Jerome’s inability to manage his affairs due to physical and mental health issues. Janet’s petition was filed before Jerome’s application for Medicaid was resolved, and the probate court granted the transfer and set a monthly support payment for Janet.The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in part but vacated the probate court’s order, relying on its earlier precedent in In re Estate of Schroeder, which prohibited consideration of Medicaid eligibility before a formal determination. The case was remanded for a new assessment of need and current valuation of assets. On remand, the probate court again ordered the transfer and support, applied retroactively, but the Court of Appeals vacated this order as well, citing reliance on outdated asset information and the same legal standard regarding Medicaid eligibility.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case after Jerome’s death, holding that the appeal was not moot because Medicaid benefits can be awarded retroactively, even to a deceased individual’s estate. The Supreme Court ruled that probate courts may consider the likely availability of Medicaid benefits before a final eligibility determination when assessing the needs of an individual and their dependents under MCL 700.5401(3)(b). The Court expressly overruled the contrary rule announced in In re Estate of Schroeder, reinstated the probate court’s 2022 protective order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In Re Estate Of Sizick" on Justia Law

Two siblings disputed the administration of their late father’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in a storage company, Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS). The father had founded TPS and, over time, executed several amendments to its operating agreement, some before and some after he began suffering from dementia. After his death, one sibling, who was an attorney, became the personal representative of the estate, managed TPS, and executed additional amendments to the operating agreement that purported to transfer ownership and management control of TPS to herself, often with retroactive effect. The other sibling challenged these actions, claiming they diverted estate assets and breached fiduciary duties.Litigation took place in two venues: a magistrate court probate proceeding and a separate district court action under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). The courts and parties often treated the cases as consolidated, although no formal consolidation order was entered. The sibling challenging the amendments sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, and related relief. The magistrate court dismissed the claims against both the sister and TPS, and the district court upheld this dismissal, concluding that the claims should have been brought exclusively in the probate case and were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that claims for judicial determination of the estate’s assets and breach of fiduciary duty fell within TEDRA’s scope and could be brought as a separate civil action rather than exclusively in probate. The Court further found that the sister and TPS were necessary or proper parties to the TEDRA action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the magistrate and district courts, reversed the dismissal orders, and remanded for further proceedings. It also awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal to the appellant, to be paid personally by the sister. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

Several cousins are shareholders in a closely held family corporation that owns industrial real estate. The dispute centers on the shares held by a trust established by one family member, Sheila, and who has the right to vote those shares after she became incapacitated and her husband resigned as trustee. The parties disagree about the operation of a buy-sell agreement, which the Levins argue restricts the transfer of voting power over the shares, while the Clapkins assert it allows the shares to be controlled by the children as successor cotrustees. The conflict over control of the trust’s shares led to a series of lawsuits between the parties.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, handling multiple related actions, determined that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the identity of the trust’s trustees. The probate court subsequently ruled in favor of the Clapkins, confirming them as successor cotrustees of the trust. After this order, the Levins filed a new lawsuit claiming the transfer of voting power violated the buy-sell agreement, while the Clapkins, in response, filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce their right to vote the trust’s shares and to be registered as the record holders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the Levins’ special motion to strike most of the claims in the cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, holding that the claims did not arise from protected litigation activity but rather from the underlying dispute over voting rights and control of the corporation. The court also dismissed the Clapkins’ appeal from the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, finding the order was not separately appealable. The main holding is that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the claims arose from unprotected conduct regarding the internal corporate dispute, not from protected petitioning activity. View "Clapkin v. Levin" on Justia Law

The decedent, a resident of Lyon County, Nevada, died intestate, leaving an estate valued at approximately $32 million. He was predeceased by his wife and had no children. The Lyon County Public Administrator identified the decedent’s living first cousins as potential heirs and petitioned the district court for an order confirming them as the legal heirs. Jamie Lipson, the child of one of the decedent’s predeceased first cousins (a first cousin once removed), contested this determination. Lipson argued that Nevada law should permit her and similarly situated relatives to inherit by right of representation, which would include more remote relatives in the distribution of the estate.The Third Judicial District Court of Lyon County determined that NRS 134.070 required distribution to the “next of kin in equal degree” on a per capita without representation basis. The court concluded that only the decedent’s living first cousins were entitled to inherit, thereby excluding Lipson and other first cousins once removed. The district court based its decision on the statutory language and longstanding state precedent, namely In re McKay’s Estate, which interpreted similar language as requiring per capita distribution.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that NRS 134.070 unambiguously requires a per capita without representation distribution scheme. This means only those relatives of equal degree—the living first cousins—inherit equally, to the exclusion of more distant relatives such as first cousins once removed. The court reaffirmed the continuing validity of In re McKay’s Estate and found no compelling reason to depart from precedent or apply a per stirpes distribution. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order, upholding the exclusion of more remote kin from inheritance under the statute. View "In re Estate of Ulvang" on Justia Law

After the death of Laurie Maria Brocato, her nephew submitted a 2019 olographic testament for probate, which left most of her estate to him. The district court ordered that this will be recorded, filed, and executed, and he was named executor. Later, Brocato’s surviving spouse, Lisa Vickers, contested the 2019 testament and presented a new four-page olographic testament, dated across three consecutive days in 2021 and written in a bound notebook, which revoked previous wills and left the estate primarily to Vickers.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans found that the 2021 testament met the requirements for an olographic will under Louisiana law, including being entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. The court annulled the probate of the 2019 will, removed the nephew as executor, and admitted the 2021 testament to probate. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the testament’s multiple dates and the location of the signature did not invalidate it, especially in light of legislative amendments intended to relax formal requirements and prioritize testamentary intent.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case after granting writs to address whether the 2021 testament satisfied the statutory form requirements, especially considering the 2025 amendment to La. C.C. art. 1575, which applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 testament was valid under the amended statute. The court found the document was entirely written, dated, and signed by the decedent, even though the signature was at the top of the second page and dates appeared throughout. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the 2021 testament’s probate, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SUCCESSION OF BROCATO" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a revocable trust created by Marsha Milot in 2009, with herself as trustee and lifelong beneficiary. After Milot stepped down from her trustee role due to alleged incapacity, her daughter, Valerie Wiederhorn, and her husband, Curtis Hennigar, became co-trustees. Jennifer Milot, a stepdaughter and remainder beneficiary, petitioned for access to the trust instrument and additional information about the trust’s administration, including documentation related to settlor’s incapacity and trustee actions. She alleged improper denial of her requests, and further claimed that Wiederhorn made unauthorized loans to herself from the trust and retaliated against Jennifer for seeking information.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Probate Division, initially ordered co-trustees to provide the trust instrument and unsealed it after review. When Jennifer sought further information and asserted she was now a qualified beneficiary due to settlor’s incapacitation, the court found the initial relief was “more or less” satisfied. It declined to invoke equitable powers or compel additional disclosures, relying on 14A V.S.A. § 603, which states that while a trust is revocable, beneficiaries’ rights are subject to settlor’s control. The court ultimately dismissed Jennifer’s petition, concluding she was not entitled to the information sought and that co-trustees owed no duty to her at that time.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal. It held that, under Vermont Trust Code § 813 and § 603, Jennifer was not entitled to trust information while the trust remained revocable and settlor was alive. However, the Court found the probate division erred by not considering Jennifer’s request to amend her petition to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn under § 706, and reversed and remanded the case for the probate division to address that request. View "In re Trust of Milot" on Justia Law

After both parents contracted COVID-19 in 2020, they asked their daughter to move from Tennessee to Alabama to care for them. In exchange for her agreement to relocate and provide care, the parents promised to convey an interest in their Orange Beach condominium to the daughter. The parents, acting in their individual capacities, executed a deed purporting to transfer an interest in the property to themselves and their daughter as joint tenants. The daughter was not aware that the condominium was, in fact, owned by a revocable trust for which the parents served as trustees.The parents later sought to annul the deed in the Baldwin Circuit Court, arguing that the deed was ineffective because the property was owned by the trust and they had not executed the deed as trustees. They also contended that the conveyance was voidable under Alabama law because a material part of the consideration was the daughter’s promise to support them. The daughter sought reformation of the deed to reflect the parents' trustee status and counterclaimed for fraud and breach of warranty. The Baldwin Circuit Court annulled the deed and dismissed the daughter’s counterclaims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the controlling statute, § 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, permitted annulment of a real property conveyance when a material part of the consideration was an agreement to provide support, regardless of whether the grantor acted as an individual or trustee. The Court further held that annulment of the deed extinguished any warranties arising from the conveyance and rendered the fraud counterclaim untenable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment, upholding annulment of the deed and dismissal of the counterclaims. View "Schumpert v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Fifteen local United Methodist Church congregations in Alabama initiated civil actions against the Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., seeking to quiet title to the church properties they occupied and used for worship. The Conference and its board of trustees joined the cases and filed counterclaims, asserting that the properties were either owned by the Conference’s board or held by the local churches in trust for the Conference or its board. Both sides relied primarily on secular documents, such as deeds and corporate records, though the Conference also referenced trust provisions in the Book of Discipline.Trial courts in various counties reviewed the motions by the local churches to dismiss the Conference’s counterclaims, arguing that the courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, which prohibits courts from resolving matters of church doctrine or internal governance. The trial courts granted the motions to dismiss the counterclaims but allowed the local churches’ quiet-title claims to proceed. The Conference and its board then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for writs of mandamus, seeking to overturn the dismissals.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that the trial courts erred in dismissing the counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court held that the property disputes could be resolved under neutral principles of law without requiring the courts to decide ecclesiastical matters. Because both parties relied on the same secular materials, and the counterclaims did not require adjudication of religious doctrine, the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine did not bar jurisdiction. The Supreme Court issued writs of mandamus, directing the trial courts to vacate their orders dismissing the Conference’s counterclaims. View "Mt. Zion of Autauga County, Inc. v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc." on Justia Law

Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

After the death of Theresa A. Meyers, questions arose regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees charged to her estate and a revocable trust she had established. The personal representative of Meyers’ estate and cotrustees of her trust initially agreed with the law firm representing them to a percentage-based fee, first at 2% and later reduced to 1% of the gross assets. Following the discovery of additional assets and the likelihood of litigation, the law firm and the remaining fiduciaries entered a written agreement switching to hourly billing. One cotrustee, however, did not sign this modification. After the law firm completed its services, some beneficiaries and devisees challenged the attorney fees as excessive, prompting a review under Nebraska law.The County Court for Douglas County held a consolidated hearing and found that the attorney fees charged by the law firm were fair, reasonable, necessary, and not excessive, taking into account the complexity of the estate, the services performed, and expert testimony. The county court also found no conflict of interest in the firm’s representation of both the personal representative and the cotrustees. The court did not address whether the written fee modification was effective. Dissatisfied, the challengers appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals determined that the written hourly fee agreement was ineffective because not all cotrustees had consented, as required by the trust. The appellate court thus applied the original 1% fee structure and found that this amount was reasonable. The law firm sought further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by addressing the effectiveness of the written fee agreement, as the challengers had not properly raised the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court found no error on the record regarding the reasonableness of the fees as determined by the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with directions to affirm the county court’s order. View "In re Estate of Meyers" on Justia Law