Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Corbin Damjanovich died in February 2024, leaving two adult children, Nicolette and Derek. After his death, Corbin’s sister, Tracy Barlow, and cousin, Carl Openshaw, petitioned for informal appointment as co-personal representatives of his estate in Yellowstone County, Montana. Subsequently, Nicolette and Derek discovered a handwritten, signed document dated December 9, 2015, which appeared to be Corbin’s will. Barlow and Openshaw then sought formal probate of this document, asserting it was a valid holographic will that named Barlow as executor and sole devisee, and expressed Corbin’s wish to establish a trust. The document gave Barlow discretion over the disbursement of funds and assets. The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the handwriting and signature, and that Corbin had capacity. Nicolette objected, arguing the document lacked testamentary intent and did not create a trust or mechanism for distributing the estate, so the estate should pass by intestacy.The Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court admitted the 2015 document to probate as a valid holographic will, found it created a power of appointment in Barlow, confirmed her as personal representative, and ended Openshaw’s co-appointment. Nicolette appealed, disputing the legal effect of the 2015 writing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the 2015 document was a valid holographic will only for the limited purpose of appointing Barlow as personal representative. The court reversed the lower court’s conclusion that the document created a power of appointment or trust, finding it did not effectively dispose of Corbin’s estate. As a result, the undisposed portion of the estate must pass by intestacy to Corbin’s descendants. The case was remanded for entry of an order of partial intestacy and further administration consistent with Montana’s intestate succession laws. View "In re Estate of Damjanovich" on Justia Law

Brightwater Capital obtained a judgment against Linzy Hill in 2012, which it renewed in 2017 but failed to renew again, causing the judgment to become dormant. After Hill’s death in 2022, his son Lenzy was appointed personal representative of the estate and published a notice to creditors, setting a deadline of September 27, 2022, for claims against the estate. Brightwater submitted its claim after this deadline, and the personal representative rejected it. Brightwater did not appeal the rejection but instead filed an ancillary petition in the probate case, seeking payment on the dormant judgment. The district court dismissed this petition without granting leave to amend.After the dismissal, Brightwater filed an amended ancillary petition, this time seeking payment from the personal representative’s bond. The district court treated this as a motion to reconsider, since Brightwater had not been granted leave to amend, and dismissed it with prejudice. Final appealable orders were entered, and Brightwater appealed only the order concerning the amended ancillary petition. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, reversed, holding that Brightwater should have been allowed to file the amended petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo and held that, under Oklahoma law, once a case is dismissed, a party may not file an amended petition without leave of court. The court found that the district court properly dismissed Brightwater’s ancillary petition and correctly treated the amended filing as a motion to reconsider, since no leave to amend had been granted and the defect in the original petition could not be remedied. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Hill v. Hill" on Justia Law

Roger Cunningham opened an IRA during his marriage to Sheila, naming her as the sole beneficiary. The couple, long-time Tennessee residents, later divorced in 2015. Their Marital Dissolution Agreement, incorporated into a Tennessee court’s final divorce decree, awarded Sheila a specific sum from the IRA and required her to relinquish any further claim to the account. Roger moved to South Dakota before the divorce was finalized but did not update the IRA’s beneficiary designation. After Roger’s death in South Dakota, his daughter Susan, as personal representative of his estate, discovered that the IRA had been transferred to Sheila, still listed as the beneficiary.Following Roger’s death, Susan initiated informal probate proceedings in South Dakota and sought a declaration from the Second Judicial Circuit Court that, under South Dakota’s revocation-on-divorce statute (SDCL 29A-2-804), Sheila’s beneficiary status had been automatically revoked by the divorce, making the IRA part of the estate. Sheila, a Tennessee resident, appeared specially to contest jurisdiction and the procedural propriety of the Estate’s motion, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and that the matter should have been brought as a separate action. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Estate, finding it had jurisdiction and that the statute revoked Sheila’s beneficiary designation, thus including the IRA in the estate.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sheila. The Supreme Court found that Sheila’s only connection to South Dakota was her receipt of the IRA funds, which resulted from Roger’s unilateral actions, not from any purposeful availment by Sheila of South Dakota’s laws. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to grant Sheila’s motion to dismiss, declining to address the procedural issue. View "Estate Of Cunningham" on Justia Law

Neil Maune and Marcus Raichle formed a general partnership known as the Maune Raichle Law Firm, which later took out life insurance policies for each partner, naming the partnership as beneficiary. In 2011, Maune, Raichle, and three others established a new law firm, MRHFM, governed by an operating agreement containing an arbitration clause and a delegation provision referencing the American Arbitration Association rules. MRHFM took over premium payments for the life insurance policies, but only Raichle’s policy was amended to name MRHFM as beneficiary. After Maune’s death, the death benefit from his policy was paid to the original partnership, not MRHFM. The Estate of Neil Maune sued Raichle and the partnership, alleging wrongful retention of the insurance proceeds, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the partnership was not a party to the operating agreement and thus could not enforce its arbitration provision. The Estate argued that Maune and Raichle signed the agreement only as members and managers of MRHFM, not as partners of the original partnership, and that the claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and held that, under Missouri’s aggregate theory of partnerships, the partnership has no legal existence separate from its partners. Because Maune and Raichle were the only partners and signed the operating agreement in their individual capacities, they bound themselves and the partnership to the arbitration agreement. The Court further held that, due to the delegation provision, questions about the scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Maune vs. Raichle" on Justia Law

After the death of Marjorie Johnson in 2020, her daughter, Rita Johnson, was appointed as executrix of her estate by the Wayne County, Michigan probate court. Rita initiated probate proceedings to determine whether certain assets belonged to the estate or to the Johnson Family Trust, which had a provision requiring arbitration of disputes. Amos C. Johnson, Marjorie’s son and trustee of the Trust, sought to compel arbitration in state court, but the request was denied. Subsequently, Amos and the Trust filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking to compel arbitration of the probate dispute under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The district court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the probate exception, the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine, and potential lack of diversity. The court ultimately dismissed the case, finding that the FAA does not provide an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction and that the probate proceedings were in rem, meaning the federal court would improperly interfere with property under the state probate court’s control.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts may only compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA if they would have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Because the probate proceedings were purely matters of state law and involved property already under the state court’s jurisdiction, the federal court lacked both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration of the state probate proceedings. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After the death of Rolland Lane, the Lane Family Trust was divided into two sub-trusts, Trust A and Trust B, with Karla Lane serving as the sole trustee of Trust A and John Edwards, Scott Edwards, and Keith “KC” Lane as co-trustees of Trust B. The main asset of the trusts was a house and acreage in Caldwell, Idaho, owned equally by both trusts. Disputes arose over the sale of this property, with Karla seeking to sell it for no less than one million dollars, while the co-trustees of Trust B objected and pursued a different sale arrangement. After a cash offer of $1,350,000 was made, the district court ordered all trustees to accept the offer and close the sale by a specified date. Karla refused to comply, leading to further litigation.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, Canyon County, ultimately removed Karla as trustee of Trust A, finding her refusal to follow the court’s order to sell the property constituted grounds for removal under Idaho law. The court appointed KC as the new trustee of Trust A. Karla appealed, arguing that her actions were within her discretionary authority as trustee and that she was acting in the best interests of the beneficiaries by seeking a higher sale price.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s order. The Supreme Court held that Karla had waived all arguments on appeal due to significant deficiencies in her briefing, including raising new arguments for the first time on appeal, failing to provide an adequate record, and not articulating how the district court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the respondents, finding the appeal to be frivolous. View "Edwards v. Lane" on Justia Law

A woman died in September 2021, survived by four sons. One son, Mark, submitted a will dated September 15, 2021, naming himself as sole beneficiary and personal representative, excluding his three brothers. Another son, Michael, objected, arguing that their mother lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will’s execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. Evidence at trial included testimony from family members, a friend who notarized the will, and a nurse who described a prior incident in which Mark threatened the decedent. Mark also sought to introduce a 2016 document (exhibit 7) showing a similar disposition of the estate, but the county court excluded it.The County Court for Douglas County found that Mark failed to prove the decedent’s testamentary capacity and that the will was the product of undue influence, ordering the estate to proceed in intestacy with Michael as personal representative. Mark appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in a prior decision, reversed the exclusion of exhibit 7, holding it was relevant to show a constant and abiding scheme for property distribution, and remanded for reconsideration on the existing record, including exhibit 7.On remand, the county court admitted exhibit 7 but declined to consider new evidence, including an affidavit from the decedent’s sister. The court again found that Mark failed to prove testamentary capacity and that the will resulted from undue influence, giving little weight to exhibit 7 regarding the decedent’s state in 2021. Mark appealed again.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the county court properly limited its review to the existing record and exhibit 7, as required by the mandate. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity and that the will was the product of undue influence, and affirmed the order for intestate administration with Michael as personal representative. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

A married couple undertook renovations on a property owned by a family trust, based on an alleged oral agreement with the original cotrustees (the couple’s relatives). The couple claimed they were to be reimbursed for the renovation costs, excluding labor, after the property was sold. The renovations expanded in scope as new issues were discovered. After the cotrustees passed away, a new trustee (also a family member) sold the property but did not reimburse the couple, citing a lack of available funds due to a line of credit and other expenses. The couple, who were also beneficiaries of the trust, requested reimbursement and a full accounting of the trust’s assets, but were denied.The District Court for Douglas County held a bench trial and found that, while there was evidence of an agreement, its terms were too indefinite to constitute a legally enforceable contract. The court also denied the couple’s claims for unjust enrichment, finding insufficient evidence that the renovations increased the property’s value or that the costs were reasonable. Claims for promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty/accounting were also denied, with the court noting that it was not required to make detailed findings absent a specific request. The court further declined to hold the trustee personally liable.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s findings under a clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the oral agreement lacked the definiteness required for contract enforcement, that the evidence did not establish unjust enrichment or reasonable value, and that the claims for promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty/accounting were properly denied based on conflicting evidence. The court also found no basis for personal liability of the trustee. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Morris v. Dall" on Justia Law

The case concerns a lawsuit brought by the executor of an estate against a city, alleging that the city’s negligence in failing to address a hazardous tree led to a fatal accident. The estate claimed that the city owned the tree and had ignored repeated warnings about its dangerous condition, resulting in the decedent’s severe injury and subsequent death after a tree fell on him while he was riding a motorcycle on a city street.After the complaint was filed, the city submitted an answer denying the allegations and raising several defenses, including a general assertion that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, the city did not specifically assert political-subdivision immunity as a defense. The case experienced delays due to a judge’s recusal and the COVID-19 pandemic. As the case progressed, the estate pursued discovery and moved for partial summary judgment. The city failed to timely respond to discovery and only raised the political-subdivision immunity defense for the first time in an untimely motion for summary judgment, after the deadlines for dispositive motions had passed. The trial court struck the city’s motion and later denied the city’s request for leave to amend its answer to add the immunity defense, finding the delay unjustified and prejudicial.The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the city’s general assertion of failure to state a claim did not preserve the specific defense of political-subdivision immunity, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the answer. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed, holding that a party does not preserve the defense of political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 by merely asserting failure to state a claim, and that unjustified and prejudicial inaction supported the denial of leave to amend the answer. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Durig v. Youngstown" on Justia Law

A married couple established a family trust in 2003, which, after the husband’s death in 2013, split into three sub-trusts. The Potter Exemption Trust (PET) became the owner of approximately 4,000 acres of land and a minority interest in E Bar L Ranch, LLP, which operates a guest ranch on both its own land and land leased from the PET. The wife, Betty, is the income beneficiary of the PET, while the husband’s children from a prior marriage are remainder beneficiaries. The PET’s trustees were initially three friends of the deceased husband, who later appointed successors, including Caitlin Wall and James Stone. Wall is also an employee of E Bar L, and Stone has performed contract work for E Bar L. In 2022, the PET and E Bar L entered into a new five-year lease for the PET land, with Wall participating as both PET trustee and E Bar L employee.Betty filed a petition in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court seeking Wall’s removal as trustee, alleging a conflict of interest due to Wall’s dual roles, and requesting access to E Bar L’s financial records to investigate potential breaches of trust. She also challenged the validity of the 2022 lease. The PET, E Bar L, and other interested parties countered, seeking declaratory judgment affirming the trustees’ authority and the lease’s validity. The District Court granted summary judgment against Betty on all but one issue, finding no conflict of interest, denying her access to E Bar L’s financials, upholding the lease, and ruling that the trust instrument did not require three trustees or allow Betty to appoint successors.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s summary judgment on the issues of conflict of interest, the validity of the lease, access to financial information, and Wall’s removal as trustee, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the trust instrument did not mandate three trustees or permit Betty to appoint successors. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Potter Exemption Trust" on Justia Law