Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose among family members who owned and operated a car dealership in West Virginia following the distribution of shares from a trust created by their late mother. One sibling, who received a minority share of the company, brought suit against her relatives, including her sister, brother-in-law, nieces, and one niece’s husband, all of whom held various positions in the dealership. She alleged that several of them, acting in concert, breached fiduciary duties, engaged in negligence, tortiously interfered with her inheritance, and committed related wrongful acts, including civil conspiracy, to benefit themselves at her expense.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County granted partial motions to dismiss some claims against certain defendants with prejudice. Notably, it dismissed all claims against one defendant, Mr. Hopkins, and removed him from the action with an express statement that this dismissal was “final.” The plaintiffs appealed these dismissals to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The Intermediate Court reinstated the civil conspiracy claim against Mr. Hopkins, finding it was sufficiently pled, and reinstated certain claims against other defendants, but did not address whether the order was final as required for appellate review.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the Intermediate Court had proper appellate jurisdiction under the finality requirements of West Virginia Code § 58-5-1 and Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the Intermediate Court lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory dismissals against Ms. Abrams and Mrs. Hopkins, vacating its decision as to them. However, the Court found the dismissal order as to Mr. Hopkins was sufficiently final to be appealable, affirmed reinstatement of the civil conspiracy claim against him, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hopkins v. Sutphin" on Justia Law

After the death of Harry Fairhurst in 2019, his will—executed in 1981 with a 1997 codicil—left his estate equally to his seven children and named two of them as co-executors. The main asset was the family home. The will allowed the co-executors to sell estate assets without probate court approval, provided all children were notified by mail of their option to purchase. In 2020, the co-executors notified the devisees that the property was available, but the letter omitted key sale terms. No child responded. Subsequently, William, one of the co-executors, purchased the property for $260,000, using part of his share as an advance toward the purchase price, despite a higher bank appraisal and market analysis.Three siblings objected to the accounting of the sale in Cumberland Probate Court, focusing on the valuation and terms. The probate court, without hearing argument, found the sale invalid and illegal because the co-executors had not sought probate court approval, as required by Rhode Island General Laws § 33-19-9. The property was ordered to remain with the estate. The co-executors appealed to Providence County Superior Court, arguing the will authorized the sale without court approval and that the probate court’s sua sponte action violated their due process rights. Both sides moved for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. It held that, regardless of the will’s language, § 33-19-9 required probate court approval for a co-executor’s private purchase of estate property to prevent self-dealing and ensure fairness. The Court found the will’s contrary provision invalid to the extent it conflicted with the statute and rejected the co-executors’ due process and laches arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, upholding the voiding of the sale. View "Fairhurst v. Fairhurst" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the management and succession of a living trust established by the stepfather of Mitchell D. Brown and Tina J. Bowden. Brown alleged that Bowden, while serving as trustee, breached fiduciary duties, amended the trust improperly to appoint Diahanne L. Morse as successor trustee, and engaged in self-dealing. After Bowden’s death, Morse acted as both the representative of Bowden’s estate and as the purported trustee. Brown sought damages, declaratory relief to void Morse’s appointment, and the naming of an independent trustee. Morse denied the allegations and brought counterclaims for tortious interference and slander of title related to trust property.The Waldo County Superior Court granted Brown’s motion to amend his complaint to add claims against Morse personally and for declaratory relief. Later, the court entered partial summary judgment for Brown, declaring that he was the properly nominated trustee and that the attempted amendment appointing Morse was void. Brown voluntarily dismissed several claims without prejudice, and the court denied Morse’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court then purported to enter “final judgment,” declaring the prior summary judgment to be final and dismissing remaining claims as moot, but did not address all outstanding claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the Superior Court’s order was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims in the amended complaint or all of Morse’s counterclaims. The Court dismissed Morse’s appeal as interlocutory, finding that none of the recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule applied. The Court also denied Brown’s request for sanctions. The case will remain in the Superior Court until all claims are fully resolved. View "Brown v. Morse" on Justia Law

A man named Bradley died without a will, leaving behind his wife, Rebecca, and his son from a previous marriage, Jason. Before his death, Bradley withdrew $80,000 from a savings account and used it to purchase a cashier’s check made payable to himself. Rebecca was an authorized signer on the account but was not designated as a beneficiary. After Bradley’s death, Rebecca discovered the existence of the cashier’s check, and, based on advice from a bank employee and her attorney, she deposited the funds into her personal account, believing the money was hers and not part of the estate. Jason, however, argued that the funds should belong to the estate for distribution according to the intestacy laws.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, heard the dispute. The parties agreed to submit the issue of ownership of the $80,000 to the court without further testimony. The District Court concluded that the funds were Rebecca’s individual property, finding that Bradley intended to make a gift to her and that she was entitled to enforce the cashier’s check as a holder under Montana’s Uniform Commercial Code. The court reasoned that there was clear and convincing evidence of Bradley’s donative intent and constructive delivery of the check to Rebecca.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that the record did not establish a completed inter vivos gift of the $80,000 to Rebecca, as there was no evidence of donative intent, delivery, or acceptance. The court also determined that Rebecca’s status as an authorized signer did not give her ownership rights and that she was not a holder or otherwise entitled to enforce the cashier’s check. The Supreme Court ordered that the funds be treated as an asset of Bradley’s estate and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "in re Estate of B. Haler" on Justia Law

Cynthia Miles, a sixty-four-year-old woman suffering from acute psychosis and a history of suicidal ideation, experienced several psychiatric crises in 2021. After multiple hospitalizations and escapes from care facilities, she was admitted to Harbor Point, an unlocked mental health facility, where she again escaped on November 11, 2021. Despite a search, Miles was never found. Her family, having previously experienced her disappearances followed by safe returns, could not determine her fate. After extensive efforts to locate her failed, her family petitioned the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County for a judicial determination of death. Following a jury trial, the court issued a certificate of presumed death on August 29, 2022.Subsequently, Miles’s daughter, as administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against several healthcare providers. The defendants asserted that the action was time-barred under Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims, arguing that the limitations period began either at Miles’s disappearance or when the family first sought a declaration of death. The Iowa District Court for Cass County rejected this argument, ruling that the statute of limitations began only upon the judicial declaration of death, not the earlier disappearance.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal to determine when the limitations period commenced. The court held that, in a case where there is no known physical injury and it is unclear whether the missing person is alive or dead, the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim does not begin to run until there is a judicial determination of death. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, allowing the wrongful death action to proceed as timely filed. View "Schneide v. Holliday" on Justia Law

A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company.An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges. View "Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust" on Justia Law

The case involves disputes among the descendants of Roy and Grace Whittenburg, who were beneficiaries of separate trusts holding interests in a large ranch spanning New Mexico and Colorado. After years of litigation over the ranch’s ownership, the parties signed two settlement agreements: a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) and a later Compromise Settlement Agreement (CSA). These agreements were intended to resolve their disputes, with provisions for partitioning the ranch and a clause designating Texas as the forum for enforcement. When the parties could not agree on partitioning, a group led by Angela Kate initiated partition proceedings in New Mexico, as allowed by the agreements. Another group, led by John Burk, opposed the partition, resulting in protracted litigation and additional attorney’s fees.The 251st District Court of Randall County, Texas, after a bench trial, found John Burk had breached the settlement agreements by opposing the partition in the New Mexico litigation, causing Angela Kate to incur $216,112 in extra attorney’s fees. Despite these findings, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment, holding that the attorney’s fees from the New Mexico litigation were not recoverable as damages. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the American Rule barred recovery of such fees as damages for breach of contract.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the American Rule does not bar recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in prior litigation as damages for breach of a settlement agreement, provided the breach was not itself the basis for that prior litigation. Because the fees at issue resulted from litigation initiated before John Burk’s breach, Angela Kate was entitled to recover those excess fees as actual damages. The Court also held she could seek reasonable attorney’s fees for the Texas suit, remanding for reconsideration of the appropriate amount. View "WANG v. WHITTENBURG" on Justia Law

Two brothers became parties to a dispute over the inheritance of their father’s estate after the father died intestate. One brother, Christopher, asserted that his sibling, Daniel, was not the biological child of their father, Ernest, and therefore not entitled to inherit. Christopher petitioned for letters of administration in the probate court, claiming to be Ernest's sole heir. The probate court granted him letters of administration. Christopher then sought to remove the estate administration to the circuit court, filing a petition that was not verified under oath as required by Alabama law. The circuit court entered an order removing the administration and later, based on DNA evidence, an affidavit from the mother, and Daniel’s marriage certificate, declared that Daniel was not Ernest’s biological child or heir.After the circuit court’s order, Daniel filed a postjudgment motion arguing that the removal of the estate administration was invalid because Christopher’s initial removal petition was not sworn, as required by Ala. Code § 12-11-41. Around the same time as the hearing on this motion, Christopher submitted an amended, sworn petition for removal, and the circuit court then entered a new order granting removal. However, this action occurred after the circuit court had already issued its prior order resolving the inheritance dispute.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the estate administration was not properly invoked until a sworn petition was filed, as mandated by statute. Thus, the July 2025 order declaring Daniel not an heir was void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at the time it was entered. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the July 2025 order. View "Thomas v. Thomas" on Justia Law

A trust was established for the primary benefit of an individual, with his family members as secondary beneficiaries. The trustee, Austin Trust Company, purchased a residential property in the District of Columbia for the trust in 2007, paying the required transfer and recordation taxes at that time. Fourteen years later, the trust was dissolved and the trustee transferred the property, without consideration, to the primary beneficiary, who then recorded the deed and paid additional transfer and recordation taxes. The beneficiary later sought a refund, claiming that the deed was exempt under District of Columbia law as either a supplemental deed or under regulations for nominal grantees.The Office of Tax and Revenue denied the refund, finding that the deed did not qualify for an exemption. The beneficiary appealed to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, concluding that the trust and the beneficiary were legally distinct entities and that District law imposes transfer and recordation taxes on each change in legal ownership of real property. The court also determined that the applicable exemptions did not apply.Reviewing the case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that the supplemental deed exemptions do not apply when property is conveyed between two distinct legal entities, even if one is the beneficiary of the other. The court further held that the nominal grantee regulations did not apply, as the trustee held and managed the property as more than a nominal grantee and owed duties to multiple beneficiaries. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment to the District was affirmed. View "Barlow v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A group of family trusts, managed by a corporate trustee, owned two C corporations with significant appreciated assets, including farmland and investment portfolios. In the early 2000s, the trusts sought to sell these corporations. To maximize after-tax proceeds, they pursued a stock sale rather than an asset sale, aiming to avoid double taxation on built-in gains. The trusts conducted an auction and ultimately sold the corporations’ stock to a newly formed entity, Humboldt Shelby Holding Corporation (HSHC), which financed the purchase with substantial loans. After the transaction, HSHC promptly liquidated the corporations’ assets and engaged in tax shelter transactions to offset the resulting gains, resulting in no taxes paid. The IRS later determined these losses were artificial and assessed taxes, penalties, and interest against HSHC, which went unpaid. The IRS then sought to hold the trusts liable as transferees of HSHC under federal law.The United States Court of Federal Claims found that, under New York’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the trusts could be held liable as transferees. The court determined that the stock sale and subsequent asset sales should be treated as a single transaction and that the trusts had constructive knowledge of the entire scheme to avoid taxes. The court also held the trusts liable for the full amount of HSHC’s unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest, and rejected the trusts’ argument that their liability should be limited to the value received.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ rulings. The Federal Circuit held that the trusts had constructive knowledge of the fraudulent scheme, upheld the imposition of transferee liability for the full amount owed, including penalties, and rejected the claim for refund of interest accrued after a deposit was made with the IRS, finding the IRS did not act unlawfully or abuse its discretion in handling the deposit. View "DILLON TRUST COMPANY LLC v. US " on Justia Law