Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After the death of Paul A. Knapp, his son Lance, as personal representative of Paul’s estate, sought to probate Paul’s 2010 will, which primarily left property to his first wife and, if she predeceased him, to his children and grandchildren. Paul’s widow, Barbara, filed claims against the estate, specifically for a share of the marital residence’s proceeds and a statutory maintenance fund. These claims were based on a premarital agreement executed before Barbara and Paul’s marriage, as well as a purported subsequent oral agreement that Barbara would receive 40% of the marital residence due to her financial contributions to its remodel and refinancing.The County Court for Dodge County reviewed the case after Lance, as personal representative, disallowed Barbara’s claims. At trial, evidence showed that while Barbara contributed funds to remodel the residence and participated in refinancing, title to the home remained solely in Paul’s name. The premarital agreement referred to certain rights in a non-existent “Article 9.4” and generally maintained that separate property would remain separate unless jointly titled. The county court found the agreement unambiguous, concluded there was no evidence of a mutual mistake justifying reformation, and determined that Barbara was not entitled to proceeds from the marital residence or a maintenance fund. The court also found insufficient evidence of an enforceable oral contract for transfer of the property.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the premarital agreement was unambiguous and did not entitle Barbara to the claimed property interests, nor was reformation appropriate. Additionally, the Court found that Barbara had not proven the existence or terms of an enforceable oral contract by clear and convincing evidence. The disallowance of Barbara’s claims was affirmed. View "In re Estate of Knapp" on Justia Law

After the death of Sean Thomas in March 2022, his widow, Jaimie, was named as the sole heir and personal representative of his estate pursuant to his will. She commenced informal probate proceedings in the District Court of Butte-Silver Bow County and began administering the estate. Over time, disputes arose concerning the management of family business assets and the distribution of estate funds, particularly regarding allegations that Jaimie was using estate assets for non-estate purposes, including her personal expenses and legal defense in ongoing litigation about business ownership and obligations.In February 2023, Paul Thomas, Sean’s father, along with related business entities, initiated a separate civil action in the same District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the ownership of a family business and asserting substantial creditor claims against Sean’s estate. Paul later moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the probate proceeding, alleging that Jaimie’s actions as personal representative were rapidly depleting the estate’s assets to the detriment of creditors. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order, followed by an order requiring Jaimie to obtain court approval before making any estate distributions, and declined to require a bond.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court had jurisdiction to restrain Jaimie’s conduct, whether it abused its discretion in doing so, and whether it was required to impose a bond. The Supreme Court held that the District Court had jurisdiction under Montana’s probate statutes, specifically § 72-3-617, MCA, to restrain the personal representative’s conduct even in informal probate. The Court further determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the restraint and that a bond was not required under the applicable probate provisions. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "In re Estate of Sean Thomas" on Justia Law

A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The trustees of an ERISA-regulated pension plan invested in six classes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). Three of these investments were in notes issued by Delaware statutory trusts via indenture agreements, while the other three were in regular-interest certificates issued by trusts governed under New York law and classified as REMICs for tax purposes. The trustees alleged that the mortgage servicers mismanaged the loans and engaged in self-dealing, violating ERISA fiduciary duties. They also claimed that Wells Fargo, as master servicer for some trusts, failed to adequately supervise Ocwen (another servicer) and failed to pursue litigation on behalf of the trusts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that, under the Department of Labor’s regulation, only the RMBSs themselves—not the underlying mortgages—were plan assets for ERISA purposes. The court determined that both the notes and the regular-interest certificates were treated as indebtedness without substantial equity features, so the look-through exception did not apply. The trustees’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that the notes issued by the indenture trusts lacked substantial equity features and thus the underlying mortgages were not plan assets. However, it held that the regular-interest certificates represented beneficial interests in the REMIC trusts; under the controlling regulation, the assets of such a trust in which a plan holds a beneficial interest are themselves plan assets. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Ocwen acted as an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the mortgages underlying the REMIC trusts. View "Powell v. Ocwen Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

An elderly man, Jerome, experienced significant health decline and was moved into a nursing home, prompting his wife, Janet, to petition the Saginaw Probate Court for a protective order under Michigan law. She requested the transfer of all of Jerome’s assets and most of his income to her, citing her increased financial needs and Jerome’s inability to manage his affairs due to physical and mental health issues. Janet’s petition was filed before Jerome’s application for Medicaid was resolved, and the probate court granted the transfer and set a monthly support payment for Janet.The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed in part but vacated the probate court’s order, relying on its earlier precedent in In re Estate of Schroeder, which prohibited consideration of Medicaid eligibility before a formal determination. The case was remanded for a new assessment of need and current valuation of assets. On remand, the probate court again ordered the transfer and support, applied retroactively, but the Court of Appeals vacated this order as well, citing reliance on outdated asset information and the same legal standard regarding Medicaid eligibility.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case after Jerome’s death, holding that the appeal was not moot because Medicaid benefits can be awarded retroactively, even to a deceased individual’s estate. The Supreme Court ruled that probate courts may consider the likely availability of Medicaid benefits before a final eligibility determination when assessing the needs of an individual and their dependents under MCL 700.5401(3)(b). The Court expressly overruled the contrary rule announced in In re Estate of Schroeder, reinstated the probate court’s 2022 protective order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In Re Estate Of Sizick" on Justia Law

Two siblings disputed the administration of their late father’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in a storage company, Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS). The father had founded TPS and, over time, executed several amendments to its operating agreement, some before and some after he began suffering from dementia. After his death, one sibling, who was an attorney, became the personal representative of the estate, managed TPS, and executed additional amendments to the operating agreement that purported to transfer ownership and management control of TPS to herself, often with retroactive effect. The other sibling challenged these actions, claiming they diverted estate assets and breached fiduciary duties.Litigation took place in two venues: a magistrate court probate proceeding and a separate district court action under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). The courts and parties often treated the cases as consolidated, although no formal consolidation order was entered. The sibling challenging the amendments sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, and related relief. The magistrate court dismissed the claims against both the sister and TPS, and the district court upheld this dismissal, concluding that the claims should have been brought exclusively in the probate case and were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that claims for judicial determination of the estate’s assets and breach of fiduciary duty fell within TEDRA’s scope and could be brought as a separate civil action rather than exclusively in probate. The Court further found that the sister and TPS were necessary or proper parties to the TEDRA action. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the magistrate and district courts, reversed the dismissal orders, and remanded for further proceedings. It also awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal to the appellant, to be paid personally by the sister. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

Several cousins are shareholders in a closely held family corporation that owns industrial real estate. The dispute centers on the shares held by a trust established by one family member, Sheila, and who has the right to vote those shares after she became incapacitated and her husband resigned as trustee. The parties disagree about the operation of a buy-sell agreement, which the Levins argue restricts the transfer of voting power over the shares, while the Clapkins assert it allows the shares to be controlled by the children as successor cotrustees. The conflict over control of the trust’s shares led to a series of lawsuits between the parties.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, handling multiple related actions, determined that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the identity of the trust’s trustees. The probate court subsequently ruled in favor of the Clapkins, confirming them as successor cotrustees of the trust. After this order, the Levins filed a new lawsuit claiming the transfer of voting power violated the buy-sell agreement, while the Clapkins, in response, filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce their right to vote the trust’s shares and to be registered as the record holders.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the Levins’ special motion to strike most of the claims in the cross-complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion, holding that the claims did not arise from protected litigation activity but rather from the underlying dispute over voting rights and control of the corporation. The court also dismissed the Clapkins’ appeal from the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, finding the order was not separately appealable. The main holding is that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the claims arose from unprotected conduct regarding the internal corporate dispute, not from protected petitioning activity. View "Clapkin v. Levin" on Justia Law

The decedent, a resident of Lyon County, Nevada, died intestate, leaving an estate valued at approximately $32 million. He was predeceased by his wife and had no children. The Lyon County Public Administrator identified the decedent’s living first cousins as potential heirs and petitioned the district court for an order confirming them as the legal heirs. Jamie Lipson, the child of one of the decedent’s predeceased first cousins (a first cousin once removed), contested this determination. Lipson argued that Nevada law should permit her and similarly situated relatives to inherit by right of representation, which would include more remote relatives in the distribution of the estate.The Third Judicial District Court of Lyon County determined that NRS 134.070 required distribution to the “next of kin in equal degree” on a per capita without representation basis. The court concluded that only the decedent’s living first cousins were entitled to inherit, thereby excluding Lipson and other first cousins once removed. The district court based its decision on the statutory language and longstanding state precedent, namely In re McKay’s Estate, which interpreted similar language as requiring per capita distribution.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that NRS 134.070 unambiguously requires a per capita without representation distribution scheme. This means only those relatives of equal degree—the living first cousins—inherit equally, to the exclusion of more distant relatives such as first cousins once removed. The court reaffirmed the continuing validity of In re McKay’s Estate and found no compelling reason to depart from precedent or apply a per stirpes distribution. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order, upholding the exclusion of more remote kin from inheritance under the statute. View "In re Estate of Ulvang" on Justia Law

After the death of Laurie Maria Brocato, her nephew submitted a 2019 olographic testament for probate, which left most of her estate to him. The district court ordered that this will be recorded, filed, and executed, and he was named executor. Later, Brocato’s surviving spouse, Lisa Vickers, contested the 2019 testament and presented a new four-page olographic testament, dated across three consecutive days in 2021 and written in a bound notebook, which revoked previous wills and left the estate primarily to Vickers.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans found that the 2021 testament met the requirements for an olographic will under Louisiana law, including being entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. The court annulled the probate of the 2019 will, removed the nephew as executor, and admitted the 2021 testament to probate. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the testament’s multiple dates and the location of the signature did not invalidate it, especially in light of legislative amendments intended to relax formal requirements and prioritize testamentary intent.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case after granting writs to address whether the 2021 testament satisfied the statutory form requirements, especially considering the 2025 amendment to La. C.C. art. 1575, which applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 testament was valid under the amended statute. The court found the document was entirely written, dated, and signed by the decedent, even though the signature was at the top of the second page and dates appeared throughout. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the 2021 testament’s probate, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SUCCESSION OF BROCATO" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a revocable trust created by Marsha Milot in 2009, with herself as trustee and lifelong beneficiary. After Milot stepped down from her trustee role due to alleged incapacity, her daughter, Valerie Wiederhorn, and her husband, Curtis Hennigar, became co-trustees. Jennifer Milot, a stepdaughter and remainder beneficiary, petitioned for access to the trust instrument and additional information about the trust’s administration, including documentation related to settlor’s incapacity and trustee actions. She alleged improper denial of her requests, and further claimed that Wiederhorn made unauthorized loans to herself from the trust and retaliated against Jennifer for seeking information.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Probate Division, initially ordered co-trustees to provide the trust instrument and unsealed it after review. When Jennifer sought further information and asserted she was now a qualified beneficiary due to settlor’s incapacitation, the court found the initial relief was “more or less” satisfied. It declined to invoke equitable powers or compel additional disclosures, relying on 14A V.S.A. § 603, which states that while a trust is revocable, beneficiaries’ rights are subject to settlor’s control. The court ultimately dismissed Jennifer’s petition, concluding she was not entitled to the information sought and that co-trustees owed no duty to her at that time.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal. It held that, under Vermont Trust Code § 813 and § 603, Jennifer was not entitled to trust information while the trust remained revocable and settlor was alive. However, the Court found the probate division erred by not considering Jennifer’s request to amend her petition to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn under § 706, and reversed and remanded the case for the probate division to address that request. View "In re Trust of Milot" on Justia Law