Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended twice. The 2018 restatement of the trust, prepared with an attorney, provided that her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, would each receive a one-third interest in her home upon her death. In 2019, Silvia amended the trust again, without an attorney, to state that her children could only sell their shares to each other for $100,000, aiming to keep the home within the family. After Silvia's death, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the probate court to declare the 2019 amendment void, arguing it unreasonably restrained their ability to sell their interests.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of Arturo and Sonia, determining that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of Civil Code section 711. The court declared the amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. Leticia, the trustee, objected, arguing that section 711 did not apply to testamentary gifts and that the 2019 amendment did not impose an unreasonable restraint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court found that the amendment's restrictions on selling the property only to siblings for a fixed price were unreasonable and void. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, concluding that Silvia intended to add to the existing trust rather than create a new one. The court affirmed the probate court's order, maintaining the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the application, suspending the defendants' powers, appointing an interim trustee, requiring a bond, setting a review hearing, and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization.Defendants appealed the order. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order was not appealable. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appealability of the order. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional and not final, aligning with the broader policy against piecemeal appeals.The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that neither Probate Code section 1300 nor section 1304 provided a basis for appealability. The court also found that defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the use of trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Additionally, the court denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions, despite concerns about defendants' counsel's conduct, which the court found troubling but not sufficient to warrant sanctions in this instance. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

A credit union filed a claim in probate court, asserting that the decedent owed money on a car loan. The estate mailed a notice of disallowance to the credit union, but the credit union claimed it never received the notice. The estate argued that the claim was time-barred because the credit union did not request a hearing within twenty days of the notice. The credit union conducted an internal investigation and submitted an affidavit stating it never received the notice and that the person who signed for it was not an employee of the credit union but an agent of the U.S. Postal Service.The Iowa District Court for Linn County imposed sanctions on the credit union and its attorneys for violating Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1), which requires that filings be well-grounded in fact and law after reasonable inquiry. The court found that the credit union's investigation was insufficient and that the attorneys made incorrect assertions about the mailing. The Iowa Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court found that the credit union and its counsel conducted a reasonable investigation under the circumstances, given the time constraints and the information available. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of the investigation should be assessed based on the time of the filing, not with hindsight. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the sanctions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dupaco Community Credit Union v. Iowa District Court for Linn County" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of the Massachusetts Principal and Income Act (MPIA) in relation to trusts established under the will of Helyn W. Kline. Kline's will created separate trusts for her daughters, including Denise Jo Levy, who is the income beneficiary of the trusts at issue here. The will allows the trustees to distribute net income to Levy and, under extraordinary circumstances, to distribute principal in emergencies. Levy's three sons are the remainder beneficiaries. The trustee, Robert Friedman, pursued a total growth investment strategy that increased the trust principal significantly more than the income.In the Probate and Family Court, Peter Judson, one of Levy's sons, filed a petition alleging improper distributions to Levy exceeding the trusts' net income. The trustee justified the distributions by exercising the power to adjust between principal and income under the MPIA, arguing it was necessary to treat all beneficiaries fairly. The Probate and Family Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee, finding no abuse of discretion in the trustee's actions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the MPIA permits a trustee to adjust between principal and income if the trust instrument does not clearly deny this power. The court found that Kline's will did not explicitly prohibit the trustee from making such adjustments. The court also concluded that the trustee did not abuse his discretion in exercising the power to adjust, as he considered relevant factors, including the intent of the testator and the needs of the beneficiaries. The court affirmed the Probate and Family Court's decision, allowing the trustee's adjustments and distributions to Levy. View "In the Matter of the Trusts under the Will of Kline" on Justia Law

This case involves the reformation of a trust to remove male beneficiary restrictions and replace them with gender-neutral language to benefit successive generations of the Terteling family. Joseph L. Terteling, his former wife Carolyn E. Terteling, and their three granddaughters filed a petition to reform Terteling Trust No. 6 to reflect the alleged original intentions of the trustors to benefit Joseph’s successive generations, regardless of gender. Thomas J. Terteling, a contingent beneficiary, objected, arguing that the petitioners could not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a mistake was made in the drafting of the Trust or that it was the intention of all the trustors to benefit successive generations regardless of gender.The magistrate court granted the petition, concluding that the stipulated facts demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a drafting error had occurred in restricting the class of beneficiaries to male children only. The court found that the trustors intended to benefit all the children and descendants of Joseph, regardless of gender. Thomas J. appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s findings that a mistake occurred in the drafting of the Trust and that the trustors intended to benefit a gender-neutral class of heirs. The evidence included declarations from Joseph and Carolyn, a 1978 affidavit signed by all the trustors, and TEDRA agreements from 2013 and 2021. The Court concluded that the male-only beneficiary restriction was a mistake and that the original intent of the trustors was to benefit successive generations of the family, regardless of gender. View "Terteling v. Terteling" on Justia Law

Brent McCormick died intestate, and his sister-in-law, Tracy McCormick, filed a petition for formal probate, listing Brent’s father, mother, and brother as the only known heirs. Beth Roberts, Brent’s biological daughter, filed a demand for notice and objected to Tracy’s petition, asserting her status as Brent’s sole heir. The county court for Washington County held a hearing and appointed Tracy as temporary personal representative, later determining that Beth was entitled to inherit from Brent despite the termination of Brent’s parental rights.The county court noted that Brent’s paternity was established by adjudication in 1991, and his parental rights were terminated in 1992. Beth was not adopted after the termination. The court analyzed relevant statutes, including Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2309, which establishes the relationship of parent and child for intestate succession, and § 30-2312.02, which bars a parent from inheriting from a child if parental rights are terminated but does not address the child’s right to inherit from the parent. The court also considered Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-106.01, which states that relinquishment of parental rights does not impair a child’s right to inherit.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the county court’s decision. The court held that under the Nebraska Probate Code, Beth was Brent’s issue and entitled to inherit from him. The court found no statutory provision indicating that the termination of Brent’s parental rights extinguished Beth’s right to inherit. The court concluded that the probate statutes and other relevant statutes did not bar Beth from inheriting from Brent, affirming the county court’s order. View "In re Estate of McCormick" on Justia Law

Jesse Beck died in a motorcycle accident in Carbon County, Montana. Four days before his death, Jesse sent his brother, Jason Beck, a phone video in which he expressed his wish to leave all his possessions to Jason, explicitly excluding Christina Fontineau. Jesse's only child, Alexia Beck, was appointed as the personal representative of his estate. Jason later sought to probate the video as Jesse's will, arguing it should be considered a valid testamentary document.The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court of Carbon County denied Jason's petition, ruling that the video did not qualify as a "document or writing upon a document" under Montana Code Annotated § 72-2-523. The court reasoned that the statute's language implied a physical or digital document capable of being written upon and signed, which a video recording could not satisfy. The court also noted that even if a video could be considered a document in a general sense, it did not fit within the statutory context requiring a document to be written on.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the video recording did not meet the statutory requirements for a will under § 72-2-523, MCA. The court emphasized that the statute's language and structure clearly implied that a "document" must be a physical or digital file capable of being signed and witnessed, which a video recording could not fulfill. The court also noted that there was no legislative or judicial precedent for recognizing nonwritten, video wills under the Uniform Probate Code. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of Jason's petition to probate the video as Jesse's will. View "In re Estate of Beck" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether the proceeds of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) should be included in the estate of a deceased individual, Thomas Reich, for the purpose of calculating the share of his surviving spouse, Pamela Reich, as an "omitted spouse" under California law. Thomas had created a revocable trust in 2003, which was amended in 2016, to distribute his assets upon his death. He designated his daughter and granddaughter as beneficiaries of the IRA, which had a balance of approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death. Thomas married Pamela in 2020 but did not update his trust to provide for her before his death in 2021.Pamela initially filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Thomas's estate, including the IRA proceeds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court overruled a demurrer by the trust's beneficiaries, suggesting that the IRA proceeds might be included in the estate. However, a partial settlement was reached, excluding the IRA proceeds from Pamela's share. Pamela then filed two new petitions regarding her entitlement to the IRA proceeds, which were assigned to a different judge.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the probate court's orders dismissing Pamela's petitions. The court held that the IRA proceeds are nonprobate assets and do not pass through the decedent's testamentary trust to the separate trusts created for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the IRA proceeds are not part of Thomas's "estate" for the purpose of calculating Pamela's omitted spouse's share. The court also noted that the prior demurrer ruling was not controlling in this context. View "Reich v. Reich" on Justia Law

Thomas Dunbar, also known as "Sam," passed away without any direct descendants. Connie Corner, who was not related to Dunbar by blood, probated a will that purportedly left his entire estate to her. Tyler Popplewell, Dunbar's grandnephew, filed a motion in Russell Circuit Court alleging that the will was a product of fraud and undue influence, and requested the court to declare it null and void. Corner later moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Tyler lacked standing to bring the claim. The trial court sustained Corner's motion, leading Tyler to appeal.The Russell Circuit Court initially dismissed Tyler's case on the grounds of lack of standing, as Corner had argued. Tyler then filed a motion to set aside the judgment, claiming he did not receive notice of the hearing. Additionally, Imogene Popplewell, Dunbar's sister and Tyler's grandmother, attempted to intervene as a successor plaintiff, but her motion was denied as untimely. The trial court reaffirmed its dismissal, citing the mailbox rule in denying Tyler's motion to set aside the judgment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Corner had waived the issue of standing by not raising it in her initial response to Tyler's complaint. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the precedent set in Harrison v. Leach, which emphasized that standing issues must be raised at the outset of litigation. Corner then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing that Corner had waived the standing issue by failing to raise it promptly. The Court emphasized that defendants must address standing issues early in the litigation process to avoid inefficiencies and potential gamesmanship. The case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on its merits. View "CORNER V. POPPLEWELL" on Justia Law