Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law

An individual established a revocable living trust in 2011, naming her three adult children as successor beneficiaries. One son, Lin-Chuan, was designated to receive all real property and a portion of bank accounts. Lin-Chuan died in 2016, before the trust creator, and was survived by his three children. After the trust creator died in 2019, the remaining child, acting as temporary successor trustee, sought a probate court determination that the transfer of trust property to Lin-Chuan failed because he predeceased the settlor. The trustee argued the transfer should lapse and be distributed according to intestacy, effectively excluding Lin-Chuan’s children as beneficiaries.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the matter following the trustee’s motion for summary adjudication. The court found that a provision in the trust stating any named person failing to survive the settlor by thirty days would be deemed to have predeceased the settlor constituted a “contrary intention” under California’s antilapse statute (Probate Code section 21110), thereby preventing Lin-Chuan’s children from taking the property. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the trustee, determining the gifts to Lin-Chuan would lapse.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, examined whether the trust expressed a clear intent to override the statutory presumption favoring the descendants of a predeceased beneficiary. The Court held that the trust provision did not constitute a survival requirement sufficient to defeat the antilapse statute, as it lacked explicit language disinheriting Lin-Chuan’s children. The Court reversed the probate court’s order, directing it to deny summary adjudication and allow Lin-Chuan’s children to benefit under the trust. View "In re Tung Trust" on Justia Law

An elderly businesswoman, after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, had her great-nephew act as her agent pursuant to a power of attorney. As her condition deteriorated, the agent managed her finances and addressed two instances of financial elder abuse. In the final months of her life, following further health declines, her agent—on the advice of attorneys—created a limited partnership and transferred nearly $17 million of her assets into it. The businesswoman died within weeks of these transfers, leaving her with only about $2.15 million outside the partnership.When the executor filed the estate tax return, he reported only the value of the partnership interest—appraised at approximately $11 million—rather than the value of the assets transferred into the partnership. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the estate’s tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service audited the return, determined that the gross estate should include the full value of the transferred assets under I.R.C. § 2036(a), and assessed a 20% penalty for underpayment. The executor disputed these findings before the United States Tax Court.The United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s deficiency notice and penalty. It found that the transfers were not made pursuant to a bona fide sale for a legitimate non-tax purpose, and that the estate had been negligent in its reporting. The executor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. It held that the estate failed to demonstrate any substantial non-tax reason for the asset transfers, so the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a) did not apply. The court also upheld the 20% penalty, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s determination that the estate lacked reasonable cause and did not act in good faith. View "Fields v. CIR" on Justia Law

A professor who graduated from the University of Iowa during the Jim Crow era left a portion of his estate to the university for a scholarship. The scholarship was to be awarded to Black students majoring in physical sciences, preferably chemistry. The university accepted the gift and has administered the scholarship for nearly thirty years, awarding it annually to Black students in chemistry. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, which barred race-based admissions practices, the university became concerned about its ability to administer a race-restricted scholarship and initiated a proceeding under Iowa Code section 540A.106(3) to modify the terms, proposing that the scholarship instead be awarded to first-generation students.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the university’s application without prejudice. The district court reasoned that no legal authority had conclusively established that administering the scholarship in its current form would be unlawful. The university responded with an amended application and asserted that it was now unlawful to carry out the original purpose. The district court again found insufficient legal authority and dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It determined that, in light of recent legal developments and the SFFA decision, it had become at least impracticable for the university to distribute the scholarship funds under the race-based restriction. The court held that modification of the scholarship terms was warranted under Iowa Code section 540A.106(3), but found no support in the record for the university’s proposed change to first-generation students. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, providing guidance for considering other modifications and ensuring participation by advocates for donor intent. View "In Re Ezra L. Totton Scholarship" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, dedicated to supporting children with cancer, constructed several buildings on land owned by a married couple. The couple later decided to sell the property as part of their divorce. During the process, the nonprofit was misinformed by the couple, who were also involved in the nonprofit’s board, about the value of its buildings and the contents of an appraisal report. Acting on these representations, the nonprofit agreed to accept a fixed percentage of sale proceeds. It was only after the sale closed that the nonprofit discovered the buildings had been undervalued and that the appraisals had, in fact, specified higher values for the structures.The nonprofit sued the couple in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, asserting claims of constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court ruled in favor of the nonprofit, finding the couple liable but reduced the damages by 50% based on comparative negligence and failure to mitigate damages. It denied attorney fees and prejudgment interest to both parties. After the nonprofit satisfied the judgment, it appealed the damage reduction and denial of fees, while the couple cross-appealed on several grounds, including the application of the election-of-remedies doctrine, various defenses, and the finding of fiduciary breach.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the election-of-remedies doctrine did not bar the nonprofit’s appeal. It found the district court erred in reducing the damage award by applying comparative negligence and the duty to mitigate, as those doctrines did not apply to the equitable and fiduciary claims at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings on the other affirmative defenses, the finding of fiduciary breach, and the denial of prejudgment interest. The court remanded for entry of a judgment for the full damages and for reconsideration of prevailing party status and attorney fees, awarding the nonprofit its appellate costs. View "Camp Magical Moments, Cancer Camp for Kids, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Two siblings became involved in a dispute over the ownership and management of their late father’s interest in Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS) and the administration of his estate. The sister, an attorney, had acted as their father’s lawyer, power of attorney, and later as personal representative of his estate. After their father’s death, she executed amendments to TPS’s operating agreement that shifted ownership and control of the company to herself, some of which were made retroactive. The brother contended that these amendments were improper and that his sister had diverted assets that should have been part of the estate. He sought judicial determination of the estate’s assets and claimed breach of fiduciary duty, among other causes of action.The litigation proceeded through both a magistrate court probate proceeding and a separate district court action under the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). There was confusion over whether the cases were consolidated, and repeated disputes about discovery, particularly concerning access to TPS’s business records. The magistrate court dismissed the brother’s claims against the sister and TPS, reasoning in part that certain claims belonged exclusively in probate and that TPS and the sister in her individual capacity were not necessary parties. The district court affirmed these dismissals, concluding the claims for judicial determination of the estate and breach of fiduciary duty were matters for the probate court alone.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the brother’s claims for judicial determination of the estate and breach of fiduciary duty fell within TEDRA’s scope and could be brought as a separate civil action, not confined to probate. The Court further held that the sister was a necessary party and TPS was a proper nominal party to the TEDRA action. The Court vacated the judgments of the magistrate and district courts, reversed the orders dismissing parties and claims, and remanded for further proceedings. The brother was awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal against the sister personally. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among family members who owned and operated a car dealership in West Virginia following the distribution of shares from a trust created by their late mother. One sibling, who received a minority share of the company, brought suit against her relatives, including her sister, brother-in-law, nieces, and one niece’s husband, all of whom held various positions in the dealership. She alleged that several of them, acting in concert, breached fiduciary duties, engaged in negligence, tortiously interfered with her inheritance, and committed related wrongful acts, including civil conspiracy, to benefit themselves at her expense.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County granted partial motions to dismiss some claims against certain defendants with prejudice. Notably, it dismissed all claims against one defendant, Mr. Hopkins, and removed him from the action with an express statement that this dismissal was “final.” The plaintiffs appealed these dismissals to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The Intermediate Court reinstated the civil conspiracy claim against Mr. Hopkins, finding it was sufficiently pled, and reinstated certain claims against other defendants, but did not address whether the order was final as required for appellate review.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the Intermediate Court had proper appellate jurisdiction under the finality requirements of West Virginia Code § 58-5-1 and Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the Intermediate Court lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory dismissals against Ms. Abrams and Mrs. Hopkins, vacating its decision as to them. However, the Court found the dismissal order as to Mr. Hopkins was sufficiently final to be appealable, affirmed reinstatement of the civil conspiracy claim against him, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hopkins v. Sutphin" on Justia Law

After the death of Harry Fairhurst in 2019, his will—executed in 1981 with a 1997 codicil—left his estate equally to his seven children and named two of them as co-executors. The main asset was the family home. The will allowed the co-executors to sell estate assets without probate court approval, provided all children were notified by mail of their option to purchase. In 2020, the co-executors notified the devisees that the property was available, but the letter omitted key sale terms. No child responded. Subsequently, William, one of the co-executors, purchased the property for $260,000, using part of his share as an advance toward the purchase price, despite a higher bank appraisal and market analysis.Three siblings objected to the accounting of the sale in Cumberland Probate Court, focusing on the valuation and terms. The probate court, without hearing argument, found the sale invalid and illegal because the co-executors had not sought probate court approval, as required by Rhode Island General Laws § 33-19-9. The property was ordered to remain with the estate. The co-executors appealed to Providence County Superior Court, arguing the will authorized the sale without court approval and that the probate court’s sua sponte action violated their due process rights. Both sides moved for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. It held that, regardless of the will’s language, § 33-19-9 required probate court approval for a co-executor’s private purchase of estate property to prevent self-dealing and ensure fairness. The Court found the will’s contrary provision invalid to the extent it conflicted with the statute and rejected the co-executors’ due process and laches arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, upholding the voiding of the sale. View "Fairhurst v. Fairhurst" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the management and succession of a living trust established by the stepfather of Mitchell D. Brown and Tina J. Bowden. Brown alleged that Bowden, while serving as trustee, breached fiduciary duties, amended the trust improperly to appoint Diahanne L. Morse as successor trustee, and engaged in self-dealing. After Bowden’s death, Morse acted as both the representative of Bowden’s estate and as the purported trustee. Brown sought damages, declaratory relief to void Morse’s appointment, and the naming of an independent trustee. Morse denied the allegations and brought counterclaims for tortious interference and slander of title related to trust property.The Waldo County Superior Court granted Brown’s motion to amend his complaint to add claims against Morse personally and for declaratory relief. Later, the court entered partial summary judgment for Brown, declaring that he was the properly nominated trustee and that the attempted amendment appointing Morse was void. Brown voluntarily dismissed several claims without prejudice, and the court denied Morse’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court then purported to enter “final judgment,” declaring the prior summary judgment to be final and dismissing remaining claims as moot, but did not address all outstanding claims.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that the Superior Court’s order was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims in the amended complaint or all of Morse’s counterclaims. The Court dismissed Morse’s appeal as interlocutory, finding that none of the recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule applied. The Court also denied Brown’s request for sanctions. The case will remain in the Superior Court until all claims are fully resolved. View "Brown v. Morse" on Justia Law

A man named Bradley died without a will, leaving behind his wife, Rebecca, and his son from a previous marriage, Jason. Before his death, Bradley withdrew $80,000 from a savings account and used it to purchase a cashier’s check made payable to himself. Rebecca was an authorized signer on the account but was not designated as a beneficiary. After Bradley’s death, Rebecca discovered the existence of the cashier’s check, and, based on advice from a bank employee and her attorney, she deposited the funds into her personal account, believing the money was hers and not part of the estate. Jason, however, argued that the funds should belong to the estate for distribution according to the intestacy laws.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, heard the dispute. The parties agreed to submit the issue of ownership of the $80,000 to the court without further testimony. The District Court concluded that the funds were Rebecca’s individual property, finding that Bradley intended to make a gift to her and that she was entitled to enforce the cashier’s check as a holder under Montana’s Uniform Commercial Code. The court reasoned that there was clear and convincing evidence of Bradley’s donative intent and constructive delivery of the check to Rebecca.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court held that the record did not establish a completed inter vivos gift of the $80,000 to Rebecca, as there was no evidence of donative intent, delivery, or acceptance. The court also determined that Rebecca’s status as an authorized signer did not give her ownership rights and that she was not a holder or otherwise entitled to enforce the cashier’s check. The Supreme Court ordered that the funds be treated as an asset of Bradley’s estate and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "in re Estate of B. Haler" on Justia Law