Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose following the deaths of a married couple who had established a revocable trust intended to distribute their assets equally between their two sons. After the husband died, the surviving wife amended the trust, effectively removing one son from the inheritance and granting all assets to the other son, aside from a small cash bequest. The disinherited son challenged the validity of this amendment, arguing that his mother lacked testamentary capacity and was subjected to undue influence by his brother. The challenge also included allegations of fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty based on the actions of the trustee following the mother’s death.The case was reviewed by the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. After a trial featuring testimony from both brothers, medical professionals, caregivers, and the attorney who prepared the trust amendments, the court found that the mother had testamentary capacity at the time of the amendment and was not unduly influenced. The court also rejected the claims of fraudulent conveyance and breach of fiduciary duty, finding insufficient evidence to support those allegations. The court entered judgment in favor of the son who had received the assets, awarding him the trust’s property. The disinherited son appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the appeal. It applied a clear error standard to the superior court’s factual findings regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence, showing deference to the lower court’s credibility determinations. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the mother had capacity and was not unduly influenced. Because these findings rendered the other claims moot, the court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, upholding the validity of the trust amendments and the distribution of assets. View "In re: The Meeker Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute among siblings arising from mutual wills executed by their parents, John and Patricia, after their divorce. The parents structured their assets as joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, intending that the survivor would use the property during their lifetime and then have it pass equally to their three children upon death. In 1997, both parents executed mutual wills in Arizona, agreeing not to alter or revoke them without mutual consent, and expressing a clear intention that all property owned at death would be divided equally among their children. After John’s death in 2010, all jointly titled assets passed to Patricia outside probate. Patricia later executed a new will in 2006, disinheriting her daughter Susan except for small bequests to Susan’s children and transferring major properties to her other two children, Gregory and Nancy, before she died in 2016.A Vermont probate court allowed Patricia’s 2006 will, rejecting Susan’s attempt to admit the earlier will. The Vermont Supreme Court, in a prior appeal, affirmed the admission of the 2006 will but noted Susan might have other remedies. Susan subsequently brought civil claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division. The trial court found for Susan on her unjust enrichment claims against Gregory and Nancy, holding that the mutual wills formed a binding contract to divide all property equally among the siblings and that Patricia breached it by transferring properties and disinheriting Susan.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court held that the mutual wills were a binding contract requiring equal distribution of all property owned by the survivor at death, regardless of how it was acquired. The Court found that Patricia’s actions unjustly enriched Gregory and Nancy and upheld the remedies awarded, including a monetary judgment and a constructive trust. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest on the monetary portion of the judgment. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

After Robert R. Young Sr.’s death in 2017, a dispute arose among his children over which of two documents should control the distribution of his estate. In 2000, Robert Sr. executed a formal will prepared by his attorney, leaving his business to his son Raymond, dividing other assets, and leaving only one dollar to his son Robert Jr. The day before his death, following a contentious conversation with Robert Jr., Robert Sr. handwrote a two-page document outlining a new distribution plan, including bequests to charity and his daughter Dianne Parker. He told Robert Jr. that he intended to take this handwritten note to his attorney to make it into a “permanent will.” Robert Sr. died the next day before doing so.Raymond initiated probate proceedings in the Waldo County Probate Court, asking to admit the 2000 will. Robert Jr. and Parker sought to probate the 2017 handwritten document as a holographic will. In a separate action in the Waldo County Superior Court, Raymond’s claims of undue influence by Robert Jr. and Parker were rejected on summary judgment. The Probate Court held a bench trial and found that Robert Sr. did not intend the handwritten 2017 document to serve as his will, but rather as notes for his attorney. The court denied probate of the 2017 document and admitted the 2000 will.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Probate Court’s order. The Court held that the Probate Court properly considered extrinsic evidence regarding testamentary intent under 18-C M.R.S. § 2-502(3), that competent evidence supported the finding that Robert Sr. lacked testamentary intent for the 2017 document, and that the appellants’ due process rights were not violated by the trial proceedings. The order denying probate of the 2017 document and allowing the 2000 will was affirmed. View "Estate of Young" on Justia Law

A woman serving as her mother’s patient advocate removed her mother from an assisted living facility, subsequently killed her mother, and then died by suicide. The mother’s estate, represented by one of her other daughters, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the daughter’s estate and obtained a judgment. When the daughter’s estate proved insolvent, attention turned to a revocable trust the daughter had created, which was the designated beneficiary of her 401(k) account and life insurance policy. The trustee of the daughter’s trust sought a declaratory ruling on whether these proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment for the mother’s estate.In the St. Clair Probate Court, the judge determined that the life insurance proceeds were subject to creditor claims under Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code, but that the 401(k) proceeds were exempt. Both sides appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s decision as to the life insurance but reversed as to the 401(k), holding that neither the statutory exemptions for retirement accounts nor life insurance applied, and thus both sources could be reached by the mother’s estate.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that assets of a revocable trust—such as life insurance and 401(k) proceeds payable to the trust after the settlor’s death—are generally subject to creditor claims if the trust was revocable at the settlor’s death, unless a statutory exception applies. However, the Court found that 401(k) proceeds are exempt from creditor claims under MCL 700.7605(2), and that life insurance proceeds are exempt under MCL 700.7605(4) because, if not paid to the settlor’s estate, they are protected by Michigan’s Insurance Code. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding the proceeds were exempt from creditor claims. View "In Re Fowler Estate" on Justia Law

A participant in two ERISA-qualified retirement plans at a university sought to change the beneficiary designation shortly before his death, naming trust accounts for his grandchildren as primary beneficiaries and removing his wife as a primary beneficiary. The plan documents required spousal consent for such changes. The participant’s wife, who was still living at the time, had previously executed a Wisconsin statutory power of attorney appointing her son-in-law as her agent. The agent signed the spousal consent form on her behalf, but the power of attorney did not expressly grant authority to waive her spousal survivor annuity rights. The plan recordkeeper rejected the beneficiary change form as deficient, and the participant died soon thereafter. The wife died about a year later. The plaintiffs, including family members and trustees, sought to enforce the beneficiary change, arguing that the power of attorney provided sufficient authority.After the recordkeeper’s rejection, the plaintiffs made a claim for benefits with the university as plan administrator. The university denied the claim, determining that Wisconsin law required a specific grant of authority in the power of attorney to waive spousal survivor benefits, which was absent in this case. The plaintiffs appealed the denial, but the university upheld its decision. Plaintiffs then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting claims under ERISA for benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the waiver was invalid and finding no merit in the other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that under Wisconsin law, specifically Wis. Stat. § 244.41(1)(f), a power of attorney must expressly grant authority to an agent to waive spousal rights to a joint and survivor annuity. Because the power of attorney did not contain such an express grant, the attempted waiver was invalid, and the plaintiffs’ ERISA claim failed. The court also affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary duty and negligence claims and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "Havlik v. University of Chicago" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over an irrevocable trust established by Priel and Jacob Grimberg, whose primary assets were two residential units. After Jacob’s death, documents were executed naming Priel’s niece, Libby Pour, as successor trustee. Arie Tomer Grimberg, the Grimbergs’ son and trust beneficiary, filed petitions in the San Diego County Superior Court to challenge the validity of these documents, alleging Priel lacked capacity and was manipulated, and further claimed that Pour diverted trust assets for her own benefit, including the improper sale of trust property and personal use of trust proceeds. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for Priel and, after various developments including Pour’s bankruptcy filings, authorized the guardian to record lis pendens on Pour’s real properties to secure potential surcharges for alleged mismanagement.The Superior Court of San Diego County issued several orders regarding the recording and withdrawal of lis pendens, in light of Pour’s bankruptcy filings and subsequent dismissals. After the bankruptcy stay lapsed, the probate court granted the guardian ad litem’s request to re-record lis pendens against Pour’s properties. Pour appealed this order, arguing that it was improper under the lis pendens statutes because there was no real property claim as defined by law, and that the order should be appealable under general Probate Code provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the appeal. The court held that the order authorizing the recording of lis pendens was not appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.39, which provides that such orders must be challenged by writ of mandate within a specified time, not by appeal. The court found that the more specific lis pendens statutes controlled over the general probate provisions. Even if the appeal were treated as a writ petition, it would be untimely. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "Grimberg v. Pour" on Justia Law

After the death of Robert P. Dykes, disputes arose between his estate, managed by his sons as co-personal representatives, and Katya Hutton, his long-term partner. At issue was a condominium in Florida that Mr. Dykes had specifically bequeathed to Ms. Hutton in his will, along with monthly payments and estate-covered expenses during probate. The estate alleged that Ms. Hutton mismanaged the condo’s rental income, failed to provide adequate accountings, and withheld funds, leading to claims of embezzlement, conversion, and concealment of estate assets. Ms. Hutton, who took over the property’s rental management after Mr. Dykes’s death, insisted she provided all relevant documentation and denied withholding any funds.The District Court of Fremont County heard the case after the estate filed five claims against Ms. Hutton. Throughout pretrial discovery, the estate asserted that Ms. Hutton had not complied with discovery orders and sought sanctions, including default judgment under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The district court found discovery disputes unresolved but allowed the case to proceed to a bench trial, offering the estate a continuance to pursue further discovery remedies, which it declined. At trial, both sides presented testimony and exhibits, including rental and financial records. The court found the estate failed to prove that Ms. Hutton had received or concealed unreported rental income, considering Marriott’s occupancy records unreliable and accepting Ms. Hutton’s explanations.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose Rule 37 sanctions, as the estate did not demonstrate a violation of discovery orders or that additional responsive documents existed. The Supreme Court further found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings, affirming the denial of all claims against Ms. Hutton. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dykes v. Hutton" on Justia Law

Two South Carolina corporations, owned and operated by Stephen P. Mantell, assist individuals with probate matters by serving as personal representatives, conservators, guardians, and attorneys in fact under powers of attorney. They occasionally acted as trustees of trusts but have since discontinued such services. Complaints were filed with the South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions alleging these corporations were conducting a “trust business” without Board authorization, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 34-21-10.The Board sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to stop the companies from operating as trustees or in other fiduciary roles without approval. The Master-in-Equity for Georgetown County granted a declaratory judgment that the corporations could not act as trustees without Board authorization and permanently enjoined them from doing so. However, the court declined to extend the injunction to their roles as guardian, conservator, or attorney in fact, finding these did not constitute a “trust business” under the statute.The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “trust business” under § 34-21-10 included all fiduciary services, not just acting as trustee, and thus required Board approval for the corporations’ roles as guardian, conservator, personal representative, and attorney in fact. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that the statutory term “trust business” does not encompass serving as a guardian, conservator, personal representative, or attorney in fact. The Court found that these activities are not defined as “trust business” under South Carolina law and are adequately regulated by the Probate Code and probate courts. The main holding is that the corporations’ non-trustee fiduciary roles do not require Board authorization under § 34-21-10. View "SC Board of Financial Instituions v. CDM Corp, Inc." on Justia Law

A married couple established a revocable family trust in 2002, which allowed either spouse to revoke the trust by providing written notice to the other trustee or by withdrawing their interest in the community property. In 2019, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage and subsequently executed a notarized notice revoking her interest in the community trust, transferring her interest to a new trust in her name. She served her husband with the revocation by mail, as required by the trust instrument, but did not file the notice with the court. No assets were withdrawn from the community trust. The husband received actual notice but objected to the revocation’s validity due to the lack of court filing. He did not challenge the revocation in family court or probate court while his wife was alive. After her death in 2024 and the dismissal of the marital dissolution case, he petitioned the probate court to declare the revocation invalid and confirm himself as sole trustee.The Superior Court of Ventura County reviewed the petition, with objections filed by the daughter, who was trustee of the wife’s trust. The probate court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and the petition itself, finding that the husband was not prejudiced by the revocation, as he had received actual notice and his property interests were unaffected. The court determined that the wife had substantially complied with the statutory requirements by serving notice, fulfilling the purpose of the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the probate court’s judgment. The Court held that failure to file the revocation in court did not render it void when the other spouse had received actual notice, as substantial compliance with statutory notice requirements satisfied the statute’s objectives. The Court also held that an evidentiary hearing was not required because there were no disputed material facts. View "Jackson v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among members of the O’Farrell family and related entities regarding farmland, family trusts, and a sale of land to a third-party corporation. Paul O’Farrell, having longstanding involvement with the family land and farming operations, brought a lawsuit naming himself, his estate, and Skyline Cattle Company as plaintiffs. He asserted claims for declaratory relief, rescission of a land sale to Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., and damages for alleged torts. Paul argued he was acting not only in his individual capacity but also on behalf of the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, VOR, Inc., and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, based on allegations of undue influence and mismanagement involving his brother Kelly and his father Raymond.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Grant County, South Dakota, previously granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing VOR and the Estate as plaintiffs on the grounds that Paul lacked authority to act on their behalf. The court also denied Paul’s request to conduct further discovery under Rule 56(f), his motion to amend the complaint, and his request for a physical and mental examination of Raymond under Rule 35(a). The court additionally awarded attorney fees to certain defendants, finding Paul’s action frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, agreeing that Paul lacked authority to sue on behalf of VOR and the Estate and could not seek rescission of the land sale as he was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of additional discovery. However, it vacated the circuit court’s denial of the motion to amend the complaint (insofar as it prevented joining VOR and Raymond as defendants), the denial of the Rule 35(a) examination, and the award of attorney fees, finding those decisions either premature or not sufficiently supported by the record. View "Estate Of O'Farrell v. O'Farrell" on Justia Law