Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

In this case, a trust was established by Frank Garrett, Jr. in South Dakota in 2006, naming his wife as the beneficiary and a South Dakota bank as trustee. The trust applied for and obtained a $10 million life insurance policy on Frank's life, funded by a nonrecourse premium finance loan. After several years, the policy was surrendered to the lender, which then sold the policy in the secondary market. Eventually, Viva Capital Trust acquired the policy, paid the premiums, and received the death benefit after Frank died in 2019. Frank’s estate, administered by his son, challenged the transaction, claiming it was part of a stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) scheme, violating South Dakota’s insurable interest statute and public policy against wagering on human life.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Viva, finding that the trust was validly established, the insurance policy was properly issued and delivered to the trust, and the policy complied with South Dakota insurable interest requirements. The court also determined that the estate’s counterclaims, challenging the trust’s validity and seeking recovery of death benefits, were barred by the statute of repose, which prohibits such actions more than one year after the settlor’s death. The court awarded litigation costs to Viva.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Viva, holding that the estate’s counterclaims regarding the trust’s validity were barred by the statute of repose, and that the insurance policy complied with South Dakota’s insurable interest statutes. The Supreme Court also found no error in denying summary judgment to the estate. However, it reversed in part the award of costs and remanded for further proceedings to ensure only authorized costs were included. View "Viva Capital Trust V. Garrett" on Justia Law

Delores Gibson created the Gibson Family Limited Partnership (GFLP) to distribute farmland to her children, with herself as general partner and her sons, Michael and Greg Gibson, as equal limited partners. Michael initiated multiple lawsuits regarding GFLP, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence. In this third action, Michael alleged that Delores was unduly influenced by Greg and Joan Gibson, challenging a land transaction favoring Greg and implicating Robert Ronayne, an attorney involved in the sale. Michael’s central claim was that Delores lacked capacity, with Greg acting as de facto general partner and violating fiduciary duties.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, reviewed repeated discovery abuses by Michael’s counsel, including improper subpoenas for Delores’s medical records while a motion to quash was pending. The subpoenas failed to comply with the requirements of SDCL 15-6-45 (Rule 45). Michael’s counsel advanced an unsustainable interpretation of Rule 45(b), arguing that unless the court ruled on a motion to quash before the subpoena’s compliance date, he was entitled to the records. The court found that Michael’s counsel disregarded the rules, failed to accept responsibility, and obtained privileged medical records improperly.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the case as a sanction under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Court held that Rule 45(b) requires forestalling compliance with subpoenas until the court has acted on a timely motion to quash, and that Michael’s counsel’s conduct constituted an egregious violation justifying dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice and denial of the motion to reconsider. View "Gibson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Caroline H. Walsh passed away in January 2012, and her son, John H. Walsh, was appointed executor of her estate. He was responsible for filing the Massachusetts estate tax return and paying the taxes by October 2012. Walsh hired an accountant who died unexpectedly, then worked with two other accountants over several years, but delays persisted due to Walsh’s failure to provide necessary documents and dissatisfaction with property appraisals. Ultimately, the estate tax return was filed nearly seven years late, along with the tax owed and a request for abatement of interest and penalties. No extension to file or pay had ever been requested.The Commissioner of Revenue assessed over $145,000 in interest and $112,327.10 in penalties for late filing and late payment. The estate’s abatement request was denied, and it appealed to the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board. After a hearing, the Board found that Walsh did not demonstrate reasonable cause for the delays, citing evidence that Walsh had failed to provide requested information and noting the absence of credible justification for the late filing. The Board affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the appeal, addressing constitutional and statutory arguments. The Court held that the interest assessed was remedial, not punitive, and thus not a “fine” under the excessive fines clauses of the Eighth Amendment or Article 26. Even assuming the penalties were fines, the Court found they were not grossly disproportional to the offense. The Court also rejected claims that the Board’s structure violated separation of powers or that a jury trial was required. Finally, it held that statutory caps on penalties did not limit the accrual of interest. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Estate of Walsh v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The dispute centered on farmland in Chouteau County, Montana, inherited by Linda Reynolds and Gerald Cook, who formed the Cook-Reynolds Partnership to lease and operate the land. Gerald and his wife, Karin Cook, became involved in probate proceedings in Idaho, where Karin, as personal representative of the Estate of Ann Lafferty Pfeifer-Murphy, misappropriated funds to benefit herself, Gerald, and their company. Gerald executed promissory notes pledging land in Chouteau County as collateral, but these actions did not reference the Partnership. In Idaho, the Estate and its beneficiaries sought restraining orders against Gerald, Karin, their company Pneumex, Inc., and the Partnership, but only Gerald was served regarding the Partnership.Subsequently, Gerald and Karin entered into a settlement agreement confessing to a judgment exceeding $1 million, with Gerald purporting to bind the Partnership as a debtor. The Idaho court entered judgment against the Partnership and others. The Estate domesticated this judgment in Montana’s Twelfth Judicial District Court and sought to execute it against the Partnership. Linda, the managing partner, challenged the Idaho judgment, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and that she had no knowledge or authorization of Gerald’s actions on behalf of the Partnership. The District Court held a hearing but ultimately the Partnership’s motion for relief was deemed denied by operation of rule due to the court’s inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s denial de novo. It held that the Idaho court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Partnership because Gerald did not have authority to bind the Partnership in the proceedings, and Linda neither authorized nor ratified Gerald’s actions. The Montana Supreme Court also found the Partnership’s motion was made within a reasonable time. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial and vacated the Idaho judgment as to the Partnership, while leaving the judgment intact as to other debtors. View "In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy" on Justia Law

A woman was the primary caregiver for her friend, residing in her friend’s condominium for several years. After the friend passed away, ownership of the condo transferred to a living trust, and the caregiver became trustee. She continued living in the condo for a month to recover from illness and remove her belongings. The friend’s nephew contacted local police, claiming the right to evict her, and presented officers with a superseded will listing him as a beneficiary but not mentioning the condo. The officers accompanied the nephew to the condo, told the caregiver she had ten minutes to leave, threatened her with arrest, pushed her out, and took her key.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the case after the caregiver sued various parties, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The court granted summary judgment to some defendants but denied it for the officers, reasoning that the caregiver, as trustee, held a possessory interest in the condo, and the officers’ actions constituted active participation in an eviction without proper legal authority. The court relied on Sixth Circuit precedent to find the seizure unreasonable and the right clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held that the caregiver had a possessory interest in the condo at the time of the eviction, the officers actively participated in the eviction, and their conduct was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because there was no court order or exigent circumstances justifying the seizure. The court further held that existing precedent clearly established the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, leaving the officers subject to further proceedings. View "Bender v. Village of Mariemont" on Justia Law

Wayne Morrison and his children contested the administration and distribution of two family trusts established by Wayne’s parents. The primary asset in both trusts was a fractional ownership of the Farnlun property. Wayne’s sister, Christina Thompson, acted as trustee for both trusts, and her daughter, Carolyn Hastings, was co-trustee of one. Wayne alleged breaches of trust and fiduciary duty, sought an accounting, and later added claims of fraud and partition by sale, naming Christina’s husband and children as additional parties. Christina, as trustee, sought to distribute trust assets in-kind to keep the Farnlun property in the family, while Wayne and his family opposed, favoring a sale and monetary distribution.The parties agreed to consolidate Wayne’s lawsuit and Christina’s petitions before the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Blaine County. The Morrisons moved to remove Christina and Carolyn as trustees, which the court denied. The court granted the Thompsons' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the partition claim, enforcing a no-contest clause that disinherited Wayne from one trust, approving in-kind distribution, and determining trust asset values and interests. The court also awarded attorney fees to the Thompsons against the Morrisons’ share of one trust.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decisions. The Court affirmed all rulings: it found no abuse of discretion in the denial of trustee removal, held the Morrisons lacked standing for partition since they did not have a present possessory interest in the property, and upheld enforcement of the no-contest clause to disinherit Wayne. The Court found no error in the trust asset valuation and distribution and affirmed the attorney fee award and its assessment against the Morrisons’ share. The Supreme Court also awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the Thompsons, to be assessed against the Morrisons’ trust share. View "Morrison v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case maintained residences in Connecticut, Arizona, and Florida, dividing his time among them. After his death, his estate’s executor filed a Connecticut domicile declaration, which triggered an audit by the Department of Revenue Services. The audit division, weighing several factors, determined the decedent was domiciled in Connecticut, making his estate subject to Connecticut estate tax. The commissioner’s appellate division affirmed this determination, and the executor appealed to the Superior Court, arguing the decedent was a Florida domiciliary and raising claims of procedural due process violations during the audit process.Upon de novo review, the Superior Court heard testimony and admitted numerous exhibits regarding the decedent’s personal, social, and property ties to Connecticut and Florida. The court found these connections to be generally equal but concluded that the executor failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was not a Connecticut domiciliary. Thus, it upheld the tax assessment. The court also rejected the executor’s claim of procedural due process violations, holding that any such errors were cured by subsequent review and the de novo trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, under General Statutes § 12-391 (h) (1), the proper standard for an estate challenging a domicile determination in an estate tax appeal is the preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. The court concluded that the Superior Court erred by applying the higher standard, reversed the judgment upholding the commissioner’s assessment, and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of domicile under the correct standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the procedural due process claim, finding that the de novo review cured any procedural deficiencies. View "Daniels v. Commissioner of Revenue Services" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law