Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Two siblings, Ryan and Nancy, disputed the administration of their father Hal’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS), an Idaho storage facility business. Hal, who suffered from progressive dementia before his death, was TPS’s sole voting member and manager, with Nancy assisting in legal and management matters. Several amendments to TPS’s operating agreement changed ownership and management, culminating—after Hal’s death—in Nancy executing further amendments that retroactively transferred Hal’s economic interest to herself and changed accounting records. Nancy, an attorney, served as both Hal’s lawyer and later as personal representative of his estate. Ryan questioned whether Hal’s interest in TPS remained an estate asset and sought access to business records, which Nancy resisted.The siblings litigated issues in two related cases in Bonneville County: a probate case in the Magistrate Court regarding Hal’s estate, and a separate TEDRA (Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act) civil action in District Court initiated by Ryan. Both courts and parties at times treated the cases as consolidated. Ryan’s TEDRA complaint sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and appointment of a receiver, naming Nancy in both her individual and representative capacities and TPS as defendants. The magistrate court dismissed Ryan’s claims and removed Nancy and TPS as parties, finding that estate matters should be decided exclusively in probate. The district court affirmed, denying Ryan’s motions and dismissing his amended complaint, reasoning that Ryan’s claims were matters for probate only.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated both lower courts’ judgments. It held that Ryan’s claims for judicial determination of estate assets and breach of fiduciary duty fall within TEDRA’s definition of “matters” and may be raised in a separate civil action, not only in probate. The Court reversed the orders dismissing claims and parties, remanded the case for further proceedings, and awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to Ryan against Nancy personally. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

A group of unhoused veterans with severe disabilities and mental illnesses sued the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), seeking to restore the West Los Angeles VA Grounds for its intended use: housing disabled veterans. The VA had leased portions of this land to third parties—including the Regents of the University of California, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources LLC—for uses that did not principally benefit veterans. Plaintiffs argued that the lack of supportive housing denied meaningful access to VA healthcare, violated the Rehabilitation Act, and placed them at serious risk of institutionalization. They also challenged VA policies that counted disability benefits as income, restricting access to supportive housing, and claimed that certain land-use agreements violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Additionally, they asserted that the original 1888 Deed created a charitable trust that the VA had breached.The United States District Court for the Central District of California held a four-week bench trial, finding that the VA’s land-use leases with UCLA, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources LLC were unlawful, voided these leases, and enjoined the VA from renegotiating them. The court certified a plaintiff class, ordered the VA to build supportive housing, found the VA and HUD violated the Rehabilitation Act in several respects, and determined that the VA had breached fiduciary duties under a charitable trust theory, invalidating certain leases on that basis as well.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Ninth Circuit held that federal courts retained jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claims, upheld class certification, and affirmed findings of meaningful access, Olmstead, and facial discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act against the VA. The court reversed judgment against HUD, and also reversed the charitable trust claim, finding no judicially enforceable fiduciary duties under the Leasing Act. The court vacated related injunctive relief and judgments based on the charitable trust theory, including those against UCLA, Brentwood, and Bridgeland. The injunctions were modified, allowing the VA to renegotiate leases if compliant with statutory requirements. View "Powers v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves a Nevada-domiciled trust, managed by a Nevada family trust company, whose trustee petitioned the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada to seal confidential information and close all court proceedings under NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256. The district court sealed nearly all documents and concealed the existence of the case, citing concerns over revealing personal, financial, and business information, and later provided limited case information after media inquiries. Several media organizations, having reported on the matter—especially due to its connection to Rupert Murdoch and control over major media holdings—sought intervention to access court records and proceedings, arguing that the First Amendment presumption of public access applied.The probate commissioner recommended allowing media intervention but denying access, and the district court entered an order adopting this recommendation. The court interpreted the statutes as granting automatic and comprehensive confidentiality, finding that privacy and security concerns—heightened by the parties’ public profiles—constituted a compelling interest for sealing and closure. The district court also concluded it lacked discretion to consider redaction as an alternative and held that the statutes’ confidentiality provisions justified the broad closure, even after the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court recognized a First Amendment presumption of access in civil and family court proceedings.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision, holding that NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 permit only provisional sealing and require judicial discretion. The statutes do not automatically justify blanket sealing or closure, nor do they displace the common law or constitutional presumption of openness. The court found that the district court failed to make specific, non-speculative factual findings to justify the sealing and closure and did not adequately consider less restrictive alternatives. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its sealing order and conduct the required analysis for each document and hearing transcript. View "New York Times Co. v. District Court" on Justia Law

William C. Hansen and Verna Hansen, a married couple, established a revocable trust in 1997, with separate shares for each spouse and detailed distribution instructions for each share after their deaths. On the same day, William C. Hansen executed a durable power of attorney naming Verna Hansen as his agent, granting her broad authority over his property. After William C. Hansen’s death in 1999, Verna Hansen, acting as his agent under the power of attorney, amended the trust twice, altering the distribution provisions. Following the deaths of both William and Verna Hansen, a dispute arose between their descendants—on one side, Catherine Hansen Dietemann and her daughter Lauren, and on the other, William Anthony (“Tony”) Hansen—regarding the validity of these amendments and the proper distribution of the trust assets.After Bravera Wealth, the trustee, sought a judicial declaration of beneficiary rights, the District Court of Stark County granted summary judgment in favor of Tony Hansen. The district court concluded that the trust amendments made by Verna Hansen were valid, finding that the broad language in the power of attorney gave her the authority to amend the trust, and that the relevant statutory requirement for express authorization did not apply retroactively. Based on the amended trust terms, the court also applied North Dakota’s antilapse statute to determine the distribution shares among the beneficiaries.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the lower court’s interpretation of North Dakota Century Code § 59-14-02(5), which requires that any powers to amend a trust by an agent under a power of attorney must be expressly stated. The Supreme Court held that the statute applied to this proceeding because it was commenced after July 31, 2007, and that neither the trust nor the power of attorney provided the required express authorization for Verna Hansen to amend the trust. As a result, the court ruled the amendments invalid, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for distribution according to the original trust terms. View "Matter of Hansen Trust" on Justia Law

An estate dispute arose following the death of Marvin C. Lepp, whose heirs included seven children and four grandchildren. Initially, Murray Lepp and Michael Lepp were appointed co-personal representatives of the estate. Over time, disputes developed between the heirs regarding the management of the estate, including the removal of personal representatives, appointment of a successor, and the handling of a contract for deed concerning estate property. After both co-personal representatives were removed, the district court appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative. Additional litigation involved the cancellation of Murray Lepp’s contract for deed, disputes over rent payments related to estate property, and requests for attorney’s fees.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, considered and issued various orders: it removed the co-personal representatives, appointed Dacotah Bank, cancelled Murray Lepp’s contract for deed following summary judgment, denied Murray Lepp’s motions to dismiss and reconsider, resolved some rent disputes, and awarded attorney’s fees to Maureen Lepp. Murray Lepp filed notices of appeal from these orders.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It determined that the appeal from the order appointing Dacotah Bank was untimely under the procedural rules. The court further found that, because the estate’s administration was unsupervised and several claims and petitions remained unresolved in the district court, including issues of partial distribution and final accounting, the orders appealed from were not final and appealable absent certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Since no such certification was sought or granted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Estate of Lepp" on Justia Law

Alan Cartwright was the beneficiary of a family trust managed by his sister, Alice Garner, and her husband, Alan Garner. Over more than a decade, Cartwright, represented by attorneys Jerry Mitchell and later his son Justin Mitchell, brought six lawsuits against the Garners challenging their administration of the trust. All of these lawsuits were ultimately resolved in favor of the Garners. After the trust litigation concluded, Cartwright, dissatisfied with his legal representation, sued the Mitchells for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment. The Garners also sued the Mitchells and their law firms under the tort-of-another doctrine, seeking to recover attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred during the trust litigation.In the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the Mitchells moved to dismiss the Garners’ suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), arguing that the claims were filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the TPPA did not protect attorneys alleged to have acted inconsistently with their client’s interests. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Mitchells had met their initial burden under the TPPA by showing the Garners’ suit related to the underlying trust lawsuits.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that, under the TPPA, an attorney filing a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise the right to petition; rather, the attorney facilitates the client’s exercise of that right. Therefore, the Mitchells failed to demonstrate that the Garners’ suit was filed in response to the Mitchells’ own exercise of the right to petition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, denying the Mitchells’ petition for dismissal under the TPPA. View "Garner v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell" on Justia Law

Melissa Evans passed away in a car accident in 2020, leaving a will that named her former spouse, Scott Evans, as the primary beneficiary and three children—Joshua (her son and appellant), Ryan (her biological son), and Tamra (her former stepdaughter)—as contingent beneficiaries. After her death, Joshua initiated probate proceedings in Rogers County District Court, seeking appointment as personal representative and determination of heirs. The petition identified only Joshua and Ryan as heirs, omitting Scott and Tamra, who were named in the will. Notice of the probate hearing was not provided to Scott or Tamra.The Rogers County District Court admitted the will to probate and issued an order in November 2020 identifying Joshua and Ryan as the sole heirs, devisees, and legatees. Joshua was appointed personal representative but was later removed, with James Greer eventually appointed as successor personal representative. In January 2024, Greer moved to vacate the portion of the 2020 order identifying heirs and beneficiaries, arguing that proper notice had not been given. The court granted the motion in March 2024. In May 2024, after a hearing with all relevant parties, the court modified the order, identifying Tamra as a beneficiary under the will, though the written order recognized Joshua and Ryan as heirs-at-law and all three as beneficiaries.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that Joshua's challenge to the order vacating the prior determination of heirs was untimely, as it was not appealed within the required thirty-day period. Furthermore, the court found that the modified order determining heirs and beneficiaries was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, as it did not affect a substantial right. The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the determination of heirs and beneficiaries remains subject to revision until the final decree of distribution. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EVANS v. GREER" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services’ attempt to recover $5,360.89 in Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a deceased recipient, Florence Pound. The sole heir, Minta Johnson, inherited Pound’s home, the primary estate asset valued at approximately $200,000. After Pound’s death, Johnson, as personal representative, published notice to creditors as required by Montana law. The Department submitted its claim one day after the four-month statutory deadline for creditor claims had expired, and the Probate Court denied the claim as untimely. The estate was then distributed entirely to Johnson.Following the denial of its claim in the Eleventh Judicial District Court (Probate Court), the Department filed a new action in the Fourth Judicial District Court, seeking recovery from Johnson personally under a separate statute, § 53-6-167(2), MCA, which allows the Department to seek reimbursement from anyone who received property from the estate. The District Court granted summary judgment to Johnson, reasoning that the Department’s untimely creditor’s claim barred further action and that issue preclusion applied because the same underlying issue had already been decided in probate.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the matter de novo. It held that the Department’s statutory right under § 53-6-167(2), MCA, to recover Medicaid benefits from an heir is independent of the probate creditor claim process, and that a missed probate deadline does not bar a subsequent action against an heir. The Court further found that issue preclusion did not apply because the probate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Department’s statutory claim against the heir, and the issues in the two proceedings were not identical. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for judgment in favor of the Department. View "Department of Public Health and Human Services v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Following the death of Daniel W. Bodmann, Sr., a dispute arose among his widow, Heather Holden-Bodmann, and his six biological and stepchildren, including Thomas E. Krouse, Jr. (Tom), over the administration of Bodmann Insurance—an estate asset—and the appointment of an executor for Dan’s estate. Dan’s holographic will named all seven children as executors and directed Andrea, one of the children, to maintain the insurance business. After Dan’s death, Andrea relied on Tom to help facilitate the transfer of the business’s clients, but conflict emerged between Tom and Heather regarding access to business records. The court found that Tom’s conduct toward Heather was aggressively disrespectful and contributed to a breakdown in cooperation, resulting in the decline of Bodmann Insurance.In the San Mateo County Superior Court, dueling petitions were filed for appointment as executor and special administrator. After an 11-day bench trial, Judge Buchwald found Tom’s behavior disqualified him from managing the business and denied his appointment as executor, citing his unwarranted aggression toward Heather and its detrimental impact on the estate asset. Interim orders limited Tom’s involvement in the business, allowed Andrea to run it, and later appointed Beth as special administrator and prospective executor after Dan, Jr. withdrew his request to serve.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding Tom’s conduct amounted to mismanagement of the estate under Probate Code sections 8402(a)(3) and 8502(a), thus disqualifying him as executor. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that Tom’s aggressive and disruptive treatment of Heather “mismanaged” Bodmann Insurance, justifying his disqualification as executor. The orders denying Tom’s petition and limiting his participation in the business were affirmed. View "In re Estate of Bodmann" on Justia Law

A man managed his elderly mother’s finances and care after his father’s death. He was given power of attorney and access to her accounts. Over several years, he arranged for large sums to be transferred from her investment and checking accounts to support his struggling business. Additionally, he mortgaged significant parcels of the family’s farmland—held in his mother’s revocable trust—as collateral for loans used primarily for his benefit. Some of these financial moves occurred while his mother’s cognitive abilities were declining, and she was living in assisted care.After concerns about these transactions were raised by a family member, law enforcement investigated. The State charged the man with multiple counts of theft by exploitation of an elder under South Dakota law, related both to the mortgages and the transfers from his mother’s accounts. At trial in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Spink County, a jury found him guilty on all counts. The circuit court imposed fully suspended penitentiary sentences and probation. The defendant appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of the crimes, and also objected to the jury instructions regarding his claimed good faith defense.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find that the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty to support his mother, was entrusted with her property, and appropriated her property for his own benefit with intent to defraud, not in the lawful execution of his trust. The court also determined that the jury was properly instructed on good faith and the State’s burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Clemensen" on Justia Law