Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose over an irrevocable trust established by Priel and Jacob Grimberg, whose primary assets were two residential units. After Jacob’s death, documents were executed naming Priel’s niece, Libby Pour, as successor trustee. Arie Tomer Grimberg, the Grimbergs’ son and trust beneficiary, filed petitions in the San Diego County Superior Court to challenge the validity of these documents, alleging Priel lacked capacity and was manipulated, and further claimed that Pour diverted trust assets for her own benefit, including the improper sale of trust property and personal use of trust proceeds. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for Priel and, after various developments including Pour’s bankruptcy filings, authorized the guardian to record lis pendens on Pour’s real properties to secure potential surcharges for alleged mismanagement.The Superior Court of San Diego County issued several orders regarding the recording and withdrawal of lis pendens, in light of Pour’s bankruptcy filings and subsequent dismissals. After the bankruptcy stay lapsed, the probate court granted the guardian ad litem’s request to re-record lis pendens against Pour’s properties. Pour appealed this order, arguing that it was improper under the lis pendens statutes because there was no real property claim as defined by law, and that the order should be appealable under general Probate Code provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the appeal. The court held that the order authorizing the recording of lis pendens was not appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.39, which provides that such orders must be challenged by writ of mandate within a specified time, not by appeal. The court found that the more specific lis pendens statutes controlled over the general probate provisions. Even if the appeal were treated as a writ petition, it would be untimely. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "Grimberg v. Pour" on Justia Law

After the death of Robert P. Dykes, disputes arose between his estate, managed by his sons as co-personal representatives, and Katya Hutton, his long-term partner. At issue was a condominium in Florida that Mr. Dykes had specifically bequeathed to Ms. Hutton in his will, along with monthly payments and estate-covered expenses during probate. The estate alleged that Ms. Hutton mismanaged the condo’s rental income, failed to provide adequate accountings, and withheld funds, leading to claims of embezzlement, conversion, and concealment of estate assets. Ms. Hutton, who took over the property’s rental management after Mr. Dykes’s death, insisted she provided all relevant documentation and denied withholding any funds.The District Court of Fremont County heard the case after the estate filed five claims against Ms. Hutton. Throughout pretrial discovery, the estate asserted that Ms. Hutton had not complied with discovery orders and sought sanctions, including default judgment under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The district court found discovery disputes unresolved but allowed the case to proceed to a bench trial, offering the estate a continuance to pursue further discovery remedies, which it declined. At trial, both sides presented testimony and exhibits, including rental and financial records. The court found the estate failed to prove that Ms. Hutton had received or concealed unreported rental income, considering Marriott’s occupancy records unreliable and accepting Ms. Hutton’s explanations.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose Rule 37 sanctions, as the estate did not demonstrate a violation of discovery orders or that additional responsive documents existed. The Supreme Court further found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings, affirming the denial of all claims against Ms. Hutton. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dykes v. Hutton" on Justia Law

Two South Carolina corporations, owned and operated by Stephen P. Mantell, assist individuals with probate matters by serving as personal representatives, conservators, guardians, and attorneys in fact under powers of attorney. They occasionally acted as trustees of trusts but have since discontinued such services. Complaints were filed with the South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions alleging these corporations were conducting a “trust business” without Board authorization, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 34-21-10.The Board sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to stop the companies from operating as trustees or in other fiduciary roles without approval. The Master-in-Equity for Georgetown County granted a declaratory judgment that the corporations could not act as trustees without Board authorization and permanently enjoined them from doing so. However, the court declined to extend the injunction to their roles as guardian, conservator, or attorney in fact, finding these did not constitute a “trust business” under the statute.The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “trust business” under § 34-21-10 included all fiduciary services, not just acting as trustee, and thus required Board approval for the corporations’ roles as guardian, conservator, personal representative, and attorney in fact. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that the statutory term “trust business” does not encompass serving as a guardian, conservator, personal representative, or attorney in fact. The Court found that these activities are not defined as “trust business” under South Carolina law and are adequately regulated by the Probate Code and probate courts. The main holding is that the corporations’ non-trustee fiduciary roles do not require Board authorization under § 34-21-10. View "SC Board of Financial Instituions v. CDM Corp, Inc." on Justia Law

A married couple established a revocable family trust in 2002, which allowed either spouse to revoke the trust by providing written notice to the other trustee or by withdrawing their interest in the community property. In 2019, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage and subsequently executed a notarized notice revoking her interest in the community trust, transferring her interest to a new trust in her name. She served her husband with the revocation by mail, as required by the trust instrument, but did not file the notice with the court. No assets were withdrawn from the community trust. The husband received actual notice but objected to the revocation’s validity due to the lack of court filing. He did not challenge the revocation in family court or probate court while his wife was alive. After her death in 2024 and the dismissal of the marital dissolution case, he petitioned the probate court to declare the revocation invalid and confirm himself as sole trustee.The Superior Court of Ventura County reviewed the petition, with objections filed by the daughter, who was trustee of the wife’s trust. The probate court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and the petition itself, finding that the husband was not prejudiced by the revocation, as he had received actual notice and his property interests were unaffected. The court determined that the wife had substantially complied with the statutory requirements by serving notice, fulfilling the purpose of the relevant statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the probate court’s judgment. The Court held that failure to file the revocation in court did not render it void when the other spouse had received actual notice, as substantial compliance with statutory notice requirements satisfied the statute’s objectives. The Court also held that an evidentiary hearing was not required because there were no disputed material facts. View "Jackson v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among members of the O’Farrell family and related entities regarding farmland, family trusts, and a sale of land to a third-party corporation. Paul O’Farrell, having longstanding involvement with the family land and farming operations, brought a lawsuit naming himself, his estate, and Skyline Cattle Company as plaintiffs. He asserted claims for declaratory relief, rescission of a land sale to Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., and damages for alleged torts. Paul argued he was acting not only in his individual capacity but also on behalf of the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, VOR, Inc., and the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, based on allegations of undue influence and mismanagement involving his brother Kelly and his father Raymond.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Grant County, South Dakota, previously granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing VOR and the Estate as plaintiffs on the grounds that Paul lacked authority to act on their behalf. The court also denied Paul’s request to conduct further discovery under Rule 56(f), his motion to amend the complaint, and his request for a physical and mental examination of Raymond under Rule 35(a). The court additionally awarded attorney fees to certain defendants, finding Paul’s action frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, agreeing that Paul lacked authority to sue on behalf of VOR and the Estate and could not seek rescission of the land sale as he was not a party to the contract. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of additional discovery. However, it vacated the circuit court’s denial of the motion to amend the complaint (insofar as it prevented joining VOR and Raymond as defendants), the denial of the Rule 35(a) examination, and the award of attorney fees, finding those decisions either premature or not sufficiently supported by the record. View "Estate Of O'Farrell v. O'Farrell" on Justia Law

After the death of Victoria H. Smith, a dispute arose over the administration of her estate. In 1990, Victoria executed a holographic will in the presence of her son, Vernon K. Smith, which left her entire estate to him and disinherited her other children. This will was later challenged by one of her other children, who alleged undue influence by Vernon. The will was invalidated, and the court determined that Victoria died intestate. The estate was then placed under supervised administration, leading to years of contentious litigation and multiple appeals. During the probate proceedings, Vernon, acting pro se, filed various motions, including attempts to remove the personal representative (PR), disqualify the PR’s counsel and the presiding district judge, authorize the farming of estate property, and contest sanctions imposed upon him.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, denied Vernon’s petitions and motions, finding them unsupported by evidence or law, and in some cases, frivolous. The court also imposed sanctions and denied his requests to disqualify the judge and counsel. Vernon was further declared a vexatious litigant in related proceedings. Vernon appealed these rulings to the Idaho Supreme Court, but faced procedural hurdles, including deficiencies in his appellate briefs, multiple defective notices of appeal, and failure to heed prior admonitions regarding briefing standards.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that Vernon’s appellate briefing did not comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a), as it lacked adequate factual statements, coherent argument, legal authority, and identification of alleged errors. The Court declined to address the merits of his claims, holding that all assignments of error were waived due to briefing defects. The Court therefore affirmed all challenged orders and judgments of the district court and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the PR under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without foundation. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Smith" on Justia Law

A 65-year-old man, referred to as Robert, was found by a food delivery worker lying on the floor in his home and subsequently brought to a hospital. The hospital petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and an order for protective placement, citing Robert’s history of stroke, seizure disorder, anxiety disorder, and aphasia, along with significant confusion, memory loss, and poor judgment. The circuit court entered orders for guardianship and protective placement, determining that an unlocked unit in a nursing/rehabilitation facility or a community-based residential facility was the least restrictive placement consistent with Robert’s needs. Robert was later transferred to an adult family home.Following an annual review, Robert’s guardian reported that he still met the statutory criteria for protective placement and requested an independent evaluation, modification or termination of the placement, appointment of adversary counsel, and a due process hearing. The Racine County Circuit Court appointed counsel and ordered an independent evaluation. At the hearing, the court credited the psychologist’s testimony regarding Robert’s diagnoses and cognitive impairments, finding that the County had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Robert met the criteria for continued protective placement. Robert appealed, contending that the County failed to establish a substantial risk of harm and the permanency of his disability. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case, holding that Robert’s appeal was not moot because his financial liability for care costs under the 2024 order persisted as a collateral consequence. Applying a mixed standard of review, the court upheld the circuit court’s factual findings as not clearly erroneous and, upon de novo review, concluded there was sufficient evidence to support continuation of protective placement. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Racine County v. R. P. L." on Justia Law

Three siblings became co-beneficiaries of their late mother’s revocable trust, which was to be divided equally among them. The trust included two properties in New Hampshire: a longstanding family home and an adjacent parcel, as well as a nearby home that one sibling, acting as trustee, had purchased for their mother using her funds. After their mother’s death, the trustee resided at the newly acquired property, funded renovations with trust assets, and did not pay rent. Disputes arose among the siblings over how to distribute the real estate, prompting the trustee to file a petition for partition. One sibling counterclaimed, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the trustee.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division reviewed the petition and counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the court awarded the family home and adjacent parcel to the sibling who requested it, and the renovated property to the trustee. The court calculated the value of the renovated property to include both improvements funded by the trust and the period of rent-free occupancy. It found the trustee had breached fiduciary duties by refusing to distribute property and by prioritizing personal interests over the trust’s beneficiaries, ordering him to reimburse the trust for all litigation-related attorney’s fees and costs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the probate court’s rulings. It held that the probate court acted within its broad equitable powers in distributing the properties as it did, and that its findings were supported by the record. The Supreme Court further concluded that the probate court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims, since they directly concerned the administration and distribution of trust assets. Finally, the Supreme Court determined that specific challenges to the remedy ordered for breach of fiduciary duty were either waived or not preserved for appellate review. View "Moffat v. Srebro" on Justia Law

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

In this case, a trust was established by Frank Garrett, Jr. in South Dakota in 2006, naming his wife as the beneficiary and a South Dakota bank as trustee. The trust applied for and obtained a $10 million life insurance policy on Frank's life, funded by a nonrecourse premium finance loan. After several years, the policy was surrendered to the lender, which then sold the policy in the secondary market. Eventually, Viva Capital Trust acquired the policy, paid the premiums, and received the death benefit after Frank died in 2019. Frank’s estate, administered by his son, challenged the transaction, claiming it was part of a stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) scheme, violating South Dakota’s insurable interest statute and public policy against wagering on human life.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Viva, finding that the trust was validly established, the insurance policy was properly issued and delivered to the trust, and the policy complied with South Dakota insurable interest requirements. The court also determined that the estate’s counterclaims, challenging the trust’s validity and seeking recovery of death benefits, were barred by the statute of repose, which prohibits such actions more than one year after the settlor’s death. The court awarded litigation costs to Viva.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Viva, holding that the estate’s counterclaims regarding the trust’s validity were barred by the statute of repose, and that the insurance policy complied with South Dakota’s insurable interest statutes. The Supreme Court also found no error in denying summary judgment to the estate. However, it reversed in part the award of costs and remanded for further proceedings to ensure only authorized costs were included. View "Viva Capital Trust V. Garrett" on Justia Law