Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After the death of Laurie Maria Brocato, her nephew submitted a 2019 olographic testament for probate, which left most of her estate to him. The district court ordered that this will be recorded, filed, and executed, and he was named executor. Later, Brocato’s surviving spouse, Lisa Vickers, contested the 2019 testament and presented a new four-page olographic testament, dated across three consecutive days in 2021 and written in a bound notebook, which revoked previous wills and left the estate primarily to Vickers.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans found that the 2021 testament met the requirements for an olographic will under Louisiana law, including being entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator. The court annulled the probate of the 2019 will, removed the nephew as executor, and admitted the 2021 testament to probate. On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the testament’s multiple dates and the location of the signature did not invalidate it, especially in light of legislative amendments intended to relax formal requirements and prioritize testamentary intent.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case after granting writs to address whether the 2021 testament satisfied the statutory form requirements, especially considering the 2025 amendment to La. C.C. art. 1575, which applied retroactively. The Supreme Court held that the 2021 testament was valid under the amended statute. The court found the document was entirely written, dated, and signed by the decedent, even though the signature was at the top of the second page and dates appeared throughout. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the 2021 testament’s probate, and remanded for further proceedings. View "SUCCESSION OF BROCATO" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a revocable trust created by Marsha Milot in 2009, with herself as trustee and lifelong beneficiary. After Milot stepped down from her trustee role due to alleged incapacity, her daughter, Valerie Wiederhorn, and her husband, Curtis Hennigar, became co-trustees. Jennifer Milot, a stepdaughter and remainder beneficiary, petitioned for access to the trust instrument and additional information about the trust’s administration, including documentation related to settlor’s incapacity and trustee actions. She alleged improper denial of her requests, and further claimed that Wiederhorn made unauthorized loans to herself from the trust and retaliated against Jennifer for seeking information.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Probate Division, initially ordered co-trustees to provide the trust instrument and unsealed it after review. When Jennifer sought further information and asserted she was now a qualified beneficiary due to settlor’s incapacitation, the court found the initial relief was “more or less” satisfied. It declined to invoke equitable powers or compel additional disclosures, relying on 14A V.S.A. § 603, which states that while a trust is revocable, beneficiaries’ rights are subject to settlor’s control. The court ultimately dismissed Jennifer’s petition, concluding she was not entitled to the information sought and that co-trustees owed no duty to her at that time.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal. It held that, under Vermont Trust Code § 813 and § 603, Jennifer was not entitled to trust information while the trust remained revocable and settlor was alive. However, the Court found the probate division erred by not considering Jennifer’s request to amend her petition to seek removal of co-trustee Wiederhorn under § 706, and reversed and remanded the case for the probate division to address that request. View "In re Trust of Milot" on Justia Law

After both parents contracted COVID-19 in 2020, they asked their daughter to move from Tennessee to Alabama to care for them. In exchange for her agreement to relocate and provide care, the parents promised to convey an interest in their Orange Beach condominium to the daughter. The parents, acting in their individual capacities, executed a deed purporting to transfer an interest in the property to themselves and their daughter as joint tenants. The daughter was not aware that the condominium was, in fact, owned by a revocable trust for which the parents served as trustees.The parents later sought to annul the deed in the Baldwin Circuit Court, arguing that the deed was ineffective because the property was owned by the trust and they had not executed the deed as trustees. They also contended that the conveyance was voidable under Alabama law because a material part of the consideration was the daughter’s promise to support them. The daughter sought reformation of the deed to reflect the parents' trustee status and counterclaimed for fraud and breach of warranty. The Baldwin Circuit Court annulled the deed and dismissed the daughter’s counterclaims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the controlling statute, § 8-9-12, Ala. Code 1975, permitted annulment of a real property conveyance when a material part of the consideration was an agreement to provide support, regardless of whether the grantor acted as an individual or trustee. The Court further held that annulment of the deed extinguished any warranties arising from the conveyance and rendered the fraud counterclaim untenable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment, upholding annulment of the deed and dismissal of the counterclaims. View "Schumpert v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Fifteen local United Methodist Church congregations in Alabama initiated civil actions against the Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., seeking to quiet title to the church properties they occupied and used for worship. The Conference and its board of trustees joined the cases and filed counterclaims, asserting that the properties were either owned by the Conference’s board or held by the local churches in trust for the Conference or its board. Both sides relied primarily on secular documents, such as deeds and corporate records, though the Conference also referenced trust provisions in the Book of Discipline.Trial courts in various counties reviewed the motions by the local churches to dismiss the Conference’s counterclaims, arguing that the courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, which prohibits courts from resolving matters of church doctrine or internal governance. The trial courts granted the motions to dismiss the counterclaims but allowed the local churches’ quiet-title claims to proceed. The Conference and its board then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for writs of mandamus, seeking to overturn the dismissals.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that the trial courts erred in dismissing the counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court held that the property disputes could be resolved under neutral principles of law without requiring the courts to decide ecclesiastical matters. Because both parties relied on the same secular materials, and the counterclaims did not require adjudication of religious doctrine, the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine did not bar jurisdiction. The Supreme Court issued writs of mandamus, directing the trial courts to vacate their orders dismissing the Conference’s counterclaims. View "Mt. Zion of Autauga County, Inc. v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc." on Justia Law

Jay Bryant initiated an action to partition a 40-acre parcel of land, originally conveyed in 1978 to his parents, Lenora and Paul Bryant, as joint tenants. Upon their divorce in 1991, a property settlement stipulated that Paul would receive the parcel as his own, and Lenora would receive a different property. Although the divorce decree incorporated this agreement, Lenora never deeded her interest in the 40 acres to Paul. Paul subsequently transferred his interest to a third party, who then conveyed the property to Jay and his brother Jed. After Paul’s death in 2021 and during probate, a title report revealed that Lenora still legally owned an undivided one-half interest in the property.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, allowed Jay to amend his complaint to add Lenora and bifurcated the quiet title and partition actions. At trial, the court took judicial notice of the divorce file and stipulation and reviewed the chain of warranty deeds. After considering testimony and evidence, the circuit court found that Jay and Jed had a legal interest in the property and that Lenora’s claim was inconsistent with her prior agreement. The court applied judicial estoppel to preclude Lenora from asserting a continuing interest, extinguished her claim, and quieted title in favor of Jay and Jed. The court issued a final judgment on the quiet title action under SDCL 15-6-54(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that Jay had standing under SDCL 21-41-1 to pursue a quiet title action and that the claim was not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-6. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of judicial estoppel, concluding Lenora was precluded from asserting an ownership interest after accepting the benefits of the stipulated property settlement. The circuit court’s judgment quieting title in favor of Jay and Jed was affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

After the death of Theresa A. Meyers, questions arose regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees charged to her estate and a revocable trust she had established. The personal representative of Meyers’ estate and cotrustees of her trust initially agreed with the law firm representing them to a percentage-based fee, first at 2% and later reduced to 1% of the gross assets. Following the discovery of additional assets and the likelihood of litigation, the law firm and the remaining fiduciaries entered a written agreement switching to hourly billing. One cotrustee, however, did not sign this modification. After the law firm completed its services, some beneficiaries and devisees challenged the attorney fees as excessive, prompting a review under Nebraska law.The County Court for Douglas County held a consolidated hearing and found that the attorney fees charged by the law firm were fair, reasonable, necessary, and not excessive, taking into account the complexity of the estate, the services performed, and expert testimony. The county court also found no conflict of interest in the firm’s representation of both the personal representative and the cotrustees. The court did not address whether the written fee modification was effective. Dissatisfied, the challengers appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals determined that the written hourly fee agreement was ineffective because not all cotrustees had consented, as required by the trust. The appellate court thus applied the original 1% fee structure and found that this amount was reasonable. The law firm sought further review.The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by addressing the effectiveness of the written fee agreement, as the challengers had not properly raised the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court found no error on the record regarding the reasonableness of the fees as determined by the county court. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with directions to affirm the county court’s order. View "In re Estate of Meyers" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among four adult brothers regarding the division of their parents’ estate. After their mother’s death, two of the brothers, Brittin and Kent, reported to the San Diego Police Department that their mother was missing, despite knowing she had died of natural causes. Their intention was to cast suspicion on their siblings, Todd and Wade, with whom they had a contentious relationship. The police briefly investigated before learning of the mother’s death and closing the matter. The phone call from the police deeply distressed Wade, a recovering alcoholic who had been sober for 15 years. Within a week, Wade relapsed, drove his motorcycle while intoxicated, and died in a crash. A psychologist testified at trial that the distress caused by the police inquiry precipitated Wade’s relapse.The Superior Court of San Diego County presided over a jury trial in which Todd, both individually and as Wade’s successor in interest, pursued claims for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligence, and conspiracy. The jury found Brittin and Kent liable for negligence and IIED, and determined their conduct was a substantial factor in causing Wade severe emotional distress and his subsequent death. Damages were awarded to both Wade’s estate and Todd, including punitive damages. The defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial were denied.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendants conceded the jury’s factual findings but argued that their actions were not, as a matter of law, the legal cause of Wade’s death. The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that under the broader scope of liability for intentional torts, the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress was a legal cause of Wade’s death. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the denial of JNOV, upholding all damages awards. View "Fisher v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Several charitable trusts were established between 1930 and 1969, each naming Memorial Hospital in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as a beneficiary. The trusts specified the use of funds for purposes such as maintaining “free beds” or supporting general hospital operations. Memorial Hospital operated as an acute care hospital until financial difficulties led to its closure in 2018, at which point it ceased providing inpatient and emergency services. Some outpatient services continued on the campus, but Memorial Hospital was no longer a functioning hospital. Bank of America, as trustee, sought judicial guidance under the cy près doctrine to designate new beneficiaries for the trusts whose purposes could no longer be fulfilled due to the hospital’s closure.Upon review, the Providence County Superior Court found that the closure of Memorial Hospital rendered the trusts’ original purposes impossible, and that each settlor evidenced a general charitable intent. The court conducted a bench trial, considering expert testimony, historical context, and proposals from various organizations, including Kent County Hospital, The Miriam Hospital Foundation, and Progreso Latino. The trustee and several parties proposed a split between The Miriam Hospital Foundation and Progreso Latino, while others argued for Kent County Hospital as the successor beneficiary. The court ultimately rejected both proposals, finding that neither alternative met the settlors’ intent to support actual hospital care.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case on appeal. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that the cy près doctrine applied and that The Miriam Hospital, as an acute care hospital offering inpatient and emergency services, was the closest alternative beneficiary to fulfill the original charitable purposes. The Court clarified that the trust proceeds must be used by Miriam Hospital for inpatient and emergency care, consistent with the settlors’ intent. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Neronha" on Justia Law

A 76-year-old man petitioned to adopt a 40-year-old woman whom he had known for six years. The parties participated in evidentiary hearings, and a court-appointed investigator prepared a report. Testimony revealed inconsistencies regarding the stated purpose of the adoption, particularly concerning the petitioner’s claim that the adoption would allow the adoptee to care for him, despite evidence that the adoptee’s health issues prevented her from working. The court also noted that the adoptee was unaware adoption would sever her legal relationship with her mother, with whom she lived and received financial support. Additionally, concerns arose regarding the petitioner’s mild cognitive impairment and unaccounted trust distributions.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the petition and evidence. The court found that the adoption was not in the best interests of the adoptee, considering the potential negative impact on her relationship with her biological mother, possible contentious inheritance issues, and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s stated goals. The court also considered the medical evidence and concluded the doctor’s report did not sufficiently address the petitioner’s cognitive capacity or awareness of the adoption’s implications. Based on these findings, the court denied the adoption petition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and reviewed the denial of the adoption decree for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, nor did the court abuse its discretion or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of K.J.K." on Justia Law

Elijah and Mary Stiny established a trust that, upon their deaths, divided the estate into shares for designated beneficiaries. Mary Stiny amended the trust after her husband’s death, naming her mother, Della Moore, as beneficiary of a 2.66% share. She also specified that if Della Moore predeceased her, the gift to Della Moore would lapse. Della Moore died before Mary Stiny, creating a dispute over who should receive this share. Della Moore’s children entered into an agreement with the trustee to distribute their mother’s share to them, but the trust’s terms did not list them as beneficiaries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed a motion for approval of this settlement. The district court found that the trust was unambiguous: since Della Moore predeceased Mary Stiny, her share lapsed and, under California Probate Code § 21111(b), was to be distributed to the remaining named beneficiaries in proportion to their interests, not to Della Moore’s children. The court also found that the parties’ settlement would improperly modify the trust and that not all beneficiaries had consented to such a modification as required by law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the Survivor’s Trust unambiguously provided that Della Moore’s gift would lapse if she predeceased Mary Stiny, and that the anti-lapse provision did not apply due to explicit language to the contrary. The court further held that the requirements for modification of an irrevocable trust under California law were not met, as not all beneficiaries consented and the reasons advanced for modification did not outweigh the trust’s material purpose. The judgment denying approval of the settlement was affirmed. View "Stiny Trusts v. Robins" on Justia Law