Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this will contest, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court on remand granting Bender's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial, holding that the jury verdict should be reinstated.Upon the death of Russell Tank, Jason Bender, Russell's neighbor and farm tenant, offered Russell's last will and testament, which named Bender as the Estate's sole heir and personal representative, for probate. Plaintiffs, Russell's four children, brought this action challenging the validity of the will based on a lack of testamentary capacity, insane delusions, and undue influence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court remanded on the undue influence claim brought by daughter Sherri Castro. The jury returned a verdict for Sherri, finding that Bender unduly influenced Russell's will. The circuit court granted Bender's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bender unduly influenced the will and that Bender must be removed from serving as personal representative of Russell's Estate. View "In re Estate of Tank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge finding Jane Furnas in contempt for failing either to refinance or to list property for sale according to an agreement, holding that there was no error.Furnas, who together with Anthony Cirone owned property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, filed a petition to partition the property. The parties settled on an agreement wherein Cirone would make monthly payments to Furnas, who would either keep the mortgage current and refinance or list the property for sale. The agreement was incorporated in a decree. Anthony later died and Plaintiff, his daughter acting as personal representative of his estate, filed a complaint for contempt alleging that Furnas had failed to comply with the terms of the decree. The judge found Furnas in civil contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Furnas's right of survivorship was terminated and that the agreement was enforceable by Cirone's estate. View "Furnas v. Cirone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Ryan Adamson's motion for relief and an order granting Sylvia Moody's petition for subsequent administration of the Estate of Victor Starkel, holding that the district court did not err by reopening the Estate pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016.After Starkel died his daughter, Moody, filed for an informal testate probate. Eight years after the district court closed the Estate, Moody initiated this lawsuit against Adamson, with whom Starkel had entered into a written stock pledge agreement (SPA), claiming conversion, security fraud, and other claims. Adamson challenged Moody's standing on the basis that the Estate was closed. Moody subsequently petitioned to re-open the Estate and to be re-appointed as the personal representative. The district court granted the motion pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016 and reopened the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the Estate on the basis that the SPA constituted a subsequently discovered asset. View "In re Estate of Starkel" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma district court ordered the admission to probate of a will executed in 2018 by Velda Mae Rivenburg, after denying challenges to the will brought by the testator's son. Velda Mae was survived by one son, Appellant Earl Austin Rivenburg (Austin), and one daughter, Appellee Bridget Ciliberti (Bridget). In April 2018, Rivenburg fell ill. Bridget traveled from her home in Tennessee to help her mother. Austin, who was stationed overseas as a civilian employee with United States Government, obtained leave from his post to travel to Oklahoma. That summer, after Austin returned to his overseas job, he was contacted by a long-time friend of Rivenburg's, Karen Heizer. Heizer was concerned that Bridget might be manipulating their mother into selling or mortgaging real estate to help Bridget pay off debt. Austin called his mother in June 2018 and broached the subject. Rivenburg became angry and hung up. Within weeks of returning to his job, Austin received notice that Bridget had initiated guardianship proceedings for their mother. The topic had never been discussed while Austin was in Oklahoma. Writing to the court, Austin objected to Bridget being appointed guardian, listed examples of what he believed to be a history of Bridget's financial manipulation of their mother. The guardianship was abandoned as soon as Rivenburg decided to change her will in September 2018. This will differed considerably from one Rivenburg had made in 2014, substantially reducing the property bequeathed to Austin in favor of Bridget. After Rivenburg's death in early 2020, Bridget sought to probate the 2018 will and have herself named personal representative. Austin challenged the will, claiming it was the product of fraud and undue influence on Bridget's part. The trial court granted demurrers to both of Austin's claims and admitted Rivenburg's 2018 will to probate. Austin appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the Court of Civil Appeals erred by conflating the concepts of fraud and undue influence, and by treating certain facts as essentially dispositive as to both. "While the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Austin as challenger to the will, the burden of producing evidence to rebut an inference of fraud shifted to Bridget. Accordingly, the trial court's order admitting Rivenburg's will to probate is reversed, and the case is remanded to give Bridget an opportunity to present evidence on the issue of fraud." View "Rivenburg v. Cilberti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant Barbara Lembo in this action brought by beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust and their mother alleging that Defendant breached her fiduciary duty as trustee, holding that the allegations in the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duties under Connecticut law.The will of the decedent bequeathed the residue of his estate to an amended and restated revocable trust benefitting his three children. At issue was the proper administration of a portion of the decedent's residuary estate that had not yet been distributed to the trust. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendant, among other things, breached her fiduciary duty by failing to protect and collect trust property. The trial court concluded that Defendant, as a trustee, had no duty to take any action prior to the distribution of the residuary assets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Defendant owed the trust beneficiaries a duty to collect and protect the prospective trust property in the residuary estate; and (2) the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Defendant for breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee. View "Barash v. Lembo" on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Daniel Barefoot, as a personal representative and legatee of the estate of Danny Bryant Barefoot, appealed a probate court order that determined the estate of Donna Viola Barefoot was entitled to a share of Danny's estate on the basis that Donna was an omitted spouse under § 43-8-90, Ala. Code 1975. Danny executed a will in August 2012, while married to Merita Hall Barefoot. In the will, other than a specific bequest to his and Merita's son, Daniel, Danny devised his residuary estate to Merita. Danny specified that, if Merita predeceased him, his estate would be shared jointly in equal shares by Daniel and Marcie Jenkins, whom he identified in the will as his stepdaughter. Danny also named Daniel and Marcie as corepresentatives of his estate. Merita died on September 6, 2014. On January 21, 2018, Danny married Donna. Danny and Donna did not execute a prenuptial agreement, and Danny did not execute a new will or a codicil to his previous will to include any testamentary dispositions to Donna. Danny died on September 5, 2021. Twelve days later, on September 17, 2021, Donna died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the appeal was from a nonfinal order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Barefoot v. Cole" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals concerned the division of certain assets in the estate of R.E. Ivey ("R.E."). At the time of his death, R.E. was survived by his wife, Edwyna Ivey ("Edwyna"), and his four children from a previous marriage -- Sharyl Eddins ("Sharyl"), William Ivey ("Robbie"), Dell Ivey Moody ("Dell"), and Ty Ivey ("Ty"). In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, Mary Jo Fletcher, as the personal representative of Edwyna's estate, appealed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna's claims for certain statutory allowances were totally offset by the value of certain assets that Edwyna had retained from R.E.'s estate. She also appealed the circuit court's determination that three of Edwyna's stepchildren, Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell, were entitled to recover on their claims of conversion and breach of trust against Edwyna. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, Sharyl, individually and as the executrix of R.E.'s estate, Dell, and Robbie filed a cross-appeal challenging the circuit court's determination that Edwyna was entitled to funds contained in an account known by the parties as the "farm account." In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order insofar as it denied Edwyna's claims for homestead, exempt-property, and family allowances pursuant to §§ 43-8-110 through -113 on the basis that those claims were completely offset by the value of the pickup truck. However, the Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it determined that Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell were entitled to recover the funds held in the POD accounts, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, the Court affirmed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna, as R.E.'s surviving spouse, was entitled to the funds that Dell withdrew from the farm account. View "Fletcher v. Eddins, et al." on Justia Law

Arthur Smith, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Sammie Wells Smith, appealed a judgment entered in favor of Michael Smith. Sammie's remaining living children were Michael, Arthur, Larry Smith, Charles Smith, Brenda Smith Watson, Sarah Smith, and Elizabeth Smith. During her lifetime, Sammie owned two tracts of land; her house was located on one of those tracts of land. On September 13, 2013, Sammie executed a general warranty deed in which she conveyed the property to Michael and Watson but reserved a life estate for herself. On October 12, 2015, Michael and Watson executed a "Corrective Deed Jointly for Life with Remainder to Survivor," in which they created a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, subject to Sammie's life estate. On October 21, 2015, Sammie executed another deed in which she conveyed her life estate to Michael. On that same date, Watson executed a "Life Estate Deed," in which she conveyed a life estate in the property to Michael. Sammie died on February 15, 2018. Arthur was living in Sammie's house at the time of her death, and he remained in her house after her death. Michael and Watson commenced an ejectment seeking to remove Arthur from the property. During a bench trial, Michael and Watson presented evidence indicating that Sammie had executed deeds conveying the property to them and relinquishing her life estate; and that they were the exclusive owners of the property. However, Larry, Elizabeth, Charles, and Sarah testified that the signatures on the deeds were not Sammie's. Testimony was also presented indicating that Sammie had repeatedly stated that she wanted the property to be divided equally among her seven living children; that Sammie had wanted the property to be available if any of those children needed somewhere to stay. Ultimately, the trial court held that Michael and Watson were not entitled to relief and denied their ejectment petition. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions that the trial court "join [the remaining heirs] as [parties] to this action... If the trial court determined that any of the remaining heirs could not be made a party to the action, it "should consider the reasons [why any such heir] cannot be joined and decide whether the action should proceed in [any such heir's] absence." View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Douglas Martinson II and Caleb Ballew ("the lawyers") represented Lesley Hatch in probate court in a dispute over the guardianship of her aunt, Brenda Cummings. During the proceedings, the lawyers withdrew from representing Hatch and filed a claim for attorney fees to be paid from Cummings's estate. The probate court entered a judgment on the merits of the underlying case and denied the lawyers' claim for fees. Over 30 days later, the lawyers moved the probate court to reconsider their claim. After a hearing, the probate court reversed course and entered an order awarding them their fees. Elizabeth Cummings Hill, acting on behalf of Cummings under a power of attorney, appealed. She argued the probate court did not have jurisdiction to grant the lawyers' motion because it was untimely. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the appeal, with instructions to vacate the order awarding attorney fees. View "Hill v. Martinson, et al." on Justia Law