Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Mark executed powers of attorney appointing his spouse, Dorothy, as his agent for health care and property. He also executed a will. Mark revoked the will and executed a new one as he was dying from cancer 17 years later. Mark’s sisters contested the new will because it changed Mark’s disposition of his interests in certain family businesses to their detriment and to the benefit of Dorothy. They allege that Dorothy, as the primary beneficiary, exerted undue influence over Mark to procure the preparation of the new will. Mark's wealth had come from a family business, founded by their father; Mark and Dorothy were married 24 years and had no children.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgment for Dorothy. What constitutes undue influence depends on the circumstances of each case, and the fiduciary-relationship presumption must be applied with caution in the context of marital relationships. Although Mark’s power of attorney for property created a fiduciary relationship with Dorothy as a matter of law, the circuit court’s directed finding that Dorothy did not procure the preparation of the will was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court reiterated its repudiation of the debilitated-testator theory of presumptive undue influence. View "In re Estate of Coffman" on Justia Law

Appellants Walmart and New Hampshire Insurance Company appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s determination that the employee’s widow, Sue Jordan, was entitled to medical and death benefits. More specifically, they challenged the Commission’s application of the presumption set forth in Idaho Code section 72-228 where there was unrebutted prima facie evidence indicating that the employee’s death arose in the course of his employment. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Jordan v. Walmart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

In this will contest, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court on remand granting Bender's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial, holding that the jury verdict should be reinstated.Upon the death of Russell Tank, Jason Bender, Russell's neighbor and farm tenant, offered Russell's last will and testament, which named Bender as the Estate's sole heir and personal representative, for probate. Plaintiffs, Russell's four children, brought this action challenging the validity of the will based on a lack of testamentary capacity, insane delusions, and undue influence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court remanded on the undue influence claim brought by daughter Sherri Castro. The jury returned a verdict for Sherri, finding that Bender unduly influenced Russell's will. The circuit court granted Bender's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bender unduly influenced the will and that Bender must be removed from serving as personal representative of Russell's Estate. View "In re Estate of Tank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge finding Jane Furnas in contempt for failing either to refinance or to list property for sale according to an agreement, holding that there was no error.Furnas, who together with Anthony Cirone owned property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, filed a petition to partition the property. The parties settled on an agreement wherein Cirone would make monthly payments to Furnas, who would either keep the mortgage current and refinance or list the property for sale. The agreement was incorporated in a decree. Anthony later died and Plaintiff, his daughter acting as personal representative of his estate, filed a complaint for contempt alleging that Furnas had failed to comply with the terms of the decree. The judge found Furnas in civil contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Furnas's right of survivorship was terminated and that the agreement was enforceable by Cirone's estate. View "Furnas v. Cirone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Ryan Adamson's motion for relief and an order granting Sylvia Moody's petition for subsequent administration of the Estate of Victor Starkel, holding that the district court did not err by reopening the Estate pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016.After Starkel died his daughter, Moody, filed for an informal testate probate. Eight years after the district court closed the Estate, Moody initiated this lawsuit against Adamson, with whom Starkel had entered into a written stock pledge agreement (SPA), claiming conversion, security fraud, and other claims. Adamson challenged Moody's standing on the basis that the Estate was closed. Moody subsequently petitioned to re-open the Estate and to be re-appointed as the personal representative. The district court granted the motion pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016 and reopened the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the Estate on the basis that the SPA constituted a subsequently discovered asset. View "In re Estate of Starkel" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma district court ordered the admission to probate of a will executed in 2018 by Velda Mae Rivenburg, after denying challenges to the will brought by the testator's son. Velda Mae was survived by one son, Appellant Earl Austin Rivenburg (Austin), and one daughter, Appellee Bridget Ciliberti (Bridget). In April 2018, Rivenburg fell ill. Bridget traveled from her home in Tennessee to help her mother. Austin, who was stationed overseas as a civilian employee with United States Government, obtained leave from his post to travel to Oklahoma. That summer, after Austin returned to his overseas job, he was contacted by a long-time friend of Rivenburg's, Karen Heizer. Heizer was concerned that Bridget might be manipulating their mother into selling or mortgaging real estate to help Bridget pay off debt. Austin called his mother in June 2018 and broached the subject. Rivenburg became angry and hung up. Within weeks of returning to his job, Austin received notice that Bridget had initiated guardianship proceedings for their mother. The topic had never been discussed while Austin was in Oklahoma. Writing to the court, Austin objected to Bridget being appointed guardian, listed examples of what he believed to be a history of Bridget's financial manipulation of their mother. The guardianship was abandoned as soon as Rivenburg decided to change her will in September 2018. This will differed considerably from one Rivenburg had made in 2014, substantially reducing the property bequeathed to Austin in favor of Bridget. After Rivenburg's death in early 2020, Bridget sought to probate the 2018 will and have herself named personal representative. Austin challenged the will, claiming it was the product of fraud and undue influence on Bridget's part. The trial court granted demurrers to both of Austin's claims and admitted Rivenburg's 2018 will to probate. Austin appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the Court of Civil Appeals erred by conflating the concepts of fraud and undue influence, and by treating certain facts as essentially dispositive as to both. "While the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Austin as challenger to the will, the burden of producing evidence to rebut an inference of fraud shifted to Bridget. Accordingly, the trial court's order admitting Rivenburg's will to probate is reversed, and the case is remanded to give Bridget an opportunity to present evidence on the issue of fraud." View "Rivenburg v. Cilberti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant Barbara Lembo in this action brought by beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust and their mother alleging that Defendant breached her fiduciary duty as trustee, holding that the allegations in the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duties under Connecticut law.The will of the decedent bequeathed the residue of his estate to an amended and restated revocable trust benefitting his three children. At issue was the proper administration of a portion of the decedent's residuary estate that had not yet been distributed to the trust. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendant, among other things, breached her fiduciary duty by failing to protect and collect trust property. The trial court concluded that Defendant, as a trustee, had no duty to take any action prior to the distribution of the residuary assets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Defendant owed the trust beneficiaries a duty to collect and protect the prospective trust property in the residuary estate; and (2) the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Defendant for breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee. View "Barash v. Lembo" on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law