Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A church organization sued its pastor after he withdrew $223,000 from a parish bank account and deposited the funds into his personal account. The pastor asserted that the money was a personal gift from a church member, who had written three $300,000 checks during a church event. One check was made payable to the church, while the other two had blank payee lines and were delivered in sealed envelopes to two pastors. The recipient pastor initially gave his check to the church president, who filled in the church’s name as payee and deposited the check in the parish account. Later, the church member allegedly told the pastor that the check was intended for him personally, prompting the pastor to transfer the funds to his own account.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Davison County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the church on its claims for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty and against the pastor on his counterclaims for conversion and fraud. The court found that all money in the parish account belonged to the church or its parish and concluded that a blank check was not sufficient delivery of a gift. The court also awarded prejudgment interest to the church.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that the check delivered to the pastor was not a completed gift under South Dakota law, but this finding alone did not entitle the church to summary judgment. The court determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the pastor’s fraud claim, specifically whether the church obtained the funds through misrepresentation of the donor’s intent. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also reversed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Iglesia Pentecostal V. Torres" on Justia Law

A trustee filed a lawsuit against a credit union, claiming that the credit union failed to accept negotiable instruments totaling $8,500,000, refused to open a trust account, and did not provide a written explanation for its refusal. The trustee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, on behalf of the trust. The trustee, who is not an attorney, filed complaints with similar allegations and included documents characteristic of the sovereign citizen movement.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, presided by Judge Daniel D. Narum, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trustee was not a licensed attorney and therefore could not represent the trust or its beneficiaries in legal proceedings. Despite this, the court considered the merits of the claims and found that the credit union was not obligated to accept the instruments, which were not legal tender. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trustee, as a non-attorney, was not authorized to provide legal representation for the trust beneficiaries. The court held that all filings made by the trustee, including the notice of appeal, were void due to the unauthorized practice of law. It further determined that the lawsuit was void from inception and that dismissal should have been without prejudice, as there was no adjudication on the merits. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions against the trustee individually for pervasive inaccuracies and frivolous arguments, awarded attorney’s fees and double costs to the credit union, denied all motions filed by the trustee as void, and dismissed the appeal. View "Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

A family dispute arose after the deaths of William and Elaine Stramer, who had five children and owned farmland in North Dakota. Their 2013 wills gave Douglas the option to purchase the farmyard around his house and Todd the option to purchase the remaining farmland for $100 per acre within one year of the surviving spouse’s death, provided Todd moved back to North Dakota and “actively farmed” the land. After William died in 2015, various trusts were created to hold the land, with Todd named as trustee. Elaine died in 2022, and Todd became personal representative of her estate. Subsequently, Douglas and Ann filed actions challenging Todd’s management and the exercise of the purchase options.The District Court of Emmons County consolidated the cases and conducted a bench trial. The court found the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust void due to lack of capacity. It determined Douglas’s option encompassed 25 acres as identified in a 2014 plat, while finding Todd had not “actively farmed” and therefore did not validly exercise his purchase option. The court invalidated Todd’s self-executed contracts for deed, removed him as trustee and personal representative, and appointed Steve Stramer instead. The court declined to award damages for Todd’s use and possession of the farm from 2023 to 2025, citing insufficient information.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the district court did not err in finding Todd had not actively farmed the land within the meaning of the will, nor in removing Todd from his fiduciary roles. However, it concluded the district court erred in finding Douglas’s option included 25 acres, holding instead that it should be limited to 5.96 acres identified as the farmyard. The Court also held that the district court misapplied the law on damages and remanded for a determination of damages for Todd’s wrongful occupation of the farm. View "Stramer v. Stramer" on Justia Law

The case involves the fatal shooting of Elijah Isham by Moraine, Ohio police officers following a car crash. After the incident, Elijah’s father, Ralph Isham, was appointed administrator of his son’s estate and, acting in that role, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police chief and several officers. Isham filed the complaint pro se, just before the statute of limitations expired. The complaint alleged violations of Elijah’s Fourth Amendment rights during the police encounter that led to his death.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sua sponte raised the issue of whether Isham could represent the estate without counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The court determined Isham was not permitted to proceed pro se because he had not sufficiently proven he was the sole beneficiary and that the estate had no creditors. The court ordered him to retain counsel or show cause why he should be allowed to proceed alone. After initial attempts to satisfy the court’s requirements were deemed inadequate, Isham retained counsel, but the district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, holding that the initial pro se filing rendered the lawsuit a legal nullity. The court dismissed the case without prejudice and denied reconsideration, even after new evidence was submitted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether a complaint filed in violation of § 1654 is a “nullity” or whether the defect is curable by retaining counsel. The Sixth Circuit held that, while § 1654 bars non-lawyers from representing estates in most cases, federal law does not mandate treating such complaints as nullities. Instead, district courts have discretion to allow correction by retaining counsel. Because Isham retained counsel within the court’s timeline, dismissal was not required. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Isham v. Richardson" on Justia Law

After Douglas G. Todd died in January 2025, his son Chadd B. Todd sought informal probate of Douglas’ 1984 will, which left Douglas’ property to his sons. Judy Sheets, who had lived with Douglas in a long-term relationship but was not married to him, objected, claiming Douglas had executed a two-page handwritten will in February 2021 leaving his estate to her. Judy admitted that, apart from Douglas’ signature and date, the material provisions of the 2021 document were written in her handwriting but asserted Douglas had instructed her what to write.The County Court for Lincoln County reviewed competing summary judgment motions from Chadd and Judy regarding the validity of the 2021 document as a holographic will. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact. It ruled that the 2021 document was not a valid holographic will of Douglas because the material provisions were not in his handwriting. Alternatively, the court found that the 2021 document did not express testamentary intent. Judy appealed this decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the county court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It analyzed whether the 2021 document, purported to be a joint will, qualified as a valid holographic will under Nebraska law, which requires the signature, material provisions, and date to be in the handwriting of the testator. The Court held that when the material provisions of a purported joint will are in the handwriting of one party, it cannot be a valid holographic will of the other party, even if the other party signs it. Thus, the 2021 document was not a valid holographic will of Douglas, and the Court affirmed the county court’s decision. View "In re Estate of Todd" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

After the death of Mary Jo Bradford in Lewis and Clark County, her daughter, Rhonda Purtle, applied for informal probate of Bradford’s will and was appointed personal representative. The will named Purtle as executor and devised property to her, but omitted her brothers, Robert and Kenneth Bates. The Bateses challenged the will and Purtle’s appointment, alleging improper disinheritance, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, financial exploitation, and sought her removal as personal representative. They also claimed that Purtle had obtained benefits through misconduct and could not impartially investigate her own actions.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, removed Purtle as personal representative, appointed a special administrator, and froze all financial accounts in which Bradford held an interest at death, including those Purtle claimed via nonprobate transfers. The court issued these orders without the statutorily required hearings or sufficient findings to invoke emergency exceptions. It did not resolve the underlying will contest or the merits of the financial exploitation claim, nor did it determine ownership of the disputed property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court violated statutory requirements by removing Purtle without a hearing and determination as required by § 72-3-526, MCA, and by appointing a special administrator without a hearing or a sufficient emergency basis under § 72-3-701(2), MCA. The Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a blanket freeze on all financial accounts without adequately justifying its scope and duration. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded, directing restoration of Purtle’s appointment and removal of the account freeze, while clarifying the requirements for interim relief and standing under the applicable statutes. View "In re Estate of Bradford" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, acting as executor of a probate estate, brought suit against a law firm and its principal, alleging negligent misrepresentations related to their representation in a probate matter. After initially naming multiple defendants and amending her complaint several times, only the law firm and its principal remained as defendants in this appeal. During the proceedings, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint that included unsanctioned pro se coplaintiffs and was found by the court to be unnecessarily lengthy and filled with irrelevant allegations. The court struck this complaint and offered the plaintiff options: to dismiss with prejudice, to file a more detailed motion explaining the absence of legal prejudice to the defendants if dismissed without prejudice, or to file a compliant Third Amended Complaint. Instead, the plaintiff filed a notice seeking voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but failed to provide the required explanation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that, since the defendants had already answered, the dismissal had to proceed under Rule 41(a)(2), which requires a court order and can be with prejudice if warranted. The court found that the plaintiff failed to address its directive and, given her history of frivolous filings and sanctions in other cases, dismissed the action with prejudice. Additionally, the court designated the plaintiff as a vexatious litigator and imposed prefiling restrictions, requiring attorney certification or prior court review for any new cases.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s actions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly dismissed the action with prejudice, complied with due process in imposing vexatious litigator restrictions, correctly declined to recuse, and found no merit in the claim of failure to report elder abuse. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Wasserman v. Beggs" on Justia Law

A grandchild, Darby, brought suit alleging that her expectancy of inheritance from her grandfather Steven’s estate was wrongfully interfered with by his stepchildren Shawn and Cynthia, and Cynthia’s son Owen. As Steven and his wife Christine experienced cognitive decline, Shawn was granted broad authority under a power of attorney, including powers to transfer property. After Christine’s death, Shawn sold Steven’s house to Owen for far below market value, deposited the proceeds in a joint account with himself and Cynthia, and upon Steven’s death, the funds bypassed the estate and were divided between Shawn and Cynthia. Darby claimed other items, such as collectible cards and coins, were also diverted. She alleged bad faith and dishonest motives by the defendants, which deprived her of her share of the estate.Darby sued in the Franklin County Superior Court, asserting claims for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance, constructive trust, conspiracy, and punitive damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Superior Court (Mills, A.R.J.) granted the motions and dismissed the action, determining that Darby had not sufficiently alleged the nature and extent of her expectancy. Darby appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the dismissal de novo and held that Darby’s complaint adequately alleged the existence, nature, and extent of her expectancy, and sufficiently pleaded facts supporting bad faith and dishonest conduct by the defendants. The Court clarified that a power of attorney cannot shield agents from liability for acts committed with dishonesty or improper motive. The Court vacated the dismissal of all counts and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Darby had stated a claim for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance. View "Sabin v. Newcomb" on Justia Law

A defendant was investigated after a private investigator discovered a memory card containing surreptitious recordings of his stepdaughter undressing in her bedroom. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home, uncovering a hidden camera disguised as a charger in the victim’s room and multiple explicit videos and images of the minor, recorded over a period of several years. The defendant had organized these materials and stored them in a concealed media vault on his phone.The defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California for sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was insufficiently specific and did not provide adequate notice of the charges. The district court denied the motion, finding the indictment adequately alleged the essential elements. After a jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict, the district court imposed a 252-month sentence, ordered restitution to the victim, and entered a personal forfeiture money judgment representing the proceeds from the sale of the defendant’s house, where the offense occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed three main issues. First, it affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the indictment sufficiently tracked the statutory language and included all necessary elements. Second, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the forfeiture order, concluding that even if the district court erred by not inquiring whether the jury should determine forfeitability, any error was harmless because the use of the house to commit the offense was uncontested and indisputable. Third, the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order due to a mathematical error and remanded for recalculation and clarification regarding certain housing expenses. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "USA V. MUMMA" on Justia Law