Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Steven Holte and Sheldon Holte, as co-trustees of the Kermit and Ardella Family Mineral Trust, along with Ardella Holte, filed a lawsuit against Tiah E. Rigby, both individually and as the personal representative of Nathan Holte's estate. The case arose from Nathan Holte's misappropriation of trust income during his tenure as trustee. After Nathan's death, Rigby became the life beneficiary of Nathan's share of the trust income. The Holtes sought to offset Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated funds.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, ruled that the co-trustees could offset Rigby's distribution to recover the misappropriated trust income but could not offset her distribution to recoup non-trust money that Nathan had stolen from Ardella's personal accounts. Rigby appealed, arguing that she should not be held liable for her father's misdeeds, while the Holtes cross-appealed, seeking to offset Rigby's distribution further.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the co-trustees could not withhold Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated trust income, as Rigby had no personal liability for Nathan's actions, and her beneficial interest vested upon Nathan's death. The court emphasized that the trust agreement required monthly distributions to life beneficiaries and that Nathan's life interest terminated upon his death, making it improper to offset against Rigby's distribution.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that the co-trustees could not offset Rigby's distribution to recover the non-trust money stolen by Nathan, as Rigby was not involved in the theft and had no personal liability. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Holte v. Rigby" on Justia Law

Estel Neven Zugg passed away in January 2021. Donna Katherine Finley filed a petition in September 2021, requesting the District Court to open formal intestacy proceedings, determine Neven's heirs, and appoint her as the estate's personal representative, claiming she was Neven's common law wife. Neven's sons, Austin and Kolby Zugg, participated in the proceedings. Katherine testified that she and Neven considered themselves married since 2016 and lived between North Dakota and Arizona, with occasional stays in Montana.The Fifteenth Judicial District Court held a bench trial in August 2022. Testimonies from Neven's friends and family indicated that Neven had ties to Montana but primarily lived in North Dakota and Arizona. The court found that Katherine and Neven did not live together in Montana, which does not recognize common law marriages from states that do not recognize them unless the couple resides in Montana.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Katherine and Neven did not establish a common law marriage under Montana law. The court emphasized that a relationship begun in a state that does not recognize common law marriages must ripen by residency in Montana to become valid. Since Katherine and Neven never lived together in Montana, their relationship did not meet the requirements for a common law marriage in Montana. The court found no clear error in the District Court's findings and upheld the denial of Katherine's petition. View "In re Estate of Zugg" on Justia Law

James Needham and Roxanne O. Smith purchased a residential property as joint tenants. Smith later vacated the property and transferred her interest to the Roxanne O. Smith Trust. After Smith's death, both parties filed crossclaims for partition. The trial court assigned the property to Needham and awarded the Trust an equitable sum for its interest. The court declined to offset Needham's contributions by the fair-market rental value for the time Smith left the property, concluding that Needham did not prevent Smith from accessing the property and that the Trust had not established the fair-market rental value.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, held a two-day bench trial and found that Smith left the property due to fear of Needham but was not denied access. The court assigned the property to Needham, who was to pay the Trust for its interest. The court rejected the Trust's request for an offset due to ouster, finding no evidence that Needham excluded Smith from the property. The court also found that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property, as the trustee's testimony lacked sufficient foundation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Trust failed to establish the fair-market rental value of the property. The court noted that the trustee's testimony was insufficient to establish rental value and that the trial court was not obligated to assign it any persuasive value. The court also declined to remand the case for additional evidence on rental value, as the Trust did not demonstrate any reason why remand was warranted. View "Needham v. Smith Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of a revocable trust, claimed entitlement to certain real property and income. The trust included an in terrorem clause, which disinherits any beneficiary who contests the trust. Plaintiff argued that she did not trigger this clause by seeking to enforce the trust's provisions as intended by the grantor, rather than challenging the trust itself. The key issue was whether her actions constituted a violation of the in terrorem clause, thereby forfeiting her bequests.The Supreme Court initially denied defendants' motion to dismiss, citing unresolved factual issues. Defendants later moved for partial summary judgment, which the court granted, determining that plaintiff had no ownership interest in Dempsaco LLC. Plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment regarding her entitlement to the real property was denied. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claim to a 50% interest in Dempsaco triggered the in terrorem clause. The Supreme Court agreed, granting defendants' motion and awarding attorney's fees. The Appellate Division modified the order by denying attorney's fees but otherwise affirmed the decision, concluding that plaintiff's actions violated the in terrorem clause.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that plaintiff did not violate the in terrorem clause because her lawsuit sought to enforce the trust's provisions as written and intended by the grantor. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on her claim to the real property, as the trust explicitly directed the trustee to transfer the property to her. However, the court found that triable issues of fact remained regarding the income stream and unjust enrichment claims. The order of the Appellate Division was modified accordingly. View "Carlson v Colangelo" on Justia Law

Effie Mae Autry had three children, Steve, Michael, and Melvin. Michael and Melvin predeceased their mother, leaving behind children. In 2014, Effie and her husband Eugene executed wills that distributed their assets equally among their children and grandchildren. Eugene passed away in 2017, and his assets were transferred to Effie. In 2019, Effie executed a new will and several warranty deeds, leaving all assets to Steve and disinheriting her grandchildren. This new will was drafted by attorney Anna Kate Robbins after their long-time attorney, Sidra Winter, refused due to concerns about Effie's mental capacity and potential undue influence by Steve.The Pontotoc County Chancery Court invalidated the 2019 will and the warranty deeds, citing undue influence by Steve and failure to properly authenticate the will. The court found that the affidavits of the attesting witnesses did not include their addresses, as required by Mississippi Code Section 91-7-7. The court also found that Steve had a confidential relationship with Effie and did not rebut the presumption of undue influence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the 2019 will was not duly authenticated due to the missing addresses on the affidavits. The court also agreed with the chancery court's finding of undue influence, noting that Steve's actions and Effie's declining mental capacity supported this conclusion. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings regarding the probate of the 2014 will. View "In Re The Matter of the Estate of Autry" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Winter, as trustee, filed a petition against Franklin Menlo, seeking instructions regarding a trust, Frank's suspension and removal as cotrustee, an accounting, and an order revoking a power of appointment executed by Vera Menlo for lack of capacity. The petition also included allegations of financial elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and wrongful taking of property. Prior to this, Jeffrey had consulted with attorney Adam Streisand about potential litigation against Frank, sharing confidential information.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County disqualified Streisand and his law firm, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamilton LLP, from representing Frank. The court found that Jeffrey was a prospective client under Rule 1.18 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits attorneys from representing clients with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client if the attorney received confidential information material to the matter. The court determined that the information Jeffrey shared with Streisand remained confidential and material, necessitating disqualification to avoid the use of that information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the lower court's interpretation that materiality should be evaluated at the time of disqualification. It concluded that the information disclosed by Jeffrey to Streisand remained confidential and material, thus affirming the disqualification. The appellate court also considered the equities, noting that the case was still in its early stages and that Frank could find other competent counsel. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed, maintaining the disqualification of Streisand and his firm. View "Winter v. Menlo" on Justia Law

The decedent died intestate in 2021, leaving no close relatives. The decedent had a stepdaughter, Karen Ellis, who claimed she was equitably adopted by the decedent and sought to inherit his estate. Ellis alleged a father-daughter relationship with the decedent, who had been involved in her life since she was four years old. She claimed the decedent treated her as his daughter, referred to her children as his grandchildren, and made statements indicating she would inherit his estate.The Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County denied Ellis’s initial petition but later allowed her to refile. The court denied a motion for summary judgment by the decedent’s intestate heirs and transmitted seven issues to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a jury trial, including whether Ellis was equitably adopted.The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the Orphans’ Court’s order, holding that a claimant must prove that the decedent intended to treat them as their own child and that the intent element is not necessarily an intent to adopt pursuant to the adoption statute. The court concluded that the orphans’ court should not have transmitted six of the seven issues to the circuit court, as they were factual in nature.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment, holding that a claimant may establish the right to inherit under the doctrine of equitable adoption by demonstrating clear and convincing proof of the decedent’s intent to adopt and that the decedent acted in accord with that intent. The case was remanded to the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County for further proceedings based on this standard. View "In re: Estate of Schappell" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mary C. Sutphin, filed a complaint alleging statutory violations of the Uniform Trust Code and breaches of fiduciary duties against several defendants, including A. David Abrams and others. The complaint was amended twice, with the second amended complaint containing sixteen counts related to the management of Lewis Chevrolet and interference with the plaintiff’s inheritance. During discovery, the plaintiff received over ten thousand documents, which led to the filing of the second amended complaint. The defendants sought detailed information about the factual basis of the plaintiff’s allegations through interrogatories, but the plaintiff’s responses were deemed insufficient, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders for the plaintiff to supplement her responses.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County referred the discovery disputes to a discovery commissioner, who recommended that the plaintiff supplement her responses with specific references to the complaint and discovery materials. The plaintiff complied, but the defendants were still unsatisfied and sought to depose the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the plaintiff had relied on her counsel for the factual basis of her claims. The discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel, applying the Shelton test, which requires showing that no other means exist to obtain the information, the information is relevant and non-privileged, and the information is crucial to the case. The circuit court partially rejected the discovery commissioner’s decision and ordered the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court committed a clear error of law by not properly applying the Shelton test. The court held that the information sought could be obtained from other sources and that the deposition would invade the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel. View "State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law