Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries
United States v. Rhodes
Norman Rhodes operated two businesses in Michigan—Rhodes Graphics and D&G Sign Company—until the 1990s, when he sought to shield himself from liability and avoid taxes by restructuring his businesses and his home ownership using “common-law trusts.” He created three trusts: Signmaker and Graphic Associates for his businesses, and July Thirtyfirst for his home, appointing Brent Johnson as “fiduciary owner” and retaining operational control. Rhodes stopped filing tax returns and paying taxes on income from these businesses, believing the trust structure exempted him from tax obligations. The IRS audited Rhodes, found no business or personal tax returns, and used a bank deposits analysis to determine his income, concluding Rhodes owed substantial back taxes and penalties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the government, finding that Rhodes was personally liable for income earned through the businesses, as the trusts did not shield him from tax liability. The court also determined that July Thirtyfirst did not qualify as a valid trust under Michigan law because it lacked definite beneficiaries, so Rhodes and his wife remained the owners of their home. The court ordered the sale of the home to satisfy Rhodes’s tax debt and denied Rhodes’s motion to amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Rhodes was liable for taxes on income from the businesses, as every rational factfinder would conclude he earned that income. It also held that July Thirtyfirst lacked the necessary elements to be a valid trust under Michigan law, so the government’s tax lien attached to the property and its sale was proper. The Sixth Circuit concluded the district court’s judgment was final and properly executed. View "United States v. Rhodes" on Justia Law
In the Matter of the Estate of Schultz
A husband and wife owned several farm properties and created reciprocal wills in 1998, giving the surviving spouse a life estate and dividing the remainder equally among their four children. After the husband’s death, the wife executed a new will in 2003, significantly altering the distribution to favor her son, Blaine, over her three daughters. The daughters only learned of the new will in 2014. Unable to restore the earlier will due to the mother’s lack of testamentary capacity, the four children entered into a family settlement agreement in 2014 to distribute the estate equally. Two children died before their mother. Upon her death in 2019, the 2003 will and the settlement agreement were filed together in the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, with proper notice given to all beneficiaries.Years later, when the executor sought to distribute the estate as per the settlement agreement, Blaine’s children objected, arguing the agreement was invalid and that distribution should follow the 2003 will. The Iowa District Court initially ruled in favor of the settlement agreement, but the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding the agreement unenforceable and remanding for proceedings under the 2003 will. On remand, the district court set new procedures, including refiling the will and sending fresh notices, after which the plaintiffs filed a will contest. Blaine’s children moved to dismiss the contest as untimely under Iowa Code § 633.309.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the statutory deadline for contesting a will—four months after the second published notice or one month after mailed notice, whichever is later—begins when the will is admitted to probate, regardless of a contemporaneous family settlement agreement. The Court found no statutory or equitable basis to toll the deadline and strictly enforced the limitations period. The Court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded for dismissal of the will contest. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Schultz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Iowa Supreme Court, Trusts & Estates
Seal Cove Auto Museum v. Sanford
A charitable trust was established to preserve and display a collection of antique automobiles, with trustees authorized to manage its assets and distribute funds to a related museum. After a series of disputes following the founder’s death, the parties entered into a settlement and an amended relationship agreement in 2020 and 2021, respectively, to clarify their obligations. The amended agreement required the trust to provide at least $200,000 annually to the museum and to manage its assets in a way that reasonably protected the value of the trust’s corpus.In December 2021, the trustees committed to a $1,000,000 donation from the trust’s endowment to a different museum, paying $500,000 immediately and pledging the rest over five years. The museum challenged this action, filing a motion to enforce the settlement and amended agreement, alleging that the donation violated the trustees’ obligations by depleting the endowment. The Business and Consumer Docket held a bench trial, where it limited the scope of evidence to the specific issue of the disputed donation. After hearing testimony, the court denied the motion, concluding that the agreement gave the trustees discretion to manage trust funds so long as annual payments to the museum were met and the trust’s corpus was reasonably maintained. The court found that the value of the trust had actually increased since the agreements were made.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the agreement unambiguously referred to the entire trust, not just the endowment, and that the trial court properly limited the scope of evidence. The court further determined there was no breach, as the trust’s obligations to the museum had been met and the value of the trust was preserved. The judgment was affirmed. View "Seal Cove Auto Museum v. Sanford" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Trusts & Estates
Iglesia Pentecostal V. Torres
A church organization sued its pastor after he withdrew $223,000 from a parish bank account and deposited the funds into his personal account. The pastor asserted that the money was a personal gift from a church member, who had written three $300,000 checks during a church event. One check was made payable to the church, while the other two had blank payee lines and were delivered in sealed envelopes to two pastors. The recipient pastor initially gave his check to the church president, who filled in the church’s name as payee and deposited the check in the parish account. Later, the church member allegedly told the pastor that the check was intended for him personally, prompting the pastor to transfer the funds to his own account.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Davison County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the church on its claims for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty and against the pastor on his counterclaims for conversion and fraud. The court found that all money in the parish account belonged to the church or its parish and concluded that a blank check was not sufficient delivery of a gift. The court also awarded prejudgment interest to the church.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. It held that the check delivered to the pastor was not a completed gift under South Dakota law, but this finding alone did not entitle the church to summary judgment. The court determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the pastor’s fraud claim, specifically whether the church obtained the funds through misrepresentation of the donor’s intent. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It also reversed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Iglesia Pentecostal V. Torres" on Justia Law
Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union
A trustee filed a lawsuit against a credit union, claiming that the credit union failed to accept negotiable instruments totaling $8,500,000, refused to open a trust account, and did not provide a written explanation for its refusal. The trustee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, on behalf of the trust. The trustee, who is not an attorney, filed complaints with similar allegations and included documents characteristic of the sovereign citizen movement.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, presided by Judge Daniel D. Narum, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trustee was not a licensed attorney and therefore could not represent the trust or its beneficiaries in legal proceedings. Despite this, the court considered the merits of the claims and found that the credit union was not obligated to accept the instruments, which were not legal tender. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trustee, as a non-attorney, was not authorized to provide legal representation for the trust beneficiaries. The court held that all filings made by the trustee, including the notice of appeal, were void due to the unauthorized practice of law. It further determined that the lawsuit was void from inception and that dismissal should have been without prejudice, as there was no adjudication on the merits. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions against the trustee individually for pervasive inaccuracies and frivolous arguments, awarded attorney’s fees and double costs to the credit union, denied all motions filed by the trustee as void, and dismissed the appeal. View "Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union" on Justia Law
Stramer v. Stramer
A family dispute arose after the deaths of William and Elaine Stramer, who had five children and owned farmland in North Dakota. Their 2013 wills gave Douglas the option to purchase the farmyard around his house and Todd the option to purchase the remaining farmland for $100 per acre within one year of the surviving spouse’s death, provided Todd moved back to North Dakota and “actively farmed” the land. After William died in 2015, various trusts were created to hold the land, with Todd named as trustee. Elaine died in 2022, and Todd became personal representative of her estate. Subsequently, Douglas and Ann filed actions challenging Todd’s management and the exercise of the purchase options.The District Court of Emmons County consolidated the cases and conducted a bench trial. The court found the Elaine Stramer Irrevocable Trust void due to lack of capacity. It determined Douglas’s option encompassed 25 acres as identified in a 2014 plat, while finding Todd had not “actively farmed” and therefore did not validly exercise his purchase option. The court invalidated Todd’s self-executed contracts for deed, removed him as trustee and personal representative, and appointed Steve Stramer instead. The court declined to award damages for Todd’s use and possession of the farm from 2023 to 2025, citing insufficient information.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the district court did not err in finding Todd had not actively farmed the land within the meaning of the will, nor in removing Todd from his fiduciary roles. However, it concluded the district court erred in finding Douglas’s option included 25 acres, holding instead that it should be limited to 5.96 acres identified as the farmyard. The Court also held that the district court misapplied the law on damages and remanded for a determination of damages for Todd’s wrongful occupation of the farm. View "Stramer v. Stramer" on Justia Law
Estate of Isham v. Richardson
The case involves the fatal shooting of Elijah Isham by Moraine, Ohio police officers following a car crash. After the incident, Elijah’s father, Ralph Isham, was appointed administrator of his son’s estate and, acting in that role, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police chief and several officers. Isham filed the complaint pro se, just before the statute of limitations expired. The complaint alleged violations of Elijah’s Fourth Amendment rights during the police encounter that led to his death.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sua sponte raised the issue of whether Isham could represent the estate without counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The court determined Isham was not permitted to proceed pro se because he had not sufficiently proven he was the sole beneficiary and that the estate had no creditors. The court ordered him to retain counsel or show cause why he should be allowed to proceed alone. After initial attempts to satisfy the court’s requirements were deemed inadequate, Isham retained counsel, but the district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, holding that the initial pro se filing rendered the lawsuit a legal nullity. The court dismissed the case without prejudice and denied reconsideration, even after new evidence was submitted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether a complaint filed in violation of § 1654 is a “nullity” or whether the defect is curable by retaining counsel. The Sixth Circuit held that, while § 1654 bars non-lawyers from representing estates in most cases, federal law does not mandate treating such complaints as nullities. Instead, district courts have discretion to allow correction by retaining counsel. Because Isham retained counsel within the court’s timeline, dismissal was not required. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Isham v. Richardson" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Todd
After Douglas G. Todd died in January 2025, his son Chadd B. Todd sought informal probate of Douglas’ 1984 will, which left Douglas’ property to his sons. Judy Sheets, who had lived with Douglas in a long-term relationship but was not married to him, objected, claiming Douglas had executed a two-page handwritten will in February 2021 leaving his estate to her. Judy admitted that, apart from Douglas’ signature and date, the material provisions of the 2021 document were written in her handwriting but asserted Douglas had instructed her what to write.The County Court for Lincoln County reviewed competing summary judgment motions from Chadd and Judy regarding the validity of the 2021 document as a holographic will. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact. It ruled that the 2021 document was not a valid holographic will of Douglas because the material provisions were not in his handwriting. Alternatively, the court found that the 2021 document did not express testamentary intent. Judy appealed this decision.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the county court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It analyzed whether the 2021 document, purported to be a joint will, qualified as a valid holographic will under Nebraska law, which requires the signature, material provisions, and date to be in the handwriting of the testator. The Court held that when the material provisions of a purported joint will are in the handwriting of one party, it cannot be a valid holographic will of the other party, even if the other party signs it. Thus, the 2021 document was not a valid holographic will of Douglas, and the Court affirmed the county court’s decision. View "In re Estate of Todd" on Justia Law
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Nebraska Supreme Court, Trusts & Estates
DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Bradford
After the death of Mary Jo Bradford in Lewis and Clark County, her daughter, Rhonda Purtle, applied for informal probate of Bradford’s will and was appointed personal representative. The will named Purtle as executor and devised property to her, but omitted her brothers, Robert and Kenneth Bates. The Bateses challenged the will and Purtle’s appointment, alleging improper disinheritance, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, financial exploitation, and sought her removal as personal representative. They also claimed that Purtle had obtained benefits through misconduct and could not impartially investigate her own actions.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, removed Purtle as personal representative, appointed a special administrator, and froze all financial accounts in which Bradford held an interest at death, including those Purtle claimed via nonprobate transfers. The court issued these orders without the statutorily required hearings or sufficient findings to invoke emergency exceptions. It did not resolve the underlying will contest or the merits of the financial exploitation claim, nor did it determine ownership of the disputed property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court violated statutory requirements by removing Purtle without a hearing and determination as required by § 72-3-526, MCA, and by appointing a special administrator without a hearing or a sufficient emergency basis under § 72-3-701(2), MCA. The Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a blanket freeze on all financial accounts without adequately justifying its scope and duration. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded, directing restoration of Purtle’s appointment and removal of the account freeze, while clarifying the requirements for interim relief and standing under the applicable statutes. View "In re Estate of Bradford" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Montana Supreme Court, Trusts & Estates