Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The circuit court granted Janet Autry’s petition to be appointed temporary guardian of Louise Sheperd. Pam and Don Beckham were allowed to intervene. The circuit court appointed the Beckhams guardians of Sheperd and First Community Bank of Searcy as the guardian of Sheperd’s estate. The court of appeals reversed. Before the mandate issued, Timothy Whaley filed an ex parte petition to be appointed temporary guardian and permanent guardian of Sheperd. Before the circuit court took action, the Beckhams filed another petition to intervene and for appointment as guardians. The circuit court denied Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion to intervene, granted the Beckhams’ intervention, and reappointed the Beckhams as temporary guardians of the person of Sheperd and First Community Bank as guardian of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings. View "Whaley v. Beckham" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a notice of appeal from a probate order approving a settlement agreement among Appellants. Upon Appellee’s motion, the circuit court extended the time to lodge the record. Appellee subsequently filed a motion asking the court to enter a nunc pro tunc order clarifying its findings of fact relating to the order granting the extension because that order did not include the findings required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 5(b). The circuit court entered the nunc pro tunc order. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in entering the nunc pro tunc order because Rule 5(b) had not been complied with at the time the original motion for extension of time was granted. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s nunc pro tunc order, as the extension order complied with Rule 5(b); (2) affirmed the circuit court’s order approving the settlement agreement, as the settlement was in the best interest of the Estate of J.D. Ashley, Sr.; and (3) denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellee’s appeal and their motion for sanctions, as Appellee timely lodged the record for his appeal and Appellee’s appeal was not frivolous. View "Ashley v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Settlor executed a will stating that First Presbyterian and First Baptist churches were to receive the remainder of his estate, which consisted largely of farmland. The Settlor named a trustee and directed it to hold the farmland as a testamentary trust during the life of the will’s lifetime beneficiaries and, thereafter, to distribute the proceeds of the property to the churches. First Presbyterian later dissolved its congregation and transferred its assets to Covenant Presbytery. The trustee for the Settlor’s trust requested that the circuit court determine the rights of First Baptist and Covenant Presbytery to the farmland and its income. The circuit court applied the cy pres doctrine and reformed the trust to provide that First Presbyterian’s distributions should be transferred to First Baptist. Covenant Presbytery appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the will did not create a charitable trust, the cy pres doctrine was inapplicable; and (2) per the parties’ stipulation, First Presbyterian assigned its rights under the trust to Covenant Presbytery. View "Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church" on Justia Law

Appellant was a signatory to a family settlement agreement concerning a will that was subsequently approved by the circuit court. The agreement distributed a portion of the assets of the decedent’s estates to the estate of a minor, K.P. Appellant later filed a motion to set aside the family-settlement agreement, alleging that, after the circuit court had approved the agreement, Appellant discovered that K.P. was not the decedent’s natural child and that K.P.’s mother had falsely claimed that K.P. was the decedent’s natural child. The circuit court dismissed Appellant’s motion on the basis of res judicata, finding that the issues of paternity and proportionate entitlement to inherit had already been litigated. The court also dismissed Appellant’s motion to compel discovery as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly concluded that its ruling on res judicata rendered moot Appellant’s motion to compel discovery. View "Norris v. Davis" on Justia Law

J.B. Hunt was a judgment creditor of Robert and Frieda Thornton, who were the trustees and life beneficiaries of five trusts, each of which provided that quarterly distributions be made to the Thorntons until their deaths. J.B. Hunt commenced an action to attach the Thorntons’ interest in future distributions from the trusts and to apply them to the satisfaction of J.B. Hunt’s judgment. The circuit court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, determining that a creditor may not claim a quarterly distribution until the date it becomes due. On appeal, J.B. Hunt asserted that Ark. Code Ann. 28-73-501 provides that a creditor may reach future distributions from a trust. Appellees argued that although attachments of future distributions may be authorized by section 28-73-501 in some situations, it was not permissible in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.B. Hunt’s complaint improperly sought the Thorntons’ uncertain future distributions from the trusts, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it. View "J.B. Hunt v. Thornton" on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded. View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Bobbie Troup, in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Easter Dawkins, filed suit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against Petitioners. During the trial proceedings, Troup filed a petition requesting that Petitioners be required to pay for the cost of five expert witnesses who had appeared to testify on her behalf on the scheduled trial date but did not testify because the circuit court had granted a motion for continuance made by Petitioners. The circuit court entered an order directing Petitioner to pay Troup for expert-witness costs associated with the continuance of the trial. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, against the circuit court, contending that the court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in ordering them pay the expert-witness costs of Troup. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, as Petitioners had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal. View "Moore v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After L.C. died, the probate court appointed his son, Bobby, as special personal representative of L.C.'s estate for the limited purpose of investigating and prosecuting all claims relating to nursing home abuse. On behalf of the estate, Bobby subsequently sued Appellees in a wrongful-death action. During the wrongful-death action proceedings, it was revealed that Bobby was a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve as a special personal representative by law. Bobby filed a motion to substitute his brother Ronnie as special personal representative, which the trial court granted. The probate court, however, later vacated its order appointing Bobby, finding the order was invalid from its inception. At issue on appeal was whether Bobby's acts prior to his removal, including his motion to substitute Ronnie, remained valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bobby's acts as a special personal representative were valid until the date of his removal as special personal representative; and (2) accordingly, the probate court erred by finding that the order of appointment was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

L.C. was a nursing home patient when he died. Bobby, L.C.'s son and the special personal representative of L.C.'s estate, filed suit against several nursing home defendants for negligence and medical malpractice. After it was discovered during a deposition that Bobby was a convicted felon and not qualified to serve as special personal representative, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the complaints against the defendants, concluding that Bobby lacked the authority to act on behalf of the estate because of his disqualification as a felon and that the complaints he filed were nullities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the actions of Bobby were invalid and that the complaints filed by Bobby were nullities. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law

Blair Stautzenberger served as the guardian of his mother's estate. After her death, two of Blair's siblings, Duane and Michael Stautzenberger, challenged Blair's management of the estate. The trial court disallowed $85,747 of the expenditures that Blair had made, found that Blair's failure to act as a reasonably prudent investor cost the estate $201,587, and made Blair personally liable for Duane and Michael's attorney fees. The court later entered a modified order that made Blair personally liable for the disallowed expenditures, investment losses, and attorney fees. Blair appealed, arguing that the trial court (1) exceeded its authority when it found him personally liable for certain expenditures in the modified order where the original order assigned him no personal liability, and (2) improperly disallowed expenses that contributed to the care and maintenance of his mother. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in entering the modified order, as it was within the court's authority to amend the original order; and (2) clearly erred in finding that many of the expenditures made by Blair were improper. View "Stautzenberger v. Stautzenberger" on Justia Law