Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellant Diane Ausman, the administrator of the Estate of Daniel Ausman, filed a complaint on August 24, 2009 against a geriatric center and doctor, alleging, among other claims, medical negligence and negligence. Shortly after the suit was filed, Appellant passed away. The attorneys representing Appellant did not learn of her death until May 2011. As a result, the attorneys filed a motion for a continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin on July 11, 2011. The parties disputed whether the one-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-108 was applicable where a special administrator of an estate dies during the pendency of litigation or whether the matter was simply governed by Ark. R. Civ. P. 25's requirement for substitution of parties. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the Estate improperly failed to revive the action within one year from the date of Appellant's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Estate's failure to move for substitution within one year from the time of Appellant's death prevented the revivor of the action. View "Ausman v. Hiram Shaddox Geriatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Trustee filed a petition to construe an inter vivos trust, taking the position that the interests of the deceased beneficiaries lapsed because they predeceased the surviving settlor and that Appellants, descendants of the settlor's stepsons, were not entitled to share in the remainder of the trust. The circuit court concluded that a beneficiary's interest lapses if the beneficiary predeceases the settlor under the common law, and therefore, Appellants could not share in the trust because their fathers' interests lapsed when they predeceased the surviving settlor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the interest of a beneficiary to an inter vivos trust vests at the time the trust is created, and thus the beneficial interest does not lapse when the beneficiary predeceases the settlor; and (2) therefore, the interests of the deceased beneficiaries did not lapse. Remanded. View "Tait v. Cmty. First Trust Co." on Justia Law

Mark Smith died after he was taken to the emergency room at Rebsamen Medical Center. Appellants sought to be appointed as co-special administrators of Smith's estate and then filed the instant wrongful-death action. However, the order of appointment was not filed until two days after Appellants filed the action. Appellees moved for summary judgment arguing that the wrongful-death complaint was a nullity as Appellants lacked standing to bring such an action. While the motions were pending, Appellants filed a motion in the probate court seeking entry of a nunc pro tunc order to reflect that the order of appointment had been filed two days before it was actually filed. The probate court entered an order on motion nunc pro tunc. Nevertheless, the circuit court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment on the basis that the complaint was a nullity because Appellees lacked standing to bring the action at the time of its filing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was in error, as the circuit court lacked authority to invalidate or disregard the order from the probate division, which established that Appellants had been appointed as administrators prior to the filing of the wrongful-death complaint. Remanded. View "Smith v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in the underlying case was the discharge of by Defendant of the law firm Harrill & Sutter and what attorneys' fees were owed following that discharge. The circuit court ruled that Defendant discharged Harrill for cause and that, as a result, Harrill was entitled to a fee based only on quantum-meruit recovery and not the parties' fee agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's award in quantum-meruit recovery but reversed the circuit court's ruling denying Defendant's request for attorneys' fees on the basis that the circuit court had provided no findings in support of its denial of such fees. On remand, the circuit court found that Defendant was the prevailing party under Arkansas law and granted her attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the issue of attorneys' fees, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was the prevailing party; but (2) the fee award was not reasonable. View "Harrill & Sutter P.L.L.C. v. Kosin" on Justia Law

Appellant, individually and as the administratrix of the Estate of Anne Pressley, filed a complaint against Appellees, a medical center (the Center) and three individuals associated with the Center, alleging claims of invasion of privacy and outrage. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, holding (1) a claim for invasion of privacy does not survive the death of a decedent; (2) the claim for outrage failed because it was based on the same conduct as the claim for invasion of privacy; and (3) because Appellant's previous two claims failed, the Center could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) does not provide for the claim of invasion of privacy to survive the death of the decedent; (2) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellant's claim for outrage; and (3) because the judgment was reversed on the outrage claim, the circuit court's finding that the Center could not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees must also be reversed. View "Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the proceeds from the sale of timber, which was harvested from land that was specifically devised in a will, should be considered part of the decedent's residuary estate. Appellant, the executor of decedent's will, requested that the circuit court decide whether an ademption had occurred after Appellee Gary Morgan conveyed by timber deed several trees on decedent's property and transferred a portion of the proceeds to Nancy Morgan. The court declined to rule on the issue of ademption and found that the proceeds from the sale of timber became part of the residuary estate. The Supreme Court reversed, thereby adopting the intention theory as the law in Arkansas, holding that if the property that is the subject of a specific devise is sold by an attorney in fact at a time when the testator is incompetent, and the testator does not regain testamentary capacity before his or her death, an ademption of the specific devise does not take place as to the unexpended, identifiable proceeds of the sale. Remanded. View "Rodgers v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

After Billy Machen died, his wife Julia filed a petition to probate Billy's will. Julia filed a copy of the will, which bore no changes or markings. That will bequeathed $10,000 to Billy's son Randy and established a testamentary trust for the benefit of Randy's children in the amount of $20,000. Randy opposed the probate of the will, contending that his father had made changes to it. Randy attached a copy of the same typed will, but this copy contained several handwritten changes. Randy filed a complaint against Julia, asserting that there was a family-settlement agreement and that the will was evidence of that agreement. The circuit court found that Billy, Julia, and Randy entered into a family-settlement agreement whereby Randy was to receive $100,000 for himself and $200,000 as trustee for his children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the undisputed facts showed that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Julia and Randy agreed to distribute the assets of Billy's estate in a manner different from his original, unaltered will, and Julia presented no evidence of fraud, duress, or imposition that would render her agreement with Randy unenforceable. View "Machen v. Machen" on Justia Law

Appellant bank sued Appellees, a corporation and its members, after loans granted to Appellees went into default and Appellees transferred certain property into a trust. After a jury rendered its verdicts, the circuit court (1) granted foreclosure against the property securing the debts, (2) dismissed Appellant's claim to avoid the transfer of one of the properties in the trust and ruled that the deed of another property in the trust was void, and (3) denied Appellant's various post-trial motions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in submitting Appellant's foreclosure and fraudulent-transfer claims to the jury because they were equitable in nature; and (2) the circuit court properly granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on Appellee's abuse-of-process claim. Remanded.

Hazel Frazier died, leaving behind her husband, Appellant Curtis Bridges, and her seven children, who were the stepchildren of Elree Frazier, a previous husband who died after taking the medication Vioxx. Later, one of the stepchildren brought a claim against Merck Company, the manufacturer of Vioxx, on behalf of Mr. Frazier, for the wrongful death of Mr. Frazier. The settlement proceeds were funneled into the estate of Ms. Frazier for distribution to Mr. Frazier's stepchildren. After Appellant was appointed the administrator for Ms. Frazier's estate, Appellant filed a claim stating that he was entitled to receive one-third of the proceeds obtained from the Merck settlement because of his curtesy interest. The district court rejected Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Ms. Frazier did not have a right to the Merck proceeds during her lifetime nor an individual right to bring suit under the wrongful-death statute, Appellant had no curtesy interest in the Merck settlement proceeds.

In 1990, Roy Sharpe executed an inter vivos trust and a will containing a testamentary trust. According to both trusts, Sharpe preferred his attorney, Charles Brown, to be employed to provide legal advice regarding trust administration and to choose a successor trustee if the need arose. Bank of America eventually served as trustee of both trusts. In 2009, Brown filed a petition to change trustees, asserting that in violation of the terms of the trusts, Bank of America intended to manage the trusts from a location outside the boundaries of Little Rock. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Brown lacked standing to bring the petition. Because the trusts did not provide a means for removing a trustee, Brown obtained no authority from the trusts to bring an action to change the trustees and had no interest in the trusts that granted him standing and permitted him to enforce the terms of the trusts. Remanded with directions to dismiss the case.