Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, trustees and co-trustees of two trusts as well as several individuals, appealed from an order entered by the circuit court that modified a previous injunction to allow Respondent, Aviation Cadet Museum, to land and depart small aircraft exclusively from the north end of its airfield. Before the Supreme Court was Petitioners' request for writ of certiorari seeking additional time to complete the record. The Court denied the writ, holding that the record in this case was not filed in a timely manner, and because the timely filing of the record on appeal is a jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal, the appeal was dismissed.

Appellee First Community Bank loaned $175,000 to Catherine Warbington and two Warbington family trusts, listing the property in the trusts as security. After Catherine died, the bank later filed a foreclosure complaint, asserting that payments were not being made on the loan and naming as defendants the unknown heirs of Catherine, the trusts, the trustee of the trusts, and others. Later, a foreclosure judgment was entered finding that the parties before the court had consented to the judgment and were indebted to the bank for the principal amount. The heirs and trusts then filed a motion to vacate the foreclosure, asserting (1) that the judgment was void by operation of law because Bert Warbington had not been personally served as trustee, and (2) Bert was not named individually in the complaint though he was a known heir and as such Ark. R. Civ. P 4 and due process required the bank name him as a party. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court found (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding from the evidence that there was personal service and (2) that the circuit court did not err in finding that Bert was an unknown heir. Affirmed.

In 2009, a car collided with a bus driven by Angela Austin, causing several passengers' deaths and serious injuries to others. Austin drove the bus as a transport vehicle for a nonprofit called Focus. Focus was insured by appellant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, who filed a complaint for interpleader indicating its willingness to pay insurance-policy proceeds in the total amount of $1 million as per its policy and requesting to be discharged from further liability. The circuit court entered an order interpleading appellant's funds. Appellees, the injured passengers and administrators of the deceased passengers' estates, filed counterclaims against appellant, alleging that Focus negligently failed to restrict Austin from using her cell phone while driving and arguing they were entitled to a judgment against appellant for a share of the interpleaded funds. Appellant filed a motion for declaratory judgment and a motion to dismiss, stating it had paid the full amount as stated in the insurance policy. The circuit court denied appellants' motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that the language of the policy was ambiguous.

Appellant Darrell Brown appealed an order of the circuit court probate division modifying its previous order authorizing distribution of net remaining settlement proceeds and declaring that, as a disbarred attorney, Brown was not entitled to any attorneys fees from the remaining settlement proceeds paid by Libya as a result of an airplane crash over Scotland to appellees Melvin Bell and Velma Wilson, as heirs of the estate of Charlotte Stinnett. For reversal, Brown argued that he was not properly served with appellees' motion for modification or with appellees' discovery requests and therefore the circuit court erred in striking his response and entering the order of distribution. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for clarification of the law. However, as the only argument advanced on appeal was a challenge to the order striking Brown's response, and as Brown did not timely file a notice of appeal from the order striking his response, the Court dismissed the appeal with prejudice.

Appellant Hunter Crenshaw appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Steven Ayers. The case was dismissed because it fell outside the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant and Mr. Ayers were involved in an automobile accident, in which Mr. Ayers died. Appellant filed a complaint against Mr. Ayers days after Mr. Ayers had died. The summons was never returned. One month later, "Steven Ayers" responded to the complaint by asserting a lack of jurisdiction and defective service of process. In August, Appellant filed a motion to get more time to properly serve the complaint on Mr. Ayers' estate. In September, "Mr. Ayers" responded again, this time asserting the defense of limitations. Four days before the statute would expire, Appellant filed a response, asserting that he properly served an appointed "special administrator" of Mr. Ayers' estate. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint for defective service. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court, and affirmed its decision to dismiss Appellant's case.

Fifteen-month-old Trayvon Scroggins died in June, 2006 after being hit by a taxicab. Trayvon was survived by his mother, Appellee Evon Medlock, his father, Appellant Tremayne Scoggins, and one sister. Appellant was serving time at a federal penitentiary at the time of Trayvonâs birth and death. Appellee was Trayvonâs sole caregiver, and was named special administratrix of his estate. On opening Trayvonâs estate, Appellee asserted that Appellant was Trayvonâs biological father, but because he was in prison, no claim as a beneficiary would be asserted on his behalf unless it was determined that he was entitled to any benefits under state law. Subsequent to her appointment as administratrix, Appellee filed a wrongful-death and survival action against the cab company. The suit ended in settlement. But at the hearing, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent Appellantâs interests. In 2009, Appellant filed a motion to establish paternity of Trayvon. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the paternity suit, arguing that state law has a mechanism for establishing paternity when one of the parents is dead, but not when the child is dead. Appellee argued that the circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over a deceased child. The circuit court dismissed the paternity suit, holding it was outside its statutory powers to hear the case. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that court dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court was âmindfulâ of Appellantâs assertion that he had a right to participate in Trayvonâs wrongful-death action. Beneficiaries of a wrongful-death action include the surviving parents and siblings. However, the Court held it âwill not read words into a statutory provision that are not there.â The Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellantâs petition.