Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

William's wife died in 1996; he died in 2011. Upon the wife's death, their trust established the decedent’s irrevocable trust, and the survivor’s amendable, revocable trust. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, both trusts would terminate; 30 percent of the survivor’s trust would be distributed to William’s children, with the rest set aside in a grandchildren’s trust. The document contained a no contest provision. In 1997, William executed the first amendment to the survivor’s trust After William’s death, a grandson filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition to determine the validity of a 2008 amendment, alleging that William lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence when he executed the amendment. The court dismissed, based the fact that another grandchild disclaimed his interest, thereby restoring the petitioner’s interest in the trust estate. The court of appeal reversed. Acceptance of the disclaimer was contrary to public policies of effectuating a testator’s intent and dissuading elder abuse, and was premised on the erroneous view that the disclaimer effectuated a settlement of the lawsuit. A settlement assumes the consent of the parties; it is not a side deal between the court and a nonlitigant. The petitioner had an interest in challenging the validity of the 2008 amendment, and the prosecution of his petition was necessary to protect that interest. View "Gregge v. Hugill" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor obtained a judgment against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment creditor filed a petition under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL), Code Civ. Proc., 680.010 et seq., to invalidate the third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant appealed. The court concluded that the underlying order invalidating the third party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly denied the third party claimant's belated motion to vacate that order. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Torjesen, v. Mansdorf" on Justia Law

John F. LeBouef, an attorney, appeals a probate judgment invalidating a will and living trust purportedly executed by John Patton. Patton's will and trust named LeBouef as the principal beneficiary to a $5 million estate. The trial court factually found that LeBouef caused the loss of the original trust instrument, which made it impossible for the trial court to determine the true terms of the trust. The trial court declared the will and trust invalid and removed Lebouef as trustee. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court's factual findings are disturbing, fatal to LeBouef's contentions, and suggest criminal culpability. The court also affirmed the trial court's postjudgment order approving LeBouef's trust accounting but denied his request for trustee fees, attorney fees, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and property management services where the trial court ruled that an award for fees, costs, services, and out-of-pocket expenses would be inequitable and reward LeBouef for his misconduct. View "Butler v. LeBouef" on Justia Law

In this case the competent spouse, Lynn Bower unquestionably paid for the support and maintenance of her conservatee husband David. In fact she devoted about 72 percent of the couple’s $200,000 marital estate income to making the $12,000 a month payments to a home specializing in Alzheimer’s care for David. What she didn’t do was comply with the letter of an order of the probate court to pay lump sum large professional fee claims directly to David’s conservator and several other creditors. Instead she either paid those claims directly herself, or those claims were paid indirectly from escrows based on liens asserted by the relevant professionals. Based on the literal noncompliance with the terms of the order, the probate judge ordered the community estate of the Bowers divided, with the conservator receiving David’s share. Because the probate court erroneously proceeded on the premise that article 3 of part 6, division 4 of the Probate Code, section 3089, was triggered by noncompliance with orders to pay professional fees directly to the conservator in a lump sum, rather than refusal to comply with an order to support the conservatee spouse, the Court of Appeal reversed an order dividing the estate and remanded the matter to the trial level for application of the proper standard to the facts of this case. View "Conservatorship of Bower" on Justia Law

Coblentz, a law firm partner, died in 2010. Coblentz served for many years as a trustee for the McClatchy Trust before resigning in 2009. In 2012, one of the Trust’s beneficiaries filed a Petition for Relief from Breach of Trust under Probate Code 17200(a), seeking damages for alleged asset mismanagement. The petition included an allegation that “Petitioner is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Respondents named herein as Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore names these Respondents by such fictitious names." An amended petition, attempting to add the Firm as a named defendant, alleged that after reading an SEC filing dated 2004, plaintiff became aware that Coblentz‘s actions as trustee had been undertaken in his capacity as a partner in the Firm, making the Firm vicariously liable. The Firm argued the beneficiary was not entitled to use the Doe defendant procedure because he had known the Firm‘s identity and the facts allegedly giving rise to its liability when the original petition was filed and that the claims were time-barred. The trial court quashed service, reasoning that plaintiff knew all the relevant facts before filing the original petition. The court of appeal affirmed. View "McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute relating to the Leland C. Babbitt and Mary Lynne Babbitt Family Trust. In In re Estate of Giraldin, the California Supreme Court held that when the settlor of a revocable trust appoints, during his lifetime, “‘someone other than himself to act as trustee, once the settlor dies and the trust becomes irrevocable,’” the remainder beneficiaries “‘have standing to sue the trustee for breaches of fiduciary duty committed during the period of revocability.’” At issue in this case is what happens if the settlor of a revocable trust does not appoint “someone other than himself to act as trustee,” but instead appoints himself to be the trustee. The court concluded that in this situation the rule is different. Although the beneficiaries of the irrevocable trust have standing to petition the probate court for an accounting and information after the settlor dies and the trust or a portion of the trust becomes irrevocable, the probate court does not have authority to order the trustee to provide an accounting or information regarding trust assets and transactions while the trust was still revocable, where, as here, there is no claim that the deceased settlor was incapacitated or subject to undue influence during the period of revocability. View "Babbitt v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this dispute concerned the ownership of property formerly owned by decedent Kenneth Liebler. Liebler's daughter, appellant Melanie Carne (as putative successor trustee to the Kenneth Liebler Irrevocable Trust dated December 21, 2009 (the "2009 Trust")), filed a second amended petition to confirm the validity of the 2009 Trust, Carne's status as successor trustee of the 2009 Trust, and the assets of the 2009 Trust. In her petition, Carne sought to confirm that certain real property previously owned by Liebler ("the Via Regla property"), had been properly transferred to the 2009 Trust. Liebler's grandson, defendant-respondent Dillon Hasting, filed an opposition to the petition. Hasting was a beneficiary of the Liebler Revocable Declaration of Trust dated February 27, 1985 (the "1985 Trust"). In his opposition, Hasting contended that the 2009 Trust was not a valid trust because Liebler had not properly transferred title to the only asset allegedly in the 2009 Trust, the Via Regla Property. In support of this contention, Hasting noted that Liebler held legal title to the Via Regla Property as trustee of the 1985 Trust, and the 2009 Trust contained no language indicating that Liebler was acting as the trustee of the 1985 Trust at the time of the purported transfer to the 2009 Trust. The trial court entered an order denying Carne's petition for the two reasons set out in Hasting's opposition. On appeal, Carne argued the trial court erred in denying her petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the language in the 2009 Trust was sufficient to convey the Via Regla Property to the 2009 Trust and that Liebler was not required to execute a separate deed in order to effectuate such conveyance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, because at the time the 2009 Trust was created, the 1985 Trust was a revocable inter vivos trust, and Liebler was the sole trustee who owned no interest in the Via Regla Property as an individual, Liebler's signature on the 2009 Trust was sufficient to "to convey good title" to the Via Regla Property from the 1985 Trust to the 2009 Trust. View "Carne v. Worthington" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation and administration of the Donald W. Callender Family Trust (Trust), executed by Donald Callender (Donald) as the settlor and original trustee in 2003. The trust held assets of money and property, including royalties for use of the "Marie Callendar" name. Defendant-appellants Cathleen Callender (Cathe) and Catherine Callender (Katy), and defendant Donald Lucky Callender (Lucky), the primary beneficiaries of the Callender Trust, were at odds primarily about how the residuary of the Trust was to be divided. The Trust provided that upon Donald's death, the residuary was to be divided into thirds and vested in each of the Beneficiaries. Plaintiffs-respondents Douglas Ammerman and Janet Feldmar (collectively, Trustees) succeeded Donald as the trustees upon his death in January 2009. When disputes arose among the Beneficiaries as to division of the residuary, they filed a petition for instructions. After trial, the court ruled the Trust residuary should be divided based on what the parties referred to as the "changing fraction method." The central issue on appeal was whether the court erred in ruling the changing fraction method applied to the residuary. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in ruling the changing fraction method applied to the Trust residuary, and that Cathe should have been charged taxes on the gift of her property. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment. View "Ammerman v. Callender" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition against their stepfather, to recover property belonging to their mother’s estate and sought damages of double the value of the property, based on Probate Code 859: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to ... an elder, ... or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse … the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered [and] in the court’s discretion ... for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Staggers died. His son was substituted in as the respondent in the probate proceeding. The court held that double damages and attorney fees under section 859 were punitive in nature and not available against the son, based on Code of Civil Procedure 377.42, which excepts from recovery against a successor “damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or exemplary damages.” The court of appeal vacated, reasoning that section 859 damages may be punitive in nature, but are not punitive damages. View "Hill v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Monschke, acting as personal representative for the estate of her mother, the decedent, filed suit for wrongful death and elder abuse against Timber Ridge Assisted Living, which petitioned to compel arbitration on the ground plaintiff, on behalf of decedent, had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause before enrolling decedent in the facility. The trial court denied the petition, finding the wrongful death claim had been brought on behalf of decedent’s surviving children, and the children were not parties to the arbitration agreement. The trial court also declined to submit the elder abuse claim to arbitration because of the possibility of conflicting rulings. The court of appeal affirmed. While a personal representative’s interests may not directly align with the interests of any particular heir, the personal representative’s duty is to stand in the position of the heirs, not the decedent. View "Monschke v. Timber Ridge Assisted Living, LLC" on Justia Law