Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey G. Grossman and his family sued attorney John Peter Wakeman, Jr. and Wakeman Law Group, Inc. for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that Wakeman negligently prepared estate planning documents for Dr. A. Richard Grossman, which disinherited them in favor of Richard's fourth wife, Elizabeth Grossman. Richard's estate was valued at $18 million, and the plaintiffs argued they were the intended beneficiaries. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $9.5 million in damages.The Ventura County Superior Court denied Wakeman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Wakeman appealed, arguing that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, as they were not his clients. He contended that his duty was solely to Richard, who had instructed him to leave everything to Elizabeth.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that Wakeman owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs. The court emphasized that there was no clear, certain, and undisputed evidence of Richard's intent to benefit the plaintiffs. Testimonies from Elizabeth and others supported Wakeman's claim that Richard intended to leave his estate to Elizabeth. The court held that imposing a duty on Wakeman to the plaintiffs would place an intolerable burden on the legal profession.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Wakeman and his law group. The appeal from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was dismissed as moot. View "Grossman v. Wakeman" on Justia Law

Carla Montgomery petitioned to receive a share of her deceased father Benjamin C. Williams' trust estate, claiming she was an omitted child under Probate Code section 21622. Carla was born following a brief relationship between her mother, Annie Elliott, and Benjamin in the 1960s. Benjamin, who fathered seven children in total, moved to California shortly after Carla's conception and was unaware of her birth. In 1999, Benjamin executed a trust naming only his two youngest children, Benita Ligia Williams and Benjamin S. Williams, as beneficiaries. Carla learned of Benjamin's death and the trust's existence in 2019 and subsequently petitioned for a share of the estate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a one-day trial where evidence and testimonies were presented. The court found that Benjamin was unaware of Carla's birth when he executed the trust but concluded that Carla failed to prove that her omission was solely due to Benjamin's unawareness of her existence. The court noted that Benjamin had also omitted four other known children from his trust, indicating his intent to provide only for the two named beneficiaries. Consequently, the court denied Carla's petition and entered judgment against her.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the trial court's application of the reasoning from Rallo v. O’Brian, which requires an omitted child to prove that the sole reason for their omission was the testator's unawareness of their birth. The appellate court found that Benjamin's omission of his other known children demonstrated his intent to exclude all preexisting children, known or unknown. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, denying Carla's petition and awarding costs on appeal to Benita. View "Estate of Williams" on Justia Law

In 2020, several residents at a skilled nursing facility died from coronavirus infections. Family members of the deceased sued the facility and its alleged alter egos, asserting claims including elder abuse, negligence, and wrongful death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by family members rather than the decedents. The trial court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the family members had authority to sign on behalf of the decedents, and that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For one agreement where a family member had power of attorney, the court exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid conflicting results.The Shasta County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. It found that the defendants did not provide evidence that the family members had authority to sign the arbitration agreements on behalf of the decedents. Additionally, the court ruled that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For the agreement involving a power of attorney, the court denied arbitration to prevent conflicting rulings between court and arbitration proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to establish that the family members were authorized agents of the decedents. The court also found that the family members did not sign the agreements in their individual capacities, and thus were not bound by them. Furthermore, the court upheld the trial court's discretion to deny arbitration for the claim involving a power of attorney to avoid conflicting rulings. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center" on Justia Law

Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the interpretation of a trust. Jerry and Mary Trotter established the Trotter Family Revocable Trust in 2011, naming themselves as both trustees and trustors. Upon Jerry's death in 2012, Mary became the sole trustee. The trust provided that upon the death of the surviving spouse, certain stock would be distributed to their son, Timothy, and the rest of the estate would be divided equally among several children, including Jerry's daughter from a previous marriage, Wendy Trotter Van Dyck. In 2020, Mary expressed her intention to exclude Van Dyck from the trust beneficiaries via email and a questionnaire. However, she passed away before a formal amendment to the trust could be made.The probate court was asked to determine whether Mary's emails and the questionnaire constituted a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that Mary's writings were insufficient to constitute an amendment, as they were not signed as required by the trust and did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust. The court ordered that the trust be distributed to its original beneficiaries, including Van Dyck. Timothy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Mary's writings did not meet the requirements for a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that the writings were not signed as required by the trust, and the electronic signature provision of the Uniform Electronics Transaction Act (UETA) did not apply because a unilateral trust amendment does not constitute a "transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the court found that Mary's writings did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust by the writings themselves. View "Trotter v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two sisters, Sarah Plott Key (Key) and Elizabeth Plott Tyler (Tyler), over the enforcement of a "no contest" clause in a 1999 trust established by their parents. The trust had a lengthy appellate history with three prior appeals concerning the same trust. Key filed a petition in probate court to disinherit her sister, Tyler, based on the "no contest" clause in the trust. Tyler had previously defended a 2007 amendment to the trust, which was found to have been procured through undue influence.Previously, the probate court had granted Tyler's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Tyler had not directly contested the trust as she had only defended the 2007 amendment. However, this was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court holding that Tyler's defense of the 2007 amendment constituted a direct contest of the trust.On remand, Tyler raised a new issue: whether the lack of a no contest clause in a 2003 amendment to the trust meant that her share of the assets distributed under the terms of that amendment were exempt from forfeiture. The trial court agreed with Tyler, concluding that her share of the assets was exempt from forfeiture.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain language of the original trust's no contest provision required that if Tyler lacked probable cause to contest the trust, she must be disinherited. The court found that Tyler's share of the trust's residual monetary assets was not exempt from forfeiture simply because her specific share was specified by a subsequent amendment that did not contain a no contest clause. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Carmody (appellant) and the estate of his deceased nephew, Robert Allen Flores. Initially, Donald was informed by an heir-hunting firm, American Research Bureau, Inc. (ARB), that he was an heir to his nephew's estate. However, believing it was a scam, Donald assigned his rights to the estate to his brother, John Carmody. The estate, however, turned out to be valuable. John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 to determine the entitlement to the distribution of the nephew's estate, which resulted in a determination that both John and Donald were the nephew's heirs, with each entitled to a 50% share. However, John died before the court issued the final distribution order.The administrator of the nephew's estate sought a final distribution order that would take into account Donald's assignment of his rights to John. Donald objected, claiming that the previous order determining the entitlement to distribution was final and prohibited the court from recognizing his prior assignment of his interest to John. The trial court rejected this claim, ruling that it properly recognized Donald's assignment of his interest in the estate to John.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that John's rights as an assignee were not raised or litigated in the section 11700 proceeding, which was limited to a determination of heirship. Thus, John did not forfeit or waive his rights as an assignee by failing to assert those rights in the section 11700 proceeding. The court also found that Donald failed to establish evidence of rescission of the assignment. View "In re Estate of Flores" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law