Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Edith Rogers appealed her removal as administrator of the estate of her grandfather Roscoe Sapp, Sr. (decedent), who died in 1994. Armuress Sapp and Brian Lincoln, two of decedent’s grandsons, separately petitioned to remove Rogers as administrator. The probate court found Rogers: (1) had failed to comply with the court’s 2001 instructions that she and her coadministrator (who died in 2003) sell the estate’s remaining real estate holdings and distribute the net proceeds to the beneficiaries of the decedent’s will; and (2) acted in bad faith toward the beneficiaries by trying to buy them out for much less than they would have received if she had timely sold the properties. The court therefore concluded Rogers had to be removed because she “mismanaged” the estate and was “incapable of properly executing the duties of the office” of administrator. The probate court withdrew letters of administration issued to Rogers and appointed Armuress as special administrator. In her briefs, Rogers challenged: (1) the 2001 order instructing the coadministrators to sell the estate’s real property; (2) the probate court’s 2016 denial of her petition for additional instructions; and (3) the 2017 judgment removing her as personal representative. The Court of Appeal determined the 2017 judgment was properly before it. Although the Court concluded the evidence did not support a finding that Rogers was incapable of executing the duties of administrator, the evidence supported her removal because she was not otherwise qualified to act as administrator, and she mismanaged the estate. Because the Court concluded Rogers did not demonstrate the probate court abused its discretion when it removed her, judgment was affirmed View "Estate of Sapp" on Justia Law

Almost twenty years after four dentists formed a partnership to acquire and maintain a dental office building, the then-partners amended their agreement to allow one of the partners, Dr. Richard Hallberg, to assign his partnership interest to his living trust, and to substitute the trustee (then Dr. Hallberg) as a general partner in place of Dr. Hallberg individually. Litigation ensued 15 years later after Dr. Hallberg's death over whether, despite the substitution, Dr. Hallberg was still a partner at the time of his death, which would trigger buyout provisions that applied in the event of a partner's death.While a trust cannot act in its own name and must always act through its trustee, a trust is a "person" that may associate in a partnership under the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (UPA), based on the plain language of the UPA's definition of "person." The clear statutory language is reinforced by other provisions of the statute, as well as by its legislative history. The Court of Appeal held that Dr. Hallberg was not a partner when he died. Rather, his trust, or the trustee of his trust, was the partner. The court saw no contradiction between the terms of the UPA and California trust law. To the extent Presta v. Tepper, (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909, 918, suggested otherwise, the court disagreed. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's judgment holding that the trust was not a separate legal entity. View "Han v. Hallberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the probate court's order striking her petition to enforce a no contest clause in a trust under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, and denying her motion to recover attorney fees.The Court of Appeal agreed with the probate court, and with a recent decision by Division Five of this district, that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to a petition such as plaintiff's seeking to enforce a no contest clause. However, the court held that plaintiff adequately demonstrated a likelihood of success under the second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure. In this case, defendant's judicial defense of the 2007 Amendment to the Trust that she procured through undue influence met the Trust's definition of a contest that triggered the no contest clause. Furthermore, under sections 21310 and 21311, that clause was enforceable against defendant. The court also held that plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that defendant lacked probable cause to defend the 2007 Amendment. The court held that the findings of the probate court concerning defendant's undue influence, which this court affirmed, provided a sufficient basis to conclude that plaintiff has shown a probability of success on her No Contest Petition. Finally, the court held that plaintiff had the contractual right to seek reimbursement of her attorney fees incurred in resisting defendant's appeal of the probate court's ruling invalidating the 2007 Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues for the Court of Appeals' review: (1) whether the nonmarital biological child of an absentee father who never openly held her out as his own have standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 to sue for his wrongful death if she failed to obtain a court order declaring paternity during his lifetime?; and (2) if she did not have standing, did section 377.60 violate the state or federal equal protection clauses? Upon the specific facts of this case, the Court concluded the child did not have standing, and there was no equal protection violation. "We cannot imagine the Legislature intended to confer wrongful death standing on a child who had no relationship whatsoever with the decedent to the exclusion of the decedent’s other family members with whom he did have a relationship." View "Stennett v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Dudek appealed after the trial court sustained the demurrer of respondents Anne Kebisek Dudek, Tiffany Guzman, Jeanette Kebisek, Mary Kebisek, Guillermo Andrade, Maria Sanchez, Ora Day, Tonya Courtney, and Michael Quinn to David's petition to recover money distributed to the respondents in accordance with the beneficiary designation of Genworth Life Insurance Policy #5804946 (the Policy), which covered the life of J.D. Dudek (J.D.), Petitioner's brother. According to David, in late 2009, J.D. created and executed the J.D. Dudek Life Insurance Trust, naming David as the trustee. David asserted the Policy was listed as an asset of the Trust, to be held and administered in accordance with the Trust's terms. According to the Petition, J.D. prepared and submitted to the life insurance company the forms required by that company to change the ownership and beneficiary designations on the Policy in order to establish David, as trustee, as the sole owner and named beneficiary of the Policy. David was unaware that not long after J.D. submitted the forms, the insurance company rejected the ownership and beneficiary designation forms because J.D. had altered some of his entries without initialing the changes. David was also unaware that J.D. had failed to file corrected forms with the life insurance company after he was notified of the insurance company's rejection of his submitted forms. After J.D. died, David produced the Trust to the life insurance company and sought to obtain the proceeds of the policy. However, the life insurance company distributed the proceeds of the policy to the beneficiaries that it had on file, pursuant to the beneficiary designations that J.D. submitted prior to the alleged change. David subsequently sought an order directing the respondents to transfer the proceeds of the Policy to him as the trustee of the Trust. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, finding that if David could establish the facts alleged in the Petition, then it would be clear that J.D. created an irrevocable trust, and properly funded it, when he delivered to David the transferring document. "If the Trust was created, then David's entitlement to the proceeds of the life insurance policy that was an asset of the Trust would be established, and he would be able to seek the court's assistance in having those proceeds conveyed to him in his capacity as trustee. The trial court therefore should not have sustained the respondents' demurrer to David's Petition." View "Dudek v. Dudek" on Justia Law

Lieselotte Herzog (the Decedent) died intestate on October 17, 2013. In April 2014, the probate court issued letters of administration appointing Winnfred Herzog (Nephew) as the administrator of the estate. Kemp & Associates, Inc. (Kemp), a firm specializing in locating heirs, held a power of attorney for Maurene Schraff Nadj (Half Sister). In July 2016, Kemp petitioned the probate court for a determination that Half Sister was the Decedent’s sole heir. The probate court denied Kemp’s petition with prejudice for insufficient evidence. Kemp appealed, arguing the probate court erred: (1) by bifurcating the issue of whether Half Sister was the Decedent’s heir; (2) by concluding Kemp did not meet its burden of proof; and (3) by ruling Kemp’s evidence was inadmissible. In addition, Kemp contended Nephew lacked standing to oppose Kemp’s petition. Finding no reversible errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Herzog" on Justia Law

The parents established the trust in 1974 when all of the siblings were minors. Howard predeceased Alice, leaving her as the sole settlor and trustee. In 2003, Alice amended the trust to name all six children, as successor co-trustees, with the power to act by majority vote. Alice died in 2015; the trust became irrevocable. Five siblings, (Appellants) agreed to maintain the assets in trust, hoping they would increase in value for the next generation. The sixth sibling asked for distribution of her share of the trust in cash. The trial court interpreted the trust to require liquidation and distribution of the trust assets upon the death of the last surviving parent, based primarily on a provision requiring distribution to any beneficiary when that beneficiary turned 30 years old. All of the siblings were at least 30 years old. The court of appeal agreed that the trust's unambiguous language requires distribution and termination of the trust, but the trial court erred when it ordered the liquidation of the trust assets to accomplish that purpose, rather than deferring to the discretion of the trustees to distribute the trust. The orders removing the parties as trustees and requiring the trust to pay all attorney fees and costs flowed from that error. View "Trolan v. Trolan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that a "Trust Transfer Deed," signed by husband, granting certain real property to his wife, did not met Family Code section 852(a)'s express declaration requirement. The court held that without an express statement specifying what interest in the property was granted to wife, the reference to a "Trust Transfer" left the document's purpose ambiguous and thus rendered the purported transmutation invalid under section 852(a). The court held that the deed was fairly susceptible of at least two interpretations―the one wife proffered, whereby husband granted all of his interest in the property to her, thereby transmuting the residence into her separate property, and the one husband proffered, whereby he granted only an interest in trust to wife for the couple's estate planning purposes. View "Begian v. Sarajian" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment ordering Lu Tuan Nguyen to return funds to the Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Joseph Ribal. On remand, the trial court awarded attorney fees incurred in enforcing the underlying judgment to Linda Rogers, the conservator, of $43,507.50. Nguyen argued on appeal of that order that he satisfied the underlying judgment, and after reviewing the record, the Court of Appeal agreed. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080 (a), required such motions to be made before the judgment is satisfied, the Court agreed with Nguyen that the motion was untimely. Therefore, the order granting Rogers $43,507.50 in attorney fees was reversed. View "Conservatorship of Ribal" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs in this dispute over the management and the distribution of monetary assets of a family trust. The court held that the trial court properly applied the substantial benefit theory, an offshoot of the common fund doctrine, in making its award of fees from trust assets. In this case, substantial evidence supported the finding that the litigation substantially benefited all beneficiaries and that litigation preserved trust assets when the accounts were frozen. The court explained that the litigation preserved a common fund for the benefit of the non-participating beneficiaries. View "Smith v. Szeyller" on Justia Law