Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

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Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over the interpretation of a trust. Jerry and Mary Trotter established the Trotter Family Revocable Trust in 2011, naming themselves as both trustees and trustors. Upon Jerry's death in 2012, Mary became the sole trustee. The trust provided that upon the death of the surviving spouse, certain stock would be distributed to their son, Timothy, and the rest of the estate would be divided equally among several children, including Jerry's daughter from a previous marriage, Wendy Trotter Van Dyck. In 2020, Mary expressed her intention to exclude Van Dyck from the trust beneficiaries via email and a questionnaire. However, she passed away before a formal amendment to the trust could be made.The probate court was asked to determine whether Mary's emails and the questionnaire constituted a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that Mary's writings were insufficient to constitute an amendment, as they were not signed as required by the trust and did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust. The court ordered that the trust be distributed to its original beneficiaries, including Van Dyck. Timothy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Mary's writings did not meet the requirements for a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that the writings were not signed as required by the trust, and the electronic signature provision of the Uniform Electronics Transaction Act (UETA) did not apply because a unilateral trust amendment does not constitute a "transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the court found that Mary's writings did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust by the writings themselves. View "Trotter v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between two sisters, Sarah Plott Key (Key) and Elizabeth Plott Tyler (Tyler), over the enforcement of a "no contest" clause in a 1999 trust established by their parents. The trust had a lengthy appellate history with three prior appeals concerning the same trust. Key filed a petition in probate court to disinherit her sister, Tyler, based on the "no contest" clause in the trust. Tyler had previously defended a 2007 amendment to the trust, which was found to have been procured through undue influence.Previously, the probate court had granted Tyler's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Tyler had not directly contested the trust as she had only defended the 2007 amendment. However, this was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court holding that Tyler's defense of the 2007 amendment constituted a direct contest of the trust.On remand, Tyler raised a new issue: whether the lack of a no contest clause in a 2003 amendment to the trust meant that her share of the assets distributed under the terms of that amendment were exempt from forfeiture. The trial court agreed with Tyler, concluding that her share of the assets was exempt from forfeiture.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain language of the original trust's no contest provision required that if Tyler lacked probable cause to contest the trust, she must be disinherited. The court found that Tyler's share of the trust's residual monetary assets was not exempt from forfeiture simply because her specific share was specified by a subsequent amendment that did not contain a no contest clause. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

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The case involves Donald Carmody (appellant) and the estate of his deceased nephew, Robert Allen Flores. Initially, Donald was informed by an heir-hunting firm, American Research Bureau, Inc. (ARB), that he was an heir to his nephew's estate. However, believing it was a scam, Donald assigned his rights to the estate to his brother, John Carmody. The estate, however, turned out to be valuable. John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 to determine the entitlement to the distribution of the nephew's estate, which resulted in a determination that both John and Donald were the nephew's heirs, with each entitled to a 50% share. However, John died before the court issued the final distribution order.The administrator of the nephew's estate sought a final distribution order that would take into account Donald's assignment of his rights to John. Donald objected, claiming that the previous order determining the entitlement to distribution was final and prohibited the court from recognizing his prior assignment of his interest to John. The trial court rejected this claim, ruling that it properly recognized Donald's assignment of his interest in the estate to John.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that John's rights as an assignee were not raised or litigated in the section 11700 proceeding, which was limited to a determination of heirship. Thus, John did not forfeit or waive his rights as an assignee by failing to assert those rights in the section 11700 proceeding. The court also found that Donald failed to establish evidence of rescission of the assignment. View "In re Estate of Flores" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law

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In this California appellate case, the key issue was whether non-monetary benefits, specifically room and board, constituted "remuneration" within the meaning of Probate Code section 21362, a provision relating to the presumption of fraud or undue influence for donative transfers to caregivers of dependent adults. The case arose when the defendant, Elvira Gutierrez, who provided care services to the decedent in exchange for room and board, was named as the sole beneficiary in the decedent’s testamentary instruments. The plaintiffs, relatives of the decedent, argued that Gutierrez was a "care custodian" under the Probate Code, and that her receipt of the decedent’s estate should be presumed to be the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court initially ruled that Gutierrez was not a care custodian because room and board did not constitute remuneration for her services. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that "remuneration" as used in section 21362 does include room and board. The Court found that such an interpretation was consistent with the term's ordinary usage, the legislative intent to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation, and its interpretation in other legal contexts. The Court therefore concluded that Gutierrez was a care custodian under the statute, and the decedent’s donative gifts to her were subject to the presumption of fraud or undue influence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

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This appeal arises from a dispute over a trust established by a deceased father, James. Brian Spears, the son, filed a petition seeking to be named a creditor of his father's trust and to remove his stepmother, Therese Spears, as trustee. The trial court dismissed Brian's petition on the grounds that he did not file an amended pleading after the court sustained Therese's demurrer to the petition, with leave to amend. Brian appealed this decision, arguing that he did in fact file an amended pleading, reasserting only his claim to be named as a creditor of the trust.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four agreed with Brian. The court found that Brian's subsequent filing, titled "Creditor's Claim," was intended to be his amended pleading. It provided additional detail about the oral agreements underlying his claim, and it was filed under the same case number as his original petition.However, the court also agreed with Therese that the statute of limitations barred recovery on one of the alleged agreements underlying Brian's creditor's claim. The court found that the two-year statute of limitations for an action based on the breach of an oral contract had expired for one of the agreements before James's death.The court reversed the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that although Brian's creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations insofar as it rests on one of the alleged oral agreements, the trial court erred in dismissing Brian's creditor's claim to the extent it rests on the other alleged agreement. View "Spears v. Spears" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law