Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Richard Mueller and his wife, Joan Mueller (collectively, settlors), had two children together: plaintiff Katherine Zahnleuter (formerly Mueller) and Amy Mueller. Richard also had a daughter from a previous marriage, Julie Van Patter. Defendant Thomas Mueller was Richard’s brother, and Katherine and Amy’s uncle. Thomas had two children: Sudha Mueller and Puja Mueller. In August 2004, the settlors created the Richard J. & Joan R. Mueller Living Trust. Under the terms of that document, Katherine and Amy were equal residual beneficiaries of the trust estate after the payment of certain expenses and gifts, including a $10,000 gift to their half-sister, Julie. Amy and then Katherine were named as the successor trustees upon the death of both settlors. The trust document authorized the trustee, in his or her discretion, to initiate or defend, at the expense of the trust estate, any litigation the trustee considered advisable related to the trust or any property of the trust. The trust document included a no contest clause. In October 2017, Joan died. Shortly thereafter, Richard was diagnosed with terminal cancer. The trust agreement would be amended three times, each amendment carrying its own no contest clause, and each giving differing amounts of money to the various beneficiaries. Thomas, the successor trustee named in the third amendment to the trust, appealed an order surcharging him for the trust assets he expended to defend against a beneficiary’s contest to the validity of the third amendment. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Zahnleuter v. Mueller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law

“Breathe” was previously known as the American Lung Association of Los Angeles County, affiliated with the national organization, ALA, and the American Lung Association in California (ALAC). Breathe’s predecessor entered into annual agreements with ALAC and the ALA that provided for “income sharing” between Breathe and ALAC, except for “funds restricted in writing by the donor, not later than the date of donation, to exclude or limit sharing, such restriction not having been invited by the donee association.” ALA sued ALAC and its affiliates, including Breathe, for trademark infringement and related causes of action. Under a 2006 Consent Judgment, Breathe disaffiliated from the ALA and ALAC and was renamed. The parties agreed to a process for settling their outstanding accounts.In 2015, ALAC moved to enforce the Consent Judgment by compelling Breathe to share three bequests that were created but not distributed before the Consent Judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the ALA, concluding the restricted funds exception of the Affiliate Agreement was ambiguous and that the bequests were shareable. The court of appeal reversed. The plain language of the bequests indicates the testators' intentions to benefit only the organization now known as Breathe. Sharing the bequests with the ALA is incompatible with those intentions and is not required under the Affiliate Agreement. View "Breathe Southern California v. American Lung Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant and the law firm (collectively, the lawyers) for legal malpractice on the theory that the lawyers in drafting the LLC operating agreements did not adhere to the intent of their mother’s trust. The lawyers moved for summary judgment on three grounds—namely, (1) they owed Plaintiffs no duty of care, (2) Plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred, and (3) the parties had too contingent of an interest to have standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment. Specifically, the court ruled that Plaintiffs had presented “no evidence of decedent’s” intent to disinherit specific grandchildren from obtaining membership interests in the LLCs, such that the lawyers owed Plaintiffs no duty to effectuate that intent.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the lawyers did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to draft the LLC operating agreements in a way that disinherited decedent’s grandchildren because decedent’s intent to disinherit the specific grandchildren from being assigned any interest in the LLCs was not, as a matter of law, clear, certain or undisputed. Further, the court wrote that because summary judgment was properly granted due to the absence of any duty running from the lawyers to Plaintiffs, the court does not have occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance (namely, that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred or that the parties lack standing.) View "Gordon v. Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP" on Justia Law

The Morenos sought a determination that Bertuccio was not an heir entitled to an intestate share of the Estate of Franco. The probate court granted them summary judgment, finding Bertuccio to be the child of a 1957 marriage between his mother Marilyn and Frank Bertuccio, under the marital presumption. Family Code section 7540(a) provides that “the child of spouses who cohabited at the time of conception and birth is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Frank was identified as Bertuccio’s father on his birth certificate and paid child support for Bertuccio after he and Marilyn divorced. Marilyn purportedly told Bertuccio that Franco was his father. The court held Bertuccio was not entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent from whom he could inherit in intestate succession under Probate Code section 6453(b)(2).The court of appeal remanded. If Bertuccio were found to be a child of the marriage of Marilyn and Frank, pursuant to the marital presumption, he would not be entitled to prove Franco was his natural parent. However, the probate court erred in applying the marital presumption without first making the requisite finding that Marilyn and Frank were cohabiting at the time of Bertuccio’s conception and birth. View "Estate of Franco" on Justia Law

Jonathan Starr brought a probate petition challenging the actions of M. Thomas Ashbrook, who was acting as the trustee of the revocable trust of Jonathan’s father, Arnold Starr. The petition alleged that Ashbrook had wasted and misused trust assets by pursuing a meritless petition for instructions and using trust assets to fund litigation against Jonathan Starr and his brothers. Ashbrook responded by bringing a special motion to strike the surcharge cause of action pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court concluded the allegations of the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of activity protected by section 425.16 and denied Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion. Ashbrook appealed the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that the alleged waste and misuse of trust assets was the injury-producing activity allegedly giving rise to Ashbrook’s liability for breach of trust. Because the surcharge cause of action did not arise out of allegations of protected activity the Court affirmed the order denying Ashbrook’s anti-SLAPP motion without addressing the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. View "Starr v. Ashbrook" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Russell Davis, Ian Herzog, Evan Marshall, Debra Wear, Gloria Tedesco, and Stephen Carpenter appealed a March 22, 2021 trial court order, which denied each of their special motions to strike (anti- SLAPP) the corresponding applications for elder abuse restraining orders (EARO) filed by plaintiff-appellant Laura White (White), as cotrustee of the Thomas S. Tedesco Living Trust (the living trust), to protect her father, conservatee Thomas Tedesco (Thomas) from defendants’ concerted efforts to isolate and unduly influence him to change his estate plan for their benefit. White cross-appealed the same order denying her request to hear the EARO applications prior to the anti-SLAPP motions. Defendants contended that: (1) White had no standing to request the EAROs because she was unable to establish that she was either a trustee of the living trust or fiduciary of Thomas; (2) the lower court erred in assuming the conservatorship was valid and White was a cotrustee of the living trust, and relying on the Court of Appeal's opinions affirming the probate court’s actions; (3) the court erred by denying defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions; (4) their assistance in asserting Thomas’s civil and testamentary rights cannot be restrained by an EARO to prevent them from seeking a judicial determination that will resolve the very issue raised by the EARO; (5) the EAROs had to be stricken because they interfered with Orange County’s exclusive subject matter jurisdiction; and (6) the court erred in proceeding without joinder by Thomas. White asserted Wear’s anti-SLAPP motion was moot given the Court of Appeal's affirmance of the EARO against her, the anti-SLAPP motions were properly denied, and defendants’ remaining contentions lacked merit. In her cross-appeal, she argued the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to rule on her applications before deciding the anti-SLAPP motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying each special motion to strike; however, it concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to utilize its case management tools and prevent a delay in hearing the merits of the applications for EAROs by failing to either: (1) revisit the prior denial of temporary EAROs and grant temporary relief pending the resolution of defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions (through appeal); or (2) decide the applications and the anti-SLAPP motions at the same time. Thus, the matter was remanded for the trial court to proceed to trial on White’s applications for EAROs regarding all defendants except Wear, against whom an EARO was already in place. View "White v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Judith ("Judy") Scherber was an intestate heir of ("Decedent") Loch David Crane, who died in 2018 while living in San Diego County. Judy’s petition was based on her relationship with Charles Bloodgood (Charles). In 1951, Charles and his wife Frances Bloodgood (Frances) took two-year-old Judy into their home after she was abandoned by her birth parents, and for the duration of their lifetimes, held Judy out as their own child while domiciled in Indiana. Applying California law to undisputed facts jointly submitted by the parties, the probate court found Judy was the presumed natural child of Charles under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA); that Shannon Wehsener (Shannon), a first cousin of Decedent who had opposed Judy’s petition, had failed to proffer any facts to rebut that presumption; and that Judy therefore was Decedent’s heir through Charles, based on Charles openly holding her out as his own child during his lifetime. Shannon argued the probate court erred in applying California law to determine the existence of a natural parental relationship between Charles and Judy. Shannon argued the court instead should have applied Indiana law, where that relationship was effectuated. And unlike California, Indiana law did not recognize the existence of a natural parent and child relationship for purposes of determining heirship when a parent openly holds out a child as that parent’s own. Shannon further argued that even if California law applied and Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy, that presumption was rebutted purely on the basis of public policy. Exercising independent review, the California Court of Appeal concluded California law applied in determining parentage between Judy and Charles for purposes of intestate succession. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court further concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the probate court’s finding that Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy under the UPA; that Shannon did not meet her burden to produce clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption; and that the presumption could not be rebutted purely on the grounds of public policy. View "Wehsener v. Jernigan" on Justia Law

The court appointed a guardian ad litem for two minor trust beneficiaries. A few years later, but before the beneficiaries reached 18, they sought the removal of the guardian ad litem. The guardian responded by filing a motion to disqualify the beneficiaries' attorney, which the trial court granted. The beneficiaries appealed.By the time the case reached the Second Appellate District, the beneficiaries had reached the age of majority. Thus, The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's order disqualifying the counsel of two trust beneficiaries, finding that the issue was moot. The court explained that there is no longer statutory authority permitting the appointment of a guardian ad litem because the beneficiaries are no longer minors. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

Parker’s daughters sought the appointment of a conservator of their mother’s estate. Schwarcz, a professional fiduciary, was appointed as temporary conservator of Parker’s estate. Following mediation, Parker, her daughters, and Schwarcz entered into an agreement that provided for a less restrictive alternative. The court approved the settlement and terminated the temporary conservatorship. Parker’s counsel emailed Schwarcz’s counsel, requesting “all communications" between Schwarcz and anyone regarding Parker’s estate. Schwarcz’s counsel refused to comply. Parker filed a “Petition for Return of Property,” under Probate Code section 850, seeking communications between Schwarcz and any non-attorney, communications between Schwarcz and her attorney with or without copying or otherwise including another person, and documents related to the temporary conservatorship.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Parker’s petition as not authorized by Probate Code 850. “Personal property” as used in section 850 does not encompass communications and documents from the administration of her temporary conservatorship estate. The section's legislative history and the historical circumstances around the enactment of its predecessor statutes do not suggest the Legislature intended section 850 to be used by a claimant to obtain communications and documents generated by a temporary conservator. View "Parker v. Schwarcz" on Justia Law