Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Respondent Neumiller & Beardslee filed a renewal request for a 2008 judgment and identified Estate Administrator Audrey Douglas as the judgment debtor without stating she was named in her role as the administrator of an estate as set forth in the original judgment. When it discovered this, respondent filed a motion to correct the error. The trial court granted that motion and corrected the judgment nunc pro tunc. Appellant Joanna Douglas-Dorsey, who was a beneficiary of the estate argued on appeal the trial court erred in correcting that error because it was not a clerical error. Remembering the “law respects form less than substance” the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Estate of Douglas" on Justia Law

Jones established a trust, naming his daughter (Spencer) as successor trustee. The property was the trust’s principal asset. Jones later married Grays-Jones, but did not amend the trust. Jones contracted to sell the property to CDI for $13.6 million. Jones died shortly thereafter. Months later, Grays-Jones petitioned for an interest in Jones’s estate as an omitted spouse. While the property was still in escrow, Grays-Jones and Spencer, as trustee, agreed the trust “shall pay to [Grays-Jones] a total of $3,000,000 . . . as her full and final settlement of [Grays-Jones’s] interest in the Estate. Payment of said amount shall be paid ... out of the escrow from the sale of the [property].” Grays-Jones would move out of Jones’s residence in exchange for $150,000, which would constitute “an advance against the total settlement.” A stipulated judgment incorporated the settlement. Spencer, as trustee, paid Grays-Jones $150,000; Grays-Jones moved out of Jones’s residence. The sale of the property fell through. Spencer did not pay Grays-Jones the outstanding $2.85 million.Grays-Jones sought to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging Spencer frustrated the sale of the property. She requested the appointment of a temporary trustee to sell the residence and property. The trial court denied the petition, finding the settlement agreement unenforceable because the sale was a condition precedent. The court of appeal reversed. The settlement agreement contained a condition precedent as to the method of payment, but Spencer’s independent promise to pay $3 million is enforceable and remains payable upon the property’s sale. View "Estate of Jones" on Justia Law

Ramsey Walter El Wardani died intestate in 2016 and was survived by his wife Janine and daughter from a previous marriage, Alexandria (Ali). Four years into a protracted probate dispute between Janine and Ali, the court removed Janine as court-appointed administrator of Ramsey’s estate. It deemed her ineligible to serve in that role because it found that she was not a United States (U.S.) resident as required by California Probate Code section 8402(a)(4). Emphasizing her numerous ties to California, Janine appealed her removal as administrator of her deceased husband’s estate. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the trial court reasonably rejected her claim to U.S. residency despite those ties. Janine sold her home in California and moved with Ramsey to Mexico in 2014 intending to retire there. She remained in Mexico “full time” for two years until Ramsey’s death. Although she returned to California for visits thereafter, she did not relocate or plan to move back to the U.S. until the probate case was over. View "Estate of El Wardani" on Justia Law

King is Jimmy's former spouse and mother of his minor child. Jimmy was killed in a California helicopter crash. His sole heirs were his spouse, Wasdin, and his minor child. Jimmy and King were residents of Alabama. An Alabama probate court named King as the personal representative of Jimmy’s estate. King filed a California wrongful death suit. Wasdin moved to intervene; Code Civil Procedure 387(d)(1)(B)) provides that a court “shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene” if “[t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction" and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair that person’s ability to protect that interest unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. King asserted the one-action rule, which precludes an heir from filing an independent action after a decedent’s personal representative has filed suit for wrongful death, and that any complaints about the inadequacy of her representation of Wasdin’s interest should be addressed by the Alabama probate court.The court of appeal reversed the denial of Wasdin’s motion. An heir must be granted leave to intervene as a matter of right so long as the statutory requirements for intervention have been met. The trial court denied the motion on the incorrect basis that there was no legal authority allowing an heir to intervene in a wrongful death action filed by the personal representative and failed to consider whether the heir’s interests were adequately represented by the personal representative. View "King v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was a beneficiary and trustee of a family trust. In 2018, Defendant provided Plaintiff, Defendant's daughter, and the other remainder beneficiaries with a notice stating: "[y]ou may not bring an action to contest the Trust more than 120 days from the date this notification by the trustee is served upon you." Approximately 230 days after Plaintiff received this notice, she filed a petition seeking to invalidate a previous amendment to the trust. Defendant, citing a no-contest clause contained in the trust instrument, claimed that Plaintiff's litigation resulted in her disinheritance. The trial court agreed and Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court. The court rejected Plaintiff's claim that untimely litigation does not constitute a "direct contest without probable cause." More specifically, Plaintiff argued that the fact her litigation was untimely does not automatically render it unsupported by probable cause, and that the court should review the merits of her challenge. The court explained that Plaintiff's litigation was a "direct contest" and that, solely because it was untimely, it lacked probable cause. View "Meiri v. Shamtoubi" on Justia Law

After Royals’ father, Adams, died at age 99, Royals became the successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the Adams Trust. Lu, Adams’s second wife, was 59 years old when she married Adams, then 95. Royals alleged that Adams intended to leave none of his assets to Lu. Lu claims Adams intended to provide for her support by depositing certain funds in certain accounts under Lu’s control outside of the Trust. A pretrial right to attach order was issued against Lu under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600).The court of appeal reversed. The prospect of punitive recovery on a financial elder abuse claim (exemplary damages or statutory penalties) may not be secured by the extraordinary remedy of pretrial attachment. A financial elder abuse claimant may obtain an attachment for potential compensatory damages and an award of attorney fees and costs associated with those damages only if the request for it complies with all applicable provisions of the statutory scheme governing pretrial attachments (Code Civ. Proc. 481.010). Royals’s attachment application did not comply with four provisions of the Attachment Law. Royals failed to support her prayer for compensatory damages with competent evidence; to the extent she sought an attachment for prospective recovery of punitive damages and statutory penalties in addition to compensatory damages, her attachment request also failed to comply with the attachable amount, attachable claim, and claimed indebtedness requirements. View "Royals v. Lu" on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District resolved three appeals, referred to as the 270 Action and the other as 475 Action.   In the 270 Action, the trial court sustained special motions to strike Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant and her counsel, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1)1 (i.e., anti-SLAPP motions). The trial court further awarded Defendant and her attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). The first 270 Appeal (No. B308337) is of the trial court’s judgment following its order on the anti-SLAPP motions. The Second Appellate District agreed with the trial court that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits in the 270 Action because, under the circumstances presented, he lacked standing to bring a malicious prosecution claim with respect to an action that had not been prosecuted against him. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.   The 475 Appeal (No. B307242) is of an order entered by the probate court dismissing Defendant’s creditor’s petition for a finder’s fee in the 475 Action. This order was rendered primarily on a misapplication of the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Second Appellate District reversed this order and remanded to the probate court for further proceedings. By their cross-appeal, Plaintiff and his attorney appeal an order directing the attorney to pay expenses for repeated violations of the probate court’s page limit rules. The Second Appellate District found that the probate court acted within its authority in directing such payment and therefore affirm View "Tukes v. Richard CA2/" on Justia Law

Lynne filed suit against her mother, individually and as trustee of a family trust, and her sisters (collectively Respondents), alleging that they forged trust instruments purporting to divide her parents’ estate upon the death of her father. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Respondents after determining the trust instruments were not forgeries. On Respondents’ motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court ordered Lynne to pay over $829,000, finding there was no merit to the position Lynne pursued at the trial, and that Lynne “acted without basis in filing any of her claims.” In addition, the court ordered Lynne to pay over $96,000 in costs.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Lynne’s arguments that the trial court’s jurisdiction was limited to the property of the trust estate, such that she could not be personally liable for any amount of attorneys’ fees over and above her interest in the trust and that because she had a reasonable and good faith belief in the merits of her claim, there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the fee award. View "Bruno v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law