Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

A trial court disapproved certain disbursements made by the trustee of a special needs trust, and it surcharged the trustee. The trustee appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the wrong standard for determining whether the disbursements were for the trust beneficiary’s special needs and disallowing expenditures as offsets for the surcharges. Because the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong definition of "special needs," the Court of Appeal remanded for the court to exercise its discretion under the proper standard. "In reaching this conclusion, however, we do not mean to be understood as holding that the trust instrument placed no limits on the types of distributions the trustee could make." View "McGee v. State Dept. of Health Care Services" on Justia Law

The Settlor of a trust, who is both the trustor and trustee, sought to amend his trust. The trust document provides that to amend the trust, he must send the document by certified mail to the trustee. The Settlor failed to follow this procedure. Thus, the Second Appellate District held that the purported amendment did not conform to the terms of the trust, rendering the amendment invalid. As a result, the trust became revocable upon the Settlor's death. After his death, the Settlor's son found an amendment in a stamped envelope addressed to the Settlor's attorney.The Second Appellate District determined that the trust itself sets forth the terms under which modification is effective. Here, because the Settlor failed to follow the terms of the trust, the amendment was not valid. View "Diaz v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

In 2015, a conservatorship of the estate of Thomas Tedesco, a wealthy nonagenarian (Thomas), was created, and Thomas requested the appointment of respondent David Wilson, an independent professional fiduciary, as conservator of the estate. Thomas’s second wife, Gloria Tedesco (Gloria) was present at the hearing and stipulated on the record, through counsel, to Wilson’s appointment. Approximately six years later, on March 23, 2021, Gloria petitioned the probate court to vacate the order creating the conservatorship, along with all subsequent orders “emanating” from the conservatorship. The court denied the petition, and she appealed. Through a "myriad of disjointed arguments," Gloria challenged the probate court’s order striking her petition to vacate all the orders in this conservatorship, including the establishment of the conservatorship and appointment of Wilson as the conservator. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Conservatorship of Tedesco" on Justia Law

Kinney, an adjudicated vexatious litigant and disbarred former attorney, obtained leave to pursue an appeal from the final judgment in this probate proceeding. Leave was granted not because Kinney made the necessary threshold showing of merit and absence of intent to harass or delay under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, but because the vexatious litigant statute has no application to a party who files an appeal in a proceeding he did not initiate.Kinney appealed the Final Distribution and Allowance of Fees Order, apparently claiming that the probate court erred in approving the Special Administrator’s decision not to pay him his $1,000 statutory fee, cancellation of an agreement with a prior administrator of the estate to manage and perform various services relating to a house owned by the estate, and approval of a distribution of $329,684.82 out of the sales proceeds of that house to satisfy indebtedness pursuant to certain judgment liens against that property.The court of appeal affirmed, describing Kinney’s arguments as “incoherent” and a “hodgepodge.” On all but one of the issues presented, Kinney either has no standing to appeal or is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion; on the remaining claim of error, the probate court acted within its discretion. View "Estate of Kempton" on Justia Law

This case involves disputes over the disposition of assets. The assets at issue include monies and real and personal property assets held in trust pursuant to the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (“Original Trust Instrument”) as amended and restated in the 2013 Amendment and Restatement of the Albert R. Pool Family Revocable Trust (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (“Amended/Restated Trust” or “Trust”). Appellant was the deceased’s nephew, as well as his attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney (POA), executor under a pour-over, will, and successor Trustee under the Amended/Restated Trust. Appellant appealed from an order (the “subject order”) of the superior court sitting in probate (the “probate court”), in connection with an Amended Petition to Surcharge Trustee for Breach of Trust; Petition to Determine Trust Ownership of Assets and for Damages Pursuant to Probate Code Section 859 brought by Respondents each of whom were beneficiaries under the Amended/Restated Trust.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the probate court’s disposition of the Subject Property in the subject order. The court explained that even had evidence existed to demonstrate that the deceased wanted Appellant to have the subject funds, the lack of any written document authorizing Appellant to deposit the monies into the joint account would be fatal to Appellant’s appeal concerning the subject funds. The court concluded Appellant’s deposit of the subject funds violated section 4264, subdivision (f) by effectuating a change in the designation of beneficiaries who would have otherwise shared in the entitlement to the subject funds. View "Pool-O'Connor v. Guadarrama" on Justia Law

Richard Mueller and his wife, Joan Mueller (collectively, settlors), had two children together: plaintiff Katherine Zahnleuter (formerly Mueller) and Amy Mueller. Richard also had a daughter from a previous marriage, Julie Van Patter. Defendant Thomas Mueller was Richard’s brother, and Katherine and Amy’s uncle. Thomas had two children: Sudha Mueller and Puja Mueller. In August 2004, the settlors created the Richard J. & Joan R. Mueller Living Trust. Under the terms of that document, Katherine and Amy were equal residual beneficiaries of the trust estate after the payment of certain expenses and gifts, including a $10,000 gift to their half-sister, Julie. Amy and then Katherine were named as the successor trustees upon the death of both settlors. The trust document authorized the trustee, in his or her discretion, to initiate or defend, at the expense of the trust estate, any litigation the trustee considered advisable related to the trust or any property of the trust. The trust document included a no contest clause. In October 2017, Joan died. Shortly thereafter, Richard was diagnosed with terminal cancer. The trust agreement would be amended three times, each amendment carrying its own no contest clause, and each giving differing amounts of money to the various beneficiaries. Thomas, the successor trustee named in the third amendment to the trust, appealed an order surcharging him for the trust assets he expended to defend against a beneficiary’s contest to the validity of the third amendment. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Zahnleuter v. Mueller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law

“Breathe” was previously known as the American Lung Association of Los Angeles County, affiliated with the national organization, ALA, and the American Lung Association in California (ALAC). Breathe’s predecessor entered into annual agreements with ALAC and the ALA that provided for “income sharing” between Breathe and ALAC, except for “funds restricted in writing by the donor, not later than the date of donation, to exclude or limit sharing, such restriction not having been invited by the donee association.” ALA sued ALAC and its affiliates, including Breathe, for trademark infringement and related causes of action. Under a 2006 Consent Judgment, Breathe disaffiliated from the ALA and ALAC and was renamed. The parties agreed to a process for settling their outstanding accounts.In 2015, ALAC moved to enforce the Consent Judgment by compelling Breathe to share three bequests that were created but not distributed before the Consent Judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the ALA, concluding the restricted funds exception of the Affiliate Agreement was ambiguous and that the bequests were shareable. The court of appeal reversed. The plain language of the bequests indicates the testators' intentions to benefit only the organization now known as Breathe. Sharing the bequests with the ALA is incompatible with those intentions and is not required under the Affiliate Agreement. View "Breathe Southern California v. American Lung Association" on Justia Law