Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Brandy filed a probate petition seeking to be appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s (Scott) estate. The trial court denied her petition based on a premarital agreement that waived Brandy’s interests in her husband’s separate property. The court named his parents as co-administrators of the estate. The court of appeal held Brandy was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of her argument that she and her late husband mistakenly believed the premarital agreement would apply only in the event of divorce, rather than upon death. On remand, the trial court found that the mistake was a unilateral mistake on Brandy’s part and that she was not entitled to rescission. The court expressly found “there was insufficient evidence that Scott encouraged or fostered Brandy’s mistaken belief.”The court of appeal affirmed. Because Brandy failed to read the agreement and meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. View "Estate of Eskra" on Justia Law

A charitable trust controls the intellectual property of Narcotics Anonymous. This trust is revocable. A group called the Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anonymous alleged the trustee breached its fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs argued that a Probate Code section confers standing on entities with the power to revoke a trust. Plaintiffs claimed that Autonomous Region is a settlor with that power and that they have special interest standing. The probate court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend finding Autonomous Region lacked standing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that the probate court properly concluded leave to amend would have been futile. The court held that the trust document does not confer standing, reasoning that the document defines the settlor as an amorphous group—the Fellowship of Narcotics Anonymous—that acts through delegates who represent groups within the Fellowship. Here, because Autonomous Region is not the settlor, its first theory failed.Second, the “special interest” standing doctrine does not extend to revocable trusts because the settlors of those trusts have elected to retain the power of revocation and hence the oversight this doctrine aims to supply.   Finally, Autonomous Region contends it should have been allowed to add facts supporting its interpretation that the trust confers standing on any regional delegate group. However, the court t held that the lower court’s s interpretation of the trust was correct. View "Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

Mary and Sal were married and had a daughter. Sal also had children from prior marriages. In 2006, Mary and Sal created a trust; each amendment to that trust was notarized. In 2017, they revoked the trust and created a new trust, which provided that upon Sal’s death, the property “shall be distributed equally among” his children. The trust mandates that “[a]ny amendment, revocation, or termination . . . shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by a notary public, by the trustor(s) making the revocation, amendment, or termination, and delivered to the trustee.” Mary alleged that in 2020, Sal executed a “First Amendment,” striking the provision that distributed the property amongst the children; it is not notarized. Sal died the next day.The probate court deemed the alleged amendment “null and void,” concluding it was invalid under Probate Code section 154021 because the trust mandated that any amendment be acknowledged by a notary public. The court of appeal affirmed. When a trust specifies a method of amendment — regardless of whether the method of amendment is exclusive or permissive, and regardless of whether the trust provides for identical or different methods of amendment and revocation — section 15402 provides no basis for validating an amendment that was not executed in compliance with that method. View "Balistreri v. Balistreri" on Justia Law

The Medi-Cal program, California’s enactment of the federal Medicaid program, was administered by the California Department of Health Care Services (the department) administers the Medi-Cal program. In this case, the department sought reimbursement from a revocable inter vivos trust for the Medi-Cal benefits provided on behalf of Joseph Snukst during his lifetime. Following his death, the probate court ordered the assets in the revocable inter vivos trust to be distributed to the sole beneficiary, Shawna Snukst, rather than to the department. The Court of Appeal concluded federal and state law governing revocable inter vivos trusts, as well as public policy, required that the department be reimbursed from the trust before any distribution to its beneficiary. Judgment was therefore reversed and remanded. View "Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law

Robert filed a petition, alleging that Dae violated a “no contest” clause in a family trust by filing a previous petition challenging Robert’s actions as trustee. Dae’s subsequently moved to strike Robert’s petition under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc. 425.16.)The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. Robert’s No Contest Petition arose from protected petitioning activity under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(1); to defeat Dae’s motion, Robert was required to show a probability that he would prevail on that Petition. Robert made such a showing. Dae’s petition broadly challenged Robert’s conduct in setting up a financial structure that Robert claimed was designed to avoid estate taxes. If Robert’s claim is true, Dae’s petition would implicate the no-contest provision by seeking to “impair” trust provisions giving Robert the authority to manage trust assets. Dae also challenged his own removal as a beneficiary. Whether that more specific challenge amounts to a “contest” for purposes of the no-contest clause depends upon the trustors’ intent. Robert provided sufficient evidence of the trustors’ intent to allow a change of beneficiary to make a prima facie showing of probability of prevailing on Robert’s contention that Dae’s claims are a “contest.” The court expressed no opinion on the outcome of Robert’s petition. View "Dae v. Traver" on Justia Law

Brianna McKee Haggerty appealed a probate court order finding that a trust agreement was validly amended, thereby excluding her from distribution. Haggerty’s aunt, Jeane Bertsch, created the trust in 2015. The trust agreement included the following reservation of rights: “The right by an acknowledged instrument in writing to revoke or amend this Agreement or any trust hereunder.” Bertsch drafted the disputed amendment in 2018. She signed the amendment and sent it to her former attorney, but she did not have it notarized. After Bertsch’s death, Haggerty argued that the 2018 amendment was invalid because it was not “acknowledged” as described in the trust agreement. The beneficiaries under the 2018 amendment responded that the amendment was “acknowledged” within the meaning of the trust agreement and, in any event, the method for amendment described in the trust agreement was not exclusive. The probate court found that the amendment was valid. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred and affirmed the probate court. View "Haggerty v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that the order denying the motion to vacate for extrinsic fraud is appealable in this case, and that misrepresentations of material fact in a conservator's account are treated as extrinsic fraud.The court held that a conservatee has no duty to investigate representations of fact in the conservator's account, unless the conservatee becomes aware of facts from which a reasonably prudent person would suspect wrongdoing. The court explained that, to set aside an order approving the conservator's account on the ground of extrinsic fraud, a conservatee is not required to establish that the misrepresentations of material fact in the account could not have been discovered prior to entry of the order approving the account. In this case, the probate court's ruling relied on legal authority that the court found unpersuasive because it placed a higher burden to investigate on the conservatee. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the probate court to exercise its discretion based on an accurate understanding of the applicable law. View "Hudson v. Foster" on Justia Law