Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Lynne filed suit against her mother, individually and as trustee of a family trust, and her sisters (collectively Respondents), alleging that they forged trust instruments purporting to divide her parents’ estate upon the death of her father. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Respondents after determining the trust instruments were not forgeries. On Respondents’ motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court ordered Lynne to pay over $829,000, finding there was no merit to the position Lynne pursued at the trial, and that Lynne “acted without basis in filing any of her claims.” In addition, the court ordered Lynne to pay over $96,000 in costs.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Lynne’s arguments that the trial court’s jurisdiction was limited to the property of the trust estate, such that she could not be personally liable for any amount of attorneys’ fees over and above her interest in the trust and that because she had a reasonable and good faith belief in the merits of her claim, there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the fee award. View "Bruno v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

Brandy filed a probate petition seeking to be appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s (Scott) estate. The trial court denied her petition based on a premarital agreement that waived Brandy’s interests in her husband’s separate property. The court named his parents as co-administrators of the estate. The court of appeal held Brandy was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of her argument that she and her late husband mistakenly believed the premarital agreement would apply only in the event of divorce, rather than upon death. On remand, the trial court found that the mistake was a unilateral mistake on Brandy’s part and that she was not entitled to rescission. The court expressly found “there was insufficient evidence that Scott encouraged or fostered Brandy’s mistaken belief.”The court of appeal affirmed. Because Brandy failed to read the agreement and meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. View "Estate of Eskra" on Justia Law

A charitable trust controls the intellectual property of Narcotics Anonymous. This trust is revocable. A group called the Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anonymous alleged the trustee breached its fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs argued that a Probate Code section confers standing on entities with the power to revoke a trust. Plaintiffs claimed that Autonomous Region is a settlor with that power and that they have special interest standing. The probate court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend finding Autonomous Region lacked standing.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that the probate court properly concluded leave to amend would have been futile. The court held that the trust document does not confer standing, reasoning that the document defines the settlor as an amorphous group—the Fellowship of Narcotics Anonymous—that acts through delegates who represent groups within the Fellowship. Here, because Autonomous Region is not the settlor, its first theory failed.Second, the “special interest” standing doctrine does not extend to revocable trusts because the settlors of those trusts have elected to retain the power of revocation and hence the oversight this doctrine aims to supply.   Finally, Autonomous Region contends it should have been allowed to add facts supporting its interpretation that the trust confers standing on any regional delegate group. However, the court t held that the lower court’s s interpretation of the trust was correct. View "Autonomous Region of Narcotics Anon v. Narcotics Anon World Svcs" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

Mary and Sal were married and had a daughter. Sal also had children from prior marriages. In 2006, Mary and Sal created a trust; each amendment to that trust was notarized. In 2017, they revoked the trust and created a new trust, which provided that upon Sal’s death, the property “shall be distributed equally among” his children. The trust mandates that “[a]ny amendment, revocation, or termination . . . shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by a notary public, by the trustor(s) making the revocation, amendment, or termination, and delivered to the trustee.” Mary alleged that in 2020, Sal executed a “First Amendment,” striking the provision that distributed the property amongst the children; it is not notarized. Sal died the next day.The probate court deemed the alleged amendment “null and void,” concluding it was invalid under Probate Code section 154021 because the trust mandated that any amendment be acknowledged by a notary public. The court of appeal affirmed. When a trust specifies a method of amendment — regardless of whether the method of amendment is exclusive or permissive, and regardless of whether the trust provides for identical or different methods of amendment and revocation — section 15402 provides no basis for validating an amendment that was not executed in compliance with that method. View "Balistreri v. Balistreri" on Justia Law

The Medi-Cal program, California’s enactment of the federal Medicaid program, was administered by the California Department of Health Care Services (the department) administers the Medi-Cal program. In this case, the department sought reimbursement from a revocable inter vivos trust for the Medi-Cal benefits provided on behalf of Joseph Snukst during his lifetime. Following his death, the probate court ordered the assets in the revocable inter vivos trust to be distributed to the sole beneficiary, Shawna Snukst, rather than to the department. The Court of Appeal concluded federal and state law governing revocable inter vivos trusts, as well as public policy, required that the department be reimbursed from the trust before any distribution to its beneficiary. Judgment was therefore reversed and remanded. View "Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Awana Ring was approximately 80 years old when her daughter Vickie Atiyeh died in November 2015. In her will, Atiyeh left a house to Ring. Roy Scott Robb (Scott Robb) and Zachary Robb were a son and an adult grandson of Ring, and father and son to one another. The Robbs were both named as defendants in this action, but were not party to this appeal. Defendants-respondents here were Richard Harmon and the corporation TSG Financial Corp. (TSG); Ring alleged that TSG was Harmon's alter ego. According to Ring, the Robbs, working together with respondents, used probate proceedings as a means to extract equity from the house to use for their own purposes. Scott Robb, in particular, in accordance with a plan designed through discussions with Harmon, caused a probate proceeding to be initiated regarding Atiyeh’s estate, orchestrated Ring’s appointment as personal representative of the estate, and then had Ring use that authority to enter into a loan to the estate secured by the house, with respondents serving as broker and lender. In addition to the loan having predatory terms, some of the loan funds were used to pay fees to respondents, and some were disbursed to an estate account, but then withdrawn by the Robbs for their own purposes. The Court of Appeal addressed whether a person who was both personal representative of a probate estate and a beneficiary of that estate, could maintain in her individual capacity, a claim for financial elder abuse (or any other claims) based on allegations that she was manipulated into taking actions as personal representative that damaged her interests as a beneficiary. The trial court ruled that she could not, sustaining the respondents’ demurrer on the view that the claims had to be brought in the person’s capacity as the personal representative. The Court of Appeal found plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim was adequately pleaded, therefore, reversing the trial court's judgment. View "Ring v. Harmon" on Justia Law