Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Beverly Scannelly petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate all orders it entered after she filed a notice of dismissal. Furthermore, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from future attempts to exercise jurisdiction over her case. Petitioner sued her brother, Respondent Gary Toxey, in 2009, seeking to void certain real-estate transfers her father made to Mr. Toxey. Petitioner filed, sought dismissal, and refilled her complaint three times in three different circuit courts. Mr. Toxey "answered" Petitioner’s complaint approximately one year later by filing a responsive pleading that collaterally attacked her complaint under "res judicata." The circuit court dismissed her case in 2010, finding that Mr. Toxey essentially filed a motion for summary judgment and that Petitioner’s claims presented no issues of material fact. In affirming the circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate she had a clear legal right to her requested writs. Accordingly, the Court denied her petition.

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule.

Appellant, the personal representative of the estate of her son, sued two police officers alleging violations of state wrongful death claims and excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when her son died after being arrested and tasered by the officers. At issue was whether a section 1983 excessive force claim survived in Alabama if the injured party died before the lawsuit was filed, or abated pursuant to Ala. Code 6-5-462. The court held that there was no inconsistency between section 6-5-462 and federal law and that the statute was applicable to this case. Therefore, the excessive force claim against one of the officers abated under Alabama law when section 6-5-462 applied to the action, which was not filed prior to the death of the son.