Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the probate court's order striking her petition to enforce a no contest clause in a trust under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, and denying her motion to recover attorney fees.The Court of Appeal agreed with the probate court, and with a recent decision by Division Five of this district, that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to a petition such as plaintiff's seeking to enforce a no contest clause. However, the court held that plaintiff adequately demonstrated a likelihood of success under the second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure. In this case, defendant's judicial defense of the 2007 Amendment to the Trust that she procured through undue influence met the Trust's definition of a contest that triggered the no contest clause. Furthermore, under sections 21310 and 21311, that clause was enforceable against defendant. The court also held that plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that defendant lacked probable cause to defend the 2007 Amendment. The court held that the findings of the probate court concerning defendant's undue influence, which this court affirmed, provided a sufficient basis to conclude that plaintiff has shown a probability of success on her No Contest Petition. Finally, the court held that plaintiff had the contractual right to seek reimbursement of her attorney fees incurred in resisting defendant's appeal of the probate court's ruling invalidating the 2007 Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law

The plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, applies to a petition to enforce a no contest clause. In this case, a beneficiary filed a petition for instructions as to whether the no contest clause of his mother's trust had been violated after his sister sought to reform the trust to eliminate his interest. The sister, as trustee, filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition. The trial court granted the motion to strike and awarded attorney fees to the sister. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been denied because the beneficiary established a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits. Therefore, the order granting attorney fees was also reversed. View "Urick v. Urick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, conservator and guardian for his son Vincent Jones, and Plaintiff’s counsel (Attorney) appealed from two orders issued by the probate court that (1) dissolved and replaced a supplemental needs trust that had been created for Vincent’s estate, and (2) directed the Attorney, who created the original trust, to disgorge legal fees paid to her by Vincent and conditionally to pay additional amounts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the probate court’s order creating a new supplemental needs trust for Vincent was not void for lack of statutory authority; and (2) the payment order against the Attorney deprived the Attorney of due process. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review of this succession case to determine whether the testament at issue iwass valid under Louisiana law, where the first two pages of the testament were initialed rather than signed and where the testament contained no attestation clause which met all of the requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577, nor any attestation by the notary beyond the general notarization. The Court found the propounded testament materially deviated from the form requirements of La. Civ.Code art. 1577 and was thus absolutely null pursuant to La. Civ.Code art. 1573. View "Successions of Jeanette Toney" on Justia Law

After Mark A. Sveen designated his then-wife, Kaye L. Melin, as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy, and his children as contingent beneficiaries, Minnesota extended its revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance policies. When Mark died in 2011, his children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment to the children. The court concluded that a contested beneficiary like Melin has standing; this court has held in Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritterthat a revocation-upon-divorce statute like the one here violates the Contract Clause when applied retroactively; and thus the court's previous opinion forecloses any conclusion other than that the statute here was unconstitutional when applied retroactively. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Melin v. Sveen" on Justia Law

Semmie John Guenther, Jr., filed an administrative charge with the EEOC, alleging that his former employer, Griffin Construction, discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. When Guenther passed away while his charge was pending, the special administrator of his estate filed suit on his behalf when he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The district court dismissed the action based on Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-101(a)(1) and found the claim had abated. The court held that federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party. The court joined its sister circuits that have allowed the individual’s estate to bring and maintain a suit for compensatory damages under the ADA in place of the aggrieved party. Therefore, Guenther’s ADA claim for compensatory damages survived his death and Griffin Construction is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guenther v. Griffin Construction Co." on Justia Law

The Estate of Clayton Lockett, through its personal representative Gary Lockett, filed suit against the Governor of Oklahoma Mary Fallin; corrections officials, medical officials, EMTs and drug manufacturers, all in relation to the execution of Clayton Lockett. In 1999, Lockett kidnapped, assaulted, and killed nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman. Lockett shot Neiman with a shotgun and then had an accomplice bury her alive. In 2000, a jury found Lockett guilty of 19 felonies arising from the same incident, including the murder, rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, and assault and battery of Neiman. The jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. Oklahoma used a common drug protocol previously administered in at least 93 Oklahoma executions: three drugs (1) sodium thiopental; (2) pancuronium bromide; and (3) potassium chloride. In 2010, facing difficulty obtaining sodium thiopental, Oklahoma officials amended the Field Memorandum to substitute in its place pentobarbital. In 2014, Oklahoma officials amended their “Field Memorandum” to allow several new alternate procedures for use in executions by lethal injection. As one of these new procedures, officials substituted midazolam as he first drug used in the protocol. Before Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma had not used midazolam during an execution. Warden Anita Trammell and Director of Corrections Robert Patton chose this new protocol. The Estate asserted several constitutional violations related to Lockett’s execution with respect to the new procedures, essentially arguing that changing of the drugs caused Lockett intense pain as additional drugs were entered into the mix. The State parties moved to dismiss the estate’s suit against them, asserting qualified immunity (among other defenses). The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the estate failed to show defendants violated any established law. Finding no error in this judgment, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "Estate of Clayton Lockett v. Fallin" on Justia Law

The Lamar County Sheriff’s Department (LCSD) arrested Warren Lewis for possession with intent. Lewis ultimately pled guilty in federal court to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine. Shortly thereafter, the State initiated a forfeiture proceeding and sought real property, personal property, and currency owned by Lewis. The trial court awarded the State all of the property sought. Lewis moved for a new trial, or alternatively, to amend the judgment, which the trial judge denied. During the pendency of these proceedings, Lewis died. He had previously transferred all of his property into a revocable trust, naming David Smith as trustee. As trustee of Lewis’ revocable trust, Smith appealed. Mississippi law required a nexus between the offense and the property in order to render the property forfeitable. Here, the State failed to establish the required nexus between some of Lewis’ property and his criminal conduct. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed forfeiture of certain property for their direct nexus to Lewis' crimes, but reversed as to others. View "Warren L. Lewis Revocable Trust v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The National Firearms Act requires ATF permission for manufacture of a firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5822. Separately, the Gun Control Act, prohibits private manufacture of machineguns, with exceptions for government entities and machineguns lawfully possessed before 1986, 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Watson, as sole trustee of the Watson Family Gun Trust, applied to permit an M-16-style machinegun. An ATF examiner mistakenly approved the application. Watson had a machinegun manufactured. Weeks later, ATF informed Watson that the approval was mistaken. Watson argued that the trust was not a “person” under the Act. ATF explained that although a trust is not a “person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold property, so it considers the individual acting on behalf of the trust. Watson surrendered his gun under protest, then filed suit, claiming that the provisions are a de facto ban on an entire class of arms in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments; due process violations; equal protection violations; and detrimental reliance. The government initiated a forfeiture action. The district court held that Watson had standing, but failed to state a claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns; a trust is not exempt from Section 922(o) because a trust is not an entity distinct from its trustees and cannot own property. View "United States v. One Palmetto State Armory PA 15 Machinegun" on Justia Law

Bessie Kirksey appealed a probate court order vacating its order discharging Kirksey as administrator ad litem of the estate of Kirksey's sister, Willie Mae Graves, deceased. Iris Johnson, Darryl Thomas, Dorothy McLemore, John McLemore, Jr., Jerrick McLemore, Frederick Pryor, Jr., Rafeal Santece Powell, Nyya Nicole Marshall, Brandon LeMar Marshall, and Jeffrey Sams (alleged heirs of Graves) cross-appealed the probate court's order insofar as it denied their motion to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court based on the alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the probate court. The Supreme Court treated the cross-appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, styled the case accordingly, dismissed the appeal, granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Kirksey v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law