Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of the death of Decedent and the ensuing dispute between his two sons from a previous marriage and Linda Carraway, whom he married two weeks before his death. Decedent's sons (Sons) challenged the validity of their father's marriage to Carraway (Wife) and the validity of the lost will that Wife sought to have established. Wife claimed she was the sole beneficiary of Decedent's estate pursuant to the terms of his will. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Sons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) Wife waived her argument that Sons lacked standing to contest the validity of her marriage to their father; but (2) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding Wife's real property holdings and her late mother's will, and the error was not harmless. View "In re Estate of Smallman" on Justia Law

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed a declaratory-judgment action in the federal district court seeking, among other things, a determination of the status of a settlement agreement they had reached with D.V.G., a minor, resolving her claims for coverage stemming from injuries she received in an automobile accident, following her death in a subsequent unrelated automobile accident. The federal district court ultimately concluded that the issue presented involved a question of Alabama law for which there was no clear controlling precedent, and it certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is an insurance company bound to a settlement agreement negotiated on behalf of an injured minor, if that minor dies before the scheduling of a pro ami hearing which was intended by both sides to obtain approval of the settlement?" The Court answered in the affirmative: "an insurance company is bound to a settlement agreement negotiated on behalf of an injured minor, even if that minor dies before the scheduling of the court hearing that all parties agreed was necessary to obtain approval of the settlement agreement. In accordance with the parties' understanding, such a hearing is still required, and the minor's death does not render that hearing impossible." View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Wood" on Justia Law

Jason Coday shot and killed Simone Kim with a rifle obtained from Ray Coxe’s gun store. Kim’s Estate brought a wrongful death action against Coxe, alleging that Coxe negligently or illegally provided Coday the rifle. Coxe defended in part by asserting immunity under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). The Estate argued against applying the PLCAA and alternatively that it was unconstitutional. The superior court ruled that the PLCAA was constitutional and, interpreting and applying the PLCAA’s immunity provisions to the facts of this case, granted summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims against Coxe. The Estate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the PLCAA was constitutional and its interpretation of the PLCAA, but because it was unclear whether certain evidence before the superior court actually was or should have been considered when granting summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims, the Court vacated the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Estate of Simone Young Kim v. Coxe" on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Jeffrey Manary or Edwin Anderson were entitled to a decedent's interest in real property that had been deeded to a trust. Manary claimed the interest as a successor trustee; his claim was based on the trust. Anderson claimed the interest as a testamentary beneficiary; his claim was based on chapter 11.11 RCW (the Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Act). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an owner complies with the Act when he specifically refers to a nonprobate asset in his will, even if he does not refer to the instrument under which the asset passes. Anderson was entitled to the decedent's interest in the property, but he was not entitled to attorney fees for answering the petition for review. View "Manary v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Respondent sued the City of Houston. After an attempted settlement, Respondent asserted that the City breached the settlement agreement. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the City filed another plea to the jurisdiction (2006 plea), arguing that it was immune from suit. The trial court implicitly denied the City's plea and set the case for trial. The City did not appeal. After Respondent died, the case was transferred to probate court. There the City filed a motion for summary judgment and an amended plea to the jurisdiction. The probate court denied the City's motion for summary judgment and, construing the City's amended plea as a motion to reconsider the 2006 plea, denied it. The City filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals dismissed part of the appeal but considered the merits of part of it. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding the court of appeals erred by failing to dismiss the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the amended plea was a motion to reconsider the 2006 plea, and time had expired for interlocutory appeal from it. View "City of Houston v. Estate of Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Mattison, gave birth to twins who were conceived by artificial insemination after their father, Jeffery Mattison, had died. She sought social security survivors' benefits for the children based on Jeffery's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied her application, and an administrative law judge affirmed that decision. Plaintiff then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan challenging the decision. That court has asked the Michigan Supreme Court to rule on whether the children could inherit from Jeffery under Michigan intestacy law. Having heard oral argument, the Supreme Court granted the district court's request to answer the question and held that under Michigan intestacy law, plaintiff's children could not inherit from Jeffery. The matter was returned to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Mattison v. Social Security Comm." on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a pathologist was competent to testify as an expert witness regarding the standard of care in a medical malpractice action asserted against a board-certified general surgeon. Decedent Mildred Anderson sought treatment from surgeon Gary McAfoos, M.D. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Anderson took a turn for the worse and died from sepsis in response to surgery ultimately conducted by Dr. McAfoos and his practice partners. Mrs. Anderson's estate sued, and at trial proferred the testimony of a pathologist, who asserted that Dr. McAfoos and his agents' acts fell below ordinary standards of care by allowing Mrs. Anderson's discharge from the hospital despite certain indicators that she was suffering from a serious infection (that ultimately lead to her death). The doctor objected to Mrs. Anderson's use of the pathologist as an expert, arguing he was incompetent to assess the standard of care on a doctor who sees patients, "[h]e can't possibly second guess care and treatment on a patient when he doesn't see patients." The trial court sustained the objection to the expert's testimony; subsequently the doctor moved for nonsuit which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mrs. Anderson did not properly preserve her claim that the expert's credentials satisfied the requirements of the state competency statute, and accordingly, could not advance her contention that he should have been allowed to render standard-of-care testimony against a board-certified surgeon. View "Anderson v. McAfoos, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical malpractice action brought by Appellant Thomas Bruckshaw as Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Bruckshaw (Decedent) and in his own right, against Appellees Frankford Hospital of Philadelphia (Frankford Hospital), Jefferson Health System, Inc., Brian P. Priest, M.D., and Randy Metcalf, M.D. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a court was empowered to remove a principal juror without any reason and without any notice to the parties, and replace her with the last possible alternate, without notice, after all evidence was submitted and the jury had already retired to deliberate. Upon review, the Court concluded that the removal of a juror can only be done by a trial court, on the record, with notice to the parties, for cause. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court committed reversible error for which the aggrieved party was not required to demonstrate prejudice. View "Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hospital" on Justia Law