Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Oklahoma Tax Commission appealed a ruling by the District Court of Grady County which found a decedent's outstanding 1978-1985 income tax liability was barred from collection through Decedent's probate case. The trial court's ruling was based on the ten-year limitation imposed by 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding the statute operated as a statute of limitations and did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The Court also found that the Oklahoma probate code required satisfaction of the tax debt before distribution of the estate assets. The decedent's estate appealed that ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court correctly held that 68 O.S. 2001 section 223(A) was a statute of limitations and did not extinguish an underlying debt to the state in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution. However, the Court concluded that neither 58 O.S. 2001 section 591 nor 58 O.S. 2001 section 635 of the probate code require payment of a debt otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. View "In the matter of the Estate of Bell-Levine" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Ford Motor Company (Ford) wanted to preserve a confidential settlement agreement between it and the Estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries of Brian Cole (the Coles). The case on appeal was a separate action between the Coles, their attorneys, and among the attorneys themselves regarding expenses, a contingency-fee agreement, and a fee-sharing agreement. The chancellor denied Ford's motion and its "Notice of Intent to Seek Closure of Proceedings and Sealing of Documents." Before the Supreme Court, Ford raised three issues: (1) whether the settlement agreement was a public, judicial record or a private contract, which should be enforced; (2) whether the state's policy encouraging settlement agreements and the parties' interest in abiding by the terms of that agreement were sufficient grounds to protect the settlement from public scrutiny; and (3) whether there was any overriding public interest which would require disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the settlement agreement was between private parties, did not involve issues of public concern, and was unnecessary to resolve the parties' disputes. Thus, the Court concluded that chancery court erred, in part, by denying Ford's motions. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian Cole" on Justia Law

Rosann Maggio, widow and primary beneficiary of the estate of Daniel Maggio, appealed a decision of the superior court which held that Daniel Maggio did not own an interest in real property in Holland, Vermont at the time of his death. Ms. Maggio argued that the trial court erroneously admitted statements from her interrogatory answers in violation of the best evidence rule, the dead man's statutes, and the requirement in V.R.E. 602 that testimony be based on personal knowledge; that the court's conclusions that the property in question was partnership property and that Daniel Maggio ceded his interest in the partnership to his partner, Paul Silas, prior to Mr. Maggio's death were unsupported by the evidence; and that the trial court erred in declining to apply the statute of frauds to the transfer of Mr. Maggio's interest in the partnership. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the transaction at issue in this case involved Mr. Maggio's relinquishment of his interest in the partnership, which left Silas fully vested in all remaining partnership assets, including the Holland property. "The pivotal distinction is between a transaction that constitutes a conveyance of an interest in a partnership, which is personal property regardless of whether the partnership assets thereby conveyed include real property, and a transaction that is a conveyance of the real property itself. The Court concluded that Ms. Maggio's arguments had no merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "In re Estate of Maggio" on Justia Law

Jeff Snider ("Jeff"), as administrator of the estate of Thelma June Smith Snider, appealed the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Marquita S. Morgan ("Morgan"), both as executrix of the estate of Troy Ray Snider and on behalf of the estate of Harold Snider and First Bank of Boaz for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The matter stemmed from accusations over the execution of a power of attorney, the "seizure" of the decedents' estates and the repayment of loans from the estates. Upon review of the lower court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Jeff's claim against Troy's estate for money had and received (count IV) and the portion of count III representing Jeff's unjust-enrichment claim against Harold's estate. The trial court's judgment of dismissal of the remaining counts, however, were reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Snider v. Morgan" on Justia Law

This case required the First Circuit Court of Appeals to explore the parameters of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The underlying litigation was a will contest turned conspiracy case. The plaintiff prevailed in probate court after two and a half years of legal wrangling. By the time Plaintiff was found to be the sole lawful heir of the decedent, the estate's assets were depleted. Seeking retribution, the plaintiff sued several persons involved in the will contest, alleging a wide-ranging conspiracy. In a preliminary ruling, the district court concluded that two of the defendants, a lawyer who had served as a court-appointed discovery master and the lawyer's firm, were immune from suit by reason of quasi-judicial immunity. The court certified this ruling as a partial final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in certifying the ruling; and (2) the court-appointed discovery master was entitled to share in the judge's immunity from suit, and the law firm whose partner enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity was entitled to share in that immunity for helping the partner to perform his judicial tasks. View "Nystedt v. Nigro" on Justia Law

Giles was a prisoner in the Delaware penal system. Campbell worked at the Sussex Correctional Institution. Giles brought excessive force and deliberate indifference claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against officers, including Campbell, based on a confrontation during Giles’s transfer to Sussex and against others regarding his medical treatment after the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, on the basis of qualified immunity, held a bench trial, and entered judgment in favor of remaining defendants. The Third Circuit remanded the summary judgment. On remand, the Delaware Department of Justice, which had represented defendants, notified the court that Campbell had died in July 2006. Giles moved to substitute the administratrix of Campbell’s estate as a defendant. Neither the suggestion of death nor the motion to substitute was served on the estate. The district court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s claim was not pending under Delaware law and was extinguished. Giles proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. The Third Circuit vacated denial of the motion to substitute, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate. View "Giles v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Carolyn Wilson Floyd petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Thomas ap R. Jones of the Hale Circuit Court to set aside his order denying her motion to dismiss the will contest filed by Carlean Wilson Wakefield on the ground that the action was barred by section 43-8-199, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that an action to contest a will must be filed within six months after the admission of the will to probate. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that Floyd properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court, and showed a clear legal right to the dismissal of the will contest because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the contest. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus was granted and the circuit court was directed to grant Floyd's motion to dismiss Wakefield's will contest. View "In re: Estate of S.L. Wilson, Sr." on Justia Law

The City of Glendale and various other parties sought to set aside the Department of the Interior's decision to accept in trust, for the benefit of the Tohono O'odham Nation, a 54-acre parcel of land known as Parcel 2. The Nation hoped to build a destination resort and casino on Parcel 2, which was unincorporated county land, entirely surrounded by the city. This appeal related the the status of the land as trust. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government after that court concluded that the Secretary of the Interior reasonably applied the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798, and that the Act did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. View "City of Glendale, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

In 1941, Anna Child Bird executed a will with a testamentary trust that benefitted her sons, her grandsons, and their issue. At the time the will was executed, the law provided that an adopted child was excluded from the definition of "child." In 1958, the statute was amended to redefine the term "child" to include an adopted child. By its terms, however, the 1958 amendment applied only to testamentary instruments executed after 1958. In 2009, another amendment made the 1958 amendment applicable to all testamentary instruments regardless of when executed. Plaintiff was the biological great-grandchild of Anna, and Plaintiff had two adopted brothers. Plaintiff's father was a biological grandson of Anna. Plaintiff had been receiving income distribution from the testamentary trust established by Anna in her will. The Supreme Court concluded that the retroactive application of the 2009 amendment to Anna's trust, with the effect that Plaintiff's interest in the trust would be divided into three parts to cover her and her two adopted brothers, was unconstitutional. Remanded. View "Anderson v. BNY Mellon, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC ("NHM"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying NHM's motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in NHM's favor. NHM contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for this wrongful-death action barred the claims asserted against it by Wheatton K. Pynes, individually and as executor of the estate of Houston Earl Pynes. "The disposition of this petition require[d] an interpretation of the interplay between Rule 9(h), Ala. R.Civ. P., relating to fictitiously named parties, and Rule 15(c), pertaining to the relation back of amendments to pleadings." Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Pynes v. Jackson Hospital" on Justia Law