Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Robert Lee Kitchens, Jr., and his wife, Mary L. Kitchens, died as a result of injuries received in a collision between their automobile and a train owned and operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central"). The Administratrix and wrongful-death beneficiaries of the Kitchenses' estate filed a wrongful-death action against several parties, including the parent company of Illinois Central, Canadian National Railway Company. Canadian National moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs ninety days to conduct discovery "to justify piercing the corporate veil" and reserved ruling on the motion to dismiss pending completion of the discovery. Canadian National filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not allege with particularity the applicability of piercing the corporate veil to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the circuit court's order permitting further discovery, reversed the circuit court's failure to grant Canadian National's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court for the entry of a final order of dismissal without prejudice. View "Canadian National Railway Co. v. Waltman" on Justia Law

When Edith Entrekin was admitted to a nursing home in Alabama, she signed a contract requiring the arbitration of "all claims or disputes" that she or the executor of her future estate might have against the nursing home. After Entrekin died, the executor of her estate brought an action against the nursing home for damages under Alabama's wrongful death statute. The district court denied the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The issue on appeal to the Eleventh circuit centered on whether a decedent's agreement with a nursing home to arbitrate any claims that she or her executor may have in the future against the nursing home bind her executor to arbitrate a wrongful death claim against the nursing home under Alabama law? The Court found it was "compelled" to follow the Alabama Supreme Court's holdings and compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim in this case. The Court reversed the district court's order denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Entrekin v. Westside Terrace, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the ownership status of Coolwater Ridge Road in Idaho County. The predecessors in interest of appellant Paddison Scenic Properties, Family Trust, L.C. granted rights of way to the United States for a road which became Coolwater Ridge Road. In the district court, Paddison sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of way did not constitute a public road or highway under Idaho law. That court held that the rights of way were public because the criteria for common law dedication were met. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because it concluded this case was not ripe for adjudication. View "Paddison Scenic Properties Family Trust v. Idaho County" on Justia Law

Washington Trust Bank (WTB) was the trustee of the trust created by Althea Bowman's last will and testament. Althea's four surviving children were the trust beneficiaries. Three of these beneficiaries argued to the district court that the Trustee exceeded its authority by encumbering a commercial property held by the trust with a deed of trust, and advancing funds to a fourth beneficiary. In that transaction, separate divisions of WTB acted as trustee (Trustee) and as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. Two of the beneficiaries appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal because the Court concluded the Bowmans lacked standing and they asserted claims that were not ripe. View "Blankenship v. Washington Trust Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative. View "Gates v. Glass" on Justia Law

Following trial, a jury declared that a Will and Revocable Trust executed by Thomas Hines, Sr. in 2002 were invalid as they were the product of undue influence. Steve and Deborah Davidson, executors of the Hines estate, appealed that ruling. The Davisons contended that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not support the jury's finding. Furthermore, the Davidsons argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence upon which the jury ultimately relied in reaching its decision. Finding no error nor abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the jury's verdict. View "Davison v. Hines" on Justia Law

Glacier Kitchens, Inc., CR Weaver Trust, and the Estate of Grace Weaver (collectively "Defendants") appealed the denial of their motion to set aside the default judgments issued against them in district court. Weaver filed a complaint against Plaintiff Mountain West Bank (MWB) alleging breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MWB filed its answer and counterclaim for judicial foreclosure. MWB attempted to serve the Defendants at the residence of Weaver by personally serving Weaver’s daughter Elizabeth Weaver (Elizabeth). Elizabeth bore no relationship to the Defendants, other than she is Weaver’s daughter. Weaver filed a pro se answer to MWB’s counterclaim as it related to him. The Defendants failed to file an answer or otherwise appear. As a result, MWB applied for entries of default against them. Weaver filed a pro se motion to set aside the judgments against Defendants. In his motion, Weaver noted that Elizabeth was not legally qualified to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB objected and argued that Weaver had failed to explain why Elizabeth was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB additionally contended that Weaver, as a non-attorney, could not appear on behalf of the Defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed Weaver's appeal without prejudice due to the fact that as a pro se appellant, Weaver was unable to bring an appeal on behalf of the Defendants. Defendants through counsel made a motion to set aside the default judgments arguing MWB's alleged faulty service. The Defendants' motion to set aside the default judgments was deemed denied pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (2009) when the District Court failed to rule on them within 60 days. It is from that denial that the Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to set aside the default judgments issued against Defendants due to the problem with service. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mtn. West v. Glacier Kitchens, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity. View "Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant A.R. Mays, executor of the estate of decedent Gilbert Henry Kinchen, filed a petition to probate the decedent's will, and Appellee Katherine Rancine-Kinchen, the decedent’s widow, filed a caveat thereto. Appellant moved to dismiss the caveat. In its order resolving the motion to dismiss, the probate court granted the motion to dismiss in part by denying two counts raised by the caveat. The probate court declined to grant the remainder of the motion to dismiss when it allowed three counts of the caveat, which raised issues about a non-testamentary trust agreement that was referenced in the will, to remain pending. Because it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the trust agreement issues, the probate court’s order transferred those issues to the superior court for resolution. Although it determined that appellee had not shown that the will was "incomplete" and "uncertain," the probate court nevertheless reserved admitting the will to probate until the trust issues were resolved by the superior court. It is from this order that Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal contending appellant failed to follow the correct appellate procedure. Finding that Appellee indeed did not follow the proper procedures, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal. View "Mays v. Racine-Kinchen" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from the probate court's ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was not a special law in violation of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. The court held that OCGA 15-9-120(b) satisfied the elasticity requirement of a general law, and the probate court erred in construing section 15-9-120(2) to mean that a probate court always would have jurisdiction to hold jury trials once its county passed the population threshold, even if the county's population dropped below the threshold in a future census. It also erred in ruling that, so construed, the statute would not be a special law. However, the probate court reached the right result, and so its ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was a constitutional general law could be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. The court also held that the parties' arguments regarding whether a right to a jury trial was triggered when the lawsuit was filed or when they started trial were moot. Finally, the court held that appellee's demand for a jury trial was timely. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Ellis v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law