Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Dorothy J. Pierce Family Mineral Trust appealed a judgment that dismissed the Trust's claim against Richard and Brenda Jorgenson for reformation of two warranty deeds. Because the parties' claims to quiet title in the disputed mineral acres were not fully adjudicated and no N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification appeared in the record, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as premature. View "Dorothy J. Pierce Family Mineral Trust v. Jorgenson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as the administratrix of Brenda Shelton's estate, appealed the district court's dismissal of her civil action against several public officials and health officials. The complaint alleged shortcomings in the way medical professionals at a state mental health facility responded after Brenda hanged herself while a patient at the facility. The district court dismissed all federal claims with prejudice and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice, electing not to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court held that the circumstances did not trigger duties related to involuntary commitment nor did they give rise to a constitutional-level of care. The court also held that a claim based upon an improper medical treatment decision could not be brought pursuant to either the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., or the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. View "Shelton v. AR Dept. of Human Services, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr." on Justia Law

A circuit court found Appellant David Cannon in contempt of court for violating (1) an order mandating that Appellant give up all authority and cease all activities relating to the James Brown estate, the Brown trusts, and all Brown entities (which he violated by filing amended tax returns without authority); and (2) an order requiring Cannon to pay back money he had misappropriated from Brown's estate. The circuit court ordered Appellant to be incarcerated for six months for contempt. However, the circuit court stated Appellant could purge himself of the contempt "by the payment of the aforementioned [money, with a portion] to be applied towards the payment of attorneys' fees incurred by the various parties, and the payment of a fine." The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings; upholding all of the circuit court's findings regarding the contempt except for the amount awarded towards attorneys' fees and the imposition of the fine. The Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion as to attorneys' fees because it did not make the necessary factual findings to support the amount awarded, so it "reverse[d] and remand[ed] the issue of attorneys' fees to the circuit court for findings of fact as to the proper amount. On remand, the circuit court held a hearing for the sole purpose of making findings of fact regarding the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for reimbursing the parties for attorneys' time related to the issue of Appellant's contemptuous conduct, and held that Appellant should pay. Appellant appealed this order, arguing payment of fees was mooted by his serving his jail sentence. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant pay attorneys' fees. Further, the Court held that the issue of attorneys' fees was not mooted by Appellant serving his jail sentence. View "Ex parte: Cannon v. Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

Decedent died, leaving a house. A developer who claimed to have purchased the property from Decedent's daughter filed a petition for probate without administration of an alleged will of Decedent. Decedent's neighbors filed a petition to revoke the probate of the will, alleging that the will was invalid and that the probate court improperly admitted the will to probate. Decedent's son filed a motion to intervene and join as a petitioner seeking to revoke the probate. The probate court (1) concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the neighbors' petition to revoke because they lacked standing; (2) granted the developer's motion to dismiss the petition to revoke the will; and (3) found that because the son, who did have standing, did not file his own motion challenging the will, the court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the son's pleading, in essence, was a petition to revoke, and it should have been treated as such; (2) the district court should have allowed intervention under the circumstances presented here; and (3) substitution of the son as the real party in interest should have been allowed in this case. Remanded. View "Russell v. Kellersman" on Justia Law

Judy Maretta, as the named beneficiary of a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) policy, received FEGLI benefits upon the death of her ex-husband. Jacqueline Hillman, the widow of the deceased, filed an action against Maretta, claiming that pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 20-111.1(D), Maretta was liable to her for the death benefits received. Maretta claimed that the state law was preempted by 5 U.S.C. 8705 and 8705 because the state statutes granted FEGLI benefits to someone other than the named beneficiary in violation of FEGLIA's terms. The circuit court concluded that section 20-111.1(D) was not preempted by FEGLIA and entered judgment against Maretta. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment for Maretta, holding that because Congress intended for FEGLI benefits to be paid and to belong to a designated beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts section 20-111.1(D). View "Maretta v. Hillman" on Justia Law

Jacob Braden, an adult with developmental disabilities, died as a result of injuries suffered while residing at an Arizona Integrated Residential and Educational Services (AIRES) facility. AIRES is a licensed private corporation that contracts with the Arizona Department of Economic Security's Division of Developmental Disabilities. Jacob's estate sued the State, alleging a statutory claim under the Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) for abuse and neglect. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, finding it was not a proper defendant under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 46-455, which permits an action under APSA against a "person" or an "enterprise." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State was not exempt from liability under section 46-455. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court after applying the rules of statutory construction to section 46-455, concluding that the State was not liable under APSA because the legislature did not intend to include the State in its expressly enumerated list of potential APSA defendants. View "Estate of Braden v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants Dawn Pyeritz sued the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania State police and several of its police officers for the destruction of her personal property, speficially "a black nylon tree stand safety harness, or belt, that allegedly was crucial evidence in a separate civil action." The police seized this item during a criminal investigation of a suspicious death. A trooper agreed to retain the belt in the custody of the police, apparently for a longer time than permitted by internal police regulations. The belt was destroyed before Appellants' counsel asked for its return. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Appellees, which the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held that no cause of action exists against a third party – someone other than the original alleged tortfeasor – for negligent spoliation of evidence. The Supreme Court granted review, and now holds that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. View "Pyeritz v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Petitioner, trustee of two trusts owning several hundred ground rent leases, failed to register the trusts' ground leases with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT) as required by the state's Ground Rent Registry Statute. Petitioner instead filed an action requesting a declaratory judgment that the Statute was unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting the SDAT from issuing extinguishment certificates regarding the trusts' ground leases as required by the Statute. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of SDAT and issued a declaratory judgment stating that the Statute was constitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the extinguishment and transfer provisions of the Statute were unconstitutional under Maryland's Declaration of Rights and Constitution; and (2) the registration requirements were constitutional under federal and Maryland constitutional principles. Remanded.

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners.