Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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In the case considered by the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District, Ropati Afatia Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) for nine claims in his habeas corpus petition. The petition was filed after the superior court dismissed his previously filed petition in a capital case. The court determined that it could issue a COA for one of the claims but declined to do so for the remaining eight.Seumanu had been convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping to commit robbery, and first-degree robbery, with special circumstances that led to a death penalty sentence. His appeal and subsequent habeas corpus petition were both unsuccessful. In 2022, Seumanu filed a new petition presenting nine claims not previously raised. The superior court dismissed the new petition as 'successive' under a specific provision of the Penal Code, meaning the claims were not new or different but rather repeated or supplemented those in the original petition.The appellate court found that the court orders regarding the habeas petition did not materially impair a fair adjudication of the case. The court determined that the ten-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests in the Court of Appeal was directory rather than mandatory. The court also agreed to appoint specific attorneys to represent Seumanu in his appeal.In terms of the specific claims, Seumanu argued that he was denied a fair penalty phase trial, that the trial court allowed the prosecution and defense to stipulate to the removal of potential jurors, and that the process of 'death qualifying' juries violated the rights of prospective jurors. The court found that the claims did not meet the requirements for relief or substantiality and upheld the superior court's dismissal.The court did grant a COA for a part of one claim which argued that a potential juror was improperly excused for cause which could result in a penalty retrial. However, for the remaining claims, the court found that Seumanu had not met the burden of demonstrating a substantial claim for relief or a substantial claim that the requirements of the relevant subdivision of the Penal Code had been met. As such, the court denied Seumanu's request for a COA for these claims. View "In re Seumanu" on Justia Law

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In 1994, David D. McClelland pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in a California state prison. In 2019, he filed for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.951, which provides a mechanism for defendants who were not the principal in a murder but were charged due to imputed malice. The court scheduled and rescheduled an evidentiary hearing multiple times at the request of both parties.In 2022, the prosecution responded to the order to show cause, planning to rely on the grand jury transcript and McClelland’s statements in Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation records as evidence. McClelland’s counsel requested the court not to consider certain hearsay testimony and argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.During a hearing in September 2022, the prosecution presented additional evidence, and McClelland's counsel requested the court to take McClelland's age at the time of the offense into consideration. McClelland's counsel then agreed to the court issuing a written ruling, and the court took the matter under submission. In November, the court denied the petition, ruling that McClelland was ineligible for resentencing as the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he aided and abetted the actual killer.McClelland appealed, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not present at the evidentiary hearing. The court disagreed, stating that the September hearing, in which all parties were present and evidence was presented, was the evidentiary hearing as per section 1172.6(d)(3). The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "People v. McClelland" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner, Terry Eugene Iversen, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Iversen had been sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for the crime of public indecency under Oregon’s sex offender recidivism statute due to his extensive criminal history, which included prior convictions for public indecency, rape, and sodomy. Iversen argued that the LWOP sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.The court, applying the demanding standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, upheld the district court’s decision. The court found that the Oregon state court’s decision concerning Iversen’s sentence was not contrary to Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The court considered Iversen’s extensive history of adult felony recidivism, his mental health record, his failed opportunities to reform, and the fact that he remained dangerous to others. The court also noted Oregon’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons like Iversen.The court concluded that Iversen’s sentence did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality given the gravity of his offense and criminal history. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Iversen’s habeas petition. View "Iversen v. Pedro" on Justia Law

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In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Benjamin David Wilson, was charged with second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, following allegations involving his stepdaughter, K.P. The jury acquitted him of the second-degree charge but found him guilty of the third-degree charge. Wilson appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient for a conviction on the third-degree charge.The facts presented to the court included K.P.'s testimony that Wilson had inappropriately touched her during a family event. Wilson denied the allegations, providing an alternative account of the incident. Despite this, the jury found him guilty of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, leading to a sentence of 10 to 15 years in prison.In response to Wilson's appeal, the court affirmed the conviction. It stated that the jury's acquittal on one charge did not necessarily impact the verdict on the other charge. The court indicated that each charge was treated as a separate indictment, and verdicts on multiple charges did not need to be consistent. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, affirming Wilson's conviction based on K.P.'s testimony. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming heard an appeal by Rodger William Dillard, who contested the termination of his parental rights to his three minor children. Dillard had initially adopted his grandchildren after their biological parents' rights were terminated. After Dillard's wife, who had custody of the children, passed away, allegations of sexual abuse were made against Dillard by two of the children. Dillard was then charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor.The Department of Family Services initially aimed to reunify the children with Dillard. However, after more than a year in the Department's custody, the plan was changed to adoption due to Dillard's lack of progress in meeting the requirements of his Family Service Case Plan. Dillard was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of three to five years for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Following this, the Department filed a petition to terminate Dillard's parental rights.The district court found that termination was in the best interest of the children, as Dillard was unfit to meet their ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs. Dillard appealed this decision, arguing that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision to terminate Dillard's parental rights. The Court held that Dillard's incarceration due to his felony convictions for sexual abuse of a minor demonstrated his unfitness to have custody and control of the children. The Court therefore affirmed the termination of Dillard's parental rights under the provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv), which allows for termination of parental rights if the parent is incarcerated due to a felony conviction and is shown to be unfit for custody and control of the child. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To: Mmd, Jid and Drd v. State, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the defendant, Kalil Cooper, who was charged with promoting organized street crime, among other offenses, after a wiretap investigation into a local gang's activities. He was charged with twelve separate counts, including two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering, and one count of promoting organized street crime. The promoting count charged that Cooper "purposefully conspire[d] with others... to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity." However, Cooper objected to this count, arguing that the "pattern of racketeering activity" was not a predicate offense under the promoting statute.The trial court agreed with Cooper's argument but instead of striking the charge, it amended the indictment to incorporate other offenses relevant to the racketeering charge as predicate offenses to the promoting charge. The jury found Cooper guilty of four counts, including the promoting charge, with conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found as the predicate offense for promoting.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a listed predicate offense under the promoting statute, and as such, Cooper's conviction for a crime that does not exist must be vacated. The court reasoned that the jury instruction in this case erroneously departed from the list of permissible predicate offenses in the promoting statute, leading the jury to convict Cooper for a crime that does not exist. This was deemed a manifest injustice. Hence, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacated the jury's verdict on the promoting count without a remand. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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The case involves James W. Jones, who was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 60 months for offenses under three separate indictments. These convictions included trafficking marijuana, having weapons while under a disability, and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The trial court imposed two 30-month prison sentences to be served consecutively for his convictions on trafficking marijuana and having weapons while under a disability. Jones appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial court had made the necessary findings for imposing consecutive prison sentences, as required by Ohio law. Specifically, the court cited Jones's extensive criminal history and evidence that he continued to commit crimes while awaiting trial or sentencing for previous crimes. The court also noted that the harm caused by Jones's crimes was so great that no single prison term adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct. Furthermore, the court found that Jones posed a danger to the public, making consecutive sentences necessary to protect the public from future crime.The court concluded that the trial court's findings were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, in line with the review standard set by Ohio law. Therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision to impose consecutive sentences. The court emphasized that the trial court was not required to state reasons to support its findings, nor was it required to recite the statutory language verbatim, provided the necessary findings could be found in the record and were incorporated into the sentencing entry. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

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The appellant, sentenced to death for capital murder, had his conviction and sentence affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. He submitted multiple motions and applications challenging his competence to be executed, all of which were denied by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.In 2015, the appellant made a motion challenging his competence to be executed. The trial court denied the motion, but on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ruled that the appellant made a substantial showing of incompetence and stayed his execution. The case was remanded for further competency proceedings, including a mental health evaluation. After a hearing in 2017, the trial court again ruled that the appellant was competent for execution, a decision affirmed by the appellate court.In September 2019, the appellant filed another motion challenging his competency. The trial court denied the motion and the appellant appealed. In April 2020, he filed a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging intellectual disability and ineligibility for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stayed the execution and remanded the application to the trial court for review. In February 2023, the trial court recommended relief on the intellectual disability claim. Based on the agreed findings and conclusions, the appellate court granted habeas relief by reforming the appellant's sentence from death to life imprisonment without parole.Therefore, the appellant's appeal of the trial court's determination of his competency to be executed was rendered moot, and the appeal was dismissed. The holding of the case is that the appellant's sentence was reformed from death to life imprisonment without parole due to his intellectual disability claim. View "Mays v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case of Kierran Pierce, who appealed his convictions of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and attempted AFSA. Pierce argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge at the close of the State's case. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did indeed err in denying the request for a mistrial. The court found that a statement made during the trial, indicating that Pierce had allegedly touched multiple children inappropriately, was highly prejudicial and should have resulted in a mistrial.However, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the attempted AFSA charge, as they found sufficient evidence to prove guilt. The court reasoned that, despite alternative explanations presented by the defendant, the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant was attempting to commit an act of sexual assault.The Supreme Court also briefly addressed the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for a view of the residence where the alleged sexual assaults occurred. The court did not make a definite ruling on this issue, suggesting instead that the parties might wish to develop these facts further in any subsequent trial. The case was ultimately reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Eric Boudette, who was convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, First Offense, following a jury trial on May 31, 2022. Boudette appealed the verdict, asserting that his motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct was wrongly denied. He also contended that his plea for a new trial was wrongly denied on the grounds that his arrest was an unlawful seizure, the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case, and the statutory speedy trial deadline had expired by the time his trial was held.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case following Boudette's appeal against the District Court's affirmation of the Justice Court's decision. The Supreme Court analyzed several aspects of the case, including jurisdiction, the Community Caretaker Doctrine, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the speedy trial issue.The Court ruled that Boudette could rightfully be charged in either county where he was found driving under the influence. They also determined that the arresting officer acted in her capacity as a community caretaker when she entered Boudette's vehicle to check on his wellbeing, thus making the arrest lawful. Regarding the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court found no evidence of perjury or the State unreasonably impeding Boudette from obtaining an independent blood test. Lastly, the Court declared that Boudette had waived his right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance.Hence, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "State v. Boudette" on Justia Law