Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Robert Haege died in 2006. Three months earlier, Haege made a will, in which he left his “personal assets” to his brother and sister, and in which he left his “business interests, both tangible and intangible, real or personal, connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd.” to his brother, sister, and two longtime employees. After Haege died, questions arose about the disposition of property associated with Traditional Fine Art, Ltd., insofar as Traditional Fine Art was a sole proprietorship and, therefore, had no legal existence separate and apart from Haege himself. The will was admitted to probate, and Sharon Haege England (sister) was appointed executrix of his estate. England failed to distribute any property to James Simmons and Elery Stinson, the two employees. The employees filed suit against England, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the will with respect to the property associated with Traditional Fine Art. The trial court ruled in favor of England, concluding that, because Traditional Fine Art was only a sole proprietorship, the property associated with the business was merely the personal property of Haege. Simmons and Stinson appealed, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. To the Supreme Court, England did not dispute the fundamental premise of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that a sole proprietor could separately dispose in his will of personal property connected with his sole proprietorship and his other personal property. Instead, England argued that Haege did not actually intend to separately dispose of any property associated with his sole proprietorship. Taking the will as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded that the most natural and reasonable understanding of the provisions of the will was that Haege left his personal property that amounted to "business interests . . . connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd." specifically including, but not limited to, membership certificates that he owned, to Simmons, Stinson, and his brother and sister, and he left all of his other personal property to his brother and sister alone. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "England v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The surviving children of Maurice Wicklund appealed an order granting Betty Wicklund's petition for an elective share, personal representative fees, attorney fees, and funeral and last illness expenses from Maurice Wicklund's estate after remand in "Estate of Wicklund" (812 N.W.2d 359). Finding no abuse of discretion in granting Betty Wicklund's petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan ("Sue") Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist appealed a district court judgment invalidating transfers of money and real property from Clarence Erickson to the appellants and invalidating Clarence Erickson's will on the bases of lack of capacity and undue influence. The appellants also appealed a district court order denying the appellants' N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b) motion to amend the district court's findings and judgment. Because the district court findings were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment. The appellants' appeal of the district court's Rule 52(b) order was dismissed.View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was real property owned by Lacy Bryant at the time of his death. Lacy left a will devising a life estate in the realty to his wife, Naomi, and devising the remainder to his youngest child, Brenda Osborn. Lacy’s will was never admitted to probate. Instead, Osborn filed an affidavit for collection of small estate, and later executed and filed an “Administrator’s Deed” transferring the real property from Lacy’s estate to herself. After Naomi died, Appellants, some of Lacy’s heirs, filed an action against Osborn, asking the court to, among other things, declare that the terms of the will were invalid and that Lacy had died intestate. Ultimately, the circuit court found that Osborn had fully complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 28-41-101, the statute governing the collection of small estates, and that the Administrator’s Deed was a valid conveyance of Lacy’s real property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that Osborn satisfied the statutory procedures for collection of a small estate and that the Administrator’s Deed was a valid conveyance. Remanded.View "Bryant v. Osborn" on Justia Law

Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer’s daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer’s son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean’s personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean’s claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option.View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

Ann Aldrich died before having revised her will to dispose of an inheritance she received from her sister. Ann’s husband, James Aldrich, argued that the most appropriate construction of the will was that Ann intended for the property she had acquired from her sister to pass to him. Ann’s nieces disagreed with James’s construction of the will. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of James pursuant to the purported authority of Fla. Stat. 732.6005(2), which provides that a will shall be construed to pass all property that the testator owned at death, including property acquired after the will is executed. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that section 732.6005(2) did not control because the disputed property was not alluded to in the will and, therefore, it was irrelevant whether it was acquired before or after the will was executed. The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District, holding that section 732.6005 does not require construing a will as disposing of property not named or in any way described in the will, despite the absence of any residuary clause, or any other clause disposing of the property, where the decedent acquired the property in question after the will was executed.View "Aldrich v. Basile" on Justia Law

Kenneth Jakeman appealed the trial court's dismissal of his claims against defendants Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, Montgomery Memorial Cemetery ("MMC"), and Judy A. Jones. Lawrence Group owned and operated Montgomery Memorial Cemetery. Lawrence Group purchased the cemetery from Alderwoods, Inc. in or around 2002. In 1967, Jakeman's father, Ben, purchased a 'family plot' in the cemetery containing 10 separate burial spaces. The plot Ben selected was specifically chosen because of its location adjacent to plots owned by Ben's mother, Frances O'Neal. Pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement, burial within Ben's plot was limited to members of either the Jakeman family or the O'Neal family. In 2002, MMC allegedly mistakenly conveyed two spaces in Ben's family plot to James Jones and his wife, Judy. James was interred in one of those two spaces. In 2006, Kenneth Jakeman learned that James had been buried in Ben's family plot, at which time, Kenneth says, he immediately notified MMC and Ben. In response to demands by Kenneth and Ben, MMC disinterred James and moved both his body and his marker; however, James was reinterred in another space on Ben's family plot. Ben died in 2008. At the time of Ben's death, James's body remained buried in one of the spaces in Ben's plot. Despite the offer of an exchange of burial spaces, and based upon their purported refusal to again exhume and move James's body and marker, in May 2010 Kenneth Jakeman filed suit against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, MMC, and Judy Jones, alleging breach of contract; trespass; negligence, willfulness, and/or wantonness; the tort of outrage; and conversion. In her answer to Kenneth's complaint, Judy asserted her own cross-claim against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, and MMC, based on their alleged error in conveying to her spaces already owned by Ben and the initial erroneous burial of James, his disinterment, and his subsequent erroneous reburial in another of Ben's spaces. Alderwoods moved to dismiss Kenneth Jakeman's complaint, arguing he lacked 'standing' to pursue the stated claims, that the asserted tort claims did not survive Ben's death, and that some of the claims were barred by the expiration of the applicable limitations periods. Lawrence Group and MMC later joined Alderwoods's dismissal motion. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Kenneth Jakeman was entitled to pursue his individual breach-of-contract claim concerning MMC's reinterment of James Jones in one of the his family's plots, and that he was entitled to pursue his claim for injunctive relief. View "Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, et al. " on Justia Law

Daughters Bonnie Wehle, Penny Martin, and Sharon Ann Wehle appealed a Circuit Court's order on final settlement of the estate of their father, Robert G. Wehle. In this "final order," the circuit court denied the daughters' claims against Thomas H. Bradley III, James H. McGowan, and Grady Hartzog, as the co-personal representatives of the estate; the order also denied the daughters'request that McGowan be removed as a cotrustee of the family trust created under Robert G. Wehle's will. After review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order insofar as the amount of compensation awarded to the personal representatives and insofar as it refused to remove McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust. The Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it denied the daughters' interest claims, awarded attorney fees and costs to the personal representatives, and failed to tax the costs of the appeal in "Wehle I" against the personal representatives. The case was remanded back to the circuit court for the purpose of taxing the costs of the appeal in Wehle I against the personal representatives, and for the award of interest against the personal representatives.View "Wehle v. Bradley" on Justia Law

David "Junior" Kimbrough died in 1998, leaving his entire estate to his long-time girlfriend, Mildred Washington. Matthew Johnson was named executor of the estate. Johnson petitioned the court to probate Kimbrough's will. Contestants filed to contest the will, and no other entries were filed during the next ten years. In September 2008, an entry of appearance was entered on behalf of four remaining contestants, which was followed by an entry of appearance on behalf of Johnson. In 2009, the chancery court denied Executor's Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, granted Contestants’ motion to compel discovery, granted Contestants’ motion to remove executor, and appointed the chancery clerk of Marshall County as executor. Johnson then filed his motion to dismiss alleging a violation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), because Washington was served process almost eleven years after the commencement of the action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but it granted a stay of the proceedings pending petition for interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied. A trial on the matter was held in 2012. After Contestants rested their case, Proponents moved the trial court for dismissal, and the chancellor ultimately granted their motion and dismissed the case. Contestants appealed to the Supreme Court, raising nine issues all pertaining to the validity of the will, and whether the trial court erred in granting Proponents' Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in granting Proponents' Mississippi Rules Civil Procedure 41(b) motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the chancery court.View "Kimbrough v. Estate of David Kimbrough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Rider v. Estate of Rider," (713 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2011)), which applied the common law of agency to hold that certain financial assets were part of the decedent's probate estate. The decedent had directed his bank to transfer specified assets in his investment account to a new account for his spouse, but died before all of the assets were credited to the account. The issue in this case was one of first impression for the Supreme Court, and after review of the facts, the Court reversed the appellate court: "[o]nce Husband issued the entitlement order and was the appropriate person, Wachovia was obligated by the UCC and the parties' Account Agreement to obey his directive. Wachovia had set up a new investment account in Wife's name and commenced the transfer of securities within a few days of Husband's request, so at that point, Wife already had a recognizable interest, even though Wachovia had not posted all of the securities to her account. The Court of Appeals, in focusing solely on the date of the 'book entry,' which it took to mean the date the securities were credited or posted to Wife's account, seemed to view this as the exclusive means for obtaining an interest in the securities."View "In the Matter of Charles Rider" on Justia Law