Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellee, as special administrator of the estate of Rufus Owens and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Owens, filed a lawsuit against Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation, LLC and others for injuries Owens sustained during his care and treatment at Pine Hills. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Appellee argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because there was no evidence of mutual assent where the agreement was signed by Appellee as the "responsible party" but did not bear the signature of a representative of Pine Hills. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no objective evidence of mutual assent, and therefore, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable.View "Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Matthews" on Justia Law

In 2011, Lonnie Brockmire (“Decedent”) died intestate. Decedent was survived by his only biological child, Sherri, and Sherri’s daughter, Bella. Sherri was adopted by her stepfather after she became an adult and prior to Decedent’s death. After Decedent died, Sherri sought a partial distribution of Decedent’s estate to Bella. The circuit court granted the distribution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bella had no right to inherit Decedent’s estate pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 474.060.1 and 474.010(2) because (1) Sherri was not a “child” of Decedent at the time he died, and (2) even if she was, Sherri did not predecease Decedent.View "In re Brockmire" on Justia Law

In 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. issued a mortgage to Robert Collopy, who transferred the mortgaged property to a trust. Collopy died later that year. In 2010, the Bank of New York Mellon, which had assumed trustee responsibility for administration of the mortgage, filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage, naming Collopy, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the trust, as the defendant. Collopy’s heir and co-trustee, Bobbie King, defended against the foreclosure action. In 2013, after an unfavorable ruling in the foreclosure action, the Bank filed a petition for the formal appointment of a special administrator to Collopy’s estate. The probate court dismissed the petition as untimely under Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 3-108(a), which prohibits the initiation of appointment proceedings more than three years after the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank’s petition was properly denied for having been filed outside the three-year limitations period in section 3-108(a). View "Estate of Collopy " on Justia Law

After Frederick McCollor died in 2010, Frederick’s wife, Patricia, brought suit against the couple’s children, John and Cheryl, for violation of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act (ITTA), undue influence, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The suit stemmed from actions John and Cheryl took at the end of Frederick’s life, including persuading Frederick and Patricia to transfer Frederick’s home to John and Cheryl and transferring over $22,000 from Frederick’s account to a joint account while John acted under a power of attorney obtained from Frederick five days after Frederick had a stroke. The superior court (1) concluded that the transfer of the real property was obtained through undue influence and was therefore void pursuant to the ITTA; (2) determined that John breached his fiduciary duty as the holder of Frederick’s power of attorney with regard to his transfer and use of Frederick’s money; and (3) ordered that the real property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of Frederick’s estate, and that John reimburse the estate in the amount of $22,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "McCollor v. McCollor" on Justia Law

Four children-beneficiaries to the estate of Evelyn Copelan contested her will. Appellants sought to probate a will in which their mother left almost her entire estate to them, leaving only one dollar each to the appellees. In turn, the appellees opposed the admission of the will to probate, claiming that their mother was without testamentary capacity when she executed the will, and asserting that their mother made the will under the undue influence of the appellants. The probate court admitted the will to probate, the appellees sought review in the superior court. Following a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment for the appellees, denying the petition of the appellants to probate the will. The appellants sought the Supreme Court's review. But finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Copelan v. Copelan" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Courtenay C. Davis Foundation and Amy Davis (together, “Davis Interests”) entered into an agreement with the University of Wyoming Foundation and the Colorado State University Research Foundation (together, “University Foundations”) in which the Davis Interests donated land and other interests to the University Foundations subject to the terms of the agreement. In 2011, the University Foundations decided to sell the gifted property and listed it for sale. In 2012, the Davis Interests filed an action against the University Foundations seeking to enjoin the sale of the property. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the donation from the Davis Interests to the University Foundations was a gift, that the agreement did not create an implied trust, and that only the attorney general had standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift.View "Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found." on Justia Law

O. Wayne Rollins established ten irrevocable trusts, the Rollins Children's Trust (RCT), and nine Subchapter S-trusts, each for the benefit of his nine grandchildren. Wayne's sons, Gary and Randall, and a close friend of the elder Rollins, Henry Tippie, were named trustees. In 2010, four of the nine beneficiaries of the S-trusts brought suit against the trustees alleging breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking, among other things, an accounting of the family entities. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the trustees and refused to order a judicial accounting of the entities which held the trust assets. To this, the trial court noted, in part, that although the trustees failed to provide an accounting of the trust assets, plaintiffs ultimately received a report on trust assets and "complete relief" on their requests through discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding: (1) plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting; (2) the trustees could be held to trustee-level fiduciary standards with regard to the family entities; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained with regard to whether the trustees breached their fiduciary duties in administering the trusts. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial court should have ordered an accounting of the family entities; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the appellants had trustee-level fiduciary duties. The Court answered 'yes' to both questions presented, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

The parties in this case separately petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment overturning an award of property from the estate of Estelle Haggerty Alexander. The decedent owned 270 acres of property, and died intestate. Following a bench trial, the court divided the six parcels of land that constituted Estelle's estate, finding that the plaintiffs and their ancestors had adversely possessed three parcels by living on the land and engaging in certain activities there but that the heirs of Larenda Jenkins, as holders of legal title, were entitled to the other three, farmed parcels. Holding that the plaintiffs' possession of the land was permissive rather than adverse, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment in part and instructed the circuit court that title to all six parcels should be quieted in the heirs of Larenda Jenkins. After careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he Court of Civil Appeals stated the ore tenus rule in its standard-of-review section, but in its analysis of the evidence did not accord the circuit court's findings the required deference. . . . we conclude that credible evidence was presented to support the circuit court's allotment to the plaintiffs of the three parcels . . .it is a rare case when this Court will overturn a finding by a trial judge who hears an adverse possession case presented ore tenus." View "Stokes, Jr. v. Cottrell" on Justia Law

Dora Gaaskjolen was an eighty-seven year-old widow who suffered from a traumatic head injury and other physical ailments. Dora’s grandson, Shane, an attorney, filed a petition for appointment of temporary conservator, and the circuit court ordered Dacotah Bank to be Dora’s temporary conservator. Shane subsequently moved for Dacotah to be Dora’s permanent conservator, but Dora moved to set aside the appointment of Dacotah as temporary conservator and, instead, nominated her daughter Audrey to be her conservator. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Shane’s motion for Dacotah to be Dora’s permanent conservator and denied Dora’s motion, finding that it was in the best interests of Dora that Dacotah be appointed as her conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s finding and conservator appointment had support in the record.View "In re Conservatorship of Gaaskjolen" on Justia Law

Brian Hover, son of decedent Margaret Dever Hover Gurnham and the Personal Representative of her Estate, appealed the circuit court's order confirming the probate court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beach First National Bank to enforce a deficiency judgment against the Estate. Hover argued the Bank's claim (which arose following a foreclosure action) was untimely and, thus, barred by section 62-3-8031 of the South Carolina Probate Code (Probate Code). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Bank's claim was barred because it was presented outside the time limits of the applicable statute.View "Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham" on Justia Law