Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from the probate court's ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was not a special law in violation of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. The court held that OCGA 15-9-120(b) satisfied the elasticity requirement of a general law, and the probate court erred in construing section 15-9-120(2) to mean that a probate court always would have jurisdiction to hold jury trials once its county passed the population threshold, even if the county's population dropped below the threshold in a future census. It also erred in ruling that, so construed, the statute would not be a special law. However, the probate court reached the right result, and so its ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was a constitutional general law could be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. The court also held that the parties' arguments regarding whether a right to a jury trial was triggered when the lawsuit was filed or when they started trial were moot. Finally, the court held that appellee's demand for a jury trial was timely. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Ellis v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from a trust dispute where appellants subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel Judge Stephens to allow them to appeal from an order dismissing their appeal. The court held that appellants have shown that they have a clear legal right to file a direct appeal from the order dismissing their properly filed direct appeals from the June 7, 2011 order and that granting mandamus relief would not be nugatory because the notices of appeal from the June 7, 2011 order were proper and valid. However, in order for mandamus relief to be granted, appellants must also show that they have no alternative adequate remedy at law. In the present case, Judge Stephens has denied permission to appellants for them to file such an appeal. Therefore, as appellants were unable to obtain "judicial review of the judicial act in question, this case presents the unusual situation where mandamus is a viable means of seeking review of a judicial action." Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the mandamus petition, and the court directed the trial court to issue the writ of mandamus. View "Sotter v. Stephens; White, et al. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Crowe v. Elder" on Justia Law

William J. Mason appealed the probate court's order denying his petition to probate the will of Frances E. Hobbs. At issue was whether the petitioner proved that the will was properly executed or that the signature to the will was in Mrs. Hobbs' handwriting. The court held that, because the trial court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to prove that the document was the will of Frances E. Hobbs, the judgment was affirmed. View "Mason v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Testatrix had four predeceased siblings, and Propounder and Caveator were two of five nieces and nephews who were Testatrix's heirs at law. Caveator appealed the probate court's order holding that Propounder carried her burden of proving that the proffered will was the last will and testament of Testatrix and that Testatrix possessed the required testamentary capacity to make a will at the time of execution. The court affirmed the order where Caveator failed to establish sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof. View "Parker v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Prine filed a caveat challenging the validity of her father's will on the grounds that he lacked testamentary capacity and was operating under undue influence. The probate court ordered the probate of the will in solemn form, and the superior court granted summary judgment to the estate. The court held that because the record showed that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence at the time the testator executed his will, the judgment was affirmed. View "Prine v. Blanton, et al." on Justia Law

In a hierarchical church property dispute, the court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine set forth in Jones v. Wolf. The court held that neutral principles of law demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the PCUSA existed on the local church's property to which TPC, Inc. held legal title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary and the judgment was reversed. View "Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over control of property belonging to the oldest church in Georgia, Christ Church in Savannah. At issue was whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. The court held that although those courts could have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law showed that the property of Christ Church at issue was held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the partition of a 40 acre piece of land where the testator's four heirs wanted to sell the land but the testator's grandson had been living on a 2.2 acre tract of land that was part of the 40 acres at issue. The grandson contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the heirs because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claim that he owned the 2.2 acres at issue. The court held that despite the fact that the grandson had lived on the property at issue for several years, this fact alone was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements for a parol gift of land. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the heirs.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.