Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a request for calendar entries of the Governor's former senior advisor for energy, Alice Reynolds, under the California Public Records Act (PRA). The request was made by the Energy and Policy Institute (EPI) and sought entries reflecting meetings with 10 specified entities, including the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), electric utilities, and unions representing energy workers, during the year prior to Reynolds' appointment to the presidency of the CPUC. The Governor's office denied the request, citing the deliberative process privilege, which protects the decision-making process of government agencies from public scrutiny.The trial court ruled in favor of EPI, finding that the public interest in access to these calendar entries outweighed the deliberative process privilege. The Governor appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One.The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that EPI's request was sufficiently specific, focused, and limited, and the public interest in disclosure was sufficiently compelling when measured against the minimal impact on government decision-making, to override the deliberative process privilege. The court found that the entities specified in EPI's request were entities with which the Governor's senior energy advisor would be expected to meet regardless of the Governor's particular policy priorities. Therefore, disclosure of records that those meetings took place, without any information as to the substance of those meetings, would reveal little if anything about the Governor's or his senior advisor's policy positions or thought processes. The court also concluded that the public has a substantial interest in knowing the extent to which the current CPUC president interacted with the CPUC and the entities the CPUC regulates when she was the Governor's senior advisor for energy. View "State v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between two local water management agencies, Mission Springs Water District (Mission Springs) and Desert Water Agency (Desert Water), over who should be the regional groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) responsible for managing groundwater in the Coachella Valley region of Riverside County, California. The dispute arose from the implementation of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which requires the creation of GSAs to manage groundwater basins. Desert Water claimed to be the exclusive GSA within its statutory boundaries, which encompass most of Mission Springs' boundaries. Mission Springs challenged this claim and also sought resolution of competing claims to GSA authority for an additional three-square-mile area outside of Desert Water’s statutory boundaries.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of Desert Water and the California Department of Water Resources (the Department), denying Mission Springs' petition for a writ of mandamus. Mission Springs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Desert Water did not violate any provisions of the Water Code by becoming a GSA. It also found that Desert Water did not form a new public corporation or public agency within Mission Springs’ jurisdiction by becoming a GSA, and therefore did not violate section 30065 of the Water Code. The court further held that the Department did not err in posting Desert Water’s notice of intent to become a GSA, as Desert Water had complied with all notice requirements. Finally, the court found that the Department was not responsible for resolving the overlapping claims to the three-square-mile area, as the Act requires the agencies to resolve this dispute themselves. View "Mission Springs Water Dist. v. Desert Water Agency" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Santa Cruz (City) and the County of Santa Cruz (County) over the interpretation of the City's claim presentation ordinance. The County sued the City for damages exceeding $1.2 million, alleging that the City's failure to maintain and manage a certain area led to emergency repairs. The County argued that it was not required to present a claim to the City before filing the lawsuit, as per the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.). The City, however, demurred, arguing that the County failed to present a claim directly to the City as required by the City’s claim presentation ordinance (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010).The trial court sustained in part and overruled in part the City’s demurrer, rejecting the City's argument that the County was required to present a claim before filing the lawsuit. The court reasoned that the City’s ordinance applies to claims that are “not governed by” section 905 (Santa Cruz Mun. Code, § 1.14.010), and the County’s claim against the City is governed by section 905, which provides an exception to the claims presentation requirement for the County’s claim against the City.The City appealed, arguing that its ordinance, which applies to claims “not governed by” section 905, must be interpreted as applying to claims “excepted” from section 905. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District agreed with the City's interpretation. The court concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the County was not required to comply with the claim presentation ordinance before filing its lawsuit against the City. The court directed the trial court to vacate its demurrer order, to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer, and to decide in the first instance whether the County should be granted leave to amend. View "City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Hubbard, who was convicted of first-degree murder in Michigan state court in 1992. Over two decades later, Hubbard filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that he is entitled to an equitable exception to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) time bar based on a credible showing of actual innocence. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Hubbard argued that he had new evidence that impeached the State’s case against him, but he failed to present evidence affirmatively demonstrating his actual innocence. The court held that AEDPA does not permit him to file an untimely habeas petition. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Hubbard's new evidence did not meet the burden of showing that the State had imprisoned an innocent person. Therefore, Hubbard must comply with the same law with which all other habeas petitioners must comply. View "Hubbard v. Rewerts" on Justia Law

The Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project (BMBP) sued the U.S. Forest Service, alleging that the Service's approval of the Walton Lake Restoration Project violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Forest Service developed the project to replace trees infested with laminated root rot and bark beetles with disease-resistant trees. In 2016, the Service contracted with T2, a private company, for logging to implement the decision. BMBP filed this action challenging the 2020 decision notice. The Service filed an administrative record (AR) in 2021.BMBP argued that the AR was incomplete, contending that deliberative materials were part of the “whole record” and that a privilege log was required if they were not included in the AR. BMBP also argued that all documents in the 2016 AR should be in the AR for this case. The court held that deliberative materials are generally not part of the AR absent impropriety or bad faith by the agency. The court also held that BMBP’s arguments failed to overcome the presumption of regularity.The court then addressed whether the Service violated NEPA by approving the Project. The court held that BMBP failed to establish that the logging contract with T2 improperly committed resources under any standard. The court also rejected BMBP’s contention that the EA diluted the significance of some impacts by analyzing them on too large a scale. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and lifted the previous stay of its order dissolving the preliminary injunction. View "BMBP V. JEFFRIES" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, both of which provide educational benefits to veterans. The petitioner, James Rudisill, served in the U.S. Army for nearly eight years over three separate periods, earning entitlements under both bills. He used a portion of his Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate degree and sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits for divinity school. However, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) limited his Post-9/11 benefits to the duration of his unused Montgomery benefits, arguing that by requesting Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of his Montgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months of benefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would otherwise be entitled.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’s decision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying service are subject to a limit on the duration of their benefits.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. The Court held that veterans who separately accrue benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills are entitled to both benefits. Neither the Montgomery GI Bill nor the Post-9/11 GI Bill restricts veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek to use either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his benefits, in any order, up to a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Rudisill v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves Mojalaki Holdings, LLC and GSSG New Hampshire, LLC (the plaintiffs) who appealed a decision by the City of Franklin Planning Board (the Board) that denied their site plan application to install a solar panel array on a piece of land owned by Mojalaki. The proposed solar panel array required the installation of new utility poles and the removal of mature trees to ensure sufficient sunlight. The land, which was mostly open space and was once a golf course, did not have any specific ordinance language addressing solar panel arrays. The Board, after multiple hearings and a site visit, denied the application based on concerns raised by neighbors about the project's potential impact on the scenery, property values, and previous negative experiences with other solar projects in the city.The Board's decision was upheld by the Superior Court, which agreed with the Board's first and third reasons for denial, namely that the installation of new utility poles would create an industrial look out of place in the neighborhood, and that cutting down mature trees contradicted the purpose provisions. However, the Superior Court did not uphold the Board's second basis, that the solar panel array endangered or adversely impacted the residents, due to lack of supporting facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Board could not rely solely on the purpose provisions to deny the application. The court found that the purpose provisions lacked sufficient specificity for site plan review and left the proposed project to be judged by the subjective views of the Board through ad hoc decision making. The court granted the plaintiffs a builder's remedy, allowing them to proceed with their development provided they comply with all other applicable regulations. View "Mojalaki Holdings v. City of Franklin" on Justia Law

The case involves Hattie Tanner, who was convicted of murder and served seventeen years in prison before her conviction was set aside due to insufficient evidentiary support. After her release, Tanner filed a lawsuit against David Walters, a retired police detective, alleging that he violated her constitutional rights by falsifying investigation reports and providing false testimony, leading to her wrongful conviction. Walters sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court partially granted and partially denied. The court allowed Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution to proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision.Previously, the district court found that Tanner's claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution should proceed to trial. Walters appealed this decision, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Walters knowingly fabricated evidence against Tanner, and thus he was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's fabrication-of-evidence claim. The court also found that a reasonable jury could find that Walters's false statements influenced the decision to charge Tanner, and that without these false statements, there would not have been probable cause to prosecute Tanner. Therefore, Walters was not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner's malicious prosecution claim. View "Tanner v. Walters" on Justia Law

In 2018, Maryland State Trooper Kevin Caraballo used force while arresting 15-year-old Cameron Lewis. Lewis sued Caraballo for excessive force and battery. Caraballo sought summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified and statutory immunity. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that there were disputes of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Specifically, a reasonable jury could find that Caraballo struck Lewis when the teenager did not pose a threat, was not actively resistant, and was subdued. The court held that Lewis’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force in the form of head strikes was clearly established at the time of his arrest. Furthermore, the court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Caraballo’s actions amounted to gross negligence or malice, precluding summary judgment in his favor on his statutory immunity defense. View "Lewis v. Caraballo" on Justia Law

A California-based psychologist, Dr. Rick Q. Wilson, was investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for potential violations of the Controlled Substances Act. The DEA issued an administrative subpoena to obtain Wilson's medical, prescription, and billing records. Wilson challenged the subpoena on statutory, constitutional, and privacy grounds.The district court initially dismissed the United States' petition to enforce the subpoena, finding it violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Fourth Amendment. However, upon reconsideration, the court granted the United States' motion to amend the petition and enforce a narrowed version of the subpoena.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the modified subpoena complied with HIPAA, was not unreasonably burdensome under the Fourth Amendment, and did not violate Wilson's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to the required-records exception. The court held that the subpoena was issued within the DEA's authority, was relevant to the DEA's investigation, and was not unreasonably broad or burdensome. The court also found that the records requested fell within the required-records exception to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law