Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Alonzo Union served as the caretaker and power of attorney for Jean Miller, an elderly woman with dementia. Union had access to Miller's finances and was responsible for her care. After Miller moved into a nursing home and accumulated an unpaid bill, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF) investigated Union's financial activities. Union entered a no contest plea to mistreatment of a dependent adult. The court ordered Union to pay restitution to the nursing home for Miller's outstanding balance and to Miller for certain payments and cash withdrawals from her account.The Wyandotte District Court accepted Union's no contest plea and found him guilty. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a 43-month underlying sentence, suspended in favor of probation, and ordered Union to pay $31,511.26 in restitution. This amount included $7,632.74 to the nursing home and $23,878.52 to Miller, covering one-half of the ATM withdrawals and Walmart purchases, among other expenses. Union appealed, arguing that the restitution order was not supported by substantial competent evidence. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's restitution order, except for the part that converted the restitution award into a civil judgment.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the portion of the restitution order directing Union to pay the nursing home $7,632.74, finding insufficient evidence that Union's crime caused the unpaid bill. However, the court affirmed the restitution order requiring Union to pay $23,878.52 to Miller. The court concluded that Union's no contest plea established that he misappropriated at least $25,000 from Miller, providing substantial competent evidence to support the restitution amount. The court held that the no contest plea and the well-pleaded facts in the charging document could be considered in determining the restitution award. View "State v. Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting an uncontested petition of the trustees of the Marvin S. Robinson Charitable Trust to retroactively modify the trust's terms to maintain its tax-exempt status as a "supporting organization" under the federal tax code, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 58a-416 authorized the retroactive modification of the trust.Under In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), which held that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and federal courts are not bound by decisions of lower state courts on issues of state law but that these entities will defer to decisions of a state's highest court, an order allowing the retroactive modification of a trust's terms to maintain its tax-exempt status is binding on federal tax authorities only if it emanates from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to review the district court's order in accordance with Bosch and affirmed the district court's judgment granting the petition, holding modification of the trust was proper. View "In re Marvin S. Robinson Charitable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that the executor of the Estate of Thelma J. Taylor converted estate property and ordering the executor to repay double the converted property's value, as provided by Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-1704, holding that the statute's plain language does not limit its application.The court of appeals upheld the conversion finding but held that section 59-1704 did not apply because the property was taken before the executor was appointed to administer the estate. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on the issue subject to review, holding (1) nothing in section 59-1704 limits its application only to circumstances when the decedent's funds are taken by a court-appointed estate fiduciary after probate proceedings begin; and (2) the district court properly assessed the double penalty against the executor under the plain language of the statute. View "In re Estate of Taylor" on Justia Law

In this matter arising from the district court's distribution of Lanny Lentz's estate among his three daughters the Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant's posttrial motions did not toll the time for her to appeal, holding that the court of appeals did in fact have jurisdiction over the appeal.Appellant, one of Lentz's daughters, filed a petition to set aside and/or reconsider the final settlement and, simultaneously, an objection to discharge of executrix and petition to disgorge fees for administration paid to the fiduciary. The district court denied the motions. Appellant appealed, claiming that the property values for properties in the final settlement were not supported by substantial competent evidence. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the appeal on the merits, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was timely and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal. View "In re Estate of Lentz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reforming an inter vivos trust created and funded by Jill Petrie St. Clair, holding that the district court's findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the district court properly applied the law.The district court reformed the trust at issue in order for the trust to express Jill's true intentions, which were not expressed in the original trust instrument due to a scrivener's error. Jill and the trustee asked the Supreme Court to affirm the district court's rulings to satisfy the requirements of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in reforming the trust because reformation was necessary for the trust to be consistent with Jill's original intent and to correct the error of the scrivener. View "In re St. Clair Trust Reformation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court upholding the validity of a transfer-on-death deed that was signed by a benefiting party at the direction of the party seeking to make the transfer, holding that the district court did not err.The district court deemed the transfer-on-death deed to constitute an enforceable transfer of Roxie Moore's real property to Maureen Miles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court considered evidence relating to the authority by which Maureen signed the deed, notwithstanding the notary's designation of signature through power of attorney; (2) the district court's determination that Maureen signed the deed as an amanuensis was supported by clear and convincing evidence; (3) the facts as found by the district court rebutted the presumption of invalidity of the deed under the clear and convincing evidence standard; and (4) Appellant failed to present even a preponderance of evidence demonstrating that Roxie lacked the capacity to make knowing and understanding conveyance. View "In re Estate of Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court admitting a testator's will and codicil to probate after the limitation period for petitioning a will for probate had passed, holding that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was warranted under the unique circumstances in this case.The testator deposited his original will and a codicil with the probate court as permitted by statute. After the testator's death, his heirs tried to locate the will, but the clerk of court informed the heirs that the will was not in the custody of the court. Eventually, the testator's daughter filed an intestate proceeding. After the limitation period for petitioning a will for probate had passed, the clerk of court located the will and codicil. The testator's stepdaughter filed a separate petition to probate the will. The district court consolidated the probate proceedings and admitted the will to probate. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will in the authorized custody of the district court but not found until after the statute of limitations had expired should be admitted to probate. View "In re Estate of Oroke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that separate damage claims against a deceased trustee for punitive and double damages under Kan. Stat. Ann. 58a-1002 and under the common law relating to a breach of trust and a breach of fiduciary duty may be recovered after the death of a trustee.A Trust and its beneficiaries brought a cause of action for a deceased Trustee’s breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty, seeking punitive damages from the Trustee’s Estate under section 58a-1002(c). On appeal from the judgment of the trial court, the Trust challenged the trial court’s rulings that prevented the jury from considering whether the Trust should receive double or punitive damages against the Trustee’s Estate. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court and court of appeals erred in concluding that Kansas law did not allow consideration of punitive and double damages because of the Trustee’s death. View "Alain Ellis Living Trust v. Harvey D. Ellis Living Trust" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation of the procedural requirements that the Kansas Probate Code sets for parties petitioning for probate. Specifically, this appeal concerned a contest between the disinherited son (Son) of the decedent and the son’s daughters (Granddaughters), who were the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will. In its final order, the district court held that the decedent’s estate passed under the will to the Granddaughters in equal shares. The Supreme Court affirmed the analysis and conclusions of both the district court and the court of appeals as to the issues raised in an appeal and petition for review, holding (1) an order setting aside the order admitting the will to probate did not end the proceeding; (2) the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding that the Granddaughters timely commenced a probate proceeding; and (3) the district court did not commit reversible error when it refused to find that a putative 1997 will revoked the 1992 will. View "In re Estate of Rickabaugh" on Justia Law

In 2013, Michael Clare shot and killed his wife, Deborah Clare, and then took his own life. Jessica Crosslin, Deborah’s biological daughter, filed a petition for letters of examination seeking to file a claim against Michael’s estate under the Kansas Probate Code. Crosslin was subsequently appointed administrator of Deborah’s estate, and Christine Clare, Michael’s aunt, was appointed administrator of Michael’s estate. The district court determined that Crosslin had failed to satisfy a statutory time limitation for filing a claim against the estate because she failed to obtain a written, signed judicial order setting the matter for hearing. The court cited specific local rules with which Crosslin apparently did not comply. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the local rules did not consistently preclude Crosslin from following the procedures that she took, the local rules conflicted with certain statutory requirements, and local rules that add requirements to the statutory scheme and create jurisdictional obstacles are invalid. View "In re Estate of Clare" on Justia Law