Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In April 2019, Charlotte Blair executed a power of attorney (POA) appointing her daughter, Annette Wiley, as her attorney in fact. The POA was not signed by two disinterested witnesses as required by Kentucky law at the time. In December 2019, Wiley signed admission documents and an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement on Blair's behalf for Blair's admission to a long-term care facility. Blair passed away in June 2020. In July 2020, the Kentucky legislature amended the law to remove the two-witness requirement for POAs.Wiley and her sister, Melanie Persson, sued the care facility, Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc., for various claims. Masonic Homes argued that some of these claims were subject to the ADR agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the POA was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of the law at the time of its execution and that the 2020 amendment was not retroactive. Therefore, the ADR agreement was unenforceable. Masonic Homes appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the POA was valid because the 2020 amendment to the law was retroactive. Wiley sought review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2020 amendment to the law was not retroactive. Therefore, the POA was invalid at the time of its execution and the ADR agreement was unenforceable. The court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Wiley v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the underlying circuit court action filed by three sisters (Sisters), holding that the circuit court correctly denied the writ.The Sisters, daughters of Elbert Goff Sr., brought the underlying complaint against, among others, Appellant, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Elbert's Estate, alleging that Appellant breached her fiduciary duties to Elbert before he died through self-dealing. The circuit court denied Appellant's ensuing motion to dismiss. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the Sisters' complaint, but the court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case; and (2) an appellate remedy was available, and great injustice and irreparable injury will not be suffered by Appellant. View "Goff v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals for failing as a reviewing court to give proper deference to the trial court's decision to deny Appellees leave to amend a pleading and held that the court erred when it found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to probate the will at issue in this action.Plaintiff filed this action challenging the validity of the decedent's will and asserting claims of undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants and requesting a declaration that the will was invalid. After Plaintiff settled his claims with some of the defendants, defendant Suzanne McGaha filed a motion for leave to amend her answer and to assert cross-claims and certain objections. The district court overruled the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the probate matter because of an alleged defect with verification of the probate petition; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Suzanne's motion for leave to amend her answer to assert cross-claims. View "McGaha v. McGaha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the circuit court affirming the district court's order liquidating a trust's assets, holding that the order was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, and unsupported by sound legal principles.J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., obtained a Jefferson District Court Court order that improperly directed the Bank to liquidate certain trust assets and pay them into the Jefferson Registry of Court. The circuit court affirmed the district court's action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Bank violated its statutory and fiduciary duties by liquidating the trust's assets when the legislature has provided an adequate mechanism and remedy for the settlement and distribution of trust assets; and (2) as a remedy, the district court is to order an accounting and appropriate damages. View "Estate of Worrall v. J.P. Morgan Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court declaring that the Estate of Nannie Wethington had no dower right pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.020 in $38,500 withdrawn from the bank account of her husband, James Wethington, by their son, Kerry Wethington, two days prior to James' death, holding that the lower courts failed to apply controlling precedent.In Kentucky, a widow has an absolute estate to one-half of the personalty of her deceased widow's estate. In this instant case, the circuit court found that James made a valid inter vivos gift to Kerry and that Nannie had no dower right to the $38,500 withdrawn from James's bank account. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the gift of $38,500 was presumptively fraudulent, and the evidence conclusively proved the presumption. The Court remanded the case with instructions that Nannie's estate be distributed the amount of the gift which would satisfy her fifty percent statutory share. View "Simpson v. Wethington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order and judgment of the circuit court enforcing a settlement agreement, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable in this case.After a dispute over an alleged forgery in a will, the parties reached a mediation agreement as to certain property. The trial court adopted the mediation agreement as part of its judgment and ordered it to be enforced. The court of appeals appealed, ruling that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable, barring enforcement of the agreement. View "Adamson v. Adamson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' second action against Defendants, the trustees of their parents' trust, because a prior action had been filed in and decided by the district court, holding that Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate under the circumstances.In the earlier action, Plaintiffs filed a notice-order-motion to remove trustees and for other relief, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The district court denied the requested relief. The circuit court affirmed. While Plaintiffs' appeal was pending in the circuit court they filed the instant proceeding in the circuit court alleging that Defendants breached their statutory and common law duties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and remand to the district court on the grounds that Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.2-030 vested the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the same trust matter which had been before it. The circuit court denied the motion but remanded the matter to the district court, concluding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the underlying matter and claims in the two cases were different, and therefore, Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate. View "Hauber v. Hauber" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals determining that the Jefferson Circuit Court had concurrent jurisdiction over Appellee's breach of trust claims, holding that the Jefferson District Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all breach of trust claims arising out of a Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.8-180 proceeding.Appellant was trustee of a revocable trust. Pursuant to section 386B.8-180, Appellant filed a petition in Jefferson District Court to approve its statutory notice informing Appellee that a different entity had accepted appointment as the new trustee. Appellee then filed an action in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging several breach of trust claims and filed for removal of the district court action to circuit court. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion for dismissal of the circuit court action. Appellant petitioned for a writ of prohibition, alleging that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition in part, concluding that concurrent jurisdiction existed for the breach of trust claims brought under the separate circuit court action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant followed the proper statutory procedure, any matters within Appellee's circuit court breach of trust action identical to those raised in the section 386B.8-180 proceedings were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the district court. View "PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the Contestants in this will-contest case, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of the will-proponent's directed-verdict motion.In reversing the circuit court's judgment in favor of the Contestants, the court of appeals found that the Contestants' evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict on the will-contest issues but otherwise affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of the will proponent's directed verdict motion. View "Getty v. Getty" on Justia Law