Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Thomas Dunbar, also known as "Sam," passed away without any direct descendants. Connie Corner, who was not related to Dunbar by blood, probated a will that purportedly left his entire estate to her. Tyler Popplewell, Dunbar's grandnephew, filed a motion in Russell Circuit Court alleging that the will was a product of fraud and undue influence, and requested the court to declare it null and void. Corner later moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Tyler lacked standing to bring the claim. The trial court sustained Corner's motion, leading Tyler to appeal.The Russell Circuit Court initially dismissed Tyler's case on the grounds of lack of standing, as Corner had argued. Tyler then filed a motion to set aside the judgment, claiming he did not receive notice of the hearing. Additionally, Imogene Popplewell, Dunbar's sister and Tyler's grandmother, attempted to intervene as a successor plaintiff, but her motion was denied as untimely. The trial court reaffirmed its dismissal, citing the mailbox rule in denying Tyler's motion to set aside the judgment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Corner had waived the issue of standing by not raising it in her initial response to Tyler's complaint. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the precedent set in Harrison v. Leach, which emphasized that standing issues must be raised at the outset of litigation. Corner then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing that Corner had waived the standing issue by failing to raise it promptly. The Court emphasized that defendants must address standing issues early in the litigation process to avoid inefficiencies and potential gamesmanship. The case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on its merits. View "CORNER V. POPPLEWELL" on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Charlotte Blair executed a power of attorney (POA) appointing her daughter, Annette Wiley, as her attorney in fact. The POA was not signed by two disinterested witnesses as required by Kentucky law at the time. In December 2019, Wiley signed admission documents and an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement on Blair's behalf for Blair's admission to a long-term care facility. Blair passed away in June 2020. In July 2020, the Kentucky legislature amended the law to remove the two-witness requirement for POAs.Wiley and her sister, Melanie Persson, sued the care facility, Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc., for various claims. Masonic Homes argued that some of these claims were subject to the ADR agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the POA was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of the law at the time of its execution and that the 2020 amendment was not retroactive. Therefore, the ADR agreement was unenforceable. Masonic Homes appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the POA was valid because the 2020 amendment to the law was retroactive. Wiley sought review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2020 amendment to the law was not retroactive. Therefore, the POA was invalid at the time of its execution and the ADR agreement was unenforceable. The court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Wiley v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the underlying circuit court action filed by three sisters (Sisters), holding that the circuit court correctly denied the writ.The Sisters, daughters of Elbert Goff Sr., brought the underlying complaint against, among others, Appellant, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Elbert's Estate, alleging that Appellant breached her fiduciary duties to Elbert before he died through self-dealing. The circuit court denied Appellant's ensuing motion to dismiss. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the Sisters' complaint, but the court of appeals denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case; and (2) an appellate remedy was available, and great injustice and irreparable injury will not be suffered by Appellant. View "Goff v. Honorable Edwards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals for failing as a reviewing court to give proper deference to the trial court's decision to deny Appellees leave to amend a pleading and held that the court erred when it found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to probate the will at issue in this action.Plaintiff filed this action challenging the validity of the decedent's will and asserting claims of undue influence and breach of fiduciary duty by Defendants and requesting a declaration that the will was invalid. After Plaintiff settled his claims with some of the defendants, defendant Suzanne McGaha filed a motion for leave to amend her answer and to assert cross-claims and certain objections. The district court overruled the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the probate matter because of an alleged defect with verification of the probate petition; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Suzanne's motion for leave to amend her answer to assert cross-claims. View "McGaha v. McGaha" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the circuit court affirming the district court's order liquidating a trust's assets, holding that the order was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, and unsupported by sound legal principles.J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., obtained a Jefferson District Court Court order that improperly directed the Bank to liquidate certain trust assets and pay them into the Jefferson Registry of Court. The circuit court affirmed the district court's action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Bank violated its statutory and fiduciary duties by liquidating the trust's assets when the legislature has provided an adequate mechanism and remedy for the settlement and distribution of trust assets; and (2) as a remedy, the district court is to order an accounting and appropriate damages. View "Estate of Worrall v. J.P. Morgan Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court declaring that the Estate of Nannie Wethington had no dower right pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.020 in $38,500 withdrawn from the bank account of her husband, James Wethington, by their son, Kerry Wethington, two days prior to James' death, holding that the lower courts failed to apply controlling precedent.In Kentucky, a widow has an absolute estate to one-half of the personalty of her deceased widow's estate. In this instant case, the circuit court found that James made a valid inter vivos gift to Kerry and that Nannie had no dower right to the $38,500 withdrawn from James's bank account. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the gift of $38,500 was presumptively fraudulent, and the evidence conclusively proved the presumption. The Court remanded the case with instructions that Nannie's estate be distributed the amount of the gift which would satisfy her fifty percent statutory share. View "Simpson v. Wethington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order and judgment of the circuit court enforcing a settlement agreement, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable in this case.After a dispute over an alleged forgery in a will, the parties reached a mediation agreement as to certain property. The trial court adopted the mediation agreement as part of its judgment and ordered it to be enforced. The court of appeals appealed, ruling that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Statute of Frauds was applicable, barring enforcement of the agreement. View "Adamson v. Adamson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' second action against Defendants, the trustees of their parents' trust, because a prior action had been filed in and decided by the district court, holding that Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate under the circumstances.In the earlier action, Plaintiffs filed a notice-order-motion to remove trustees and for other relief, alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The district court denied the requested relief. The circuit court affirmed. While Plaintiffs' appeal was pending in the circuit court they filed the instant proceeding in the circuit court alleging that Defendants breached their statutory and common law duties. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and remand to the district court on the grounds that Ky. Rev. Stat. 386B.2-030 vested the district court with exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the same trust matter which had been before it. The circuit court denied the motion but remanded the matter to the district court, concluding that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the underlying matter and claims in the two cases were different, and therefore, Plaintiffs' filing in the circuit court was appropriate. View "Hauber v. Hauber" on Justia Law