Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to address the manner in which the proponent of a notarial testament must prove conformity with its statutory form requirements; specifically, whether an unsigned copy of a lost notarial testament could be probated with extrinsic evidence only. This matter arose out of a petition to open the small succession of the decedent, Diana Bartlett Morgan, filed by her daughter, Diana Lynn Ford. The petition alleged the decedent died intestate as an executed Last Will and Testament could not be located or produced by the surviving spouse, James William Morgan. Mr. Morgan subsequently petitioned to probate a lost will alleging that the decedent executed a proper one-page notarial testament on June 22, 2016. Mr. Morgan sought to remove Ms. Ford as administratrix, to be named as independent executor, and for the issuance of letters of independent administration arguing that Ms. Ford failed to advise the court of the existence of a copy of decedent’s will. He further alleged that the original notarial testament was believed to have been deposited into a safety deposit box belonging to Lawrence Dupre, the drafting attorney. After a search of the box, the notarial testament could not be located. In support of his petition, Mr. Morgan submitted an unsigned copy of the lost notarial testament. Finding that the evidence presented failed to meet the requirements, the Court held the purported testament was absolutely null. View "In re: Succession of Diana Bartlett Morgan" on Justia Law

The decedent Willie Clyde Burns married Silver Ruth Cooper in 1959. The couple lived in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana and had three children. A divorce petition was filed in 1966 in Arkansas, captioned “Sybia Ruth Burns vs. W. C. Burns.” A final judgment of divorce was rendered on August 26, 1966 by the Arkansas court. Willie filed a divorce petition in Claiborne Parish in 1967, and the petition was served on Silver, captioned “W.C. Burns (Col.) vs. Sylvia Ruth Burns.” There was no judgment of final divorce rendered in this case. Silver went on to marry Welcome Boyd in 1968. Willie went on to marry Annie Bradley in 1970. Annie testified at trial that at the start of their marriage she and Willie had no assets and that anything Willie owned at the time of his death was acquired during their marriage. The couple was married for 45 years and had two children. Willie died intestate in 2015. Annie petitioned to open Willie’s succession and appoint an administratrix. Silver filed a Petition in Intervention in which she sought to be named Willie’s surviving spouse as she was never lawfully divorced from him. In support of her position, Silver provided a report by a forensic document examiner who concluded that the signatures on the documents of both divorce proceedings did not belong to Silver. She also testified that she never went by the names Sybia or Sylvia. The trial court granted the petition to intervene, declared the Arkansas divorce invalid, and recognized Silver as the legal wife of Willie at the time of his death. In addition, the trial court found that Annie was a good faith putative spouse based on Annie’s testimony that Willie told her he was divorced. The trial court then said that the estate would be divided according to the formula in Prince v. Hopson, 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), allocating one-fourth of the community to the legal spouse, one-fourth to the putative spouse, and the decedent’s one half to his heirs. The Lousiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's division of the community, finding that as a good faith putative spouse, Annie had an undivided one-half interest in the community. Willie’s five children were to divide equally his undivided one-half interest in the community, subject to Annie’s usufruct. View "Succession of Willie Clyde Burns" on Justia Law

Alexis Carroll Hartline and Zachary Shawn Hartline sought an interim allowance for their maintenance during the administration of the succession of Raymond John Brandt (“Decedent”). It was undisputed that the Hartlines were Decedent’s forced heirs by adoption (hereinafter, the “Forced Heirs”) and that Decedent entered into a last will and testament placing their legitime in trust. It was further undisputed that Decedent designated the Forced Heirs as principal beneficiaries of the relevant trusts and designated his surviving spouse, Jessica Fussell Brandt (the “Surviving Spouse”), as income beneficiary, thus granting her the sole right to any and all net income generated by the estate property held in trust for the duration of her life. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the Forced Heirs’ writ to review whether they were entitled to receive the requested allowance as an advance on amounts they were “eventually due,” pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3321. The Supreme Court found the Forced Heirs could not receive an interim allowance during the administration of Decedent’s succession because they were not due, upon the termination of the administration, cash and/or property from which cash might be made available. The Court thus affirmed the court of appeal and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Succession of Raymond John Brandt" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address whether the law in effect at the time a testamentary trust came into existence allowed the settlor of the trust to provide for substitution of beneficiaries when the original beneficiary died testate, but without descendants. The Supreme Court concluded the law permitted such substitution. View "Succession of Dean Bradley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dejaun Kendrick, individually and on behalf of her minor son, sued the estate of the deceased, Anthony Michael Barre, seeking filiation and child support. The estate filed exceptions of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action. The trial court granted the exceptions, but the court of appeal reversed. Finding an initial child support claim cannot be brought after the father’s death, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s ruling granting the exception of no cause of action. View "Kendrick v. Estate of Michael Barre, et al." on Justia Law

Robert Johnson and Beverly Edwin were married for twenty-two years, and together had three children. During their marriage, Johnson signed and recorded an “Affidavit of Usufruct” in favor of Edwin “for the remainder of [Ms. Edwin’s] life even if she remarries.” This lifetime usufruct covered Johnson’s separate property in Walker, Louisiana. During their marriage, Johnson and Edwin lived in a house on the subject property and also rebuilt the house together following a fire. The couple separated in 2002 or 2003, at which time Edwin moved off of the premises, while Johnson continued to live there. The couple divorced in 2006. Johnson died intestate on August 13, 2010. In June 2014, Edwin petitioned to be named administratrix of Johnson’s succession and was initially appointed as such. However, the trial court removed her as administratrix and appointed three of Johnson’s fourteen children to serve as co-administrators, namely: Lorie Parker, Aveis Parker, and Robert Johnson, Jr. In 2018, after a family conflict arose regarding who had a right to use the property, Edwin filed a “Motion to Enforce Conventional Usufruct and Spousal Reimbursement Claim,” contending the house on the property was vacant, the value of the property was depreciating, and it needed repair. Edwin further alleged Johnson’s estate owed her $21,600.00, representing the amount of money she claimed to have expended to clean, maintain, and improve the property due to the alleged neglect of the co-administrators. The co-administrators countered, filing a peremptory exception of prescription in which they argued that Edwin’s usufruct was extinguished by the ten-year prescription of nonuse. In opposition to the exception, Edwin contended that the prescription of nonuse did not apply to a lifetime usufruct. Alternatively, she asserted that she had used the property during the pertinent ten-year period so as to interrupt the accrual of prescription for nonuse. Certiorari was granted in this matter to determine whether a usufruct “granted for life” was subject to the ten-year prescription of nonuse set forth in La. C.C. art. 621; and, if so, whether the lifetime usufruct established in this case was prescribed pursuant to that article. After review of the record and consideration of the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that while a lifetime usufruct may prescribe due to nonuse, the usufruct at issue did not prescribe as there was no ten-year period of continued nonuse. The lower courts’ judgments were reversed. View "In re: Succession of the Estate of Robert Johnson" on Justia Law

James Conway Liner, III (“Mr. Liner”) executed two notarial testaments: one in 2013 and another in 2015 (purporting to revoke all prior testaments). The 2013 testament, executed pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1577 for testators who were able to read and sign their name, divided Mr. Liner’s property equally amongst his three children: James Conway Liner, IV (“Conway”), Jeffrey Liner (“Jeff”), and Laura Liner Centola (“Laura”). The 2015 testament excluded Conway from any inheritance and was executed pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1579 for a testator who was unable to read regardless of whether they can sign their own name. Mr. Liner died in 2018. Jeff and Laura filed a petition to probate the 2015 testament. Conway intervened and sought to have the 2015 testament declared null under various theories including an allegedly defective attestation clause. As it was at the original hearing, the primary issue presented was whether the attestation clause verifying that Mr. Liner declared he “signed” the testament was substantially similar to the La. C.C. art. 1579 requirement that the attestation clause verify a testator declared he signed his name “at the end” and “on each other separate page” of the testament. The Louisiana Supreme Court also addressed Conway’s additional arguments as to whether the attestation clause reflected an inconsistency in the notary both following and reading the testament and whether the attestation clause failed to establish that Mr. Liner declared he heard the reading of the will in the presence of the notary and the witnesses. Following a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court vacated its original decree in this case, affirmed the decision of the court of appeal (reversed the trial court's nullification of the 2015 testament), and clarified the analytical framework for determining whether a notarial will is in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. View "Succession of James Conway Liner, III" on Justia Law

The testator herein executed a notarial testament in 2016, naming her niece as her sole legatee. After the testator’s death in 2018, her widower challenged the testament, contending inter alia that it was rendered invalid by the failure to state in the attestation clause that the testator declared she had signed “at the end” of the testament. The issue this case presented was whether the language of an attestation clause in the 2016 notarial testament, which failed to expressly state that the testator declared or signified that she signed the testament “at the end,” even though it stated the testator signed “on each page,” violated the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1577 and rendered the testament absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 1573. The district court invalidated the testament, finding “the only deviation from La.Civ.Code art. 1577(2) was the absence of the words ‘at the end’ in the attestation clause.” The Louisiana Supreme Court found the attestation clause in this case made use of the exact language set forth in the sample attestation clause in the pre-1980 version of former La. R.S. 9:2442; i.e., that the will was “[s]igned on each page” (as noted, when changed in 1980 to its current wording, the difference was denominated by its authors as a technical and/or semantic change). The question for the Supreme Court reduced to whether such a semantic departure from Article 1577’s current language could be considered substantially similar to the requisite attestation ‒ that the testator “signed at the end and on each other separate page.” The Court recognized that these phrases had slightly different connotations, as once the testator signs “at the end” of the testamentary recitations he was not required to sign after the attestation clause even if it concluded on a subsequent page; the testator was only required to sign on each of the other separate pages that precede his signature at the end of the testamentary recitations. Here, the declaration the testator signed "on each page" of a testament necessarily established that the testament had been signed on every page, including the page containing the end of the testament. The appellate and district court decisions were reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Succession of Peggy Blackwell Bruce" on Justia Law

The testator herein executed two notarial testaments: one in 2013 and another in 2015 (which purported to revoke all prior testaments). The 2013 testament divided the testator’s property equally among his three adult children (Conway, Jeffrey, and Laura). The 2015 testament, executed under La. C.C. art. 1579 (for a testator who is unable to read regardless of whether he is able to sign his name), divided the testator’s property between only two of his children (Jeffrey and Laura), excluding the third child (Conway). After the testator’s death in 2018, Conway challenged the validity of the 2015 testament on several bases, in response to his siblings’ attempt to probate the testament. The issue raised by this case was whether the language of an attestation clause in the 2015 testament, which failed to expressly state that the testator declared or signified that he signed the testament “at the end of the testament and on each other separate page,” in accordance with the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1579, rendered the testament absolutely null under La. C.C. art. 1573. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the attestation clause here stated simply that the testator "signed" the testament, which could only establish the testator signed the eight-page testament once, rather than "at the end" and "on each other separate page," as required by La. C.C. art. 1579(2). "An attestation clause that fails to state that the testament was signed at the end and on each other separate page fails to inform the testator and witnesses that the testator has a responsibility to sign every page of a multiple-page testament, and “signing one’s name on each page of the will undoubtedly offers more heightened protection from surreptitious replacement of pages." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which invalidated the 2015 testament. View "Succession of James Conway Liner, III" on Justia Law

Edward Robin (Testator) had ten children: five from his first marriage to Doris Robin–Chris, Don, Brad, Edward, Jr., and Donna Robin; three from his second marriage to Thaslia Robin–Marcela Dardar, Elizabeth Locicero, and Lee Robin; and two other children–Chantel Viada and Chad Robin. On November 4, 2004, Testator executed a notarial testament before Notary Public Todd Villarrubia and two witnesses. In that testament, Testator bequeathed his gun collection and hunting equipment to Lee and the remainder of his estate to Brad and Don. His other seven children were not included in the testament. Brad and Don were named in the testament as co-executors of the estate. Testator also executed a “REVOCATION OF ANY AND ALL PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS” before Notary Villarrubia and two witnesses–Ralph Litolff, Jr. and Monique Hardy. That document (the act of revocation) was not dated and consisted of one sentence, which stated: “I, EDWARD JOHN ROBIN, SR., revoke any and all prior Wills and Codicils that I may have made as pursuant to La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 1607.” Testator died on August 22, 2017. Pursuant to a petition for appointment of an administrator, premised on an allegation that Testator died intestate, Chantel was appointed administratrix. Brad (Legatee) opposed Chantel's appointment, arguing Testator did not die intestate. In his petition, Legatee alleged that Testator left a testament in notarial form dated November 4, 2004, recognized that an act of revocation had been executed by Testator, and urged that the act of revocation, which had not been dated by Notary, was ineffective because it did not satisfy the authentic act requirement of La. C.C. art. 1607. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the revocation was valid. The Court found that because extrinsic evidence regarding the date on which the act of revocation was executed did not “negate or vary” the content of the act of revocation, the lower courts improperly applied La. C.C. art. 1848 to preclude the admission of such evidence. "The extrinsic evidence establishes that the act of revocation was executed after the testament at issue in this case. Because the testament was revoked by the testator," the trial court’s judgment was reversed, and this matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Succession of Edward Robin, Sr." on Justia Law