Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

J.C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lockhart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also owned a life estate in the same property, and they maintained the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who have a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart's petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling. View "Lockhart v. Collins" on Justia Law

Frank Nichols, individually and as executor of Annie Hobson Nichols’s estate, petitioned the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County to remove his sister, Shirlee Phillips, and Kathryn Kennington as coadministratrixes of the estate of his other sister, Bobbye Brill. The chancellor denied Frank’s petition. The chancellor also found that Bobbye's will created a condition precedent, which Shirlee must perform in order to receive the residuary estate. Frank appealed the chancellor's judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding no error, affirmed the judgment of the chancery court which Frank then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals and chancery court correctly awarded the residuary estate to Phillips, but that both courts erred in finding that the will created a conditional bequest. However, because "[a]n appellate court may affirm a trial court if the correct result is reached, even if the trial court reached the [correct] result for the wrong reasons," the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Estate of Brill v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The "last will and testament" of Ted Watkins named his ex-stepdaughter Petitioner Diana Kinsey as executrix of his estate, and bequeathed all of his property to her. A year following his death, the estate was closed, and Petitioner was discharged from her executrix duties. Several years later, she filed a wrongful-death action against various silica-related entities in circuit court for Mr. Watkins' death from silicosis. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations or alternatively, that Petitioner lacked standing to file the action. The circuit court dismissed all defendants with prejudice. In its review of the case, the Supreme Court only dealt with the issue of whether Petitioner's claim was time barred by the statute of limitations, and indeed found that her claim was so barred. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's action.

This case came before the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal from circuit court. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply premises-liability law and denying Double Quick, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. The matter arose from a shooting that occurred in the parking lot of a Double Quick convenience store. George Ford, accompanied by his young son, entered Double Quick to make a purchase. Shortly afterward, Cassius Gallion entered the store. Ford and Gallion exchanged words. Gallion exited the store first. Then Ford left the store to pump gas into his car. Because she was worried that Ford and Gallion would fight, the assistant store manager accompanied Ford and helped Ford’s son into the car. At the gas pumps, Ford and Gallion again exchanged words. Mario Moore, who had arrived at the Double Quick but had not yet been inside, approached Ford’s car, intervened in the argument, and threw a punch at Ford. Mario missed Ford, but struck Jackson, who then returned to the store and called the police. Ford then retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car and shot Mario. Mario died as result of his injury. Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario’s estate, filed suit against Double Quick arguing that Double Quick had neglected to protect Mario from injury and death while he was on the store’s premises. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the case was more similar to a basic negligence action against an employee of Double Quick than a premises-liability action, and that a jury should determine whether the manager's actions were the proximate cause of Mario's injuries. Double Quick appealed the portion of the order denying it summary judgment. "In premises-liability cases, there are two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person: the requisite 'cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises." The Supreme Court found that there was no suggestion in the record that the store manager had any knowledge of Ford's violent nature. Moore failed to prove that the injury was reasonably foreseeable, or that the manager's behavior was the proximate cause of Mario's injury. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge should have granted Double Quick's motion for summary judgment.

Louis Wallace, personal representative of the Estate of Cynthia Wallace, filed a suit in circuit court against Cynthia’s doctor Dr. Emad Mohammed, alleging wrongful death as the cause of action. After discovering evidence that Louis was never legally married to Cynthia, Dr. Mohamed moved to intervene in the estate proceedings in the Chancery Court. The chancellor allowed the intervention, considered the evidence, and removed Wallace as the administrator, and in his stead, appointed the Chancery Clerk. Subsequently, Dr. Mohamed moved to dismiss the wrongful death action, claiming Wallace lacked standing to bring the suit on behalf of the estate. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the wrongful death action “since Plaintiff lacked standing to commence the suit,” and “the Plaintiff lack[ed] standing as a wrongful death beneficiary and there being rightful beneficiaries available to commence a new suit.” Subsequently, Wallace appealed the chancery court’s decision to allow Dr. Mohamed to intervene in the estate proceedings, as well as the decision to remove Wallace as estate administrator. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed both chancery court rulings and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate Wallace as the estate administrator. Wallace then appealed the circuit court’s judgment, which had granted Dr. Mohamed’s motion to dismiss the wrongful death suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Wallace was not entitled to recover for Cynthia Wallace’s death, and Wallace was not the estate’s representative. The Court concluded the circuit court erred in dismissing the case, but find no error in its dismissing Wallace. The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the wrongful death suit.

Appellants Bobbi Young and Linda Carter, next of kin to Clarence Young, appealed an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dr. Robert Smith and Baptist Memorial Hospital. On appeal, the Youngs argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant their "motion to withdraw admissions" filed seven years after the admissions were otherwise "conclusively established." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's ruling was well within its discretion under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further affirmed the circuit court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the Youngs' claims against Dr. Smith and the hospital, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Doctor's favor.

Anthony Smith died in a plane crash in 2001. His estate contained two separate life insurance policies. Mr. Smith's father Raymond was named as sole beneficiary of one policy, and Mr. Smith's ex-wife Ruth was named as beneficiary on the other. At the time of his death, Mr. Smith owned a life estate in 657 acres of land in Tate County. One hundred and sixty of the acres were set aside in fee simple for Raymond and his wife Dorothy as part of their homestead. This case came before an appellate court three separate times. Each time, the issue before the court involved the proper way to apportion the tax liability among the beneficiaries to the estate. The Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that taxes should be based on the taxable estate, rather than the gross estate. On remand, the Estate filed two motions demanding that Raymond and Ruth reimburse the Estate for taxes paid plus interest on the insurance policies. Raymond filed a motion demanding that the Estate pay him for rent for the time he was excluded from his homestead. The chancery court ultimately held that Raymond and Ruth were responsible for their portions of tax liability owed to the Estate, and that Raymond was entitled to twenty-four months' rent. The Estate appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the case record, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court.