Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law

Decedent, the mother of Cathie and Marcy, died testate. Decedent's will expressly made no provision for her daughters. Decedent named Kristine Fankell as the personal representative of her estate. After Fankell's application for informal probate was accepted, Marcy filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate and a petition for formal probate of the will. Cathie subsequently filed an objection to the application and appointment of Fankell as personal representative as well as a motion for substitute of judge. The district court (1) denied Cathie's motion for substitution of judge as untimely, and (2) granted Fankell's motion to strike Cathie's pleadings because she failed timely to intervene and her interests were adequately represented by Marcy. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathie's motion for substitution of judge, holding that the court correctly determined Cathie's motion was untimely. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett, the adult son of Abel and Judy Bennett, died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Jeremiah died intestate and was survived by two minor children. The district court appointed Sabrina Bennett, Jeremiah's former wife, as the personal representative of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina subsequently petitioned the district court for a declaration that Abel and Judy (the Bennetts) had no standing to claim wrongful death damages as a result of Jeremiah's death. The district court concluded that Jeremiah's children were the sole heirs of the estate and therefore had priority over any wrongful death and survivorship claims. The Bennetts petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control. The Court accepted the petition and vacated the portion of the district court's order holding that the Bennetts could not recover wrongful death claims as a matter of law, holding that the Bennetts were entitled to recover wrongful death damage as Jeremiah's parents and survivors. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett died intestate. Jeremiah's two children resided with their mother, Jeremiah's ex-spouse, Sabrina. Jeremiah's father, Abel, was appointed the personal representative (PR) of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina objected to Abel's appointment and nominated herself as the PR in her capacity as guardian and conservator of the children. After a hearing, the district court removed Abel as PR of the estate and appointed Sabrina as PR. Abel appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abel failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law in determining that it was in the best interests of the estate to remove Abel and to appoint Sabrina as PR for Jeremiah's estate. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

Decedent's will named her daughter Dawn as personal representative of her estate. After the clerk of court accepted Dawn's application for informal probate, Dawn issued a notice to heirs and devisees specifying that the estate was being administered without supervision of the court. Decedent's son, William, subsequently filed a motion for substitute of judge in the proceeding pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the substitution statute did not apply to the informal probate matter because the matter was not under the supervision of the district court and therefore not a "civil action" for purposes of section 3-1-804; and (2) although the proceeding was later converted into a court-supervised administration under which section 3-1-804 would apply, William's motion for substitution was filed prematurely, and was therefore not timely and void. View "In re Estate of Greene" on Justia Law

Margaret Howard was driving south and John Bradford was driving north on a two-lane highway when the two vehicles collided. Neither Margaret nor John survived. The Howards, the co-personal representatives of Margaret's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Bradfords, the co-personal representatives of John's estate, alleging negligence. A jury found that John was not liable in negligence for the death of Margaret. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err ruling that a defense expert's testimony was supported by an adequate factual foundation and by determining that the scientific method used by the expert to reconstruct the accident was reliable and admissible; (2) the Bradfords did not violate the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to supplement the disclosure of the defense expert; and (3) the district court did not err by denying the Howards' motion for a new trial View "Wheaton v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Appellant, the personal representative of the estate of Decedent, appealed from a final distribution order of the district court, which interpreted Decedent's last will and testament to devise the entirety of Decedent's real property to Appellee, Appellant's brother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) interpreting Decedent's will to determine that Decedent intended to devise to Appellee 528 acres subject to special farm property valuation; and (2) allowing Appellee to object to the personal representative's proposed distribution of income from the property subject to special farm property valuation more than thirty days after the proposed distribution was submitted for approval. View "Ecton v. Ecton" on Justia Law

After Maxine's family contributed financially to help her keep her house, Maxine transferred title of the property to the Maxine Lane Irrevocable Trust. The Trust Agreement provided that if the property was sold during Maxine's lifetime, $50,000 was to be paid to each of Maxine's brothers. Later, Maxine consented to the sale of the property, and the Trust received $176,469 in net proceeds. The Trustee indicated she was obligated to make $50,000 distributions to Maxine's brothers as stated in the Trust and then use the remaining proceeds for Maxine's support. Maxine filed a declaratory judgment action against the Trustee, asking the district court to determine whether the Trust required the sale proceeds to be used to purchase another residence for Maxine, or whether the Trust required the $50,000 distributions be made. The district court granted summary judgment to Linda, concluding that the Trust mandated the Trustee to make the distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded the Trust Agreement required the Trust to make the $50,000 distributions upon the sale of the property. View "Lane v. Caler" on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law