Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The dispute at the center of this case concerned an intestate estate. On appeal, one of the decedent’s two children argued that the county court erred in (1) approving the final accounting and ordering distribution accordingly, and (2) naming the decedent’s daughter-in-law as an heir at law. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the county court (1) erred when it included certain nonprobate assets in the intestate estate and when it found that the decedent’s daughter-in-law was an heir at law, and (2) did not err in excluding certain assets from the intestate estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Balvin" on Justia Law

In 2006, a Colorado court entered a decree for adult adoption making Plaintiff, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, the heir of Merrill Maddocks under the intestacy laws. In 2014, Merrill died without leaving any surviving children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint to quiet title to a section of farmland, arguing that he was the owner of the property because he was the “eldest son” of Merrill under the will of Merrill’s great-uncle. Defendant, the person who takes the property if Plaintiff is not Merrill’s “eldest son,” argued that Plaintiff was not Merrill’s eldest son under the will because “it was not legally possible to adopt an adult” in Nebraska when the great-uncle died. The trial court quieted title in the property in Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was Merrill’s eldest son because the Colorado decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Merrill and Plaintiff did not have a parent-child relationship, Plaintiff was not Merrill’s “eldest son” under the great-uncle’s will. Remanded with directions to quiet title to the property in Defendant. View "Burnett v. Maddocks" on Justia Law

After Emil Alberts died, Lois Alberts, his surviving spouse, authorized her attorney to file a petition on her behalf to elect to take one-half of Emil’s augmented estate pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2313. Emil’s two nephews (Appellants), as coperaonal representatives of Emil’s estate and as beneficiaries of Emil’s trust, objected to the petition’s validity and to the calculation of Lois’ elective share within it. The county court found that Lois’ petition for elective share was validly filed and that certain trust property should be included in the augmented estate for purposes of calculating Lois’ elective share. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county court did not err in finding that the petition for elective share was validly filed; but (2) the county court erred in failing to rule that the value of the trust property at issue should be excluded from the augmented estate under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2314(c)(2). Remanded. View "In re Estate of Alberts" on Justia Law

Before Genevieve Franke’s death in 2014, she had been a resident of a nursing home. In 2013, Genevieve agreed to sell her farmland to her son John Franke at a price below its fair market value. Laurie Berggren, Genevieve's daughter, subsequently petitioned for the appointment of a conservator. The court appointed Laurie as Genevieve’s temporary conservator and Cornerstone Bank as Genevieve’s permanent conservator. Both Genevieve and John appealed. Before the parties filed briefs, Genevieve’s attorney filed a suggestion of death stating that Genevieve had died. Genevieve, through her attorney of record, sought an order to dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the county court’s order appointing a permanent conservator. John, in turn, moved for an order reviving the appeal. The Supreme Court overruled both of these motions, holding (1) Genevieve’s attorney has no standing to represent her in the Court after her death; (2) Genevieve’s death has abated John’s appeal, for which he has standing, because her competency and need for a conservator are moot issues; and (3) the abatement of John’s appeal does not require the Court to vacate the county court’s orders appointing a conservator. View "In re Conservatorship of Franke" on Justia Law

William Lorenz died in 2010. The county court admitted William’s last will and testament and two codicils to formal probate and also appointed William’s daughter, Theresa Lorenz, as personal representative of the estate. Alice Shea, William’s former wife, filed a petition challenging the rejection of her claims in the estate, seeking the appointment of a special administrator and challenging the second codicil of William’s will. The county court awarded summary judgment to Theresa except in regard to Alice’s claims regarding alimony and interest on a late payment. The court of appeals affirmed the county court’s order but modified the court’s dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator to reflect that the request should have been dismissed without prejudice. Theresa petitioned for further review, assigning three errors relating to the issue of the special administrator. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) erred in concluding that Alice’s filing of her claims and petition for allowance of those claims was sufficient written demand under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2726; and (2) erred in modifying the dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator without prejudice. View "In re Estate of Lorenz" on Justia Law

After Eric Zornes won a lottery, Eric and his wife, Julia, commenced a gifting plan to Andy Wolfe, Jason Wolfe, and Jason Reed. These gifts were structured as loans, and each borrower made a promissory note for his loan, payable to Julia’s and Eric’s revocable trusts jointly. Andy’s note was secured by a deed of trust for real property. Julia and Eric later divorced pursuant to a settlement agreement. When Eric found that Andy’s house had been sold and that Julia had retained the proceeds of the sale, Eric filed this complaint alleging that Julia had converted the proceeds of Andy’s note. Julia counterclaimed for partition of the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Julia, concluding that even if Julia had converted the proceeds, the settlement agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction. The court also ordered partition of the promissory notes for Jason Wolfe’s and Jason Reed’s loans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Eric was not entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim; (2) the settlement agreement did not constitute an accord and satisfaction; and (3) the lower court erred in the method by which it partitioned the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. View "Zornes v. Zornes" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died in 2011. The contestants of her will objected to the petition to admit to probate either the decedent’s February 2011 will or her August 2001 will, alleging that the wills were invalid because the decedent lacked testamentary capacity and because the devises were the result of undue influence. After a trial, the jury found that the 2011 will was valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding a “presumption of undue influence”; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion responding to a jury question or in admitting, in part, a video of the execution of the 2001 will. View "In re Estate of Clinger" on Justia Law

Constance created an LLC and a revocable trust. Constance transferred her real estate to the LLC and directed that, upon her death, her remaining property be transferred to the Trust. After Constance's death, her son David, as trustee of the Trust and as manager of the LLC, filed a declaratory action to allow the sale of the real estate pursuant to the Trust. Constance's other children, as beneficiaries of the Trust and members of the LLC, filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the LLC should govern disposition of the real property and sought an accounting. The district court determined that the Trust would control the disposition and that David did not breach his fiduciary duties. The court of appeals affirmed. David subsequently moved for attorney fees and postjudgment interest, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees, holding (1) the award of attorney fees and costs was outside the scope of the mandate given by the court of appeals, and therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) the beneficiaries were not entitled to attorney fees on the ground that David's motion was frivolous. View "Klingelhoefer v. Monif" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, relatives of Decedent, sought Attorney's services in the administration of Decedent's estate. Plaintiffs later brought this professional negligence case against Attorney and his firm (Defendants), claiming that Attorney failed properly to disclose a conflict of interest to Plaintiffs, Attorney erroneously advised Plaintiffs to execute disclaimers that should be regarded as invalid and ineffective, and Attorney caused the estate to incur additional taxes by failing to include the purportedly disclaimed property in the qualified terminable interest property election on the estate tax return. The district court (1) entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the conflict of interest claim, and (2) dismissed as time barred Plaintiffs' claims regarding the disclaimed property and associated tax return elections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment regarding the conflict of interest; but (2) reversed the judgments on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claims. Remanded. View "Guinn v. Murray" on Justia Law

After Decedent died in 2010, her son, Robert, was appointed the personal representative of her estate. After Robert filed an inventory of estate property and a proposed schedule of distribution, Christy, the daughter of Decedent's other son, filed a motion for supervised administration, arguing that pursuant to Decedent's will, she was left an interest in Decedent's land but that Robert did not include this interest in the schedule of distribution. At issue before the probate court was what portion of Christy's interest in the estate was purchased by Mark, Robert's son, at a bankruptcy auction in 1998. The probate court concluded that Christy's interest in Decedent's share of the land was not transferred to Mark following the bankruptcy sale and approved Christy's motion for supervised administration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court did not err in finding Christy's motion for supervised administration tolled Christy's thirty-day deadline to object to the distribution of assets; (2) the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the question of what was sold at Christy's bankruptcy auction as it related to Decedent's estate; and (3) the probate court made the correct determination regarding what Christy was entitled to through Decedent's estate. View "In re Estate of Odenreider" on Justia Law