Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the case involved Gail C. Tremblay, the plaintiff, and the Estate of Donald D. Bald, the decedent, and Allan Bald, the defendants. Tremblay and Donald Bald were engaged and lived together for over ten years but never married. During their relationship, they executed several agreements stating that if they were living together at the time of Bald's death, Tremblay would receive certain properties. Upon Bald's death, Tremblay initiated legal action, arguing that the agreements were enforceable contracts. The defendants disagreed, asserting that the agreements lacked consideration, and the Superior Court sided with the defendants.Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that the agreements are enforceable. The court stated that a valid enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds. While the defendants argued that the agreements lacked consideration because the couple was already living together when the agreements were executed, the court disagreed. The court held that the plaintiff's continued cohabitation constituted a benefit to the decedent, thereby satisfying the requirement for consideration. Furthermore, the court stated that either party's ability to end the relationship prior to the decedent's death did not affect the enforceability of the agreements. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tremblay v. Bald" on Justia Law

The putative intervenors, the Robert T. Keeler Foundation (the Foundation) and Peter Mithoefer, the fiduciary for the Estate of Robert T. Keeler (the Estate), appealed circuit court orders which: (1) denied their motion to intervene in proceedings brought under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) by petitioner, the Trustees of Dartmouth College (Dartmouth), and assented to by respondent, the New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT), to modify the restrictions governing an institutional fund created by a charitable gift pursuant to the last will and testament of Robert T. Keeler; and (2) granted Dartmouth’s assented-to application to modify. On appeal, the putative intervenors argued they had “special interest” standing pursuant to In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266, 274-75 (2019), and that granting the assented-to application was error. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the putative intervenors’ motion to intervene for lack of standing and, therefore, necessarily also affirmed the decision to grant the assented-to application. View "In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the Court announced a new rule intended to compensate plaintiffs who were not in the zone of danger but nevertheless suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the Court applied the Corso standard to allegations involving medical professionals’ negligent misdiagnosis, which resulted in the death of Lisa Chartier. Lisa’s husband, Marc Chartier, brought this action against defendants, Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC (Apple Therapy), Four Seasons Orthopaedic Center, PLLC d/b/a New Hampshire Orthopaedic Center (Four Seasons Orthopaedic), and Dr. Heather Killie. He appealed a superior court order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court found plaintiff alleged he suffered severe emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms from contemporaneously perceiving the sudden, unexpected, and shocking suffering and death of his wife. Under these circumstances, Lisa’s pulmonary embolism constituted the “accident” in line with Corso, and subsequent cases. The Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the basis that Marc’s emotional distress was too attenuated from defendants’ negligent conduct to permit recovery. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion. View "Chartier v. Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Newton appealed his convictions by jury on three counts of exploitation of an elderly, disabled, or impaired adult in violation of RSA 631:9, I(a) (2016) and RSA 631:10 (2016). Defendant became trustee of the Newton Family Trust and retained power of attorney over both the victim (defendant’s mother) and her husband (defendant’s father) in 2014 as a result of their failing health. The Trust created a fiduciary duty in the trustee and specified that the assets and money held by the Trust were to be used only for the benefit of the victim and her husband until their death. The victim’s husband died on December 21, 2015. By July 2017, the New Hampshire Attorney General had launched an investigation into allegations that defendant exploited the victim for large sums of money. Defendant argued the trial court erred when, at trial, it excluded out-of-court statements made by the defendant’s parents and a financial planner. He also appealed the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a hearing to review and reconsider the sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "New Hampshire v. Newton" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Apostoloff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition to validate a purported amendment to the Omega Trust. He contended the court erred in dismissing his petition by finding the grantor did not substantially comply with the terms of the trust regarding amendments, and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the grantor intended to amend his trust. Taking all of the facts alleged in the petition as true, and applying them against the applicable law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the allegations constituted a basis for legal relief. Thus, petitioner has sufficiently pled his case to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re The Omega Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Peter Dodier, appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) order denying the estate’s claim for workers’ compensation and death benefits following Peter Dodier’s death. The CAB denied the estate’s claim based on its determination that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were not a compensable injury. It therefore did not reach the issue of death benefits. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that Dodier’s anxiety and depression were compensable, it reversed the CAB’s decision and remanded for its consideration of whether the estate was entitled to death benefits. View "Appeal of Estate of Peter Dodier" on Justia Law

Respondent Ryanne Earley appealed a final divorce decree awarding petitioner Wm. Michael Earley part of her interest in an irrevocable life insurance trust established by her parents. She argued the trial court erred by classifying her interest in the trust as marital property subject to equitable division under RSA 458:16-a (Supp. 2020). Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s decision was contrary to RSA 564-B:5-502 (2019), it reversed in part, vacated the remainder of the property division determination, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wm. & Ryanne Earley" on Justia Law