Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Three siblings became co-beneficiaries of their late mother’s revocable trust, which was to be divided equally among them. The trust included two properties in New Hampshire: a longstanding family home and an adjacent parcel, as well as a nearby home that one sibling, acting as trustee, had purchased for their mother using her funds. After their mother’s death, the trustee resided at the newly acquired property, funded renovations with trust assets, and did not pay rent. Disputes arose among the siblings over how to distribute the real estate, prompting the trustee to file a petition for partition. One sibling counterclaimed, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by the trustee.The 6th Circuit Court–Concord Probate Division reviewed the petition and counterclaims. After a four-day trial, the court awarded the family home and adjacent parcel to the sibling who requested it, and the renovated property to the trustee. The court calculated the value of the renovated property to include both improvements funded by the trust and the period of rent-free occupancy. It found the trustee had breached fiduciary duties by refusing to distribute property and by prioritizing personal interests over the trust’s beneficiaries, ordering him to reimburse the trust for all litigation-related attorney’s fees and costs.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the probate court’s rulings. It held that the probate court acted within its broad equitable powers in distributing the properties as it did, and that its findings were supported by the record. The Supreme Court further concluded that the probate court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaims, since they directly concerned the administration and distribution of trust assets. Finally, the Supreme Court determined that specific challenges to the remedy ordered for breach of fiduciary duty were either waived or not preserved for appellate review. View "Moffat v. Srebro" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the guardianship of an adult ward. The mother, who previously served as the ward’s guardian from 2010 to 2020, was removed from that role by the Circuit Court on an ex parte basis and replaced by the Office of Public Guardian (OPG), initially as a temporary successor and later by agreement as the enduring guardian. In 2021, the mother sought removal of OPG and to be reinstated as guardian, but the court denied her motion, finding no cause for OPG’s removal and determining she was not an appropriate successor. In December 2024, the mother renewed her motion, citing improvements in her ability to serve as guardian and concerns about OPG’s performance. After hearings, the court again denied her request, concluding she had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that OPG was not acting in the ward’s best interests or that there was cause for removal.Following the denial of her reconsideration motion, the mother appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The trial court had required the mother to demonstrate cause for removing OPG as guardian, which it interpreted as necessary under the governing statute. The Supreme Court reviewed whether this was the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that RSA 464-A:39 does not require a showing of cause to remove an adult guardian; the sole statutory inquiry is whether removal is in the ward’s best interests. The trial court erred by imposing a requirement for cause, thus adding language not found in the statute. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the proper legal standard. View "In re Guardianship of T.M." on Justia Law

Carol Wagner, the plaintiff, claims entitlement to a surviving spousal share from the estate of John Chislett, her former husband. She seeks to rescind a quitclaim deed she granted to the decedent, alleging it was obtained through fraud. Additionally, she challenges the validity of a 1974 Dominican Republic divorce decree obtained by the decedent, asserting it is invalid under New Hampshire law. The defendants, Sally Chislett, Kevin Chislett, and Wai Kwan Chislett, contest her claims.The Circuit Court (Kissinger, J.) ruled against the plaintiff, determining that her rescission action was barred by the statute of limitations and that her challenge to the divorce decree was barred by laches due to her forty-seven-year delay in raising the issue. Consequently, the court dismissed her claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statute of limitations for actions involving real property, RSA 508:2, applied to the plaintiff's rescission claim, which had expired. The court also agreed with the lower court's application of the doctrine of laches, finding that the plaintiff's delay in challenging the divorce decree was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had remarried in reliance on the divorce decree and waited nearly five decades to contest its validity, during which time both her second husband and the decedent had died.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision effectively barred the plaintiff from claiming a surviving spousal share from the decedent's estate. View "Wagner v. Chislett" on Justia Law

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the case involved Gail C. Tremblay, the plaintiff, and the Estate of Donald D. Bald, the decedent, and Allan Bald, the defendants. Tremblay and Donald Bald were engaged and lived together for over ten years but never married. During their relationship, they executed several agreements stating that if they were living together at the time of Bald's death, Tremblay would receive certain properties. Upon Bald's death, Tremblay initiated legal action, arguing that the agreements were enforceable contracts. The defendants disagreed, asserting that the agreements lacked consideration, and the Superior Court sided with the defendants.Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, concluding that the agreements are enforceable. The court stated that a valid enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds. While the defendants argued that the agreements lacked consideration because the couple was already living together when the agreements were executed, the court disagreed. The court held that the plaintiff's continued cohabitation constituted a benefit to the decedent, thereby satisfying the requirement for consideration. Furthermore, the court stated that either party's ability to end the relationship prior to the decedent's death did not affect the enforceability of the agreements. As a result, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tremblay v. Bald" on Justia Law

The putative intervenors, the Robert T. Keeler Foundation (the Foundation) and Peter Mithoefer, the fiduciary for the Estate of Robert T. Keeler (the Estate), appealed circuit court orders which: (1) denied their motion to intervene in proceedings brought under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) by petitioner, the Trustees of Dartmouth College (Dartmouth), and assented to by respondent, the New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT), to modify the restrictions governing an institutional fund created by a charitable gift pursuant to the last will and testament of Robert T. Keeler; and (2) granted Dartmouth’s assented-to application to modify. On appeal, the putative intervenors argued they had “special interest” standing pursuant to In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266, 274-75 (2019), and that granting the assented-to application was error. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the putative intervenors’ motion to intervene for lack of standing and, therefore, necessarily also affirmed the decision to grant the assented-to application. View "In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the Court announced a new rule intended to compensate plaintiffs who were not in the zone of danger but nevertheless suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the Court applied the Corso standard to allegations involving medical professionals’ negligent misdiagnosis, which resulted in the death of Lisa Chartier. Lisa’s husband, Marc Chartier, brought this action against defendants, Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC (Apple Therapy), Four Seasons Orthopaedic Center, PLLC d/b/a New Hampshire Orthopaedic Center (Four Seasons Orthopaedic), and Dr. Heather Killie. He appealed a superior court order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court found plaintiff alleged he suffered severe emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms from contemporaneously perceiving the sudden, unexpected, and shocking suffering and death of his wife. Under these circumstances, Lisa’s pulmonary embolism constituted the “accident” in line with Corso, and subsequent cases. The Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the basis that Marc’s emotional distress was too attenuated from defendants’ negligent conduct to permit recovery. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion. View "Chartier v. Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Newton appealed his convictions by jury on three counts of exploitation of an elderly, disabled, or impaired adult in violation of RSA 631:9, I(a) (2016) and RSA 631:10 (2016). Defendant became trustee of the Newton Family Trust and retained power of attorney over both the victim (defendant’s mother) and her husband (defendant’s father) in 2014 as a result of their failing health. The Trust created a fiduciary duty in the trustee and specified that the assets and money held by the Trust were to be used only for the benefit of the victim and her husband until their death. The victim’s husband died on December 21, 2015. By July 2017, the New Hampshire Attorney General had launched an investigation into allegations that defendant exploited the victim for large sums of money. Defendant argued the trial court erred when, at trial, it excluded out-of-court statements made by the defendant’s parents and a financial planner. He also appealed the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering a hearing to review and reconsider the sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "New Hampshire v. Newton" on Justia Law