Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them." View "Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lynne DiGaetano, Michael John DiGaetano, Christopher D. DiGaetano, Scott M. DiGaetano, and Shauna Arsenault, appealed a superior court order that granted the motion in limine of Defendant, John M. DiGaetano, to exclude parol evidence. Defendant cross-appealed a prior order of the same court that denied his motion to strike Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal. The matter arose from the distribution of trust proceeds from the death of the parties' parents-grandparents. Paragraph eleven of this trust provided that the trust “may be revoked in its entirety or amended from time to time by an instrument in writing executed by the said Donors jointly or by a surviving Donor.” The patriarch died in 2002, and the matriarch amended the trust in 2003 to establish Defendant as the sole trustee and beneficiary. Following his mother's death in 2006, Defendant sold the trust assets and collected the proceeds. Seeking to establish his right to the proceeds, Defendant petitioned the probate court who concluded that the 2003 amended trust was enforceable, and ruled in Defendant's favor. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of whether the original trust was a contractual "common plan" and whether the matriarch breached that contract when she amended it. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal: The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' contention that the original trust was a contract, the existence of which would be evidence to reform the family trust and to impose a constructive trust in their favor. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion and remanded the case to dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal. View "DiGaetano v. DiGaetano " on Justia Law

Petitioners Todd and Trent Bemis appealed a probate court order that dismissed their petition for guardianship over the person and estate of their step-father Dr. Raymond B. More than seven months after Dr. B left an assisted-living facility in Florida, Petitioners filed their petition for guardianship when Dr. B engaged in behavior the Supreme Court "assume[d] was evidence of his legal incapacity at that time." The petition contained no allegations about the doctor’s behavior, and Petitioners had no contact with him after he left Florida. Dr. B objected to a request for a psychological evaluation, and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was "per se defective" because the guardianship statute requires that all evidence of a proposed ward's inability to care for himself "must have occurred within 6 months prior to the filing of the petition and at least one incidence of such behavior must have occurred within 20 days of the filing of the petition." After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition and denied the petitioners' motion for a psychiatric evaluation. The petitioners appealed both decisions. Finding that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the doctor’s interest in freedom from an unwanted psychological examination outweighed the petitioners' interests in procuring evidence of his alleged incapacity, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Raymond B." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed the denial of his motion for payment of legal fees, arguing that the Cheshire County Probate Court erred in finding that the imposition of a guardianship does not require the proposed ward to pay a good-faith petitioner's attorney's fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the probate court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re Guardianship of Mary Louise Eaton " on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital. View "Hayes v. So. New Hampshire Medical Ctr" on Justia Law

Defendants Robin Colburn and Ronald and Richard Tennant appealed a superior court order that denied their motion to dismiss this action by Plaintiffs Richard and Cheryl Fellows and Benjamin Bellerose. Plaintiffs were successors-in-interest to property once owned by Defendants' parents. The property was subject to a 1996 lead paint abatement order. Defendants' parents sold the property to Jesus and Eileen Guzman who were not aware of the abatement order when they sold the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought suit upon discovery of the abatement order. Defendants argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over them because despite being administrators of their parents' estate, none of the Defendants actually lived in New Hampshire. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suffiient to justify the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Defendants as either successor trustees or beneficiaries. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not plead facts sufficient for the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Fellows v. Colburn" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Estate of June M. Day (Estate) and Byron and Stephanie Day, appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to Respondent Hanover Insurance Company, arguing Hanover's consent to settle a claim by Petitioners with the insurer of a third party tortfeasor did not preclude Hanover from contesting its liability to provide the Estate underinsured motorist coverage under its insurance contract with the Estate's decedent. In 2007, June Day was fatally injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, Day's vehicle was insured under an automobile liability policy and a personal umbrella policy issued by Hanover, and both policies provided underinsured motorist coverage. Following the accident, Petitioners made a claim against the third party's insurance company's policy. Hanover agreed that Petitioners could accept the settlement offered "while reserving [Hanover's] right to continue the investigation into liability in this matter," and noting that Hanover had "neither accepted nor denied liability." Petitioners accepted payment and executed a release to the third party and her insurance company. Thereafter Petitioners took the position that, by consenting to the settlement, Hanover was precluded from contesting that Petitioners were "legally entitled to recover" damages from the third party. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rejected Petitioners' position and dismissed the action. Petitioners filed an objection arguing that the court had "misunderstood the essence of the petition." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the record supports the trial court's ruling regarding the litigation strategy the petitioners pursued below. . . . insofar as the petitioners complain that Hanover failed to exercise good faith in that it delayed investigating and processing their claim, we note that the petitioners at all times had it within their power under the terms of the policy to address this problem by demanding arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim against Hanover, or, alternatively, by filing a breach of contract action in court."

The decedent Timothy Donovan died in 2009. His will provided that his intangible personal property, such as bank accounts and stocks, be devided and bequeathed to his family. The will specifically excluded the decedentâs shares in Optimum Manufacturing Company. Two months before he died, the decedent sold all of his Optimum stock. Subsequently, the family filed suit seeking to have the proceeds from the sale of the Optimum stock passed to his family in accordance with his will. The trial court found that the decedent adeemed the stock, so it did not pass to the family as intangible property. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, finding that neither the Optimum stock nor the proceeds from the sale passed to the family.