Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellants Gary Puhr, Kristen Pfahl, Brad Schubert, and Brian Shubert appealed orders in consolidated probates of the estates of Lowell, Gust, and Anne Shubert approving a land sale by the estates' personal representative, Charlene Wikholm, and denying the appellants' petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal from the order approving the land sale was moot and that the order denying the petition to remove Wikholm was appealable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal of the order approving the land sale and affirmed the order denying the removal of Wikholm as personal representative. View "Estates of Shubert" on Justia Law

Greggory Tank appealed a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County oil, gas and mineral interests in Debbora Rolla, the personal representative of the estate of George Tank. Because the district court did not err in ruling the challenged quitclaim deeds reserved mineral interests in George Tank and reserved in him a life estate in the surface only, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rolla v. Tank" on Justia Law

Elden and Rita Linderkamp appealed a judgment that required Elden Linderkamp to pay Four Season's Healthcare Center, Inc. for nursing home care provided to his parents, invalidating a contract for deed and warranty deed conveying land from the parents to the Linderkamps, authorizing the parents' personal representative to administer the land in the probate of the parents' estates, and allowing the Linderkamps a net claim against the parents' estates. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence of a claimed oral agreement for Earl Linderkamp to compensate Elden for improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the contract for deed and warranty deed and did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence to support Elden's claim he made improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the deeds. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in declining to rule on an issue about all of the children's liability for their parents' nursing home debt under N.D.C.C. 14-09-10. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp" on Justia Law

Janet L. Brash, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Larry R. Brash, appealed judgment entered after a bench trial that dismissed her action against William M. Gulleson. We affirm. In the mid-1980s, Dr. Brash began running cows on Gulleson's ranch under an oral agreement to operate on a "60/40 share basis." Gulleson provided care and feed and received 60 percent of the calf crop from Dr. Brash's cows, and Dr. Brash provided veterinarian services. In the fall of 1997, Dr. Brash supervised an inventory and evaluation of cows on the Gulleson ranch, which included cows owned by Gulleson, Dr. Brash, and two or three others who had agreements with Gulleson. At that time, Dr. Brash had 108 cows on the Gulleson ranch. In 2000, Dr. Brash and Gulleson executed a written Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Brashes agreed to furnish 130 cows presently situated on the Gulleson farm to be cared for by Gulleson, and Gulleson would in return give the Brashes 40 percent of the calf crop each year. After Dr. Brash's death in 2004, Janet Brash testified she became the sole owner of all 130 cows and their offspring; however, when she demanded the return of the estate's and her portion of the herd, Gulleson returned only seven cows. In 2005, Janet Brash brought this action against Gulleson, alleging Gulleson failed to comply with the Agreement executed in 2000. After trial, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, holding in part that Dr. Brash had failed to provide 130 cows as required under the contract, which constituted a failure of consideration, and that Janet Brash had failed to prove a breach of the agreement by Gulleson. The court dismissed Brash's claims with prejudice. Judgment was entered in June 2012. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding there was a failure of consideration in the performance of the Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement between the Brashes and Gulleson. View "Brash v. Gulleson" on Justia Law

Thain Cashmore, individually, as personal representative of the estate of Robert Cashmore, and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, and Bourck Cashmore, individually and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, appealed an order that held the personal representative in contempt of court and an order denying the personal representative's N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the contempt order. In 2009, the personal representative moved to approve an "amended" final report and account and proposed distribution which differed significantly from the judgment approving the original final report entered the previous month. The amended final report purported to show estate assets had brought in less money than anticipated in the original final report. The amended final report also requested $2,502.13 in additional personal representative fees, $9,965.20 in additional attorney fees, and $8,000 in additional fees to close the estate. As a result, the amended final report showed the estate with a zero balance instead of the $72,598.56 listed in the original final report, and the estate therefore claimed it would be unable to pay Trudy Cashmore the $6,377.83 approved in the original final report. Undeterred by the Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court's final judgment ordering Trudy Cashmore be paid $6,377.83 within ten days, the personal representative did not pay her. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the personal representative in contempt or in denying the motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Cashmore" on Justia Law

Nancy Finkle appealed an order and judgment quieting title to 1/2 of the mineral interests in certain real property in Mountrail County in Leslie D. Johnson, Carol Johnson, Merlyn H. Johnson, Thea Donna D. Johnson, Delores Albertson and their children. Finkle claimed she owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court held Finkle did not have an interest in the minerals. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Finkle" on Justia Law

Southeastern Shelter Corporation appealed a district court order that held daily monetary sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated upon her death. The trial court held that only the $5,000 awarded for attorney's fees in its June 2006 order was to compensate Southeastern and survived Herzig's death and that none of the daily sanctions imposed in its July 2006 order were to compensate Southeastern and therefore did not survive Herzig's death. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court answered the specific question the Court remanded, it affirmed the order in the underlying cases and directed the 2008 case be remanded for entry of judgment. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

Neil Bartelson appeals from a district court order denying his petition to remove Guardian and Protective Services ("GAPS") as the personal representative of the Estate of Ralph Bartelson, an order denying his motion to vacate the order denying his petition and an order awarding attorney's fees. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Bartelson and Diane Fischer. In 2008, the district court approved a settlement agreement appointing Valer as guardian and GAPS as conservator. Ralph Bartelson died August 23, 2008, and GAPS was appointed the personal representative of the estate. Bartelson and Fischer alleged Valer and Haught misappropriated Ralph Bartelson's funds. GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. The district court ordered it did not have jurisdiction over claims of misappropriation occurring before the court's 2008 appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. Bartelson and Fischer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings and for the court to determine whether Bartelson and Fischer had standing to assert their misappropriation claims when they did not allege that GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by not filing a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. On remand, Bartelson filed a petition to be appointed as the successor personal representative. The district court ruled neither Bartelson nor Fischer's estate had standing to assert their misappropriation claims. The court denied a motion to reconsider. Bartelson then petitioned to remove GAPS as personal representative of Ralph Bartelson's estate, arguing GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue collection of assets belonging to the estate and failing to bring an action against Valer and Haught for misappropriation, but did not hold a hearing on that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Bartelson's petition for removal of GAPS as the personal representative without conducting a hearing. The case was remanded for a hearing on the petition. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

William and Patricia Clairmont appealed a judgment interpreting two trusts they created for the benefit of their grandson, Matthew Larson, and dismissing the Clairmonts' petition to reform the trusts. The Clairmonts argued the district court erred in denying their petition to reform the trusts because there was clear and convincing evidence of a mistake of law that affected their intent and the terms of the trusts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court misapplied the law construing trusts involving a mistake of law and the correct application of the law to the court's findings required reformation of the trusts. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for reformation of the trusts. View "In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of April 11, 2008, Jeremy Rustad and Heidi Hanna were killed in a plane crash in McLean County. Rustad was piloting his Cessna aircraft and Hanna was a passenger when the plane crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable causes of the accident were due to pilot error and pilot impairment due to alcohol. The estate published a notice to creditors of Rustad for three successive weeks beginning May 22, 2008, informing them they had three months to file claims. On September 24, 2008, Olson, as "co-personal representative of the estate of Heidi Hanna, deceased, caretaker of [B.H.], a minor, and temporary guardian of [B.H.], a minor," filed a claim against the estate asserting the estate was indebted to Hanna's estate and to Hanna's children. The estate "disallowed" Olson's claim. In early 2009, Olson filed this wrongful death and survival action against the estate. The estate moved for summary judgment dismissing the action. The estate argued Olson's claims were barred because she did not serve the personal representative in that capacity and the failure to present her claims in the probate action made them res judicata. The estate also argued Olson could not show Hanna was injured before Rustad died, and therefore, both the wrongful death and survivor claims were barred under the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court rejected the estate's arguments that service of process was insufficient and that the action was barred by res judicata. The court concluded Olson presented no evidence to show Hanna died before Rustad, and dismissed the wrongful death and survival actions because they were barred by the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court further noted Rustad had an aircraft insurance policy and the nonclaim provisions did not prevent Olson from recovering to the extent of insurance coverage available for the accident. The court ruled the language in the insurance policy unambiguously limited coverage under the circumstances to $103,000, and a judgment was entered in favor of Olson for $103,000. The Estate appealed; the Supreme Court, after review of the trial court record, affirmed. View "Olson v. Estate of Rustad" on Justia Law