Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-Appellant William McNamara appealed a district court order distributing the undistributed assets of the estate of Edith Harms. The district court determined Edith Harms' will required the undistributed assets be distributed to the estate of Arne Harms. William McNamara argued the district court erred by considering the terms of the will because a prior agreement controlled. Alternatively, Petitioner argued the district court's interpretation of Edith Harms' will was erroneous, contending that will directed the undistributed assets be distributed to the Edith Harms testamentary trust. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly determined the prior agreement did not control but erred in its interpretation of Edith Harms' will. The Court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Harms" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Sherry Jensen (formerly known as Sherry Nesemeier), appealed a district court order that denied her motion to construe the phrase "personal property" in her father Eugene Camas's will to include tangible and intangible property located in his residence, and that denied her motion for formal probate with supervised administration. Petitioner moved for formal probate with supervised administration, alleging it was necessary to protect her interests because her brother Kevin Camas intended to distribute only nominal items of tangible personal property to her. Petitioner also moved for an order construing the phrase "personal property" in the bequest to her to include tangible and intangible property located in her father's home. The district court found the language of Eugene Camas's will unambiguously limited "personal property" to tangible personal property physically located within the residence. The district court determined the will's residuary clause demonstrated Eugene Camas's intent to bequeath all other types of property to Kevin Camas. The court also found formal or supervised administration of the estate was unnecessary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the district court's holding and affirmed denial of both of Petitioner's motions. View "Estate of Camas" on Justia Law

Lee Paulson's mother and siblings appealed a district court's orders that interpreted his will in favor of his fiancee, Robyn Risovi, denied a motion for reconsideration, and order distribution of his estate. Lee Paulson and Risovi were engaged to be married, with a wedding set for July 18, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Lee Paulson and Risovi executed an antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement contained several terms: an agreement by Lee Paulson to name Risovi as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, an agreement by Lee Paulson that his will would transfer specific real property to Risovi, and an agreement by Lee Paulson to establish a testamentary trust for the benefit of Risovi's daughter. On the same date, Lee Paulson executed a will. The will established the trust for Risovi's daughter, devised real property to "my wife, Robyn," bequeathed all of his tangible personal property to "my spouse, Robyn," if she survived him, and devised his residuary estate to "my spouse, if my spouse survives me[.]" Article Six of the will outlined the definitions governing the will, and provided, "My spouse's name is Robyn Risovi and all references in this Will to 'my spouse' are to her only." A footnote followed this statement: "This Will has been prepared in anticipation of the upcoming marriage of . . . Lee Paulson and Robyn Risovi set for July 18, 2009." Lee Paulson died on July 15, 2009. The district court declined to read the antenuptial agreement together with the will to determine Lee Paulson's testamentary intent, as encouraged by the Paulson family, because the antenuptial agreement was not incorporated into the will by reference. The Paulson family appealed, and the appeal was remanded to determine if the estate was supervised. After further review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's interpretation of the will in favor or Risovi. View "Estate of Paulson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Philip Sprague appealed an order that denied his petition for formal probate of a will allegedly executed by Harriet O. Clemetson. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly applied the law by presuming that a missing will is revoked, and because the lower court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, it affirmed the order. View "Estate of Clemetson" on Justia Law

Respondents-Appellants Brian Wicklund and Deborah Williams, the surviving children of Maurice Wicklund, appealed an order that granted a petition by Maurice Wicklund's surviving spouse, Petitioner-Appellee Betty Wicklund, for an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from Maurice Wicklund's estate. The surviving children claimed their father intended to transfer North Dakota mineral interests to them under a will and Trust agreement, and they argued the district court erred in failing to address issues relating to their father's intent and erred in granting the surviving spouse an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from his estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's decision effectuated Maurice Wicklund's intent from the plain language of his will and the Trust, but the court's findings were inadequate to explain the bases for granting Betty Wicklund an elective share, administration costs, and personal representative fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate of Audrey Hollingsworth, appeals from a district court judgment determining the distribution of insurance proceeds. Jerry Hollingsworth, Petitioner's brother had lived in a house he shared with their mother Audrey and continued to live there after her death. The house was insured under a farm and ranch policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak) which listed Jerry Hollingsworth as the primary insured, with Audrey Hollingsworth listed as an additional insured. After Audrey Hollingsworth's death, the Estate was listed as the additional insured. The house was destroyed by fire in 2006. Nodak issued several checks made payable to Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate for the loss. Disputes arose over the various heirs' rights in the insurance proceeds, and Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate, began proceedings in the informal probate requesting that the district court order a division of the insurance proceeds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment directing division of various components of the insurance proceeds between Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate. The court concluded that the portion of the insurance proceeds paid for loss of the dwelling should be divided on the basis of the relative percentage value of Jerry Hollingsworth's life estate and the Estate's remainder interest, as calculated by actuarial tables. Finding that there was an "unsupervised probate" of the case, it could not be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification. Because the district court's judgment resolved some but not all of the disputed between the parties in this case, the disbursement of the insurance proceeds was not a final, appealable judgment. The Supreme Court determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case further, and dismissed the appeal. View "Estate of Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

Neil Bartelson and Diane Fischer appealed a district court order that concluded the court did not have jurisdiction to decide whether funds expended prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator were misappropriated. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Neil Bartelson, and Diane Fischer. While living with Valer, Ralph Bartelson established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Neil Bartelson and Fischer alleged that Valer and Haught made inappropriate withdrawals from Ralph Bartelson's account, and Neil Bartelson petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. In 2008, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the court. Under the agreement, Valer was appointed guardian of Ralph Bartelson, and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. (GAPS) was appointed conservator. Ralph Bartelson died one month later, and his will was admitted to informal probate. Valer and Haught were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of Ralph Bartelson's estate, but Neil Bartelson and Fischer later requested the appointment of an alternative representative. The parties entered into a stipulation, agreeing that GAPS would be substituted as the personal representative of the estate and petitioning the court for formal probate. The court then filed an order consistent with the parties' stipulation. GAPS then retained a CPA with forensic accounting experience, to review transfers of Ralph Bartelson's assets to his family members. While the CPA was able to provide a summary of funds expended from Ralph Bartelson's estate and a list of amounts received by various family members, the CPA was unable to determine the reason the family members received these amounts. After the review, GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claim. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondents-Appellants Mary Reichert, Jo Anne Dalhoff, and James Gassmann appealed a district court judgment that reformed the terms of their parents' revocable living trusts and determined that John T. Gassmann was to receive farmland held in a limited liability limited partnership in addition to his one-fourth interest in the residue of his parents' trusts. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in reforming the terms of the parents' trusts and in determining John T. Gassmann received the farmland held in the partnership. The Court found that Respondents challenged the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, to which the Supreme Court held that, “even when reviewing findings made under a clear and convincing evidence standard, determination of the credibility of witnesses is a function of the trial court.”

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order.

Rose Morgan appealed a district court's judgment that denied the probate of Maxine Vestre's will after a jury found Maxine Vestre lacked testamentary capacity to make a will and that the will was the product of undue influence. Maxine Vestre died in December, 2008. In 2009, Mr. Vestre filed an objection to probate of the will and to the appointment of Ms. Morgan as the personal representative, alleging that the will was invalid. Ms. Morgan argued the district court erred by refusing to grant her a directed verdict on the testamentary capacity issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict and for the trial court to deny Ms. Morgan's motion for a directed verdict. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment.