Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Randall Dionne, Cynthia Larson, and James Goodness appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will, and denying a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the dismissal of James Goodness's petition to void the deed of property to Respondent-Appellee (and personal representative of the estate) Norman Dionne. At the time of her death, Ardis Dionne owned a 1/4 interest in some land in Mountrail County. Norman Dionne was appointed the personal representative, and instituted an intestate probate proceeding. The will left all of Ardis Dionne's property, including the real estate, to her husband James Goodness. Norman Dionne and Cynthia Larson met with Goodness in to persuade him to transfer or sell the real estate to them. Goodness told them he did not want the real estate, and signed a deed that purported to transfer the estate's interest in the property to Norman Dionne for one dollar, and that "[a]fter paying administration expenses and creditor's claims, if any, all of the remaining assets of the estate (including the proceeds from the sale of the land) shall be distributed to James Goodness." But "James Goodness" was crossed but and "Norman for maintenance, 4/25/02" was handwritten in. Goodness and all of Ardis Dionne's children signed the deed. Subsequently, Norman Dionne, as personal representative of the estate, issued a deed to himself in his individual capacity. In 2008, Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson filed a petition to void the deed Norman Dionne had issued to himself and to transfer the land back into the estate for distribution. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson claimed the parties did not intend all of the land to go to Norman Dionne when James Goodness signed the deed giving up his interest in the land. They claimed the land was supposed to be kept by the estate until Ardis Dionne's mother died, and then be distributed to all six children equally. The district court dismissed the petition on summary judgment, ruling the deed unambiguously transferred the property to Norman Dionne. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial, ruling the deed was ambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate. A bench trial was later held to determine the intent of the parties that signed the deed. The district court found the intent of the parties was that the entire property would go to Norman Dionne. A new petition was then filed seeking formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will. Finding the issue res judicata, the Supreme Court held that "[a]dmitting the will to probate [would have been] an exercise in futility. . . Here, if the will [was] valid, James Goodness [was] the sole beneficiary, and signed a valid distribution agreement transferring his whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. If the [was] not valid, the property [would pass] by intestacy equally to all of Ardis Dionne's children, who also signed a valid distribution agreement transferring their whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. There is no reason to admit the will to probate. The district court properly granted Norman Dionne's Rule 12(b)(vi) motion and dismissed the petition." View "Estate of Dionne" on Justia Law

The Dorothy J. Pierce Family Mineral Trust appealed a judgment that dismissed the Trust's claim against Richard and Brenda Jorgenson for reformation of two warranty deeds. Because the parties' claims to quiet title in the disputed mineral acres were not fully adjudicated and no N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification appeared in the record, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as premature. View "Dorothy J. Pierce Family Mineral Trust v. Jorgenson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Donna Kraft, the personal representative for the estate of Emma Boehm, appeals a trial court's order recognizing Interested Party-Appellee Alicia Rae Ramos as a devisee under the estate of Emma Boehm. Alicia Rae Ramos was born to Kelly McCormick and William Boehm on August 15, 1979. McCormick and William Boehm lived together with Ramos for approximately one year. They did not marry, and their relationship eventually deteriorated to the point where it ended. In July 1983, McCormick married Bernard Schumacher. In November 1983, Schumacher adopted Ramos, and William Boehm's parental rights were terminated. After the termination of his parental rights, William Boehm ceased seeing or spending time with Ramos. When Ramos was fifteen, she and William Boehm were reintroduced and, through shared meals and time spent on his family's farm, became reacquainted with one another. When Ramos graduated from high school, William Boehm attended the ceremony. In February 1995, Emma Boehm, William Boehm's mother, executed a Last Will and Testament. In her will, Emma Boehm divided the residuary of her estate into seven shares, one for each of her six living children and one for the children of a deceased son. Emma Boehm died in 2010 but was predeceased by William Boehm who died in 2000. Following Emma Boehm's death, her Last Will and Testament was admitted to informal probate, and Ramos moved for determination of her status with respect to Emma Boehm's will. The trial court found William Boehm functioned as a parent to Ramos. Kraft argued the trial court erred as a matter of law by relying on laws governing intestate succession to interpret Emma Boehm's will. More specifically, Kraft argued the court erred when it concluded Ramos was included in "issue" under Emma Boehm's will and held Ramos was a devisee entitled to take from Emma Boehm's estate. Ramos argued the trial court correctly construed Emma Boehm's will. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Ramos was a proper devisee under Emma Boehm's will and affirmed the trial court's May 17, 2011, order and its February 17, 2012, opinion on the motion to reconsider in which it concluded William Boehm functioned as a parent to Ramos. View "Estate of Boehm" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final. View "Pifer v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant William McNamara appealed a district court order distributing the undistributed assets of the estate of Edith Harms. The district court determined Edith Harms' will required the undistributed assets be distributed to the estate of Arne Harms. William McNamara argued the district court erred by considering the terms of the will because a prior agreement controlled. Alternatively, Petitioner argued the district court's interpretation of Edith Harms' will was erroneous, contending that will directed the undistributed assets be distributed to the Edith Harms testamentary trust. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly determined the prior agreement did not control but erred in its interpretation of Edith Harms' will. The Court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Harms" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Sherry Jensen (formerly known as Sherry Nesemeier), appealed a district court order that denied her motion to construe the phrase "personal property" in her father Eugene Camas's will to include tangible and intangible property located in his residence, and that denied her motion for formal probate with supervised administration. Petitioner moved for formal probate with supervised administration, alleging it was necessary to protect her interests because her brother Kevin Camas intended to distribute only nominal items of tangible personal property to her. Petitioner also moved for an order construing the phrase "personal property" in the bequest to her to include tangible and intangible property located in her father's home. The district court found the language of Eugene Camas's will unambiguously limited "personal property" to tangible personal property physically located within the residence. The district court determined the will's residuary clause demonstrated Eugene Camas's intent to bequeath all other types of property to Kevin Camas. The court also found formal or supervised administration of the estate was unnecessary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the district court's holding and affirmed denial of both of Petitioner's motions. View "Estate of Camas" on Justia Law

Lee Paulson's mother and siblings appealed a district court's orders that interpreted his will in favor of his fiancee, Robyn Risovi, denied a motion for reconsideration, and order distribution of his estate. Lee Paulson and Risovi were engaged to be married, with a wedding set for July 18, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Lee Paulson and Risovi executed an antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement contained several terms: an agreement by Lee Paulson to name Risovi as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, an agreement by Lee Paulson that his will would transfer specific real property to Risovi, and an agreement by Lee Paulson to establish a testamentary trust for the benefit of Risovi's daughter. On the same date, Lee Paulson executed a will. The will established the trust for Risovi's daughter, devised real property to "my wife, Robyn," bequeathed all of his tangible personal property to "my spouse, Robyn," if she survived him, and devised his residuary estate to "my spouse, if my spouse survives me[.]" Article Six of the will outlined the definitions governing the will, and provided, "My spouse's name is Robyn Risovi and all references in this Will to 'my spouse' are to her only." A footnote followed this statement: "This Will has been prepared in anticipation of the upcoming marriage of . . . Lee Paulson and Robyn Risovi set for July 18, 2009." Lee Paulson died on July 15, 2009. The district court declined to read the antenuptial agreement together with the will to determine Lee Paulson's testamentary intent, as encouraged by the Paulson family, because the antenuptial agreement was not incorporated into the will by reference. The Paulson family appealed, and the appeal was remanded to determine if the estate was supervised. After further review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's interpretation of the will in favor or Risovi. View "Estate of Paulson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Philip Sprague appealed an order that denied his petition for formal probate of a will allegedly executed by Harriet O. Clemetson. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly applied the law by presuming that a missing will is revoked, and because the lower court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, it affirmed the order. View "Estate of Clemetson" on Justia Law

Respondents-Appellants Brian Wicklund and Deborah Williams, the surviving children of Maurice Wicklund, appealed an order that granted a petition by Maurice Wicklund's surviving spouse, Petitioner-Appellee Betty Wicklund, for an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from Maurice Wicklund's estate. The surviving children claimed their father intended to transfer North Dakota mineral interests to them under a will and Trust agreement, and they argued the district court erred in failing to address issues relating to their father's intent and erred in granting the surviving spouse an elective share, a homestead allowance, an exempt property allowance, a family allowance, personal representative fees, and administration costs from his estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's decision effectuated Maurice Wicklund's intent from the plain language of his will and the Trust, but the court's findings were inadequate to explain the bases for granting Betty Wicklund an elective share, administration costs, and personal representative fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate of Audrey Hollingsworth, appeals from a district court judgment determining the distribution of insurance proceeds. Jerry Hollingsworth, Petitioner's brother had lived in a house he shared with their mother Audrey and continued to live there after her death. The house was insured under a farm and ranch policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak) which listed Jerry Hollingsworth as the primary insured, with Audrey Hollingsworth listed as an additional insured. After Audrey Hollingsworth's death, the Estate was listed as the additional insured. The house was destroyed by fire in 2006. Nodak issued several checks made payable to Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate for the loss. Disputes arose over the various heirs' rights in the insurance proceeds, and Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate, began proceedings in the informal probate requesting that the district court order a division of the insurance proceeds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment directing division of various components of the insurance proceeds between Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate. The court concluded that the portion of the insurance proceeds paid for loss of the dwelling should be divided on the basis of the relative percentage value of Jerry Hollingsworth's life estate and the Estate's remainder interest, as calculated by actuarial tables. Finding that there was an "unsupervised probate" of the case, it could not be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification. Because the district court's judgment resolved some but not all of the disputed between the parties in this case, the disbursement of the insurance proceeds was not a final, appealable judgment. The Supreme Court determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case further, and dismissed the appeal. View "Estate of Hollingsworth" on Justia Law