Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Neil Bartelson and Diane Fischer appealed a district court order that concluded the court did not have jurisdiction to decide whether funds expended prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator were misappropriated. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Neil Bartelson, and Diane Fischer. While living with Valer, Ralph Bartelson established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Neil Bartelson and Fischer alleged that Valer and Haught made inappropriate withdrawals from Ralph Bartelson's account, and Neil Bartelson petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. In 2008, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the court. Under the agreement, Valer was appointed guardian of Ralph Bartelson, and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. (GAPS) was appointed conservator. Ralph Bartelson died one month later, and his will was admitted to informal probate. Valer and Haught were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of Ralph Bartelson's estate, but Neil Bartelson and Fischer later requested the appointment of an alternative representative. The parties entered into a stipulation, agreeing that GAPS would be substituted as the personal representative of the estate and petitioning the court for formal probate. The court then filed an order consistent with the parties' stipulation. GAPS then retained a CPA with forensic accounting experience, to review transfers of Ralph Bartelson's assets to his family members. While the CPA was able to provide a summary of funds expended from Ralph Bartelson's estate and a list of amounts received by various family members, the CPA was unable to determine the reason the family members received these amounts. After the review, GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claim. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondents-Appellants Mary Reichert, Jo Anne Dalhoff, and James Gassmann appealed a district court judgment that reformed the terms of their parents' revocable living trusts and determined that John T. Gassmann was to receive farmland held in a limited liability limited partnership in addition to his one-fourth interest in the residue of his parents' trusts. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in reforming the terms of the parents' trusts and in determining John T. Gassmann received the farmland held in the partnership. The Court found that Respondents challenged the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, to which the Supreme Court held that, “even when reviewing findings made under a clear and convincing evidence standard, determination of the credibility of witnesses is a function of the trial court.”

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order.

Rose Morgan appealed a district court's judgment that denied the probate of Maxine Vestre's will after a jury found Maxine Vestre lacked testamentary capacity to make a will and that the will was the product of undue influence. Maxine Vestre died in December, 2008. In 2009, Mr. Vestre filed an objection to probate of the will and to the appointment of Ms. Morgan as the personal representative, alleging that the will was invalid. Ms. Morgan argued the district court erred by refusing to grant her a directed verdict on the testamentary capacity issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's verdict and for the trial court to deny Ms. Morgan's motion for a directed verdict. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment.

Stephen and Jane Silbernagel appealed a judgment entered upon a motion by John M. and Tom Silbernagel to enforce a prior stipulated judgment in consolidated cases involving the estates of John P. Silbernagel and Marcella Silbernagel. Stephen, Tom, and John M. Silbernagel are sons of John P. Silbernagel, who died in 2003, and grandchildren of Marcella Silbernagel, who died in 1983, whose estate was not probated or settled. A family dispute arose regarding interests in land in Kidder and Logan counties, which had been owned by Marcella Silbernagel and initially farmed by John P. Silbernagel. Stephen Silbernagel subsequently farmed the land and was named in John P. Silbernagel's will as the beneficiary of his father's interest in the land. In three consolidated cases beginning in 2002 and involving a guardianship and conservatorship for John P. Silbernagel, the probate of his estate, and an action to set aside a conveyance of land by John P. Silbernagel to Stephen Silbernagel, John M. and Tom Silbernagel sued Stephen Silbernagel and his wife, Jane. During October 2004 jury selection in those consolidated cases, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was incorporated into an April 29, 2005 judgment and a March 31, 2008 amended judgment. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Stephen and Jane Silbernagel contended the settlement agreement and judgment contemplated they would acquire clear title to all of Marcella Silbernagel's land, that her land would be the only collateral to be pledged as security for a $150,000 loan to pay John M. and Tom Silbernagel, and that because another relative asserted an interest in the land, the purpose of the settlement agreement and judgment was frustrated. Stephen and Jane Silbernagel also argued the district court erred in deciding John M. and Tom Silbernagel had tendered full performance under the settlement agreement and judgment, and they sought to vacate the April 2005 judgment and remand for trial on the merits. Upon careful consideration of the record of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in construing the prior stipulated judgment, and affirmed its decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant David Locken appealed a grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to determine who owned a tract of land in Dickey County. In 1973, Mr. Locken purchased the tract. He put money down and promised to make yearly payments until the balance due was satisfied. The final payment listed on the contract for deed was scheduled for March, 1998. In 1974, Mr. Locken assigned his interest in the contract for the deed to his parents. Through a series of conveyances in the 1980s, the tract was gifted to all of Mr. Lockenâs siblings by quitclaim deed, excluding Mr. Locken. The siblingsâ interests would reconvey to a family trust by quitclaim deed in 2002. Mr. Lockenâs mother died in 2001, and his father died in 2006. Both parents devised âall right, title and interestâ in land they owned to Mr. Locken. The family trust sold its real estate holdings to a third party, who reconveyed the land to his own trust. Mr. Locken brought suit to reclaim his interest in the tract, and named everyone in the chain of these conveyances as defendants. The district court dismissed Mr. Lockenâs action, holding that his claim was time barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Mr. Lockenâs interest in the land ended with the final payment in March, 1998. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Lockenâs claim as time barred by the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.