Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Darwin Glasoe was the record title holder to a home in Williston when he died in 2003. His widow was appointed the personal representative of the estate, but she died shortly thereafter. No action was taken to further estate administration until a successor personal representative was appointed in December 2013. LeAnne Glasoe and Kris Glasoe were Darwin Glasoe's surviving children, and LeAnne Glasoe lived in the home during all pertinent times. The Williams County Auditor continued to mail its annual tax statements to the record title holder, Darwin Glasoe, after his death. Although real estate taxes were paid on the property through 2009, no taxes were paid on the property from 2010 through 2013. The County placed a tax lien on the property for delinquent taxes in May 2013. A tax deed issued to the County dated October 2, 2013, was filed on October 7, 2013. The County sold the property at public auction to Bradley and Brenda Parker a month later. On November 21, 2013, LeAnne Glasoe attempted to repurchase the property, but the County would not allow her to do so. The County issued the Parkers a deed to the property, which was filed on December 4, 2013. The Estate of Darwin Glasoe, LeAnne Glasoe, and Kris Glasoe appealed a judgment dismissing their action to recover and quiet title to property. Because the Glasoes failed to establish any jurisdictional defects in the tax lien foreclosure proceedings and LeAnne Glasoe's attempt to repurchase the property was too late, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Glasoe v. Williams County" on Justia Law

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

The last will and testament of Donald Amundson provided for his entire estate to be distributed to the Donald G. Amundson Trust. The Trust owned farmland jointly with the Kenneth Amundson Trust, which was set up by Donald Amundson's brother. Donald Amundson's Trust declaration directed the Trust assets were to be distributed upon his death to four charities, with the remainder distributed to ten nieces and nephews. Debra Magers and Gladys Gleason were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of the Estate. Magers, Gleason, and Todd Graveline were appointed as co-trustees of the Trust. John Widdel, Jr. represented all parties in relation to the administration of the estate. Magers eventually became sole personal representative and trustee of the Trust and Estate. In August 2013, the beneficiaries of the Estate petitioned for court determination of reasonableness of fees and for settlement and distribution of estate. The petition objected to the fees charged by Magers and Widdel for their services to the Estate and Trust. In September 2014, the district court found Magers had breached her fiduciary duty in several ways, which included paying Widdel large fees without question. The court also found administration of the Estate and Trust was not complicated and Widdel's fees were unreasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. The court ordered Widdel to return attorney's fees in the amount of $95,000. Widdel appealed the district court judgment ordering him to repay $95,000 of the attorney's fees he charged in the administration of the Estate. He argued the district court abused its discretion in finding the attorney's fees were unreasonable, and that the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of substituting his professional corporation as the named party on the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees charged by Widdel were unreasonable and in finding Widdel could properly be held personally liable on the judgment. View "Estate of Amundson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, P.M., the son of V.A.M., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for his father. V.A.M. was 81 years old at the time of the petition; he had seven children. A guardian ad litem recommended the district court appoint a third-party limited corporate guardian and a third-party limited corporate conservator. In May 2013, V.A.M. and some of his children, including D.N., P.M., K.J., and T.M., reached an agreement and stipulated a limited guardianship and limited conservatorship were necessary. The stipulation specified V.A.M.'s rights and the guardian and conservator's duties. The court appointed Guardian, Fiduciary & Advocacy Services as the limited guardian and First International Bank & Trust of Fargo ("Bank") as the limited conservator. T.M. and K.J. responded to the Bank's petition to sell V.A.M.’s farmstead. T.M. stated that he was not opposed to leasing the farmstead, but he was in favor of purchasing the property. T.M. and K.J. opposed the request to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims and claimed V.A.M. had no desire to pursue any legal claims and should not have to pay for pursuing any claims. D.N. responded to the petition, requesting V.A.M. be able to retain his farmstead and the court grant the petition to allow the Bank to assign V.A.M.'s possible legal claims to his children. V.A.M. also responded to the petition. He stated that he was in favor of selling the farmstead to T.M. He also stated that he did not have any claims against T.M., that he was opposed to the Bank assigning any of his claims to his children, and that he was opposed to the Bank providing his financial information and tax returns to his children. After a hearing, the district court approved the sale of the real property and the assignment of claims. The court authorized the Bank to sell the farmstead to T.M. The court also authorized the Bank to assign to V.A.M.'s children, in equal shares, any and all possible claims V.A.M. held for undue influence, lack of capacity, or breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered the Bank was not authorized to disclose any of V.A.M.'s financial information or tax returns to V.A.M.'s children. T.M. and K.J. appealed the order authorizing V.A.M.'s conservator to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims, arguing that the district court erred in creating a "sub-conservator" to investigate and decide whether to pursue V.A.M.'s legal claims. D.N. argued the court assigned V.A.M.'s legal claims to his children and did not create a "sub-conservator." The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the district court's order, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of V.A.M." on Justia Law

James Huston appealed an order denying his petition to remove Wilma Russell as personal representative of Virgil Huston's estate and from an order denying Russell's petition to determine Virgil Huston's heirs. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court did not misapply the law and provided a reasoned explanation for its determination not to remove Russell as personal representative of the estate. The court's decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable or unreasonable, and the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James Huston's petition to remove Russell as personal representative. View "Estate of Huston" on Justia Law

Margaret Oakland appealed a district court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Bonnie Bowman, and Evan and Dayna Del Val. Oakland argued on appeal that her claim was not time-barred and equitable tolling should have applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in determining that Oakland's claim was brought after the statute of limitations expired and that equitable tolling did not apply. View "Oakland v. Bowman" on Justia Law

Appellants Gary Puhr, Kristen Pfahl, Brad Schubert, and Brian Shubert appealed orders in consolidated probates of the estates of Lowell, Gust, and Anne Shubert approving a land sale by the estates' personal representative, Charlene Wikholm, and denying the appellants' petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal from the order approving the land sale was moot and that the order denying the petition to remove Wikholm was appealable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal of the order approving the land sale and affirmed the order denying the removal of Wikholm as personal representative. View "Estates of Shubert" on Justia Law

Greggory Tank appealed a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County oil, gas and mineral interests in Debbora Rolla, the personal representative of the estate of George Tank. Because the district court did not err in ruling the challenged quitclaim deeds reserved mineral interests in George Tank and reserved in him a life estate in the surface only, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rolla v. Tank" on Justia Law

Elden and Rita Linderkamp appealed a judgment that required Elden Linderkamp to pay Four Season's Healthcare Center, Inc. for nursing home care provided to his parents, invalidating a contract for deed and warranty deed conveying land from the parents to the Linderkamps, authorizing the parents' personal representative to administer the land in the probate of the parents' estates, and allowing the Linderkamps a net claim against the parents' estates. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence of a claimed oral agreement for Earl Linderkamp to compensate Elden for improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the contract for deed and warranty deed and did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence to support Elden's claim he made improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the deeds. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in declining to rule on an issue about all of the children's liability for their parents' nursing home debt under N.D.C.C. 14-09-10. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp" on Justia Law

Janet L. Brash, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Larry R. Brash, appealed judgment entered after a bench trial that dismissed her action against William M. Gulleson. We affirm. In the mid-1980s, Dr. Brash began running cows on Gulleson's ranch under an oral agreement to operate on a "60/40 share basis." Gulleson provided care and feed and received 60 percent of the calf crop from Dr. Brash's cows, and Dr. Brash provided veterinarian services. In the fall of 1997, Dr. Brash supervised an inventory and evaluation of cows on the Gulleson ranch, which included cows owned by Gulleson, Dr. Brash, and two or three others who had agreements with Gulleson. At that time, Dr. Brash had 108 cows on the Gulleson ranch. In 2000, Dr. Brash and Gulleson executed a written Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Brashes agreed to furnish 130 cows presently situated on the Gulleson farm to be cared for by Gulleson, and Gulleson would in return give the Brashes 40 percent of the calf crop each year. After Dr. Brash's death in 2004, Janet Brash testified she became the sole owner of all 130 cows and their offspring; however, when she demanded the return of the estate's and her portion of the herd, Gulleson returned only seven cows. In 2005, Janet Brash brought this action against Gulleson, alleging Gulleson failed to comply with the Agreement executed in 2000. After trial, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, holding in part that Dr. Brash had failed to provide 130 cows as required under the contract, which constituted a failure of consideration, and that Janet Brash had failed to prove a breach of the agreement by Gulleson. The court dismissed Brash's claims with prejudice. Judgment was entered in June 2012. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding there was a failure of consideration in the performance of the Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement between the Brashes and Gulleson. View "Brash v. Gulleson" on Justia Law