Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Appellant Estate of Aram Dermanouelian (the Estate) appealed a superior court judgment which granted a "Motion for Summary Reversal" filed by Appellee Co-Executor Jo-Ann Dermanouelian. The effect of the Superior Court’s ruling was to reverse a Probate Court order. The Probate Court’s order that was reversed had granted a "Motion to Strike" filed by the Estate; the target of that motion to strike was the entry of appearance of an attorney whom Ms. Dermanouelian had engaged to represent her in her capacity as a co-executor of the Estate. On appeal, the Estate contended that the Superior Court erred in granting Ms. Dermanouelian’s motion for summary reversal: a co-executor may act neither unilaterally nor individually in hiring legal counsel to assist the co-executor in his or her official capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that a co-executor may individually engage counsel at any time to represent him or her in his or her capacity as a co-executor—at least when the attorney is engaged at the co-executor’s expense. "We recognize that complications will often arise when one or more co-executors personally select(s) an attorney to represent him or her in that capacity. . . . Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, in view of a co-executor’s role as a fiduciary (with all of the attendant responsibility and potential liability that that role entails) and bearing in mind the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship, it is "essential that he [or she] have the selection of the attorney who is to assist him [or her] in the performance of duties imposed on him [or her] by law." View "In re Estate of Aram Dermanouelian" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence. The civil suit and eventual trial took place in the wake of the death of Peter Almonte, who in 2000, killed himself approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room after an "severe psychological episode." Hospital personnel "decided" to honor Mr. Almonte's demand to be discharged, which plaintiffs alleged was a breach of the doctors' and hospital's duty arising from a patient/physician relationship. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Dr. Rita Kurl, M.D. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court rejected the jury's findings as to the absence of negligence, but granted defendants motion because the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Finding no basis upon which it could grant plaintiffs the relief they sought, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Almonte v. Kurl" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the decedent Robert Daniel George, who was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist in 2006, qualified as an insured under an insurance policy provided by Harleysville Worcester Insurance Company, which policy was procured by The Cormack-Routhier Agency, Inc. Plaintiffs Pamela A. Riel and Glenn N. George, as co-administrators of the decedent’s estate, and Pamela A. Riel, on behalf of her and the decedent’s minor daughter, Kara George, brought a complaint against Defendants Harleysville and Cormack for declaratory and other relief, but a Superior Court justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Harleysville because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the decedent should be considered a named insured under the policy. Plaintiffs further asserted that the trial justice erred in dismissing their claims against Cormack because, even if they failed to establish that the decedent was a named insured, they still were entitled to pursue their claims against Cormack for failing to procure adequate coverage. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Riel v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Several years after Decedent died and his will was probated, Plaintiffs, Decedent's three children, filed a verified complaint against Defendants, two of the trustees named by Decedent to manage and control Decedent's trust estate. The complaint alleged breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for failing to transfer ownership of two businesses to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also filed a probate appeal. The superior court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss both the Plaintiffs' probate appeal and their verified complaint. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment to the extent that it dismissed two of the children's probate appeal, as it was not perfected, and the Plaintiffs' verified complaint, as it was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed one of the children's probate appeal because he was the only plaintiff to properly file an appeal in the superior court. View "Mendes v. Factor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an irrevocable trust, filed a complaint against Defendant, a university graduate student, alleging that he breached his lease agreement by painting over expensive historical wallpaper inside Plaintiff's nineteenth century building and by failing to pay the last month's rent. The superior court trial justice found that Defendant breached the lease by painting portions of the premises but ruled that Plaintiff had failed to prove that the trust had incurred damages that exceeded the amount of unpaid rent. The trial justice then awarded Plaintiff $1,600, plus interest, representing one month of unpaid rent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment with respect to that portion of the trial justice's decision declining to award damages for the repair of Plaintiff's property and for her failure to award attorney's fees, holding (1) the trial justice erred when she determined damages because she applied the wrong standard; and (2) the clear language of the lease agreement provided contractual authorization for the award of attorneys' fees, and the trial justice abused her discretion in failing to do so. View "Sophie F. Bronowiski Mulligan Irrevocable Trust v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Trustee sought an order allowing him to remove the life tenant (Defendant) from property owned by the trust. The probate court issued an order in conformity with Trustee's petition after Defendant was defaulted for failing to appear. Defendant filed a complaint in superior court purportedly appealing from the decision of the probate court. The trial justice concluded that Defendant had failed to comply with the requirements for filing a claim of appeal from the probate court and granted Trustee's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's appeal for failure to comply with every relevant provision of the statute governing appeals from the probate court, and therefore, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Ims v. Audette" on Justia Law

Defendant Louis Giuliano, Jr. contested the will of Testator, Louis Guiliano, Sr. The jury found the will was properly executed, and the superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the executrix and the primary beneficiary of Testator's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err by (1) denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to submit a single transcript of dubious relevance; (2) refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial where there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that Testator possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will, declining to instruct the jury on those issues, and denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on those grounds; and (4) excluding from evidence an inventory of Testator's estate. View "Lett v. Giuliano" on Justia Law

Esther Randall, the mother of plaintiff Elton Randall and defendant Deborah Randall, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to her four children. After Esther's death, Deborah, as executrix of her mother's estate, filed in probate court a petition for the sale of real property in the estate. Elton then filed a claim to the property, alleging that his parents had made an agreement with him before their deaths that the premises would pass to him. The probate court granted the petition to sell the property and disallowed Elton's claim to the property. Elton appealed to the superior court. The court dismissed Elton's appeal, finding that Elton failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral contract with his parents and, therefore, Elton's claim to the property was barred by the statute of frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly err in concluding that Elton had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement with his parents.

Appellant Craig Quigley was a beneficiary of a testamentary trust. In 2003, the trustees filed a petition in the superior court to reform the trust. The court entered an order granting the petition. In 2009, Quigley filed a motion to vacate the order, arguing (1) that the superior court had never obtained jurisdiction over Quigley because there was no service of process with respect to the petition and, therefore, any judgment against Quigley was void; and (2) the order should be vacated pursuant to R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 60(b)(6), which provides for vacation of any order for "any other reason justifying relief." The hearing justice denied the motion. Quigley appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Quigley was not a defendant in the proceeding with respect to the petition for reformation of the trust, service of process was not required; (2) because Quigley had actual notice of the proceeding and was represented by counsel at the proceeding, Quigley's due process rights were not violated; and (3) the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not made within a reasonable time in violation of the rule.

Plaintiff Virginia Sharkey appealed the dismissal of her legal malpractice claim against Defendant Attorney George Prescott. Plaintiff and her husband retained Attorney Prescott to prepare an estate plan. Mr. Prescott established a trust indenture that the Sharkeys executed in 1999. Subsequently, the Sharkeys signed a quitclaim deed, also prepared by Mr. Prescott, which conveyed two lots of land they owned to the trust. Plaintiff asserted that the trust was set up to care for the surviving spouse. Mr. Prescott sent Plaintiff a letter shortly thereafter, memorializing the actions he took on their behalf. Mr. Sharkey died in 2002. In 2003, Plaintiff wanted to sell one of the two lots conveyed to the trust. The local authority told Plaintiff that because both lots were conveyed to the trust, they effectively merged together, and could not be sold as she intended. In 2006, Plaintiff sought access to trust funds. The bank informed Plaintiff that she was not able to get access as she had intended. These two instances lead Plaintiff to believe that Mr. Prescott was negligent in the performance of his duties as her attorney. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against Mr. Prescott. Mr. Prescott moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Plaintiffâs claims against him were time-barred. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's case as time barred. After a review of the case, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to the letter Mr. Prescott sent memorializing the trust set-up. The Court reasoned that because Plaintiff claims she did not receive the letter, this created a "genuine issue of fact" that could not withstand a grant of summary judgment. For this, the Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, but affirmed it on all other respects. The case therefore, was remanded for further proceedings.