Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court to grant summary judgment to the Estate of Rose Beadle in this action seeking to determine title to Beadle's investment accounts, holding that the order was void as a matter of law.Pursuant to a court order, Beadle's temporary guardian and conservator altered Beadle's investment accounts to eliminate Travis and Truman Raguse as her beneficiaries. The court issued its order, however, without a hearing and without notice to the beneficiaries. The circuit court approved a final accounting and terminated the guardian/conservatorship. During the probate of Beadle's estate, the Raguses filed petitions to determine title to Beadle's investment accounts. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the Estate's petition to determine title. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the order authorizing the conservator to remove the beneficiaries on Beadle's accounts was entered without notice to the beneficiaries and without hearting, the order was void as a matter of law. View "In re Estate of Beadle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying the motion for partial summary judgment brought by the Estate of Robert T. Lynch as to its action against Kevin Lynch and entering judgment as a matter of law for Kevin on his counterclaim for conversion, holding that remand was required.The Estate sued Kevin alleging claims for fiduciary fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and elder exploitation. Kevin filed a counterclaim alleging conversion, among other claims. After the circuit court denied the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment on its claims against Kevin the court entered judgment as a matter of law for Kevin on his counterclaim. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the Estate's claims involving two payable-on-death CDs Kevin deposited in his individual account and directed that, on remand, the circuit court shall enter judgment as a matter of law for compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest on the Estate’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion; (2) ruled that the Estate's claim for punitive damage on the reversed portion of the judgment was an open question on remand; and (3) otherwise affirmed. View "Estate of Lynch v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment concluding that Plains Commerce Bank could not foreclose on certain trust real estate, that the trustee's mortgage on trust real estate was void and unenforceable, and that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, holding that the attorney fee award was an abuse of discretion.Garry and Betty Beck treated an irrevocable spendthrift trust naming their three children as secondary beneficiaries. Their child Matthew Beck took out a substantial personal loan with Plains Commerce and granted a mortgage to the bank on trust real estate as partial collateral. When Matthew defaulted on the loan, Plains Commerce brought a foreclosure action against Matthew in his capacity as trustee. Jamie Moeckly intervened on behalf of the trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Jamie and further granted her motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in awarding attorney fees to Jamie as intervenor for the trust; and (2) because there was no mortgage foreclosure the statutory provision in S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38 authorizing attorney fees "on foreclosure" did not apply. View "Plains Commerce Bank, Inc. v. Beck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the claims brought by the Estate of Owen Thacker against Victoria Timm, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The parties in this case were involved romantically, lived with each each other, and owned property as joint tenants. After Plaintiffs were appointed co-guardians and co-conservators of Thacker they filed this suit on behalf of Thacker against Timm, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and undue influence. The Estate was substituted as Plaintiff and added a claim for breach of duty as trustee of implied trust. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Timm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "Estate of Thacker v. Timm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's application for attorney fees as a co-trustee under S.D. Codified Laws 55-3-13, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding Appellant nothing in attorney fees.James Endres created an irrevocable family trust, designating his seven children as beneficiaries. The children were later designated as co-trustees. Appellant, one of the children, commenced litigation seeking court supervision of the trust and to remove five of the co-trustees for breach of fiduciary duties. The parties eventually settled all issues except for Appellant's application for attorney fees. The circuit court denied attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to attorney fees under section 55-3-13 for his actions as a co-trustee which were productive to actual benefit of the trust. View "Endres v. Endres" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on remand declaring that Lynn and Lisa Schock satisfied the conditions of Bonnie J. Pease's handwritten holographic will, holding that the circuit court did not err.After the Supreme Court held that the will in this case appointed the Schocks as the personal representatives and gave them Bonnie's entire estate subject to conditions, the circuit court, on remand, declared that the Schocks satisfied the will's conditions and approved the proposed final distribution of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Schocks satisfied the conditions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting Sally Johnson's request to supervise and reform a trust and denied Mindy Smith's petition seeking clarification from the court and requesting other relief, holding that the circuit court erred in denying certain attorney fees.After Fred Peterson died, his daughter Sally filed separate petitions seeking court supervision and reformation of one of the two trusts he created in his lifetime. Another daughter, Mindy opposed the reformation and requested other relief. After a trial, the circuit court granted Sally's petition to reform the trust at issue and denied all of Mindy's petitions and motions. Sally subsequently filed a motion for reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding (1) the circuit court was authorized to award Sally attorney fees under S.D. Codified Laws 15-17-38; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the litigation did not provide the trust with an economic benefit; and (3) attorney fees were authorized for Sally's efforts to vindicate her father's intent. View "In re Petersen Trusts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the S.D. Codified Laws chapter 21-65 does not create a private right of action that survives a vulnerable adult's death and that a predicate theft conviction is not required to maintain an action authorized under S.D. Codified Laws 22-46-13.Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of Richard Hermanek's estate, claiming that Defendants, who previously served as Hermanek's attorneys-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney (POA), breached their fiduciary duties under the POA and converted Hermanek's property to their own use. The district court certified a question of law addressing Defendants' claim that an action alleging abuse of a vulnerable adult does not survive the death of the adult at issue. The Supreme Court answered (1) a vulnerable adult or substitute petition has a private right of action for the financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, but the private right of action cannot be commenced under chapter 21-65 after the vulnerable adult's death; and (2) financial exploitation remains actionable after a person's death under section 22-46-13, and a criminal conviction is not required as a predicate to a civil cause of action for exploitation. View "Hermanek-Peck v. Spry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in this action brought by the personal representative of the Estate of Susan Markve against Kenneth Markve (Ken) alleging undue influence, conversion, statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and common law fraud, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained.The Estate brought this action alleging that Susan lacked capacity to execute a quitclaim deed to a certain house and the power of attorney naming Ken as her agent. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Ken, concluding that no factual basis supported the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that questions of fact should have precluded summary judgment on several of the Estate's claims. View "Johnson v. Markve" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying the motions filed by Kristina Libbert and Darren Hickey to intervene in the underlying petition challenging the validity of an amendment to the Shirley A. Hickey Trust and for clarification and reconsideration, holding that a portion of the order denying the motion for clarification and reconsideration must be vacated.Nearly one year after Bradley Hickey filed a petition challenging the validity of an amendment to the Shirley A. Hickey Trust Kristina and Darren moved to intervene in the petition. The circuit court denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely. Thereafter, Kristina and Darren filed their motion for clarification and reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the order denying intervention, holding that remand was required to consider the timeliness of the motion to intervene under the standards set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-24(a)(2); and (2) vacated the portion of the circuit court's order on the motion for clarification and reconsideration, holding that the trial court must reconsider this order after reconsidering Kristina and Darren's request for intervention. View "In re Hickey Living Trust" on Justia Law