Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

After Charles Colombe died, Wesley Colombe filed a petition for informal probate and was appointed as personal representative of Charles’s Estate. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe (RST) filed a notice of creditor’s claim seeking to enforce a Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court order and judgment. Wesley filed a notice of disallowance of claim, asserting that the RST could not show that the order was entitled to comity. The circuit court granted comity to the tribal court order and judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting comity to the tribal court order pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 1-1-25. View "Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Colombe" on Justia Law

Two members of a seven-member trust succession committee petitioned the circuit court for court supervision of the trust. Marvin M. Schwan owned and operated Schwan’s Sales Enterprises (a.k.a. The Schwan Food Company) until his death in 1993. In 1992, Marvin had created the Marvin M. Schwan Charitable Foundation. The Trust Instrument named seven beneficiaries: Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Lutheran College Conference, Inc., Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Bethany Lutheran College, Inc., International Lutheran Laymen’s League, and Wisconsin Lutheran Synod Kingdom Workers, Inc. After Marvin’s death, the Trustees redeemed all Marvin’s stock in the company and funded the Foundation with assets valuing nearly $1 billion. The parties did not dispute that certain investments made by the Trustees over several years caused approximately $600 million in losses to the Foundation. These losses reduced the value of the Foundation’s assets and reduced the Foundation’s distributions to the Beneficiaries. According to Committee members Paul and Mark Schwan, the Trustees did not inform the Committee until 2013 that the Foundation had experienced such significant losses from the investments. In June 2014, Mark and Paul petitioned the circuit court for instruction and supervision under SDCL 21-22-9. Paul and Mark asked the court to address whether the Committee had a duty under the Trust Instrument to request an accounting from the Trustees related to the Trustees’ investment losses, whether a majority vote of the Committee was required in order to request an accounting, whether the Committee members that were also Trustees had a conflict of interest, whether the Committee had a fiduciary duty to request an accounting, and whether Paul and Mark as individual Committee members could request an accounting. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition because it concluded that the two members did not meet the classifications of persons able to petition the circuit court for supervision. After its review of the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court found the trial court did not conclude that the Trustees, Attorney General, or Beneficiaries established good cause to the contrary related to the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition. The court did not hold a hearing on the merits of Paul and Mark’s petition, noting that it would not address arguments raised by the Trustees or Paul and Mark because it concluded that Paul and Mark did not meet any classification entitled to seek court supervision. The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to "fix a time and place for a hearing thereon, . . . and upon such hearing, enter an order assuming supervision unless good cause to the contrary is shown." View "Schwan v. Burgdorf" on Justia Law

Three individuals (the Conservators) were appointed guardians and conservators of Mary Novotny. The Conservators established the Mary D. Novotny Trust. Catherine Novotny was a beneficiary of the Trust, and the conservators were the trustees. When a dispute over the Trust arose between the trustees and Catherine, the circuit court granted reimbursement of expenses to the trustees. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conservators and awarded them reimbursement and future expenses. Catherine appealed. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that there was no evidence in the record that supported the basis for reimbursement under S.D. Codified Laws 55-3-13, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the Conservators’ motions for expenses. View "In re Guardianship of Novotny" on Justia Law

In this lengthy estate dispute, Testator’s daughter (Daughter) appealed several rulings of the circuit court, including the circuit court’s denial of her request for relief from an order under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Daughter relief under section 15-6-60(b); (2) did not err when it considered extrinsic evidence to interpret Testator’s last will and testament and subsequent codicil; (3) properly approved the personal representative’s proposed distribution of Testator’s assets; (4) did not err in reforming the will and codicil; and (5) did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Testator’s grandson. View "In re Estate of Bickel" on Justia Law

In 1989, Decedent opened a savings account. In 2007, Decedent included her son (Son) and daughter as additional account owners. Decedent died in 2012. The next year, Son withdrew $17,554 from the account and placed the funds in a certificate of deposit in his name. In doing so, Son relied on S.D. Codified Laws 29A-6-104, which provides that the proceeds of a joint account automatically pass to the surviving account holder. Decedent’s Estate brought suit against Son requesting a judgment for $17,554, asserting that Son converted the funds for his personal use. Son responded that, as joint owner of the account, he could not convert the funds for his own use. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Estate, concluding that the Estate met its burden of proof that Decedent did not intend to establish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and therefore, the Estate rebutted the presumption under section 29A-6-104 that the proceeds automatically pass to the surviving account holder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it determined that Decedent did not intend to create a joint account with right of survivorship in 2007. View "Estate of Card v. Card" on Justia Law

After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Lester and Harriet Shoup created an inter vivos trust. After Lester and Harriet died, the couple's only children, Gregory and Larry Shoup, filed a motion to terminate the trust. Gregory and Larry argued that the trust had fulfilled its purpose because it only provided for Lester and Harriet during their lives and no trust provision existed directing disposition of the remaining trust assets. Lee and Linda Shoup, Gregory's children, objected, arguing that the trust had not fulfilled its purpose and that two letters found with the original trust document provided instructions on the disposition of trust assets. The circuit court terminated the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly determined that the letters would substantially change the trust if given effect, but that the change was prohibited because the trustees did not consent to the letters in writing; and (2) correctly concluded that the trust had fulfilled its purpose and should be terminated. View "In re Sunray Holdings Trust" on Justia Law

Decedent's ex-wife, Ann, filed a claim against Decedent's estate for compensation for nursing and convalescent services she provided to Decedent before his death. Before Decedent died, he forgave a loan he made to Ann. The trustee of Decedent's trust denied Ann's claim, asserting that the loan forgiveness constituted payment for Ann's services. Ann subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking payment from Decedent's trust. The trial court ordered that the trust pay Ann $183,538 for services rendered, concluding that Ann was entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the loan forgiveness was not compensation for the services Ann provided to Decedent and that Ann was entitled to compensation for the services she provided to Decedent; but (2) concluded that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of Ann's award. Remanded with instructions to recalculate the award. View "In re Nelson Living Trust" on Justia Law

After Wife moved into a nursing home, Husband disinherited Wife in his will. Wife's attorney-in-fact, her son, disclaimed any inheritance Wife may have been entitled to receive from Husband's estate. One year later, while Wife was receiving Medicaid assistance for her nursing home care, Husband predeceased Wife. Wife's guardian ad litem petitioned for an elective share of Husband's estate and moved to set aside the disclaimer. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Wife had validly disclaimed her right to an elective share and that Wife received her fair share of Husband's estate when Husband used their joint resources to pay for her care. The Department of Social Services, which administers the Medicaid program, intervened and moved to reconsider. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for Wife to obtain her elective share, holding (1) Wife was entitled to an elective share; and (2) because no prejudice to interested parties was demonstrated, the circuit court erred by not granting the guardian ad litem's motion to revoke the disclaimer where the guardian was acting in Wife's best interests. View "In re Estate of Shipman" on Justia Law

Curley Haisch and his wife Rose owned Mulehead Ranch. Joe Duling was the Haisches' financial advisor as well as a realtor and broker. When Curley was ninety years old, he decided to sell the ranch and signed a listing agreement with Joe. Approximately one year later, Joe suggested that Curley and Rose form a charitable remainder trust (Trust) into which the ranch and chattels could be gifted. Curley and Rose executed the Trust, to which the Ranch was transferred. The Trustee then sold the Ranch to Joe and Lynne Duling. Later, it was discovered that the Trust contained multiple defects. The Trustee brought suit against the Dulings, their businesses, and the Mulehead Ranch on behalf of the Trust and the Haisches. The complaint alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties. A jury found in favor of the Trust awarded Plaintiffs $1,568,200, including punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on damages, holding (1) the circuit court erred in failing to give a proper instruction on the statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiffs' claims for future tax consequences related to the defects in the Trust; and (2) the court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Bailey v. Duling" on Justia Law