Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Defendant Paul Wentzlaff, an insurance agent, stole thousands of dollars from Harvey Severson, an elderly man who asked Defendant to help manage his financial affairs. Plaintiff Donald Hass, as personal representative for Severson’s estate, sued Defendant and two insurance companies who appointed Defendant as an agent, North American Company for Life and Health Insurance (North American) and Allianz Life Insurance of North America (Allianz). Hass and North American each moved for summary judgment and Allianz joined North American’s motion. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion and granted the insurance companies’ motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the insurance companies were vicariously liable for Defendant's acts. Based on undisputed material facts on the record in this case, the Supreme Court found that Defendant Wentzlaff was not acting within the scope of his employment when he stole money from Severson, and thus, as a matter of law, North American and Allianz were not vicariously liable for his acts. The Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. View "Hass v. Wentzlaff" on Justia Law

After witnessing Blair Hamilton accidentally kill himself in October 2009, Lyndon Hart in August 2011 filed a petition to extend time to file a creditor's claim against Hamilton's Estate for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the actions of Hamilton. The circuit court denied the petition. Hart appealed and served his notice of appeal only on the Estate's attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Estate's motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to serve notice of appeal on all the heirs was denied, as in this case, the heirs were not parties in a creditor's claim against an estate; and (2) because Hart did not present or file a claim, the Court could not reach the merits of Hart's argument on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to extend time to file a creditor's claim. View "In re Estate of Hamilton" on Justia Law

Pooled Advocate Trust, Inc. (PATI), the managing corporation for a Medicaid pooled trust, brought a declaratory judgment action on Medicaid eligibility issues associated with the trust and named the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS) as a necessary party. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for PATI. Fred and Gladys Matthews transferred assets to the pooled trust. When the Matthews subsequently applied for Medicaid long-term care benefits, DSS imposed a penalty period because they were over age sixty-five at the time of the transfers. PATI petitioned for further relief, seeking a declaration that DSS could not impose penalty periods for transfers made by pooled trust beneficiaries age sixty-five or older. The circuit court granted PATI's petition. The Matthews also appealed DSS's application of a penalty period, but an ALJ upheld the decision and another circuit court affirmed. DSS appealed the circuit court's order granting PATI's petition and the Matthews appealed the other circuit court's affirmance of the ALJ's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the administrative appeal and reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that transfers of assets into pooled trusts by beneficiaries age sixty-five or older may be subject to a transfer penalty period for Medicaid eligibility purposes. View "In re Pooled Advocate Trust" on Justia Law

Two beneficiaries of the Moncur Revocable Family Trust petitioned the trial court to remove the co-trustees of the Trust on the grounds that the co-trustees violated various fiduciary duties. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the co-trustees did not violate their fiduciary duties by using a surrogate bidder to purchase Trust property at a public auction without obtaining permission from the beneficiaries, and by holding the Trust real property auction after an auction to dispose of personal property held in the Trust; and (2) the remaining allegations that the co-trustees breached their fiduciary duties were without merit. View "In re Estate of Moncur" on Justia Law

Certain remainder beneficiaries of the Florence Y. Wallbaum Revocable Living Trust petitioned the trial court to interpret the terms of the trust and to determine whether the trustee breached its fiduciary duties. The trial court (1) found the Trust was ambiguous; (2) after considering extrinsic evidence, found that the settler of the trust, Florence Wallbaum, intended for the trustee to use trust principal to maintain the Wallbaum residence; and (3) ruled the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duties in administering the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the Trust was ambiguous; (2) Florence intended Trust principal to be used to maintain the Wallbaum residence; and (3) the trustee did not violate any fiduciary duties. View "In re Wallbaum Living Trust" on Justia Law

This was the fourth appeal in connection with the estate of Walter Brownlee, Sr. After Brownlee died and his will was probated, a dispute arose between Jeanie Weekley, Brownlee's longtime companion, and Brownlee's children regarding certain aspects of the will and the trust Brownlee had created. Weekley sued, and later, following Brownlee II, Weekley brought suit against Robert Wagner, Brownlee's personal representative, for breach of his fiduciary duties in administering the estate. The circuit court found that Wagner's failure to inspect, collect and manage certain construction equipment was breach of his fiduciary duty. On remand, the court awarded Weekley damages against Wagner for a total judgment amount of $139,834. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's damages award was not clearly erroneous. View "Weekley v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Lorraine Flaws died testate but was predeceased by her named beneficiaries. Because Flaws' will did not designate contingent beneficiaries, the administration of her estate was governed by the laws of intestate succession. Prior to a hearing to determine heirs, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed claiming that Lorraine's niece, who was born to Lorraine's brother out of wedlock, did not have standing under the pertinent statutes to assert that she was an heir of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the niece did not comply with S.D. Codified Laws 29A-2-114, which sets forth the methods and time limits an individual born out of wedlock must comply with in order to establish parentage for purposes of intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a question remained as to whether Yvette failed to comply with any of the methods and time limits in the statute for establishing paternity. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Flaws" on Justia Law

Leo Geier, an heir to his mother Minnie Geier's estate, petitioned for supervised administration of the estate and removal of the estate's personal representative. After hearing evidence, the circuit court denied the petition. Leo appealed. Appellees, Minnie's estate and the personal representative, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that Leo did not appeal from a final order and that not all the required parties were served with a notice of the appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that although the order of the circuit court was one from which Leo could appeal, the Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal was granted because not all of the heirs were served with notice of the appeal. View "In re Estate of Geier" on Justia Law

The personal representative of an estate sold real property that had been specifically devised to several heirs. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous appeal that the personal representative lacked the authority to sell the property and remanded the case to allow the buyers of the real property to intervene to protect their interests. After remand, the buyers filed suit against the estate. The heirs who objected to the sale intervened. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyers, finding that the buyers were good faith purchasers for value of specifically devised land and thus were protected by S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-714 as a matter of law. The intervening heirs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on narrower grounds, holding that based on lack of notice of the heirs' interest in the land or the law at issue, the buyers were good faith purchasers for value, and as such, were protected by the statute.