Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Timothy Brian Johnson and Phillip Barnes, nephews of the deceased Samuel D. Johnson, appealed a judgment from the Lamar Circuit Court. The court declared that Alabama's antilapse statute, § 43-8-224, Ala. Code 1975, did not apply to Johnson's will, making Judith Mayers the sole beneficiary. Johnson's will, executed in October 1990, left his entire estate to his father, Coy D. Johnson. If Coy predeceased him, the estate would be divided equally among his siblings, Roger D. Johnson, Denny R. Johnson, Judith A. Mayers, and Janice M. Barnes. If none of these individuals survived him, the estate would pass to his nearest living heirs. At Johnson's death in July 2022, Mayers was the only surviving named beneficiary.The Lamar Probate Court admitted the will to probate and issued letters of administration to Mayers. The administration was then moved to the Lamar Circuit Court. Mayers petitioned the circuit court to declare that the antilapse statute did not apply, asserting she was the sole beneficiary. The circuit court agreed, finding the will unambiguous and ruling that the antilapse statute did not apply, making Mayers the sole beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the antilapse statute, which prevents a devise from lapsing if a beneficiary predeceases the testator, did not apply because the will included survivorship language and an alternative devise provision. The will clearly indicated that only the named beneficiaries who survived the testator would inherit, and if none survived, the estate would pass to the nearest living heirs. Since Mayers was the only surviving named beneficiary, she was entitled to the entire estate. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Mayers" on Justia Law

Joy Goodwin Adams sued Tiffany Rudd Atkinson, Katherine M. Rudd, Goodwin Capital Partners, Ltd., and KATISAM, Inc., seeking reimbursement for attorneys' fees she paid to a third party. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed her suit with prejudice, leading Joy to appeal. The central issue was whether the terms "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous when used independently in a contract. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that they are synonymous.The case involves three trusts and two agreements. Joy's parents created two trusts in 1986 and 1987 for Joy and her daughters, Tiffany and Kate. Joy created a third trust in 1989. Joy executed a 2011 release-and-indemnification agreement with BB&T, a co-trustee, and a 2013 settlement agreement with the defendants after Tiffany and Kate sued her for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The 2013 agreement included a "hold harmless" provision requiring the defendants to protect Joy against claims for attorneys' fees by corporate trustees successfully defending against suits initiated by Tiffany and Kate.In prior litigation, Tiffany and Kate sued BB&T for negligence, and BB&T filed a third-party claim against Joy for attorneys' fees. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of BB&T on the negligence claim and denied Joy's motion on the indemnification claim. Joy settled BB&T's claim for $614,791.62 and then demanded reimbursement from the defendants, who refused.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous, meaning the defendants agreed to reimburse Joy for the attorneys' fees she paid to BB&T. The court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law

Willie C. Scott signed a promissory note on May 22, 2018, promising to pay $67,000 to Jimmy C. Scott by March 24, 2020. The note detailed amounts borrowed on three separate dates. Willie passed away on November 20, 2019, and Jeanetta C. Scott, as administratrix of his estate, denied the allegations in Jimmy's complaint, asserting that Willie had fulfilled his obligations under the note.Jimmy filed a complaint in the Pike Circuit Court on October 13, 2021, seeking repayment. Jeanetta contested the claim, and the case was consolidated with another related to the administration of Willie's estate. Jimmy moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits from himself and two witnesses who attested to witnessing Willie sign the note. Jeanetta opposed the motion, providing affidavits from herself and another individual, both asserting that the signature on the note was not Willie's.The Pike Circuit Court initially denied Jimmy's motion for summary judgment but later granted it after a renewed motion and hearing. Jeanetta's subsequent motion to set aside the summary judgment was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the circuit court had improperly made credibility assessments in granting summary judgment. The court noted that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the authenticity of Willie's signature on the promissory note, which should be resolved by a jury. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Jimmy and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of real property following the death of Billy Skidmore. Billy died intestate in July 2015, leaving behind two sons, John and Billy Jr. The Marshall Probate Court awarded John letters of administration over Billy's estate. Billy Jr. later filed a claim asserting his entitlement to an equal share of the estate. John filed an inventory listing the estate's assets, including a one-third interest in a commercial building. Billy Jr. moved to compel a final settlement, leading to a hearing where John admitted to commingling estate rental proceeds with his personal funds. The probate court subsequently appointed Billy Jr. as the successor administrator and authorized him to list the estate's real property for sale.John discovered a 2004 deed conveying the property to him and Billy as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, which he recorded in July 2023. Despite this, the probate court declared the property to be owned one-third each by John, Jenna (John's ex-wife), and Billy's estate. John removed the administration of the estate to the Marshall Circuit Court and filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the probate court's judgment. The circuit court denied his motion, leading John to appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Marshall Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over the title to the real property. The court emphasized that probate courts do not have the authority to determine equitable issues or administer equitable remedies, such as setting aside a recorded deed. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Skidmore v. Skidmore" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law

Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Daniel Barefoot, as a personal representative and legatee of the estate of Danny Bryant Barefoot, appealed a probate court order that determined the estate of Donna Viola Barefoot was entitled to a share of Danny's estate on the basis that Donna was an omitted spouse under § 43-8-90, Ala. Code 1975. Danny executed a will in August 2012, while married to Merita Hall Barefoot. In the will, other than a specific bequest to his and Merita's son, Daniel, Danny devised his residuary estate to Merita. Danny specified that, if Merita predeceased him, his estate would be shared jointly in equal shares by Daniel and Marcie Jenkins, whom he identified in the will as his stepdaughter. Danny also named Daniel and Marcie as corepresentatives of his estate. Merita died on September 6, 2014. On January 21, 2018, Danny married Donna. Danny and Donna did not execute a prenuptial agreement, and Danny did not execute a new will or a codicil to his previous will to include any testamentary dispositions to Donna. Danny died on September 5, 2021. Twelve days later, on September 17, 2021, Donna died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the appeal was from a nonfinal order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Barefoot v. Cole" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals concerned the division of certain assets in the estate of R.E. Ivey ("R.E."). At the time of his death, R.E. was survived by his wife, Edwyna Ivey ("Edwyna"), and his four children from a previous marriage -- Sharyl Eddins ("Sharyl"), William Ivey ("Robbie"), Dell Ivey Moody ("Dell"), and Ty Ivey ("Ty"). In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, Mary Jo Fletcher, as the personal representative of Edwyna's estate, appealed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna's claims for certain statutory allowances were totally offset by the value of certain assets that Edwyna had retained from R.E.'s estate. She also appealed the circuit court's determination that three of Edwyna's stepchildren, Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell, were entitled to recover on their claims of conversion and breach of trust against Edwyna. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, Sharyl, individually and as the executrix of R.E.'s estate, Dell, and Robbie filed a cross-appeal challenging the circuit court's determination that Edwyna was entitled to funds contained in an account known by the parties as the "farm account." In appeal no. SC-2022-0533, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order insofar as it denied Edwyna's claims for homestead, exempt-property, and family allowances pursuant to §§ 43-8-110 through -113 on the basis that those claims were completely offset by the value of the pickup truck. However, the Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it determined that Sharyl, Robbie, and Dell were entitled to recover the funds held in the POD accounts, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. In appeal no. SC-2022-0640, the Court affirmed the circuit court's determination that Edwyna, as R.E.'s surviving spouse, was entitled to the funds that Dell withdrew from the farm account. View "Fletcher v. Eddins, et al." on Justia Law