Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law

In these two original actions the Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt certain paragraphs of its order.Two brothers, who were coexecutors of their deceased father's estate, sought writs of prohibition to prevent the judge of the general division from enforcing her order memorializing a settlement in a judicial-dissolution action, arguing that they were not bound by the order because the general division lacked both subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order and personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court granted a limited writ of prohibition in each action, holding that the general division patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adopt the paragraphs of its order directing the brothers to take actions as coexecutors. View "Neiman v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner, executor of the estate of Virginia Durkin, against Respondent, the judge presiding over the underlying action involving the Durkin estate, holding that Respondent was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner attempted to appeal a prior order appointing a special master commissioner, arguing that Respondent's appointment of the special master commissioner under Ohio Rev. Code 2101.06 disregarded the law of the case established in prior proceedings. After the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order Petitioner brought the instant original action. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the appeal court's mandate was not violated in this case. View "Durkin v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.15 does not apply to essential witnesses to a remediated will, holding that the voiding provision of section 2107.15 applies equally to essential witnesses to both formally compliant and remediated wills.Noting that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.03, which governs the formal requirements for the execution of a written will, and section 2107.15, which voids a will's devise to a witness if that witness was essential to establishing the validity of the will, mention "competent" witnesses but that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.24, which provides a process for admitting a purported will to probate despite its failure to fully adhere to the formal requirements, does not, the court of appeals concluded that section 2107.24 eliminates the requirement of witness competency. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the voiding provision of section 2107.15 does not apply to essential witnesses to a remediated will. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment related to section 2107.15, holding that the statute applies both to wills executed in compliance with section 2107.03 and those submitted pursuant to section 2107.24. View "In re Estate of Shaffer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.24 eliminates the requirement of witness competency and that, therefore, the voiding provision of Ohio Rev. Code 2107.15 does not apply to essential witnesses to a remediated will, holding that the voiding provision of section 2107.15 applies equally to essential witnesses to both formally compliant and remediated wills.Zachary Norman, the son of Juley Norman, filed an application to probate a 2006 document claiming to be a will that was handwritten and signed by Joseph Shaffer. The will had no witness signatures. The probate court denied the application. On appeal, Zachary argued that Ohio Rev. Code 2107.24 does not require the witnesses to a noncompliant will to be "competent witnesses," and therefore, the voiding provision of section 2107.15 did not apply to a purported will that may be remediated pursuant to section 2107.24. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2107.15 applies both to wills executed in compliance with section 2107.03 and those submitted pursuant to section 2107.24; and (2) the probate court correctly applied section 2107.15 and determined that Juley could not be included in the list of beneficiaries of Shaffer's estate. View "In re Estate of Shaffer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cora Sue Bell and concluding that Embassy Healthcare could pursue its claim against Cora individually under Ohio Rev. Code 3103.03, Ohio’s necessaries statute, and was not required to present its claim to the estate of her deceased husband, Robert Bell, holding that a creditor’s failure to present its claim for unpaid expenses to a decedent’s estate within the six-month statute of limitations in Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06 bars a later action against the decedent’s surviving spouse under section 3103.03.The court of appeals concluded that Embassy could pursue its claim for Robert’s unpaid nursing-facility expenses against Cora individually under section 3103.03 and was not required to present its claim first to Robert’s estate under section 2117.06. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a creditor must present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent’s estate under Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06 before it can pursue a claim individually against the surviving spouse under section 3103.03. View "Embassy Healthcare v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus, nor was he entitled to a writ of prohibition.In his mandamus and prohibition complaint, Appellant alleged that the common pleas court and its judges unlawfully conveyed to another assets that Appellant’s deceased father had bequeathed to him. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief because he failed to demonstrate that he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and because he did not demonstrate that the courts lacked statutory jurisdiction over the matter. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Scioto County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

Joseph Gorman contracted with James Wilson to purchase a fifteen percent interest in Marine 1, LLC for $300,000. At the time Gorman died, he owed Wilson $187,000 on the contract. The probate court appointed William Lawrence as the executor of Gorman’s estate. The estate’s counsel was Joseph Goldsmith. Wilson’s attorney sent a letter addressed to both Gorman’s personal secretary and the trustee of his trust, purporting to present Wilson’s claim for approximately $200,000 to the executor of Gorman’s estate. The letter was then forwarded to Goldsmith and Lawrence. The trial judge found that the letter was not legally sufficient for presenting Wilson’s claim and granted the estate’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Ohio law permits a claim against an estate to be deemed presented when “other individuals connected with the estate receive the claim[.]” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a claimant against an estate does not meet the mandatory requirement under Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06(A)(1)(a) to present a claim to the executor or administrator of an estate if the claimant delivers the claim to a person not appointed by the probate court, even if that person gives it to the executor or administrator. View "Wilson v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Sarunas Abraitis, the former executor of his mother’s estate, applied to admit his mother’s will to probate. The will provided that if Abraitis’s father predeceased his mother, her entire estate would be divided equally between Abraitis and his brother, Vytautas. The matter was assigned to Judge Laura Gallagher. While the estate was being administered, Vytautas died. Abraitis subsequently filed an application to probate a different, later will that his mother executed and that bequeathed to him the entire estate. Vytautas’s former wife, Vivian, filed a complaint to contest the later will. The action was also assigned to Judge Gallagher. Abraitis filed two actions in prohibition alleging that Judge Gallagher lacked jurisdiction. As grounds for the writ, Abraitis referred to collateral proceedings regarding his mother’s guardianship and federal and state tax proceedings, arguing that because none of the parties objected or moved to intervene in the tax cases, the probate court was precluded from hearing any matter concerning the estate. The court of appeals dismissed Abraitis’s complaints in prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abraitis had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that Judge Gallagher did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the probate court action. View "State ex rel. Abraitis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law