Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a family dispute over the management of a trust established by Bernard and Jeannette Fenenbock. The trust was divided into three sub-trusts (Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C) to benefit their children, Glenna Fenenbock Gaddy and Mark Fenenbock. After Bernard's death, Glenna began serving as co-trustee with her mother Jeannette. Upon Jeannette's death, Glenna transferred shares from the sub-trusts to her own trust and sold them to her sons, Weston and Lane. Mark filed a lawsuit against Glenna, asserting that she had breached her duties as a trustee by transferring the shares without his approval as a co-trustee.The probate court ruled in favor of Mark, declaring that Mark is a co-trustee and that the transfer of shares to Glenna's Trust was void. The court ordered that the shares be restored to the sub-trusts. Glenna appealed this decision, and the court of appeals vacated the probate court’s order, concluding that the buyers of the shares, Weston and Lane, were “jurisdictionally indispensable parties” whose absence deprived the probate court of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction but erred by ordering Glenna to restore property she no longer owns or controls. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the probate court’s order, reversed the probate court’s order, and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. The court noted that any appropriate relief must come from Glenna or Glenna’s Trust or through the ultimate distribution of the assets remaining in the Sub-Trusts. View "IN THE MATTER OF TRUST A AND TRUST C. ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BERNARD L. AND JEANNETTE FENENBOCK LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of the term "home" in the context of Medicaid eligibility. The applicants, Clyde and Dorothy Burt, sold their house to their daughter and son-in-law, Linda and Robby Wallace, and moved into a rental property owned by the Wallaces. Later, they moved into a skilled-nursing facility. After moving into the facility, the Burts used their cash assets to buy an undivided one-half interest in the house they had previously sold to the Wallaces. They then executed a Lady Bird deed in favor of the Wallaces, granting their newly acquired one-half interest back to the Wallaces, reserving an enhanced life estate. The Burts then applied for Medicaid assistance, but the Texas Health and Human Services Commission denied their claim, arguing that the property interest was not excluded from the calculation of resources for Medicaid eligibility.The trial court reversed the agency’s determination, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The court of appeals held that a property interest created after admission to a skilled-nursing facility can be excluded from the resources used to determine Medicaid eligibility if the applicant states an intent to live at the property in the future.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation. The court held that a “home” is the applicant’s principal place of residence before the claim for Medicaid assistance arises, coupled with the intent to reside there in the future. A property interest purchased with qualifying resources after the applicant moves to a skilled-nursing facility is an available resource for determining Medicaid eligibility under federal eligibility rules, as the property was not the applicant’s principal place of residence at the time the claim for benefits arose. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment in favor of the Commission. View "TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION v. ESTATE OF CLYDE L. BURT" on Justia Law

In this dispute over ownership of some ranchland the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that a grantor conveys an expectancy interest only through a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent to do so, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Father devised his estate, including Cottonwood Ranch, to Widow for life with the remainder upon her death to his children, including Son. Father granted Widow power to sell estate property and to redirect a child's remainder interest to others. Widow, a co-owner of the ranch, later conveyed her separate interest in the ranch to Son and daughter. Thereafter, while Widow was still living, Son conveyed his "right, title and interest in and to" the ranch to his daughters. At issue was whether Son gifted a remainder interest in Father's estate property when he conveyed his present interest in the same property without expressly reserving any remainder interest. Applying the rule set forth in Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1942), the Supreme Court held that Son did not convey his remainder interest in the estate property. View "Jordan v. Parker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the probate court to modify a trust under Texas Trust Code 112.054 but denying the trustee's demand for a jury trial, holding that there is no statutory right to a jury in a section 112.054 judicial trust-modification proceeding.In reversing the probate court, the court of appeals held that the Trust Code conferred a right to a jury trial and that the error in denying the trustee's jury demand was harmful. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Trust Code's incorporation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure creates a right to a trial by jury in a section 112.054 judicial trust-modification proceeding. View "In re Troy S. Poe Trust" on Justia Law

In this challenge to a share issuance the Supreme Court held that the probate court improperly submitted an invalid theory of liability to the jury and that the trial court's charge error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.In the weeks before he died, Dick Poe, the sole director of Poe Management, Inc. (PMI), authorized the corporation to issue new shares and then bought the new shares for $3.2 million, making him the majority owner of PMI. Dick's death vested control of the family-owned car-dealership enterprise in the two co-executors of Dick's estate. Richard, Dick's son and PMI's only other shareholder, brought this action challenging the share issuance as a breach of Dick's fiduciary duty. The trial court rendered judgment in favor Richard. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the probate court erred in charging the jury in two respects and that the errors were harmful. View "In re Estate of Poe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

The Supreme reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing a will contestant's lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that because the contestant did not rebut the evidence established by the will's proponent the the contestant accepted benefits under the will to which she was not otherwise legally entitled, the trial court properly dismissed the contest.Before his death, Dempsey Johnson executed a will devising his estate through specific bequests and leaving the residuary to his three daughters, including Tia MacNerland. After Johnson died, MacNerland sued the estate's executor seeking to set aside Johnson's will on the grounds that he was unduly influenced when he executed the will. The trial court dismissed the will contest for lack of standing under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the executor failed to demonstrate that MacNerland accepted greater benefits than those to which she was entitled under the will or intestacy laws. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because MacNerland accepted benefits under Johnson's will, the trial court properly dismissed her challenge to the will's validity. View "In re Estate of Johnson" on Justia Law

In this guardianship proceeding, the Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify counsel for the guardianship applicant due to a purported conflict of interest.Jamie Rogers, represented by Alfred Allen, filed an application for temporary guardianship of Verna Thetford's person and a management trust for her estate. Verna moved to disqualify Allen as Jamie's counsel, asserting that Allen had represented Verna and that she objected to his representation of Jamie in violation of his fiduciary duties to her. The trial court denied the motion to disqualify and appointed Jamie as temporary guardian for Verna. Verna argued before the Supreme Court that the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct required that Allen be disqualified. The Supreme Court held (1) the Rules permit such representation in limited circumstances and that a trial court's decision regarding disqualification, based on a careful, thorough consideration of the evidence, is entitled to great deference by an appellate court; and (2) there was no reason to disturb the trial court's discretion in this case. View "In re Thetford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled its decision in Faris v. Faris, 138 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. App. 1940) ruling that a devisee's default is imputed to his own devisee, even where the latter is not in default, holding that Texas Estates Code 256.003(a) holding that the applicant for the probate of the will is in default in failing to timely probate the will.Linda Ferreira, in her capacity as executor of her ex-husband Norman's estate, offered the will of Patricia Hill, whom Norman subsequently married, for probate nine years after Patricia's death. Douglas and Debra Butler, Patricia's intestate heirs, contested the probate of the will on the ground that it was barred by the four-year limitations period in section 256.003(a). The trial court granted summary judgment for the Butlers. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Norman's default in probating Patricia's will applied to Linda, and (2) even if Linda had applied to probate the will in her individual capacity as a devisee of a devisee, Norman's default would bar her application under Faris. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, under section 256.003(a), when an applicant seeks late probate of a will in her individual capacity, only the applicant's conduct is relevant to determining whether she was not in default. View "Ferreira v. Butler" on Justia Law

In this dispute in probate over title to property bequeathed in a will, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court ruling that governmental immunity barred an heir’s suit against a county, holding that, contrary to the court of appeals’ decision, Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002), applied in this case.The decedent’s heirs and the county, one of the beneficiaries under the will, agreed to combine forces against the other beneficiary, a private university, during litigation over the properly bequeathed in the will. The county and heirs agreed to share equally in any recovery either of them obtained in the proceedings. The university subsequently settled, and the settlement was divided between the county and the heirs under their agreement. Later, an heir sued the county alleging a breach of the agreement. The county asserted that governmental immunity barred the heir’s suit. The trial court and court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Lawson, which provides that a governmental entity cannot create immunity for itself by settling a claim for which it lacks immunity only to assert immunity from suit in a subsequent action to enforce the government’s agreement, applied. View "Hughes v. Green County" on Justia Law