Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Tracey Martin her agreed-upon share of proceeds of John Wood's insurance policy after he committed suicide, holding that the circuit court did not err.During their divorce proceeding, Wood agreed to maintain a preexisting life insurance policy for the partial benefit of Tracey Martin. The circuit court incorporated the agreement (the agreement) into the final divorce decree. Six years later, in defiance of the court order, Wood removed Martin as a beneficiary and designated his brothers, his new wife, and a friend as beneficiaries on the policy. Wood committed suicide two days later. In a lawsuit initiated by Martin, the insurer interpleaded the policy proceeds. The circuit court awarded Martin her share of the proceeds consistent with the divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Va. Code 38.2-3122(B) did not bar Martin's claim because the final divorce decree that ratified and incorporated the agreement created an equitable assignment; and (2) faced with competing equities, the circuit court did not err in finding Martin's beneficial interest in the interpleader proceeds to be superior to that of the new beneficiaries. View "Wood v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees from the unrepresented parties in her partition suit under Va. Code 8.01-92 and denying Plaintiff's requests to share the costs for bringing the action and for an award of the rental value of the subject property from the parties who occupied it, holding that the trial court did not err.Plaintiff and her four siblings inherited real property from their mother. Plaintiff later brought suit to partition the property and requested that the trial court compel its sale and divide the proceeds according to the parties' respective rights and interests after subtracting the expenses of Plaintiff's suit. Two siblings appeared at trial pro se. The trial court ordered that the property be sold and the proceeds be split equally among all five siblings and denied Plaintiff's request for fair rental value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in refusing to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees out of the shares of the unrepresented siblings in the proceeds of the sale of the property; (2) did not err in failing to divide the costs of the partition suit equally among the siblings; and (3) did not err in failing to award fair rental value. View "Berry v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court interpreting certain provisions of the will of Sandra Larsen's late husband and determining that Sandra did not have a life estate in the decedent's property, holding that the circuit court did not err.The decedent's will divided his estate between Sandra, his children, Pamela and Kirk, and his grandchildren. Pamela and Kirk filed a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the circuit court to construe the terms of the decedent's will and determine the extent of Sandra's interest in the decedent's house and farm. The circuit court determined that Sandra did not have a life estate in the property, noting that Sandra's rights to the property were subject to be terminated when she was no longer physically or mentally able to reside in the home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decedent's will did not gave Sandra a life estate in the property; (2) Pamela and Kirk had concurrent rights to access and use the property; and (3) parol evidence was necessary to interpret the scope of Sandra's rights. View "Larsen v. Stack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an obstructive act committed before the accrual of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations under Va. Code 8.01-229(D) regardless of whether the cause of action has accrued at the time of the obstructive act.After Nelson Mackey left a law firm, the remaining partners - Griffith Dodson, Richard Pence, and Richard Viar - formed another partnership. Pence, Dodson, and Viar subsequently passed away. Mackey told Michael Quinn, who helped Joyce Viar with tax matters regarding Richard's estate, that certain stock that the former partnership owned had no financial interest to Mrs. Viar. Therefore, the estate did not attempt to collect the stock. Mackey subsequently sold the stock. When the three estates learned of the stock's existence and Mackey's actions, they sued Mackey alleging conversion of the stock. The trial court concluded that Mackey converted the stock, that section 8.01-229(D) tolled the limitations period, and that the tolling applied to all of the estates. The Supreme Court held (1) Mackey's representation to Quinn was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to Mrs. Via; but (2) because Mackey demonstrated no obstructive intent as to the Dodson or Pence estates, section 8.01-229(D) did not toll the limitations period for their claims. View "Mackey v. McDannald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the trustee of a living trust and dismissing with prejudice the beneficiary's declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial interpretation of two provisions of the trust, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the beneficiary's complaint.In response to the declaratory judgment action, the trustee filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the beneficiary's action had violated a no-contest provision of the trust, and therefore, the circuit court should revoke the beneficiary's interest in the trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the trustee on her counterclaim and directed the beneficiary to pay the trustee attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the beneficiary's complaint did not violate the no-contest provision of the trust and thus require the forfeiture of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. View "Hunter v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that a prior final circuit court order had a preclusive effect on Appellant's claims regarding her ownership rights in parcels of property, holding that the circuit court did not err.Linda and David were the children of George and Dorothy, who owned properties as tenants in common. After George died, Dorothy executed deeds of gift purporting to convey the properties to Linda. The circuit court voided the purported conveyance. Dorothy then executed deeds of sale regarding the properties, purporting to vest complete fee simple ownership of the properties in Linda. A commissioner concluded that a determination that the deeds of sale from Dorothy conveyed 100 percent fee simple ownership of the properties to Linda was barred by collateral estoppel. After Dorothy died, David filed a complaint asserting that he had an interest in the properties. The circuit court concluded that Linda held a seventy-five percent interest and David a twenty-five percent interest in fee simple absolute in the properties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that claim preclusion barred Linda from relitigating her claim of a 100 percent ownership interest in the properties and in determining the ownership of the properties. View "Alexander v. Cobb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court delegating its final approval of final accountings submitted by a trustee and conservator as provided by statute and directing that the Commissioner of Accounts conduct that approval of the final accountings, holding that the circuit court erred.In a circuit court order, the court ruled that a previous order as not yet final but would become so when the Commissioner filed the approval of the final accounts with the clerk of the circuit court. The Supreme Court dismissed a first appeal without prejudice because the previous order was not a final, appealable order. In a second appeal, the trustee argued that the circuit court erred by adopting a procedure for the review and approval of the final accounts that deprived the beneficiaries of a meaningful opportunity and due process to review and challenge the accountings. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court erroneously delegated its approval of the final accounts to the Commissioner without a certification that it had made a personal examination of the exceptions. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this dispute over what percentage of shares in a company the three children (Children) of Peter Knop (Father) owned the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that despite Father's intention to make gifts of certified stock to the children, the gifts were never effectually made under Virginia law and that the children were not entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.The family company in this case owned 1,000 acres of land. The shares in the company were owned by Father and Children. The trial court concluded that although Father stated his intention to make gifts of stock to Children for estate planning purposes, those gifts were never effectually made because they were never delivered to Children in the manner required by law. The trial court further denied Children relief under equitable estoppel principles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the shares were never delivered to Children, the gifts were not completed; and (2) the record supported the trial court's conclusion that Children were not entitled to relief on their equitable estoppel claim. View "Knop v. Knop" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant’s motion to amend her complaint to name the personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate as the proper party defendant and dismissing the action as time-barred, holding that the circuit court did not err.The decedent executed a holographic will that excluded his wife, Ray, as a beneficiary of his estate. Following her husband’s death, Appellant filed an action to claim her elective share of the augmented estate. The administratrix of the estate was not named as a party to the action. When Appellant realized the error, she requested that the circuit court enter an order adding the administratrix to the complaint as a party defendant. The circuit court denied the motion and dismissed the action as time-barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to identify the proper party defendant in the complaint as filed; and (2) Appellant was time-barred from bringing a new and proper action against the estate’s personal representative. View "Ray v. Ready" on Justia Law

In this appeal of a judgment in a will contest the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence and holding that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s verdict that the will was the result of undue influence, holding that the trial court should have granted Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence at the close of all evidence.The complaint in this case sought to impeach a will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. At the close of the evidence Defendant filed a motion to strike the evidence. The trial court granted the motion to strike as to testamentary capacity but overruled it as to undue influence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support an allegation of undue influence. View "Parson v. Miller" on Justia Law