Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

In this California appellate case, the key issue was whether non-monetary benefits, specifically room and board, constituted "remuneration" within the meaning of Probate Code section 21362, a provision relating to the presumption of fraud or undue influence for donative transfers to caregivers of dependent adults. The case arose when the defendant, Elvira Gutierrez, who provided care services to the decedent in exchange for room and board, was named as the sole beneficiary in the decedent’s testamentary instruments. The plaintiffs, relatives of the decedent, argued that Gutierrez was a "care custodian" under the Probate Code, and that her receipt of the decedent’s estate should be presumed to be the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court initially ruled that Gutierrez was not a care custodian because room and board did not constitute remuneration for her services. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that "remuneration" as used in section 21362 does include room and board. The Court found that such an interpretation was consistent with the term's ordinary usage, the legislative intent to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation, and its interpretation in other legal contexts. The Court therefore concluded that Gutierrez was a care custodian under the statute, and the decedent’s donative gifts to her were subject to the presumption of fraud or undue influence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the court was asked to determine the deadline for filing a claim against a decedent’s estate for reimbursement for Medicaid services provided to the decedent while alive. The probate code of Alaska provides that for claims arising “before the death of the decedent,” the creditor must file within four months after the estate's representative first published notice to creditors. For claims arising “at or after the death of the decedent,” the creditor must file within four months after the claim arose. The court held that Medicaid estate recovery claims arise before death and therefore must be filed within four months after notice to creditors. The court reasoned that although the state may not pursue these claims until after the Medicaid beneficiary has died, these claims arise when Medicaid services are provided, not when the claims become enforceable. The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the probate code, the underlying legislative purpose of the Medicaid estate recovery statute, and the weight of precedent from other jurisdictions. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Fe Perez Abad" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Aaron Welch died intestate, leaving behind a widow, Kristin Welch, and two minor children from his previous marriage. Kristin Welch, appointed as the administratrix of Aaron Welch's estate, filed an application for reservation of homestead & dower with the Pope County Circuit Court, claiming a homestead interest in the mortgaged home she had lived in with her late husband. Katelyn Gipson, the natural guardian of the minor children, argued that Kristin Welch did not have such an interest based on Arkansas Code Ann. § 28-39-201. This statute requires a surviving spouse to have been continuously married to the deceased for more than a year to have a homestead interest. Kristin Welch challenged the constitutionality of this statute, but the circuit court found it constitutional and ruled that she did not have a homestead interest in the property.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the Arkansas Constitution's provision on homestead rights was gender-based and had been previously declared unconstitutional for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the statutory provision, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-39-201(d), which is gender-neutral and requires the continuous marriage condition, stands as the controlling law. The court found no error in the circuit court's application of this statute and concluded that Kristin Welch, having been married to the decedent for less than a year, did not have a statutory homestead interest in the property. View "WELCH ex rel. ESTATE OF AARON WELCH v. GIPSON" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a dispute over a trust established by a deceased father, James. Brian Spears, the son, filed a petition seeking to be named a creditor of his father's trust and to remove his stepmother, Therese Spears, as trustee. The trial court dismissed Brian's petition on the grounds that he did not file an amended pleading after the court sustained Therese's demurrer to the petition, with leave to amend. Brian appealed this decision, arguing that he did in fact file an amended pleading, reasserting only his claim to be named as a creditor of the trust.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four agreed with Brian. The court found that Brian's subsequent filing, titled "Creditor's Claim," was intended to be his amended pleading. It provided additional detail about the oral agreements underlying his claim, and it was filed under the same case number as his original petition.However, the court also agreed with Therese that the statute of limitations barred recovery on one of the alleged agreements underlying Brian's creditor's claim. The court found that the two-year statute of limitations for an action based on the breach of an oral contract had expired for one of the agreements before James's death.The court reversed the trial court's order, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that although Brian's creditor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations insofar as it rests on one of the alleged oral agreements, the trial court erred in dismissing Brian's creditor's claim to the extent it rests on the other alleged agreement. View "Spears v. Spears" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reversed the trial court's denial of anti-SLAPP motions filed by Tara Crawford, a trustee, and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. The case arose from a dispute over an easement connected to a piece of property sold by Alan Patterson to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of Green Tree Headlands LLC. After Patterson's death, Crawford, as trustee of Patterson's trust, managed the property and argued that the easement had expired based on the terms of the Declaration of Restrictions. McArthur disagreed, asserting that the easement remained in existence. Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, which she later voluntarily dismissed. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and Graves. Crawford and Graves filed anti-SLAPP motions, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that Crawford had a reasonable basis to sue McArthur, as the Declaration of Restrictions, by itself, gave Crawford a factual basis to argue that the easement was temporarily limited and had expired. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motions and reversed its decision. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was called to determine issues regarding the distribution of assets under a will and trust, and personal jurisdiction. The case arose from a dispute between two brothers, John R. Luongo and Michael A. Luongo Jr., regarding their mother's estate and a trust she established. The Superior Court had previously divided the property of the estate between the brothers and dismissed two counts of John's complaint, arguing that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Michael.Upon review, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to distribute the assets under the will and the related trust. The authority to resolve disputes over the distribution of assets under a will rests solely with the Probate Court. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's order distributing the assets of the estate.Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court found that the Superior Court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Michael for claims related to the trust. This was due to the fact that the trust was established as a Massachusetts trust with its principal place of administration in Massachusetts and the process to transfer the trust’s administration to Maine was not completed by either trustee.The court affirmed the dismissal of Counts 1 and 3 of John’s complaint, related to the trust, but vacated the judgment in all other respects, including Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. The case was remanded for dismissal of the remaining counts of John’s complaint and Michael’s counterclaim for conversion. View "Luongo v. Luongo" on Justia Law

In the case concerning the estate of Frances R. Mason, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled on two key issues. First, it considered whether the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, could enforce a lien (known as a TEFRA lien) against a member's property after the member's death. The Court concluded that, under Massachusetts law, MassHealth can only enforce such a lien if the property is sold during the member's lifetime. Therefore, MassHealth could not enforce its lien against Mason's property, which was not sold until after her death. This ruling is a restriction on MassHealth's ability to recover Medicaid benefits paid.Second, the Court addressed the timing of MassHealth's claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid on Mason's behalf. The Court concluded that the three-year statute of repose of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) does not apply retroactively to bar MassHealth's claim against the estate of a member who died prior to the effective date of the MUPC. Accordingly, MassHealth's claim against Mason's estate, which was filed nearly nine years after her death, was not barred by the MUPC's three-year statute of repose.The facts of the case were as follows: Frances R. Mason was a recipient of Medicaid benefits from MassHealth. From January to August 2008, MassHealth paid for her care in a residential nursing facility. In May 2008, MassHealth imposed a TEFRA lien against Mason's home, as she was expected to be permanently institutionalized in the facility. Mason died in August 2008 without the property having been sold. MassHealth filed a claim to recover the Medicaid benefits paid for Mason's care in August 2018, after the executor of Mason's will had opened formal probate proceedings in June 2017.The disposition by the Court was to affirm the order of the Probate and Family Court judge insofar as it struck MassHealth's lien against Mason's home, and to reverse the order insofar as it dismissed MassHealth's claim against her estate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "In re Estate of Mason" on Justia Law

This case, delivered by The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, concerns the right of succession to the role of estate administrator, specifically in situations where a third-party administrator has been appointed. The deceased, George Landing, Jr., left behind two minor daughters and no will. His ex-wife initially served as the estate's administrator. She later voluntarily resigned and appointed Jim McGough, a local attorney and guardian to Landing's daughters, to the position.One of the daughters, Emma Landing, sought to replace McGough as the administrator of her father's estate upon reaching the age of majority. She argued that under 58 O.S. § 135, she had superior right to the role and the court could not refuse her request. The District Court of Tulsa County denied her request, prompting her appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion in appointing the estate's administrator and that it did not abuse this discretion in refusing Emma's request. The court rejected Emma's argument that she had an absolute right to replace the existing administrator. It noted that granting such a right would lead to uncertainty and confusion in probate matters and could undermine the orderly settlement of estates. The court also affirmed that the trial court had not found Emma incompetent to serve as administrator but had simply decided there was no good reason to replace McGough. The order of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANDING" on Justia Law