Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Brian Cole was killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2001. Brian Cole’s Estate had a court-approved contingency fee contract with Eugene Tullos, and only Eugene Tullos, to represent the Estate in wrongful death litigation. The Ferrell Group claimed this contract rendered it an interested party entitled to notice of the Estate’s final accounting under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-295. The trial court found that the Ferrell Group was not an interested party pursuant to the notice statute. Because the Ferrell Group did not probate a claim or have a contract with the Estate, or otherwise show a direct pecuniary interest in the Estate, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian K. Cole, Deceased" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Christine Davidson was the court-appointed conservator of the person and estate of Lorraine Presha from 2009 to 2015. Presha died in March 2015. In June 2015, Davidson filed a combined petition for: (1) approval of the sixth and final accounting, and (2) conservator’s fees. Davidson sought conservator’s fees in the amount of $12,621.60. The probate court ordered conservator’s fees in the amount of $7,000. Davidson contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) examining Davidson’s billing practices; (2) utilizing its finding that Davidson’s billing practices were improper when ruling upon Davidson’s petition for compensation; (3) vitiating the finality of prior cases for which Davidson served as the conservator; and (4) not utilizing the enumerated factors when ruling on her petition for compensation. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Conservatorship of Presha" on Justia Law

After trial, the probate court approved, subject to a $93,036.75 surcharge, the first and final account and report of trustee (First Report), filed by Melodie Scott, trustee of The A’Yana McDonald Special Needs Trust (the trust). The Beneficiary, through court-appointed counsel, objected to the First Report and to the petition for settlement and termination of the trust, alleging the trustee failed to file court-mandated reports, had no supporting records for fees paid to the trustee, and that the money was not spent solely for her benefit. Beneficiary requested that Trustee be surcharged $259,309.38 for missing interest payments and for improper disbursements. The court found the beneficiary proved the trustee expended various funds without sufficient care or justification, and without reference to the text or purpose of the trust; "and once that money is gone, of course legal damages result.” The trustee raised three issues on appeal: (1) the probate court did not apply the correct legal standard (without specifying what was incorrect); (2) the trustee asserted substantial evidence does not support the finding of breach; and (3) the trustee contended the probate court erred by denying compensation for Trustee’s services. The Court of Appeal found that "given Trustee’s mismanagement of the trust estate, failure to make the required court filings, and continued service when she lacked a license, the probate court could reasonably conclude that Trustee was not entitled to compensation because any compensation for the service rendered would be inequitable due to Trustee’s multiple failures in administering the trust." The total amount of the surcharge was modified to $92,036.75. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Scott v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Cortese is the daughter of Francesca, and the stepdaughter of Robert. Attorney Sherwood handled their legal matters under Robert’s direction. Cortese alleges Robert promised her that, upon his death, “he would treat her equally as his other children.” Sherwood drafted Francesca’s will and represented Robert as executor during the administration of Francesca’s estate after Francesca’s 1997 death. Robert was worth $2 billion; Francesca’s estate was valued at $2 million. Robert became the trustee and life beneficiary of Francesca’s trust. Cortese and her sister were remainder beneficiaries. “Relying on Robert’s promises and [Sherwood]’s representations, [Cortese] did not challenge Robert’s acts as executor.” In 2008, “in reliance on promises,” by Sherwood and Robert, Cortese “reluctantly agreed to terminate the Trust … without the advice of counsel.” Cortese alleges the termination favored Robert, causing Cortese and her sister to bear unnecessary capital gains tax. After Robert’s 2016 death, Cortese was not a beneficiary of Robert’s estate. Cortese alleged breach of fiduciary duty against Sherwood and Topham, as co-trustees of Robert’s trust; third-party liability for breach of trust against Sherwood; and return of trust property against both. The court dismissed the second claim against Sherwood, apparently for failure to comply with Civil Code 1714.10: A party must establish a reasonable probability of prevailing before pursuing a “cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his ... client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.” The court of appeal agreed. Cortese alleged Sherwood conspired with Robert and induced her to forego challenges to Robert’s actions--conduct arising from the compromise of a dispute. No statutory exceptions apply. View "Cortese v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers shot and killed Purnell, who died intestate. Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of the estate. Murray, Purnell’s mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration to act on behalf of her son’s estate. Murray filed a lawsuit on behalf of the estate alleging excessive force against the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment but allowed her claims against the officers to proceed to a jury trial. The officers' defense was that they had used deadly force in self-defense. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the officers. Murray filed a pro se notice of appeal. The Third Circuit ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of Purnell’s estate. Under 28 U.S.C. 1654, “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Although an individual may represent herself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. The Third Circuit then dismissed Murray’s appeal: a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate. View "Murray v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A log truck driven by Royce Sullivan collided with the rear of an automobile being driven by Harry Schroeder, who had just pulled his car onto a highway in Lowndes County, Mississippi. Harry died as a result of the accident, and his wife, Helen (a passenger in her husband’s car) suffered severe injuries, permanent disability, and diminished capacity. Helen, individually, and as one of Harry’s wrongful-death beneficiaries, sued Sullivan in federal court, alleging that Sullivan’s negligence had caused Harry’s death and her permanent disability. Sullivan moved for summary judgment at the close of discovery, arguing that the uncontradicted evidence established Harry’s negligence as the sole cause of the accident. In denying summary judgment, the federal judge stated that the evidence created a jury question as to Sullivan’s fault, and that “plaintiffs do not appear to dispute Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence.” The parties settled and agreed to a release of claims, and the district court dismissed the case. Following the settlement agreement, release, and subsequent dismissal of the action against Sullivan, Helen filed suit against Harry in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, alleging Harry negligently had failed to yield the right of way and pulled in front of Sullivan’s log truck at an extremely slow rate of speed, causing the accident which resulted in Helen’s permanent disability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Harry and found that Helen was judicially estopped from bringing a claim against Harry. Helen appealed that order. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the release agreement between Helen and Sullivan because Harry was not a signatory to it. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

Kenneth M. (Matazo) and Kazu Tagami were grantors of the Trust. Matazo and Kazu had three children: Kenneth K., Barbara, and Charles. A family dispute arose when the settlors suspected the prior trustee, who was Barbara's son, of embezzling funds from the Trust. Matazo and Kazu removed the prior trustee and appointed professional fiduciary Claudia Powell as trustee. Attorney Nancy Ewin drafted the restatement of the Trust; Powell hired attorney Kent Thompson to represent her in her fiduciary capacity as trustee of the Trust. A physician certified in March 2012 that Kazu was unable to make her own financial and medical decisions due to medical issues. Matazo died in August 2012. Kazu died almost three years later, in June 2015. Charles challenged two probate orders: (1) settling, allowing and approving the third and final predeath account and report of trustee (Third Account) and finding Charles objected to the Third Account without reasonable cause and in bad faith, which justified an award of costs and fees pursuant to Probate Code section 17211 (a); and (2) an award of attorney fees pursuant to Probate Code 17211 requiring Charles to pay these fees from his share of the Tagami Living Trust or personally if his share was inadequate. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Charles' contentions in both appeals and affirmed the Probate Court's orders. View "Powell v. Tagami" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), seeking to recover the loss of the inheritance she would have received from her mother's estate if not for her brother's fraudulent schemes, and the approximately $200,000 in legal expenses that she incurred in the course of Connecticut state court proceedings in which she sought to remove her brother as executor. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims.The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that plaintiff's claim for distribution of her inheritance and that of her mother's estate was not ripe under RICO because the Estate was not closed and the amount of the lost inheritance was too speculative; her claim under RICO for legal expenses incurred in pursuing her grievances against her brother and other defendants was ripe; she plausibly alleged that her legal expense injuries were proximately caused by defendants' RICO violations; she adequately pleaded that her brother, and Defendant Garvey, and Red Knot violated 18 U.S.C. 1962(b); and she adequately pleaded that all six defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). View "D'Addario v. D'Addario" on Justia Law

Harvey Cohoon was diagnosed with a treatable form of cancer and was residing at Victoria Healthcare Center while he underwent treatment and recovered from various injuries he had suffered. For 19 days, Cohoon did well at Victoria Center. On the 20th day, he was observed to have difficulty swallowing thin liquids, and after evaluation, his diet was changed. Plaintiff contended that change was not properly communicated to the kitchen, and that night he was served a dinner that did not comport with his new diet. Less than 20 minutes after being served dinner, a nurse found him in respiratory arrest. The paramedics had to remove large pieces of chicken from his throat before intubating him. More pieces of chicken were removed from his airway at the hospital. He died the following day due to complications from oxygen deprivation to his brain. Donna Cochrum, Cohoon’s niece, filed suit against Victoria Center, asserting causes of action for elder abuse and negligence. As personal representative of Cohoon’s estate, Cochrum asserted a wrongful death cause of action. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Cochrum on all causes of action. Subsequently, the trial court granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding insufficient evidence of recklessness to support the elder abuse cause of action. It also adjusted the remaining damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3333.2. Cochrum appealed the amended judgment, contending the evidence supported the elder abuse cause of action. Two of the defendants cross-appealed, contending the court improperly applied the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 cap. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the amended judgment. View "Cochrum v. Costa Victoria Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Arthur Blech died and left an estate worth over $65 million. At issue on appeal was how to account for the sale of the 3,050-acre Blech Ranch, located in San Luis Obispo County, California. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal determined that the gift of Blech Ranch (and of its equivalent in cash as of the date of its sale) was a funding mechanism for Raymond Blech's 35% share of the remainder or residue of the estate rather than an additional specific gift to him. View "Blech v. Blech" on Justia Law