Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court admitting a will to probate, holding that the trial court properly admitted testimony to refute the claim that the will was fraudulent and did not err in declining to adopt a novel and more rigorous standard for admitting a will to probate.On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in considering testimony to establish the testamentary nature of the document proffered for probate and erred in failing to require the proponent of the will to authenticate all three pages of the document. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial court properly considered the challenged testimony to establish that the first two unsigned pages of the will were entirely consistent with the testator’s stated testamentary intentions and to refuse the assertion that they were not part of his original will; and (2) the will was properly authenticated. View "Canody v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

Johnston Land Company, LLC, appeals from an order denying its petition to invalidate an alleged lien filed by attorney Sara Sorenson in the form of an affidavit regarding property in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. A dispute over excessive attorney fees led to this case. John Widdel, Jr., represented the trustees of the Donald G. Amundson Trust. In 2013 beneficiaries of the estate petitioned for court determination of attorney fees. The district court ordered Widdell to refund $95,000.00 in attorney fees. During litigation over the fees, Widdel's family's limited liability partnership, Bell Fire LLP, transferred property to a revocable living trust in the name of his wife. In a deposition related to the debt Widdel testified he had essentially no assets, lived rent-free in an apartment owned by the Widdel trust, and drove a car owned by his wife. The Widdel trust sought to sell the property at issue to Johnston, which had offices on the property. Beneficiaries of the Amundson trust filed suit in 2017 regarding other allegedly fraudulent transfers by Widdel to avoid paying the judgment. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C., and Sorenson represented the beneficiaries of Amundson's estate. The district court concluded Sorenson's affidavit was not a nonconsensual common-law lien under N.D.C.C. 35-01-02 because it "does not claim an interest in the subject property; it is merely a statement to the world, akin to a lis pendens, that the referenced property may be pursued to satisfy the Judgment." The district court did not rule on Johnston's additional issues, writing, "In the instant action, this Court has only been asked to make a determination whether the Affidavit of Sara K. Sorenson is a nonconsensual common-law lien, which it has done." The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed as to the affidavit's nature, reversed as to remaining issues and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Johnston Land Company, LLC v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the administration of the Henry B. Wilson, Jr., Revocable Trust Dated June 27, 2002 the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the order of the county court to have removed the cotrustees of the subtrust of Lou Ann Goding, Henry’s daughter.Lou Ann filed this suit alleging mismanagement of Henry’s trust. The county court, after a trial, removed the cotrustees of Henry’s trust. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no error in need of correction, interpreting the county court’s order to have removed the cotrustees of Lou Ann’s subtrust. Although the Supreme Court’s reasoning differed from that of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the county court’s order to have removed the cotrustees of the subtrusts; but (2) because the Court of Appeals did not remove the cotrustees of Lou Ann’s subtrust de novo, instead finding no error in need of correction, this Court’s ultimate conclusion that the county court did not err is the same. View "In re Henry B. Wilson, Jr., Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the claims brought by a trust’s grantors and beneficiaries for constructive trusts against other parties who had dealt with the trustee, holding that the claims failed either for lack of proof or because of Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-38,101.The district court dismissed the case after finding that the defendants were all entitled to protection under 30-38,101, which protects third parties dealing in good faith with a trustee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims for a constructive trust against the defendants in this case. View "Junker v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Decedent and objector were married for 32 years. Petitioners are decedent’s sons from a prior relationship. In 1993, decedent and objector secured a joint term life insurance policy, naming objector as the primary beneficiary, with petitioners as contingent beneficiaries. In 2013, decedent executed a will. A 2014 final judgment dissolved decedent’s marriage to objector, awarding decedent full ownership of the Policy. In 2016, decedent executed a handwritten codicil, stating that he did not want objector “inheriting anything from [him] under any circumstances by beneficiary designation or otherwise.” At the time of his death, objector remained as the primary beneficiary of the Policy. Petitioners sought to be designated as the rightful beneficiaries of the Policy under Probate Code sections 50401 and 9611. The probate court ordered payment to the petitioners. The court of appeal reversed. The jurisdiction of the probate court may not be invoked where the only relevant alleged assets of the estate are alleged to be the proceeds of a life insurance policy, the beneficiary of which is not the estate. View "Estate of Post" on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in Texas for intentional interference with an inheritance.Richard Archer and Richard’s six children (the Archers) brought this action against Ted Anderson’s estate for intentional interference with their inheritance, alleging that Anderson influenced Jack Archer to disinherit them. The jury found in favor of the Archers. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized tortious interference with inheritance as a cause of action in Texas and deferred to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do so. The court then reversed and rendered judgment for Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas. View "Archer v. Anderson" on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in Texas for intentional interference with an inheritance.Richard Archer and Richard’s six children (the Archers) brought this action against Ted Anderson’s estate for intentional interference with their inheritance, alleging that Anderson influenced Jack Archer to disinherit them. The jury found in favor of the Archers. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized tortious interference with inheritance as a cause of action in Texas and deferred to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do so. The court then reversed and rendered judgment for Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas. View "Archer v. Anderson" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether the rebuttable presumption of undue influence was applicable when the decedent’s attorney breaches Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.8(c), which generally prohibited an attorney from preparing an instrument giving the attorney or his or her close family a substantial gift. Appellants argued that a breach of MRPC 1.8(c) automatically rendered an instrument void, while the appellee attorney argued that, rather than an invalidation of the instrument, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arose in these circumstances. After considering the applicable provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and the underlying principles of probate law, the Michigan Supreme Court determined a rebuttable presumption applied to these circumstances. "[T]he adoption of MRPC 1.8(c) has no effect on this conclusion because a breach of this rule, like breaches of other professional conduct rules, only triggers the invocation of the attorney disciplinary process; it does not breach the statutory law of EPIC." View "In re Mardigian Estate" on Justia Law

At issue was not the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a trust but, rather, the circuit court’s authority to enforce an order.The beneficiary of the trust filed a motion for an order to show cause for why the trustee failed to follow an order of the circuit court. The circuit court held the trustee in contempt, found that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duties to the beneficiary, and found that the trustee had misappropriated trust funds. The court ordered the trustee to personally reimburse the trust for the misappropriated funds and to personally pay the beneficiary attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court had authority to enforce its order and did not clearly err when it found that the trustee violated the order; and (2) the circuit court did not err when it found that the trustee breached his fiduciary duties as trustee of the trust and did not err in its remaining decisions. View "In re Heupel Family Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals interpreting Minn. Rev. Stat. 524.3-101 to allow real property to devolve immediately upon a testator’s death to a residual devisee.Plaintiff, in her capacity as personal representative to her father’s estate, sued Defendants to quiet title to residential property owned by her father at his death. Plaintiff’s brother, John, conveyed his interest in the property by quitclaim deed to Minnesota Premier Properties a few days after Wells Fargo bought the foreclosed property at a sheriff’s sale after the decedent’s death. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that John did not have an interest to convey to Premier through the quitclaim deed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under section 524.3-10, a valid, transferable ownership interest in real property devolves immediately upon a testator’s death to a person to whom the property is devised by the testator’s will. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in interpreting the statute. View "Laymon v. Minnesota Premier Properties, LLC" on Justia Law