Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Petrus Family Trust and Edmond Petrus, Jr., individually and as trustee of the Petrus Family Trust (collectively, Petrus) sued Chris Kirk d/b/a Kirk Enterprises (Kirk) and several other parties for claims arising from Petrus’s purchase of a home Kirk built in McCall. Kirk moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion in Kirk’s favor. The district court also awarded attorney fees to Kirk under Idaho Code section 12-121, apportioning the award so as to award Kirk fees only insofar as Kirk was required to defend against a frivolous claim. Petrus appealed. As relevant here, Kirk moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that: (1) Petrus’s conspiracy-to-defraud claim was unsupported; and (2) Petrus’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim was untimely under Idaho Code section 5-241(b). Petrus responded that the breach of implied warranty of habitability claim was timely under section 5-241(a) because it arose in tort, not in contract, and did not address the conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The district held a hearing on Kirk’s summary judgment motion, at which Petrus conceded summary judgment for Kirk was proper on the conspiracy-to-defraud claim, leaving only the breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim. The district court then granted summary judgment to Kirk, concluding Petrus’s breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim arose in contract and was therefore untimely under section 5-241(b). Even if Petrus’s claim arose in tort, the district court concluded it would be barred by the economic loss rule. Petrus timely moved for reconsideration, but the district court denied the motion after concluding Petrus had not offered any new argument or evidence that would warrant a different result. Thereafter, the district court awarded attorney fees to Kirk under Idaho Code section 12-121, apportioning the award so as to award fees to Kirk only insofar as he was required to defend against Petrus’s conspiracy-to-defraud claim. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court was correct that a breach of the implied warranty of habitability arose in contract, making Petrus’s claim untimely. "This conclusion, however, is not to say that a home buyer is left without a tort remedy when a builder negligently constructs a home and causes tort damages. In that scenario, an appropriate tort claim may be asserted, and our ruling today does not foreclose that claim." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of Kirk and appointment of attorney fees. View "Petrus Family Trust v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Donald Frizzell (“Frizzell”) appealed the dismissal of his complaint. Frizzell and defendants Edwin and Darlene DeYoung (collectively, the “DeYoungs”), were parties to an existing trust, with Edwin serving as trustee and Frizzell and Darlene as beneficiaries. The parties entered into an agreement pursuant to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA agreement”). The TEDRA agreement was designed to modify the existing trust terms and also resolve issues related to Edwin’s administration of the trust in his role as trustee. Two years after the TEDRA agreement was filed with the district court, Frizzell filed suit against the DeYoungs alleging Edwin was breaching the TEDRA agreement and his fiduciary duties. The district court granted the DeYoungs’ motion to dismiss based on provisions in the TEDRA agreement that purported to hold Edwin harmless for any actions taken in his role as trustee. The district court also stated Frizzell was bound by the TEDRA agreement to pursue nonjudicial dispute resolution, rather than file a lawsuit for Edwin’s breach of duty. Frizzell appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in dismissing the complaint because the parties were not able to waive future claims for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. Frizzell was not prohibited by TERDA or the agreement from seeking judicial action based on Edwin's alleged breaches of the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order dismissing Frizzell’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Frizzell v. DeYoung" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an intra‐family dispute over who owns a residential house. The Second Circuit held that the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs' adverse possession claim where the affirmative complaint did not contain any affirmative facts that plaintiffs did anything that constituted a distinct assertion of a right hostile to defendants. However, with regard to the constructive trust claim, the court held that there may be a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether an implied promise was made and as to whether defendants' refusal to honor this promise unjustly enriched them. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jaffer v. Hirji" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in an action seeking funds from her husband's trust that was transferred from an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, plan. The husband had requested the "Accrued Benefit" amount from his ERISA employee-benefit plan be transferred to his trust days before he passed away. Applying an abuse of discretion standard to this case, the court held that the plan administrative committee reasonably explained its interpretation and relied on substantial evidence to deny plaintiff's claim. Therefore, the committee did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the relevant inquiry was not when funds were received by a participant, but rather when funds were transferred out of the plan. View "Wengert v. Rajendran" on Justia Law

In appeal no. 1161016, Margaret McGimsey, Cathy Cramer, Barbara McCollum, and Marilyn Busch (referred to collectively as "the nieces") appealed the grant of summary judgement entered in favor of Lynda Jeanette Gray, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Thomas Leonard Pitts, deceased, in a will contest they initiated following Pitts's death; the nieces also challenged the trial court's order directing them to reimburse Gray $8,393 for court costs and certain litigation expenses. In appeal no. 1161055, Gray cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its discretion by not also entering an award of attorney fees in her favor. The Alabama Supreme Court was satisfied the nieces identified evidence indicating: (1) Gray assisted Pitts in an initial attempt to revise his existing will sometime in 2010; (2) that Gray gave conflicting accounts regarding her presence in Pitts's meeting with hospice services that led to Howard contacting Pitts; (3) Gray helped with the scheduling of the meeting at which the November 2010 will was executed and arranged for the witnesses to be at that meeting; (4) that Gray was in the house both times Howard met with Pitts; and (5) that the nieces were not told about the November 2010 will when it was executed. This evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether there was undue activity on Gray's part in procuring the execution of the November 2010 will. Inasmuch as the nieces put forth substantial evidence of all three elements of an undue-influence claim, the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Gray on that claim, and that judgment was reversed. Moreover, inasmuch as section 43-8-196 Ala. Code 1975 provides that a will contestant is liable for the costs of the contest only if the contest "fails," the trial court's judgment was also reversed to the extent it ordered the nieces to reimburse Gray $8,393. View "McGimsey v. Gray" on Justia Law

In appeal no. 1161016, Margaret McGimsey, Cathy Cramer, Barbara McCollum, and Marilyn Busch (referred to collectively as "the nieces") appealed the grant of summary judgement entered in favor of Lynda Jeanette Gray, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Thomas Leonard Pitts, deceased, in a will contest they initiated following Pitts's death; the nieces also challenged the trial court's order directing them to reimburse Gray $8,393 for court costs and certain litigation expenses. In appeal no. 1161055, Gray cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its discretion by not also entering an award of attorney fees in her favor. The Alabama Supreme Court was satisfied the nieces identified evidence indicating: (1) Gray assisted Pitts in an initial attempt to revise his existing will sometime in 2010; (2) that Gray gave conflicting accounts regarding her presence in Pitts's meeting with hospice services that led to Howard contacting Pitts; (3) Gray helped with the scheduling of the meeting at which the November 2010 will was executed and arranged for the witnesses to be at that meeting; (4) that Gray was in the house both times Howard met with Pitts; and (5) that the nieces were not told about the November 2010 will when it was executed. This evidence was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether there was undue activity on Gray's part in procuring the execution of the November 2010 will. Inasmuch as the nieces put forth substantial evidence of all three elements of an undue-influence claim, the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Gray on that claim, and that judgment was reversed. Moreover, inasmuch as section 43-8-196 Ala. Code 1975 provides that a will contestant is liable for the costs of the contest only if the contest "fails," the trial court's judgment was also reversed to the extent it ordered the nieces to reimburse Gray $8,393. View "McGimsey v. Gray" on Justia Law

At issue was to which of the decedent’s wives applied the provision of a trust agreement providing that a charitable foundation would be created unless the decedent was survived by his wife, in which case the foundation would not come into existence. After the decedent created the trust, his first wife died. The decedent remarried before he died. The Court of Appeals held (1) the decedent expressed a reasonably clear intention that the phrase “my wife,” as used in the contested provision, referred to his first wife rather than his second wife; and (2) therefore, the distribution to the foundation did not lapse, and the circuit court correctly accepted the trustees’ proposed restatement of the trust with respect to that issue. View "In re Albert G. Aaron Living Trust" on Justia Law

A family rushed to the scene of a car accident, only to discover that it had been caused by a family member, who soon thereafter died from her traumatic injuries. The family brought a bystander claim against the deceased family member’s estate for negligent infliction of emotional distress, making the novel argument that, even though the family member was also the tortfeasor, the family could recover for its resulting emotional distress. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the estate, reasoning that the family’s claim had no basis in current Alaska law. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, concurring that the family’s claim had no basis in Alaska law and also failed to satisfy the test set forth in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981) regarding expanding tort liability. View "Schack v. Schack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court ruling that a will bequest of a tract of land unambiguously devised a fee-simple interest, rather than a life-estate interest, to the testator’s son, entitling the son to summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that the will granted the son a life estate and Petitioners the remainder interest in the property at issue, holding that the contested provision unambiguously conveyed a life estate. View "Knopf v. Gray" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court entering summary judgment in favor of Curtis Frye, Daryl Frye, and the Estate of Carroll Frye (collectively, the Estate) on the Estate’s action seeking enforcement of a property insurance contract for the loss of a dwelling by fire. The Court held that the trial court erred by interpreting Carroll’s insurance contract with MMG Insurance Company as providing coverage to the Estate because when the fire occurred, several weeks after Carroll’s death, none of the parties was both insured by MMG and in possession of an insurable interest. Therefore, Me. Rev. Stat. 24-A, 2406 preluded enforcement of the policy as to the dwelling as a matter of law. The Court remanded the case for entry of a summary judgment in favor of MMG. View "Estate of Carroll G. Frye v. MMG Insurance Co." on Justia Law