Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case was whether a revocation clause, contained within a notarial testament that was found to be void for failure to include an attestation clause, could be valid as an authentic act and thereby revoke two prior testaments, resulting in an intestate succession. Charles Harlan died on November 26, 2015, survived by his second wife, Xiaoping Harlan, and his four adult children from his first marriage. The children filed a petition in the district court, seeking to have the decedent’s March 9, 2000 testament filed and executed and to have Hansel Harlan named as executor of the succession; Xiaoping filed a petition to nullify the probated March 9, 2000 testament, to have Hansel removed as executor, and to have herself appointed as administratrix of the succession. Xiaoping further sought to file a purported notarial testament, executed on June 5, 2012 and containing a revocation of all prior testaments, along with a March 1, 2014 codicil. The district court found no valid revocation. The appellate court ruled that the invalid testament nevertheless met the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1833 so as to qualify as an authentic act, capable of revoking prior testaments pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1607(2). The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in reversing those parts of the February 24, 2016 and the June 6, 2016 district court judgments, which found that the invalid 2012 testament did not contain a valid authentic act that revoked the March 9, 2000 and the May 24, 2007 testaments, and the appellate court erred in rendering judgments holding that the March 9, 2000 and the May 24, 2007 testaments were revoked by the absolutely null 2012 testament. View "Succession of Charles George Harlan" on Justia Law

In this case, a trustee sold at foreclosure property once owned by a convicted fraudster and there were surplus proceeds. The trial court concluded that the lis pendens was inadequate to give the County any interest in the property because the criminal court had ordered restitution but had not ordered the property levied upon to satisfy the restitution award. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the surplus proceeds to the trusts. The court held that the County had no interest in the property as it was not seized and, on their own, the lis pendens and temporary restraining order did not mandate a different result. View "Integrated Lender Services v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In this case, a trustee sold at foreclosure property once owned by a convicted fraudster and there were surplus proceeds. The trial court concluded that the lis pendens was inadequate to give the County any interest in the property because the criminal court had ordered restitution but had not ordered the property levied upon to satisfy the restitution award. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the surplus proceeds to the trusts. The court held that the County had no interest in the property as it was not seized and, on their own, the lis pendens and temporary restraining order did not mandate a different result. View "Integrated Lender Services v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Emerita Cruz Joya appealed a probate court order approving the final accounting and settling the estate of Norman Casserley (Decedent). Joya had filed a creditor's claim against Decedent's estate based on a criminal restitution order entered in her husband's favor, which was recorded after Decedent's death. The court rejected Joya's argument that her claim was entitled to priority either as a recorded lien or under the state Constitution's restitution provision. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the probate court’s rejection of Joya’s claim, and affirmed. View "Estate of Casserley" on Justia Law

At issue was the proper procedure before an orphans’ court when an interested party files a petition to caveat a will and when an interested party requests that the orphans’ court transmit an issue to the circuit court for a trial by jury.In this case, the Court of Appeals held (1) when it enacted Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 5-207(b), the General Assembly intended to mandate a judicial probate hearing as the single procedure after a party files a petition to caveat, and as such, an automatic stay is not required when a petition to caveat a will is filed; (2) when an interested party in a caveat case makes a request to transfer undecided factual issues to a circuit court, the orphans’ court is required to transmit the issues to a court of law pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 2-105(b); and (3) in this case, the orphans’ court did not err in refusing to stay the judicial probate proceeding simply because a petition to caveat was filed, but the court did err when it refused a party’s request to transmit unresolved factual issues to a court of law, and the error was not harmless. View "Shealer v. Straka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from a circuit court’s order revoking the clerk of court’s issuance of letters of appointment and the clerk’s statement of informal probate and appointment of personal representative, holding that the circuit court’s order was not a final order from which an appeal can be taken.On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred in its revocation without giving Appellant notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that, until further proceedings determined the rights of the parties as it related to the appointment of a personal representative and to the probate of the decedent’s will, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction under S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-3(2). View "Estate of Stanton W. Fox" on Justia Law

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Richard Hayes developed a subdivision called Mountain View Estates on land jointly owned by him and his wife, Nadine Hayes, in the Town of Manchester. The subdivision grew to include forty residential homes, a school building, and a chiropractic clinic on forty-four lots. From the sale of the first lot in about 1981 until his death in 2004, Richard Hayes paid for maintenance and plowing of the roads that ran through the subdivision and maintained the subdivision’s sewer system and the portion of the water system that he and his wife still owned, without charge to the homeowners. Following the Hayes’ deaths in 2004, a probate proceeding was opened and the Hayes’ adult children, Jeffrey Hayes and Deborah Hayes McGraw, were appointed coadministrators of their estates. The co-administrators sent a letter to the homeowners in the subdivision stating that effective immediately, the homeowners would be responsible for maintaining and plowing the subdivision’s roads. The homeowners refused to assume responsibility for the road maintenance. The homeowners intervened in the probate proceedings of the Hayes’ estates to protect their rights regarding the subdivision. The estates appealed the trial court’s decision that the estates were obligated, based on an agreement between the developers and the homeowners, to continue to maintain and repair the roads and water and sewer systems until the town accepted the dedication of the infrastructure. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s findings and conclusions, and remanded the matter to the trial court for remand to the probate division for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Mountain View Estates Homeowners Association" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the county court that Plaintiff, personal representative of the estate of Richard A. Hasterlik and an individual beneficiary, did not qualify for preferential inheritance tax treatment under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2004 on the ground that Plaintiff failed to prove that the decedent stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent to her.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the county court erred in finding that the evidence did not establish that Plaintiff was a person to whom the deceased, for more than ten years prior to his death, stood in the acknowledged relation of a parent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court’s factual determination was not clearly wrong. View "In re Estate of Hasterlik" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the county court’s order appointing a special administrator in this will contest, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.Two siblings filed a petition in the county court contesting the validity of Marcia G. Abbott-Ochsner’s will presented for informal probate by their brother, who had been appointed as the personal representative of the estate. The personal representative transferred the will contest to the district court. Afterward, the county court granted the siblings’ request to appoint a special administrator for the estate pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2425 pending resolution of the district court proceedings. The brother appealed, arguing that the county court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a special administrator because the case had been transferred to the district court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the county court’s order did not affect with finality Appellant’s substantial rights, and therefore, the order appealed from was not a final order. View "In re Estate of Abbott-Ochsner" on Justia Law

At issue was how to construe a will’s residuary clause to determine what estate it granted to the testator’s wife (Wife) and whether Appellants were entitled to their attorneys’ fees under the doctrine of judicial instructions.Testator’s son filed a complaint asking the circuit court to construe the residuary clause as granting Wife a life estate in the residual property. The circuit court granted Wife’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the intent of Testator was to devise and bequeath all of the rest and residue of the estate to Wife and that a life estate was not created. Despite this adverse ruling, Testator’s two sons (together, Appellants) moved for the circuit court to tax their attorneys’ fees against the estate on the ground that the meaning of the residuary clause required judicial instruction. The circuit court declined to do so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the residuary clause unambiguously granted Wife a life estate in the residual property; and (2) the circuit court properly refused to award attorneys’ fees under the doctrine of judicial instructions. View "Feeney v. Feeney" on Justia Law